ISIDORO GEVEROLA, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF DAVAO, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

On certiorari against the Court of First Instance of Davao, seeking to set aside the order of the respondent Judge decreeing the immediate arrest
of herein peti­tioner, Isidoro Geverola, and the
confiscation of the bail posted by him, for his failure to appear at the trial
of the criminal case for Malversation through Falsification of Public Documents
filed against the said petitioner,
before the Court a quo.

Herein petitioner, Isidoro Geverola, is accused of Malversation
through Falsification of Public
Documents, in criminal case No. 8219, before
the Court of First Instance of Davao.  He
was previously released
provisionally upon a bail of P32,000.00.  Upon arraignment, he interposed the plea of
not guilty.  The trial of the case was
set for the first time on August 23, 24 and 25, 1965.

On the morning of August
23, 1965, the first day of the scheduled date of hearing of the case, Atty.
Primo L. Ocampo appeared before the court in
representation of the accused.  In open
court, said counsel orally moved for postponement of the hearing of the case,
on the ground that the accused was
ill on influenza with chronic
cough, and was physically incapable of appearing at the trial.  A medical certificate issued by Dr. Eugenio Cla­veria, municipal
health officer of the town, duly sworn to before Enrique de los
Santos, municipal judge of Ma­lita, Davao, was submitted in support of the motion.  The medical certificate states that Isidoro Geverola was under his treatment since August 20, 1965, of Influenza, with Chronic Cough, and the
patient is a resi­dent of Liquiab, Malita, Davao. 
(Annex A – motion.)

Respondents do not
dispute the allegations in the petition that the distance between Malita (where peti­tioner resides) and Davao
City (where the court holds its session) is 125 kilometers of rough road.

Acting upon but without
resolving the defense motion for postponement, without objection on the part of
the fiscal, an order was dictated in open court, as follows:

“We will order the arrest of the accused and forfeiture of the
bond and we will have a hearing of your motion with the doctor
testifying.” (T.S.N. p. 3, Exhibit A, petition.)

No hearing of the case was held that morning, neither on the merits nor to receive the testimony
of the doctor, for the reason that neither the accused nor the doctor was
present in court.

Thereafter, a written
order was issued, dated August 23, 1965, which was served on counsel of the accused
the next day, as follows:

“For failure of the defendant Isidoro
Geverola to appear this morning for trial despite
notice to bondsmen, the bond filed herein for his temporary liberty is hereby
declared forfeited and the said bondsmen are given thirty (30) days from today
within which to produce the body of the accused and to explain why final
judgment should not be rendered against the bond.  Moreover, the immediate arrest of the
accused is hereby directed.” (Annex B, petition.) [Underscoring
supplied.]

On August
25, 1965, the
accused, through counsel, filed a motion
for reconsideration of the order, alleging among other matters:

“x x x if
the motion for postponement, supported as it is by a medical certificate duly
sworn to before a municipal judge, the truth, of which was not traversed by the
fiscal, x x x.”

had
been found spurious or that the illness of the accused is determined to be of
such a nature as not to prevent him from travelling
over 125 kilometers of rough roads in order to attend trial –

“x x
x and the court had passed upon the motion,
and denied it, x x x.”

the order of August
25, 1965, would have
been beyond question.

The motion for
reconsideration was denied in an or­der dated August 28, 1965, as follows:

“Since no action on the oral motion for postponement has been
taken because the Court will hear the same or the oral testimony of the doctor
and since the accused failed to appear on the day set for trial, the order of
forfeiture, and his arrest was well taken. 
Had the counsel for the accused press­ed the court to resolve his
motion, the same would have been denied be­cause the medical certificate which is
the basis thereof does not comply with the requirements prescribed by
the Rules of Court.”

Hence, the instant
petition for certiorari.

In retrospect, upon the
foregoing facts which are not disputed, it is evident that without passing on
the merits of the motion for postponement, the respondent judge ordered the
arrest of the accused, and the con­fiscation of the bail.  Significantly, however, having realized the
necessity of a prior resolution of the mo­tion for postponement, the respondent
judge tried to justify the order of immediate arrest of the accused and the
confiscation of the bail by declaring in his be­lated order of August 28 –

“x x
x Had the counsel for the accused pressed the Court to resolve
his motion, the same would have been denied x x x.”

Be that as it may, however, the last order could hardly be a justification for the improvident
issuance of the order of arrest and confiscation of the bail, be­cause the
transfer of the hearing of the motion for postponement and consequent deferment
of a resolution thereon should preclude and legally bar any further proceedings, especially when the order of arrest
and forfeiture of the bail was premised on the inability of the accused to
appear at the trial.

Section 2, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court provides:

“The court on the
application of either party or on its
own motion may in its discretion
for good cause postpone one the trial of the case for such period of time as the ends of justice and the right of the defendant to a
speedy trial require.”

It is a settled principle
that the granting or denial of a motion
for postponement rests, as a general rule, upon the discretion of the court. 
But this doctrine should not b taken to mean absolute authority, it
being qualified in the sense that the discretion to be exercised must be sound end reasonable, not arbitrary
or capricious.  While the trial of cases
with reasonable dispatch is as much the concern of the judges as of the
parties, for that is conducive to the attainment of justice, however, considering that in the present case, the
postponement sought was the first to be asked by the accused; the illness of the
accused was seemingly serious, requiring rest on the part of the patient; the distance from Malita,
where the accused was confined, to Davao City is more than 125 kilometers; there was no objection
to the postponement on the part of the
fiscal; the medical certificate was sworn to before a municipal judge and the
truth of the certifica­tion was not traversed by the fiscal, under these circumstances, it would have been the better course of prud­ence to give the defense a reasonable opportunity to present the doctor to testify on his medical certificate, even if that course of
action would involve a delay of the trial.  For the court which is the guardian of the
rights of the accused as well as
those of the people at large should not, for light-cause, jeopardize the rights or interest of both the accused and the jural
society.

The fact that the notice for
postponement was made orally in
open court on the morning of the scheduled date of trial, without previous notice to the fiscal, is not inexcusable
negligence, considering the peculiar circumstance obtaining in the case, that
the accused appears to have been stricken with “influenza with chronic cough”, on August 20, a
contingency or accident which could
not be
anticipated or foreseen.  As counsel for
petitioner states in his
memorandum –

“August 21 and 22 was a Saturday and Sunday, respectively, and
it was only on August 22 when he was informed of the sickness of client.  Even if he had wanted to, he could not have
filed an oppor­tune motion before August 23, be­cause the preceding day was a
Sun­day.”

What has rendered
less excusable the issuance of the orders complained of,
is the fact that without ruling on the motion for postponement, the accused was
immediately ordered
arrested and
his bail confiscated.

“In perusing the records of this case, we noted that the
attorney de officio in the court below, prayed and
insisted for the postponement of the trial which was scheduled to take place on
the very morning in which he was notified of his appoint­ment.  WITHOUT RULING ON THE PETITION FOR POSTPONEMENT, WHICH WAS ITS DUTY TO DO, THE LOWER COURT PROCEEDED WITH THE TRIAL.” (People vs. Labra, 81 Phil. 394.)

The evident philosophy
underlying the necessity of a prior resolution of the motion for postponement
is to afford the movant ample opportunity to seek and
avail of such remedies as may be proper
under the premises, for, it cannot be disputed that there are legal remedies un­der the Rules of Court.  Such an opportunity is an integral part of
the due process and its denial constitutes a
violation of a constitutional right of the accused.

“Although litigants
are not justified in taking for granted that their motions would be
granted, THE COURTS ARE BOUND TO ACT – in proper cases – ON ALL MOTIONS WITH SUFFICIENT DIS­PATCH
NECESSARY TO ALLOW THE PARTIES TO AVAIL THEMSELVES OF PROPER
REMEDIES.  THIS IS IMPLIED IN THE MANDATE
THAT ‘JUSTICE SHALL BE IMPARTIALLY ADMINISTERED WITHOUT UNNECESSARY
DELAY.'” (Semira vs. Enriquez, 88 Phil. 228.)

Upon the foregoing
considerations, We are of the opinion, and so hold,
that the respondent judge acted with gross abuse of discretion in issuing the
orders complained of.

WHEREFORE, the writ is granted, and
the orders com­plained of are set aside. 
Without costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez,
Castro, Fernando, and Capistrano, JJ., concur.

Zaldivar, J., on official leave of absence.