G.R. No. L-25379. September 25, 1968
JOSE L. LACHICA AND THE LIBERAL PARTY, PETITIONER, VS. HON. JUAN E. YAP, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF SORSOGON, SERGIO ABESAMES, ET ALS. …
FERNANDO, J.:
This is a petition for
certiorari with preliminary injunction, petitioners being Jose L. Lachita, the candidate for the office of Congressman of the
other petitioner, Liberal Party, for the Second. District of the Province of Sorsogon, filed against respondent Judge, the
Honorable Juan E. Yap, of the Court of First instance of Sorsogon,
the chairman and members of the provincial board of canvassers as well as
Vicente L. Peralta, the Nacionalista Party candidate,
now deceased. It was filed on December
2, 1965, to nullify an order of November 29, 1965 of respondent
Judge denying the petition for recount, of the ballots cast in Precinct No. 7
of the Municipality of Bacon, Precinct No. 22, of the Municipality
of Casiguran and Precincts Nos. 48 and 58 of the Municipality of Sorsogon and thereafter to order respondent Judge to proceed with such judicial recount. On the assumption that respondent Vicente L.
Peralta had already been proclaimed, it was likewise prayed
in the petition that judgment be rendered
declaring the same null and
void, so that the winner could be ascertained after such judicial recount and
thereafter declared as such.
This Court, in a
resolution of December 3, 1965, gave due course to the petition, requiring
respondents to answer within 10 days, No injunction was issued.
In the answer of
respondent. Vicente L. Peralta, he
asserted that there was no valid ground for a judicial recount. Hence, the order of respondent judge denying
such a plea was in accordance with law and judicial precedents. Moreover, he alleged in his special defenses
that his proclamation “has been made in the regular performance of duty by
the respondent Provincial Board of Canvassers [and] is now a consummated fact it is not tainted with illegality or irregularity
of any kind. [1] The
prayer was for the dismissal of the petition for certiorari.
Thereafter, in the
manifestation filed on January 14, 1966 by respondent Vicente L. Peralta, he
stated that this petition was set forth for oral argument for December 20,
1965, at which date counsel for the opposing parties appealed and argued for
the respective sides, petition being submitted for decision. It was likewise alleged that he, having been
proclaimed previously, had “already taken his oath of office last December
30, 1965, and having effectively assumed and commenced the discharge of his
duties as the duly elected Congressman of the Second District of Sorsogon, the above-entitled petition of petitioner Lachica has now become a moot question.” [2]
The above manifestation
was noted in a resolution of January 19, 1966 of this Court. There was no denial of such fact of
proclamation by petitioners in their counter-manifestation of January 18, 1966,
they would have however, this Court, the above proclamation notwithstanding,
still rule on the merits of their petition.
According to the
Constitution: “The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have
an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. ***”[3] In the leading case of Angara
v. Electoral Commission, [4] the scope of such authority was set forth
thus: “From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is
evident that the purpose was to transfer in, its totality all the powers
previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested
elections of its members, to an independent
and impartial tribunal.” [5] The grant of power to the then Philippine
Senate and House of Representatives under the Jones Law was characterized by
this Court as “full, clear and complete.” [6] Moreover, as noted by Justice
Laurel in the same Angara decision; “The grant
of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, is intended to be as complete
and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature.” [7]
To such a doctrine this Court has remained committed. The power of
the Electoral Tribunal remains fall, clear and complete. It excludes
the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would
in any wise restrict or curtail it or even affect the same. [8]
Prior, to the proclamation of respondent Peralta, this Court
could very well pass on the validity
of the action of respondent Judge in an appropriate proceeding. After such proclamation, and much more so
after the oath of office was taken by the candidate proclaimed, with his
exercise of the prerogatives vested in such position, it would not only curtail
the plenary grant of authority to the Electoral Tribunal but likewise could
result in an unseemly wrangling between such constitutional agency and this
Court if the matter were not left to the sole and exclusive appraisal and judgment of the Electoral Tribunal.
The resolution of this Court in Nacionalista
Party v. Commission on Elections, [9]
affords a precedent for the dismissal of this suit. Thus: “* * *, acting on the motion to
dismiss filed by respondent Benigno Aquino, Jr. and petitioners’ opposition thereto; considering that the
principal issue in this case involves the eligibility or qualification of said
respondent under Section 4, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides in
part that ‘no person shall be a Senator unless he be a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines and, at the time of his election is at least thirty-five
years of age, * * *’; that Section 11 of the same Article makes the Senate
Electoral. Tribunal the sole Judge of al contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of
the members of the Senate; that inasmuch as respondent Benigno
Aguino, Jr. has been proclaimed elected to that body
and has assumes
office as member thereof the
determination of his eligibility or qualification properly and
exclusively pertains to the Senate Electoral Tribunal, where in fact a case
involving this issue has been filed and is now pending; and that the other
issues raised in the original petition herein as well, as in the other
pleadings subsequently filed by the parties, as summarized in petitioners’
opposition to the motion to dismiss, are
merely incidental in character and have become moot and academic insofar as the main issue is concerned: the Court resolved to dismiss the instant petition, without pronouncement as
to costs.”
WHEREFORE, this petition is denied. Without pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Dizon and
Zaldivar, JJ., did
not take part.
[1]
Answer of respondent Vicente L. Peralta, Special Defenses, par. 17.
[2]
Manifestation of respondent Peralta of January14, 1966.
[3]
Section 11, Article VI, Constitution of the Philippines.
[4]
63 Phil. 139 (1936).
[5]
Ibid, p.175.
[6]
Veloso v. Board of Canvassers, 39 Phil. 886 (1919).
[7]
Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139,
175.
[8]
Cf.. Suanez v. Chief Accountant, 81 Phil. 818
(1948) and Tañada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051
(1957)
[9]
L-28242, February 23. 1968.