THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE VS. TEOFILO CABILTES, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

This is an appeal interposed by Teofilo
Cabiltes and Gonzalo Cabiltes
from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Leyte
(Ormoc City) in its criminal case 847-O, finding them
guilty of the crime of murder.  The dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:

“The Court finds the accused Teofilo
Cabiltes and Gonzalo Cabiltes
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and hereby sentences each
of said accused Teofilo Cabiltes
and Gonzalo Cabiltes to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to joint­ly and severally
indemnify the heirs of Esteban Me­sias in the sum of
six thousand pesos (P6,000.00) and to pay 2/3 of the costs.  x x x

“The weapons used in the commission of the crime are hereby
confiscated.”

In an amended complaint filed with the justice of the peace court
of Kananga, Leyte,
seven persons, namely, Teofilo Cabiltes,
Domingo Cabiltes, Gonzalo Cabiltes,
Diego Cabiltes, Arturo Allego,
Carlito Moriles and Berto Nadera, were charged with
the murder of Esteban Mesias. Domingo Cabiltes, Carlito Moriles and Arturo Arego were
later excluded from the complaint because the prosecution entertained grave
doubt as to their participation in the commission of the crime.  Only Teofilo Cabilte, Gonzalo Cabil­tes, and
Diego Cabiltes were thereafter indicted in an
information filed with the Court of first Instance of Leyte
(Ormoc City), which recites that on or about May 31,
1960, the three accused, conspir­ing and confederating, and mutually helping
one another, and with treachery, feloniously assaulted, attacked, and wounded
Esteban Mesias with a bolo, knives and stones,
inflicting injuries on him, to wit: 
“(1) incised wound on the chin 2-1/2 inches long, deepness reaches
the bone; (2) incised wound 3 inches below the left clavicle 1-1/2 inches long
and 1/4 inch deep; (3) stab wound right side epi­gastric
region 1 inch long 10 inches deepness diagonal; (4) stab wound 1 inch above
sternum left side 1 inch long 8 inches deepness diagonal; and (5) stab wound
back left side 1 inch long by 10 inches deepness diagonal,” which injuries
caused his death.

The version of the prosecution, as unfolded by witnesses Faustino
Alapan, Ceferino Moriles, Demetrio Sarit and Joaquin and the documentary evidence on record,
is substantially as follows:  During a barrio
fiesta in Natubgan, Kananga,
Leyte, while Teofilo Cabiltes was standing on the roadside (where a native drama
was to be staged) at around six o’clock in the evening of May 31, 1960, he was
informed by his uncle Gregorio that his father Do­mingo Cabiltes
had been assaulted by Esteban Mesias.  Teofilo Cabiltes proposed to take revenge.  And this proposal to kill Mesias
was communicated to Gonzalo Cabiltes, Domingo Cabiltes, Diego Cabiltes, Carlito Moriles, Arturo Allego and Gualberto Nedera, all of whom gave their assent.  Teofilo Cabiltes then went home, changed his clothes, and armed
himself with a hunting knife.  Upon his
return, Gonzalo Cabiltes, Diego Cabiltes,
Domingo Cabiltes, Arturo Allego
and Carlito Moriles and he,
as one group, left for the poblacion of Kananga, accompanied by Faustino Alapan.  At about
half a kilometer from the house of Domingo Cabiltes,
they overtook Mesias. 
Teofilo Cabiltes
walked abreast and side by side with Mesias for a
while, and then stabbed him in the back with his hunting knife.  Gonzalo Cabiltes
then stabbed him in the breast with a small bolo.  When the victim slumped to the ground, the
three ac­cused carried him to a canal filled with water, after which Teofilo Cabiltes hacked him on
the chin and other parts of the body. 
Diego Cabiltes then hurried home, while
Gonzalo Cabiltes ran away to the house of his aunt
where he was later arrested.

The three accused, after their arrest, as well as Faustino Alapan, executed affidavits which were sworn to before Demetrio D. Sarit, justice of the
peace of Kananga,
Leyte.

The version of the defense, on the other hand, unravelled by the declarations of Diego Cabiltes,
TeofiloCabiltes, Gonzalo Cabiltes,
Benjamin Pore, Eufracio Zarcon
and Buenaventura Tali­bao, consists partly in a
disavowal that the written statements se­cured from Teofilo,
Diego and Gonzalo Cabiltes were voluntarily
made.  Atty. Benjamin Pore declared that
he was informed by the three accused of their maltreatment at the hands of the
police autho­rities, and because of this, he advised them to submit to medical
treatment, which they did.

The appellant Gonzalo Cabiltes, while
admitting that he was with Teofilo Cabiltes on the way to the poblacion
of Kananga
on the day of the killing, disclaimed knowledge of the plot to kill Mesias.  He declared
that on their way to the poblacion, they met Mesias, who thereupon asked Teofilo
Cabiltes if he was the son of Domingo Cabiltes, and when Teofilo
answered that he was, Mesias forthwith boxed him on
the right forehead.  Surprised at what he
saw, he fled to the house of his aunt, Paying Cabiltes
he was later apprehended and brought to the municipal jail together with Teofilo Cabiltes, Diego Cabiltes and Domingo Cabiltes.  He claims that al of them were manhandled by
the police, for which reason they sought medi­cal treatment at the Ormoc Public Dispensary.

Upon its evaluation at the evidence on record, the trial court
rendered the judgment^[1]
heretofore adverted to.  Teofilo Cabiltes has withdrawn
his appeal, so e are here concerned only with Gonzalo Cabiltes‘
appeal.^[2]

Gonzalo Cabiltes puts squarely in issue
the credibility a Faustino Alapan, the only
eyewitness for the prosecution, averring that this witness has enmeshed himself
in irretrievable inconsis­tencies and grave contradictions.  Specifically, it is averred that while in his
affidavit (exhs. 1, 1-A).  Alapan stated that
when the killing took place at around six o’clock in the evening of May 31,
1960, he was in the house of Domingo Cabiltes,
pounding rice, af­ter which he was told to go to the poblacion
of Kananga, in his di­rect testimony he declared that
at the time the killing took place, he was in Diego Cabiltes‘
house in barrio Tubgan, Kananga,
pound­ing rice, and, on cross-examination, he stated that he started to live in
the house of Javier Porras at three o’clock in the
afternoon of the same date.  The
appellant’s submission, on the basis of the above-stated contradictions, is
that Alapan was not present at the scene of the
killing as it was impossible for him to be in-two places et the same time.

Our own perceptive examination of Alapan’s
oral testimony vis-a-vis his affidavit reveals
no material contradiction of conse­quence. Although in his affidavit he did
state that he was in the house of Domingo Cabiltes at
about six o’clock in the evening of May 31, 1960, his oral testimony that he
was in the house of Diego Cabiltes in the afternoon
of the same date makes no mention of the exact time of his presence in the
house of the latter.  We are therefore
not prepared to accept the appellant’s thesis that Alapan’s
being in Diego’s house earlier precluded him from being present at six o’clock
of the same afternoon in the house of Domingo Cabiltes,
es­pecially if we take into account that the barrios where the houses of
Domingo and Diego are located?  Natubgan and Tubgan,
respectively, are in the same municipality
of Kananga.  There is no evidence whatsoever that would
suggest that if Alapan was initially in the barrio
of Tubgan, it was impossible for him to be in the
house of Domingo Cabiltes in barrio Natubgan in the afternoon of the same day.

The appellant lays stress on the import of the testimony of Alapan on cross-examination that he started to live in the
house of Javier Porras at three o’clock in the
afternoon of May 31, 1960, that he did not leave the house of Porras except at 4:00 p. m. when he went out to fetch
water, and that he had never gone to barrio Natubgan
The pertinent testimony reads:

“Q. On that date when you started living with Mr. Porras, what time of day did you go to the house of Mr. Porras to start living with him?

“A. I went to the house of Mr. Porras
in the af­ternoon of that day.

“Q. Approximately what time in the afternoon?

“A. I went to the house of Mr. Porras
on May 31, 1960, at about 3:00 o’clock.

“Q. And you did not leave the house of Mr. Por­ras
from that time on, did you?

“A. I left the house of Mr. Porras,

“Q. When, what time did you go out from the house of Mr. Porras on May 31,
1960?

“A. At about 4:00 o’clock

“Q. Where did you go at 4:00 o’clock
in the afternoon of May 31, 1960?

“A. I fetched water to he used for cooking.

“Q. And you never had gone to the barrio of Natub­gan?

“A. No, sir.”

But as aptly stated by the Solicitor General, when the witness
sta­ted that he had never gone to barrio Natubgan,
the question that was asked him did not make reference to any particular date
or hour.  So that his negative answer
could refer to any day other than that of the commission of the crime.  But whatever doubt may have been engendered
by the above interrogation and the answer thereto elicited regarding his
presence at the scene of the crime, was dissi­pated when he made the
clarification that the killing had already hap­pened when he went to live in
the house of Porras.

It is Further argued that there was no sense in the Cabilteses‘ bringing Alapan along
with them to kill Mesias, because as there were
already six in the group, Alapan, who was a mere
youngster of 15 years of age, could not be of any conceivable help to
them.  We deem it unnecessary to
speculate on the possible reasons or motives that impelled the accused to take Alapan with them in the execution of their mission to
liquidate Mesias, but it is pertinent to observe in
this regard that Alapan was a former neighbor of Teofilo and Gonzalo Cabiltes in barrio
Minuto, Kananga and that
for sometime he lived in the house of Teofilo Cabiltes.

Further assailing AIapan’s credibility,
the appellant not only accords undue emphasis to the statement made by Alapan in his affi­davit to the effect that Domingo Cabiltes, Arturo AIlego and Carlito Moriles helped in
stabbing Mesias, but as well contrasts his decla­ration
in direct examination that Gonzalo, Teofilo and Diego
Cabil­tes inflicted the wounds sustained by the
deceased, with his declara­tion on cross-examination that Domingo Cabiltes, Teofilo Cabiltes and Gonzalo Cabiltes
were the only participants in the stabbing inci­dent.  Be that as it may, as regards the
participation of Teofilo Cabiltes
and Gonzalo Cabiltes in the stabbing, Alapan’s testimony was consistent both in the direct and
cross-examinations, although this a appears to be at variance with the
narration in his affidavit.  The
discrepancy regarding who took part in the stabbing, is of course patent, but
such contradiction may justifiably be overlooked because it is not infrequent
that a witness may, without design, inaccurately narrate certain facts arising
from extraordinary occur­rences.  As
Moore on Facts, 1098, has said, an affidavit, “being taken ex parte is almost always incomplete and often
inaccurate sometimes from partial suggestion, and sometimes from want of
suggestion and inquiries, without the aid of which witness may be unable to
recall the connected collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of
the first suggestion of his memory and for accurate recollection of all that
belongs to the subject.”  Moreover, Alapan was a lowly laborer, an illiterate barrio
lad, 15 years of age, who signed his name by affixing his thumbmark,
did know how to write, did not know what a minute or an hour is, or how many
days there are in a month, or what a year is, and could not recall the
different barrios where he lived.

Although it is neither the function nor the prerogative of a
court to conjure up a meaning that is not there or to give to the testimony of
a witness a meaning that cannot reasonably he inferred from the entirety of his
integrated testimony, we are of the opinion, nevertheless, that this Court is
required by the recognized canons of judicial review to determine whether under
the environmental circumstances surrounding the declarations of a witness, the
said witness can be accorded credence. 
In the case at bar, we are satisfied after a searching scrutiny of the
testimony and the affidavit of eyewitness Alapan,
that the contradictions and inconsistencies his declarations are trivial
mistakes which cannot be attributed a desire to pervert the truth.  It is a truism that the most can­did witness
oftentimes commits mistakes and incurs in inconsisten­cies in his declarations,
but such honest lapses do not necessarily impair his intrinsic
credibility.  Far from being evidence of
falsehood they could justifiably be regarded as a demonstration of good faith
and, in this case before us, a confirmation of the fact that Alapan was not a rehearsed witness.

Indeed, we note that Alapan appears to
be a person who bore absolutely no ill-feeling against any of the accused; the
re­cord does not disclose any untoward motive which could have in­duced him to
perjure himself in a prosecution for a heinous crime.  The theory of intentional falsehood which is
the central theme of the appellant in his brief must therefore be discounted.

At all events, there is proof beyond reasonable doubt that the
appellant, acting in conspiracy, participated in the killing of the deceased.

Firstly, his disclaimer of knowledge of the plot to kill Mesias is negated by the following circumstances:  (I) the plan to kill Mesias
was discussed before they left for the poblacion;
(2) Teofilo Cabiltes
personally explained to him the plan to go to the poblacion;
(3) he joined the other accused and was with them on the way to Kananga; and (4) he was admittedly present when the
stabbing was committed.

Secondly, his declaration that when Teofilo
Cabiltes stabbed the deceased he ran away, is of
doubtful veracity, For, if as tes­tified to by him, it was Mesias
who first hit Teofilo Cabiltes
on the right forehead, causing ‘the latter to fall to the ground, then his na­tural
reaction as an uncle would be to rush to the aid of his prostrate nephew.  Abandoning his relative in the condition
pictured by him is contrary to human instinct: 
blood is still thicker than water. 
Indeed, it is more reasonable to believe that Gonzalo Cabiltes is net the type of a man so, devoid of courage and
so lacking lea human feeling as not to give succor or defend his nephew from
List alleged assailant whom he described as being twice taller and bigger than Teofilo Cabiltes.  Thus it is that we accept as the true version
of the appellant’s beha­vior during the incident that testified to by Alapan who affirmed that after Teofilo
Cabiltes stabbed Mesias,
Gonzalo Cabiltes also stabbed him.

Thirdly, corroboration can be gleaned from the autopsy
find­ings of sanitary inspector Joaquin Demillo.  The various stab wounds found in the body of
the deceased were obviously caused by more than one weapon and inflicted by
more than one person.  During the trial,
two different weapons were presented in evidence, which sup­ports the thesis
that at least two persons participated in the stabbing.  Alapan identified
the hunting knife (exh. E) as the weapon used by Teofilo Cabiltes, and the small
bolo (exh. F) as that wielded by Gon­zalo Cabiltes.

Fourthly, the mute but eloquent physical evidence proves
be­yond peradventure that the mortal “stab wound 1 inch above sternum left
side 1 inch long 8 inches deepeness diagonal”
sustained by Me­sias was caused by the small bolo
which measures about eight inches in length arid about one inch in width.

Finally, the testimony of Alapan
finds indirect corroboration in the extrajudicial confession of Teofilo Cabiltes, Gonzalo’s
co-accused, which in part states “That when he [Esteban Mesias] was already hit my companions rushed at him namely;
x x x Gonzalo Cabiltes, x x x
and they helped one another in stabbing Esteban Me­sias
and they also stoned him.”

True it is that an extrajudicial confession is admissible only
against the person who made it; jurisprudence, however, makes it admissible as
corroborative evidence of other facts that tend to es­tablish the guilt of his
co-defendant(s) (People v. Simbajon, et al.,
L-18073-75, Sept. 30, 1965).  Conspiracy
having been established in this case, each of the statements is admissible
against all the conspirators (People v. Belen, et al., L-13895, Sept. 30, 1963).  The appellant’s conduct before, during and
after the commission of the crime, conclusively shows that he acted in concert
with his co-accused.

Of course, Gonzalo Cabiltes claims with
vehemence that their statements were wrenched from them thru force and
violence.  This claim does not command
respect, as no motive on the part of the investigating officer has been proven,
and none was in fact given, that could have impelled him to concoct the facts
narrated in the extra judicial confessions in question.  Moreover, judging from the nature of the
facts stated therein, it is clear that it is only the affiants who could have
supplied them.  In fact Demetrio Sarit, jus­tice of peace
of Kananga, Leyte, before
whom the affidavits were sworn to, testified that the contents thereof which
are in the Cebu– Visayan
dialect were read to the affiants, and that they confirmed the contents thereof
as true and correct, after which they volunta­rily affixed their
signatures.  And although they aver that
several persons were looking at them when they signed their affidavits at the
point of a gun, oddly enough not one of these supposed onlookers testified in
their behalf.  Regarding Pore’s testimony
that he was informed by the three accused that they were maltreated by the
police, because of which he advised them to secure medical certificates, the
accused failed to produce any medical certificate at the trial attesting to the
alleged injuries.  The trial court,
therefore, correctly found that the affidavits in question were freely and
volun­tarily executed.

In the face of the evidence against the appellant, his avowal of
innocence must be rejected.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo, in so far
as the appel­lant Gonzalo Cabiltes is concerned, is
affirmed in toto, at the said
appellant’s cost.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez,
Angeles, Fernando, and Capistrano, JJ., concur.

Zaldivar, J., on leave.

^[1] Teofilo Cabiltes‘ motion to
withdraw appeal was granted by this Court per its resolution of July 16, 1962.

^[2]
Diego Cabiltes was acquitted by the court a quo
“on grounds of rea­sonable doubt.”