HEIRS OF RAYMUNDO CASTRO, PETITIONER, VS. APOLONIO BUSTOS, RESPONDENT.

Appeal from the Court of Appeals.

Respondent Apolonio Bustos was charged in the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga on October 26, 1962 with the crime of murder for the killing of Ray­mundo
Castro, whose heirs are now the petitioners. 
The trial court found Bustos guilty only of homicide and, crediting him
with two mitigating circumstances, namely, passion or obfuscation and voluntary
surrend­er, sentenced him to an indeterminate prison term of 2 years, 4 months
and 1 day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision
mayor, as maximum, and to indemnify the
petitioners, who were re­presented in the case by a private prosecutor, in the
sum of six thousand pesos (P6,000) “without prejudice to whatever the
accused (respondent), is entitled from the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) for his services of around twenty-six (26) years as a public school
teacher, prior to October 20, 1962.” Both respondent and petitioners
appealed to the Court of Appeals, respondent asking that that appellate court
acquit him and petitioners praying, on the other hand, that respond­ent be
convicted of murder, that the portion regarding what said respondent will
receive from the GSIS be de­leted and that he be ordered to pay petitioners
“the aggregate sum of P50,764.00 as indemnity and actual, moral, temperate
and exemplary damages.” For the pur­poses of their appeal, petitioners
even filed unneces­sarily a printed record on appeal.  On October 18, 1965, the Court of Appeals
rendered judgment modifying that of the trial court in so far as it concerned
(1) the amount of damages to be awarded petitioners thus:

“x x x Aside from the P6,000 indemnity awarded by the trial court,
which we uphold, we feel justified, in the exercise of our discretion, to award
to the heirs of the de­ceased moral damages in the amount of P6,000 plus
P13,380.00 to com­pensate for the loss of earning of the decedent at the annual
salary of P2,676.00 x x x.”

and
(2) the mitigating circumstance of “obfuscation”, appreciated as such
by the trial court, which was changed to “vindication of a grave
offense”, but affirm­ing it in all other respects.  Upon motion, however, of respondent for the
reconsideration of said decision, re­iterating his plea for acquittal, or, in
the alternative, praying for the elimination of the award of moral and
compensatory damages, the Court of Appeals promulgated on November 13, 1965, an
amended decision, the pertinent portions of which are:

“The arguments interposed by the appellant in his Motion for
reconsi­deration to support the complete re­versal of the judgment appealed
from, have been considered and passed upon in our decision, and we see no
reason to alter the same in so far as the appellant’s guilt of the crime is
concerned.  On the other hand, we agree
with the appellant that in the interest of justice and equity and in view of
the presence of two mitigating circumstances, without any aggravating one to
offset them, the award of moral and compensatory damages should be eliminated.

“WHEREFORE, the decision pro­mulgated October 18, 1965, is
hereby amended by eliminating therefrom the award of P6000.00 representing
moral damages, and of P13,380.00 representing the decedent’s loss of
earnings.”

From this amended
decision, only petitioners have appealed to Us. 
The prayer in their petition for certiorari asks for nothing more than
that the amended deci­sion of the Court of Appeals be revoked and reversed, and
its original decision be affirmed in toto in so far as the award
of indemnity and damages is concerned. 
Since We find the grounds of the appeal meritorious, We grant fully the
prayer in the petition.

This case affords this
Court as appropriate an opportunity, as any other, to
restate, in a more compre­hensive way, the law regarding the items of damages
that are recoverable in cases of death caused by a crime, whe­ther the claim
therefor is made in the criminal proceed­ings itself or in a separate civil
action.  In the in­stant case, recovery
of such damages is being sought in the criminal proceedings, but even if it
were claimed otherwise, the indemnity and damages would be the same, for
generally, the items of damages are identical in both procedures, except with
respect to attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation which can be awarded only
when a separate civil action is instituted. 
(Art. 2208, Civil Code) With the clarifications We are making herein, at least the writer of this opinion expects that
litiga­tions regarding the aspects of the law herein passed upon may be
minimized.

As a start,
it is to be noted that in the matter of damages, the original decision of the
Court of Appeals, while correct in making a particularization in
the award of indemnity and damages, nonetheless, still failed to comply
strictly with the constitutional requirement that all decisions of
courts of record must state both the facts and the law on which
they are based.  (Sec. 12, Art, VIII,
Constitution) In said original decision, the Court of Appeals held:

“Coming now to the damages asked by the heirs of the deceased:
Aside from the P6,000.00 indemnity awarded by the trial court which we uphold,
we feel justified, in the exercise of our discretion, to award to the heirs of
the deceased moral damages in the amount of P6,000 plus P13,380.00 to
compensate for the loss of earning of the decedent at the annual salary of
P2,676.00 (Exh. V; p. 42 t.s.n. Vergara).

“WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is modified as above indi­cated
in so far as it concerns the amount of indemnity and damages to be awarded to
the heirs of the de­ceased, and the mitigating circumstance of vindication of a
grave offense which takes the place of the circumstance of obfuscation
appreciated by the trial court; and affirmed in all other respects.  Costs against the appellant.”

As can be seen, no legal or factual basis
is stated therein for the award of indemnity and damages to petitioners; worse,
the impression is given that the said award is pure­ly a matter of discretion
on the part of the court.  Clear­ly, this
is not in accordance with the law. 
Indeed, it must have been this failure to refer to the pertinent le­gal
provisions which induced the appellate court, at the mere invocation by
respondent of Art. 2204 of the Civil Code, to commit the error of readily
eliminating in the amended decision the items on moral damages and compensa­tion
for loss of earning of the decedent which its original decision had correctly
contained.  Having held that it had
discretion in the premises, the court easily yielded to the argument that
simply because it had credited the respondent with two mitigating
circumstances, it was al­ready justified in eliminating the items of damages al­ready
adverted to, presumably having in mind said Art. 2204 which provides, that:

“In crimes, the damages to be adjudicated may be respectively
increased or lessened according to the aggravating or mitigating cir­cumstances.”

Of
course, this was clear error, inasmuch as construed literally or otherwise, the
quoted provision does not warrant a complete deletion of said items of
damages.  In any event, the court
evidently failed to take into account that several other provisions can come
into play considering the circumstances in this case.

When the commission of a crime results in death, the civil
obligations arising therefrom are governed by the penal laws, “x x x
subject to the provisions of Art. 2177, and of the pertinent provisions of
Chapter 2, Preliminary Title on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of this
Book (Book IV) regulating damages.” (Art. 1161, Civil Code)

Thus, “every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable.” (Art. 100, Revised Penal Code) This civil liability, in case
the felony involves death, includes indemnification for consequential dama­ges
(Art. 104, id.) and said consequential damages in turn include “x x x those suffered by his
family or by a third person by reason of the crime.” (Art. 107, id.) Since
these provisions are subject, however, as above indicated, to certain
provisions of the Civil Code, We will now turn to said provisions:

The general rule in the
Civil Code is that:

“In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable
for all da­mages which are the natural and pro­bable consequences of the act or
omis­sion complained of.  It is not neces­sary
that such damages have been fore­seen or could have reasonably been foreseen by
the defendant.” (Art. 2202)

When, however, the crime committed involves death, there is Art. 2206 which provides thus:

“The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or
quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pe­sos, even though there may
have been mitigating circumstances.  In
addi­tion:

(1)  The defendant shall be liable for the loss of
the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the
heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded
by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability
not caused by the defendant, had no earn­ing capacity at the time of his death;

(2)  If the deceased was obliged to give support
according to the pro­visions of article 291, the recipient who is not an heir
called to the decedent’s inheritance by law of testate or intestate succession,
may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period not
exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;

(3)  The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate
descendants and ascend­ants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental
anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.”

The
amount of P3,000 referred to in the above article has already been increased by
this Court first, to P6,000.00 in People v. Amansec, 80 Phil. 426, and lately
to P12,000.00 in the case of People v. Pantoja, G. R. No. L-18793, promulgated
October 11, 1968, and it must be stressed that this amount, as well as the
amount of moral damages, may be adjudicated even without proof of
pecuniary loss, the assessment of the moral damages being “left to the dis­cretion
of the court, according to the circumstances of each case.” (Art. 2216)

Exemplary damages may
also be imposed as a part of this civil liability when the crime has been
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, such damages being
“separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended
party,” (Art. 2230).  Exemplary
damages cannot however be recovered as a matter of right; the court will decide
whether or not they should be given.  (Art.
2233)

In any event, save as expressly provided in con­nection with the
indemnity for the sole fact of death (1st par., Art. 2206) and in cases wherein
exemplary da­mages are awarded precisely because of the attendance of
aggravating circumstances, (Art. 2230) “x x x damages to be adjudicated
may be respectively increased or less­ened according to the aggravating or
mitigating circum­stances,” (Art. 2204) but “the party suffering the
loss or injury must exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to minimize
the damages resulting from the act or
omission in question.” (Art. 2203) “Interest as a part of the
damages, may, in a proper case, be adjudicated in the discretion of the
Court.” (Art. 2211) As to attor­neys’ fees and expenses of litigation, the
same may be re­covered only when exemplary damages have been granted (Art.
2208, par.1) or, as We have already stated, when there is a separate civil
action.

Stated differently, when death occurs as a result of a crime, the
heirs of the deceased are entitled to the following items of damages:

1.  As indemnity for the death of the victim of
the offense — P12,000.00, without the
need of any evidence or proof of damages, and even though there may have
been mitigating circumstances attending the commission of the offense.

2.  As indemnity for loss of earning capacity of
the deceased — an amount to be fixed by the court according to the
circumstances of the deceased related to his actual in­come at the time of
death and his probable life expectancy, the said indemnity to be assessed and
awarded by the court as a mat­ter of duty, unless the deceased had no earning
capacity at said time on account of permanent disability not caused by the
accused.  If the deceased was obliged to
give support, under Art. 291, Civil Code, the recipient who is not an heir, may
de­mand support from the accused for not more than five years, the exact
duration to be fixed by the court.

3.  As moral damages for mental anguish, –­ an
amount to be fixed by the court.  This
may be recovered even by the illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the de­ceased.

4.  As exemplary damages, when the crime is
attended by one or more aggravating cir­cumstances, — an amount to be fixed
in the discretion of the court, the same to be considered separate from fines.

5.  As attorney’s fees and expenses of litiga­tion,
— the actual amount thereof, (but only when a separate civil action to reco­ver
civil liability has been filed or when exemplary damages are awarded).

6.  Interests in the proper cases.

7.  It must be emphasized that the indemnities for
loss of earning capacity of the de­ceased and for moral damages are recover­able
separately from and in addition to the fixed sum of P12,000.00
corresponding to the indemnity for the sole fact of death, and that these
damages may, however, be respectively increased or lessened accord­ing to the
mitigating or aggravating cir­cumstances, except items 1 and 4 above, for
obvious reasons.

In the light of the
foregoing discussion, it is clear that the Court of Appeals erred in
eliminating in its amended
decision, the items of moral damages and compensation for loss of earning
capacity of the deceased.  Indeed, as to the award of moral damages in
case of death, this Court has already held in Mercado v. Lira, etc., G. R. Nos. L-13328-29,
September 29, 1961, that once the heirs of the deceased claim moral damages and
are able to prove they are entitled thereto, it be­comes the duty of the court
to make the award.  We held:

“Art. 2206 states
further that ‘In addition’ to the
amount of at least P3,000.00 to be awarded for the death of a passenger, the
spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased
may demand moral damages as a consequence of the death of their deceased kin,
which simply means that once the above-mention­ed heirs of the deceased claim
compensation for moral damages and are able to prove that they are entitled to
such award, it becomes the duty of the court to award moral damages to the
claimant in an amount commensurate with the mental anguish suffered by
them.”

This doctrine was
reiterated in Maranan v. Perez, G. R. No. L-22272, June 26, 1967:

“In connection with
the award of damages, the court a quo granted only P3,000 to plaintiff-appellant.  This is the minimum compensatory da­mages
amount recoverable under Art. 1764 in connection with Art. 2206 of the Civil
Code when a breach of con­tract results in the passenger’s death.  As has been the policy fol­lowed by this
Court, this minimal award should be increased to P6,000 x x x Still,
Arts. 2206 and 1764 award moral damages in addition to compensatory damages, to
the parents of the passenger killed to compensate for the mental anguish they
suffered.  A claim therefor, having been
properly made, it becomes the court’s duty to award moral damages.  Plaintiff demands P5,000 as moral damages;
however, in the cir­cumstances, We consider P3,000 moral damages, in addition
to the P6,000 damages aforestated, as sufficient.  Interest upon such damages are also due to
plaintiff-appellant.”

Likewise, in the matter
of the compensatory damages for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased,
We also held in the case of Daniel Bulante v. Chu Liante, G. R. Nos. L-21583
and L-21591-92, May 20, 1968 that:

“The next item objected to re­fers to the damages awarded to
the heirs of the deceased passengers for loss of earning capacity, se­parately
from the indemnities by reason of death. 
The ground for the objection is that loss of earn­ing capacity was not
specifically pleaded or claimed in the complaint.  This item, however, may be consi­dered
included in the prayer for ‘actual damages’ and for other ‘just and equitable
reliefs,’ especially if taken in the light of Art. 2206, in connection with
Art. 1764, of the Civil Code, which allows, in addi­tion to an indemnity of at
least P3,000 by reason of death, recovery for loss of earning capacity on the
part of the deceased, the same to be paid to his heirs ‘in every case x x x unless the deceased on account
of permanent physical dis­ability not caused by the defendant, had no earning
capacity at the time of his death.'”

To be sure, these cases of Mercado v. Lira, Mara­nan v. Perez and
Bulante v. Chua Liante, from which We have quoted, were actions based on
contracts of common carriers.  But the
above-mentioned doctrines are equally applicable to civil liability ex delicto because, after all, Art. 2206 of the Civil Code which was
applied in said cases is precisely the provision pertinent to lia­bility
arising from crimes (and quasi-delicts). 
No doubt, said Article must have been relied upon by the court in the above cases only because Art.
1764 of the Civil Code provides that
said “Art. 2206 shall also apply to the death of a passenger caused
by the breach of contract of a common
carrier.” Accordingly, the interpretation given to said article in those
cases are applicable to the case at bar.  In other words, this
must be so because under the Civil
Code, the same rules on damages are generally to be observed, whether death results from a crime or a quasi­-delict or a breach of the
contract of common carriage.

As to the amount of the indemnity for moral damages and loss of
earning capacity of the deceased in the pre­sent case, the original decision of
the Court of Appeals awarding them, does not afford sufficient basis for Us to
increase the amounts fixed by said court, as prayed for by appellants.  As has already been stated, the said decision
failed to follow the Constitution, not only in not stating the law on which it is based but also in not making the necessary
findings of fact on which it based its
discret­ion in fixing the respective amounts it awarded for moral and
compensatory damages.  Legally,
therefore, We can, if We wish to, return this case to that court for it to
supply these constitutional omissions. 
We opt, however, to save time and further difficulties for, and damages
to, the pe­titioners.  Extant in the
records before Us is the fact that the respondent has never disputed that
petitioners are the widow and seven children of the deceased, three of whom
were still minors at the time of his death, nor that the said deceased was a
public school teacher, 56 years old, and earning P2,276.00 a year.  These facts appear to have been repeatedly
asserted in the briefs of petitioners in the Court of Appeals and in this
Court.  No denial was ever made by the
respondent.  When respondent moved for
the reconsideration of the original decision of the Court of Appeals, (Annex E
of Petition for Certiorari) he only argued that in view of the mitigating
circumstances cre­dited to him by said court, petitioners were not entitled to
moral damages and to indemnity for loss of earning ca­pacity of the deceased;
the amounts fixed therefor by said court – he never questioned.  When petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration
of the amended decision of the Court of Appeals, these facts (relationship,
earn­ings, etc.) were reiterated.  (Annex
G, id.) Respondent did not file any answer to said motion despite the resolu­tion
requiring him to do so.  (Par. 12, Petition
for Certiorari) Neither has respondent filed any brief in the present instance,
notwithstanding repeated requests on his part for extension to file the same,
which, incident­ally, were all granted. 
Under these circumstances, We feel justified in brushing aside strict
technicalities of procedure in order to accomplish substantial justice more
expeditiously.  Anyway, as We said at the
outset, peti­tioners are asking Us, in the prayer of their petition for
certiorari, for nothing more than to affirm “in toto”
the original decision of the Court of Appeals, and in their lone assignment of
error in the present instance, their only claim is that “the Court of
Appeals erred when it issued the amended decision eliminating the award of
P6,000 moral damages and the award of P13,380.00 loss of earnings of the
deceased Raymundo Castro.” In these cir­cumstances, even if We should
award the amounts of da­mages just mentioned, inspite of the absence of the per­tinent
findings of fact by the Court of Appeals, We would not have to reach beyond
amounts that are undis­puted by the respondent.

We, therefore, overrule the prayer for additional damages in
petitioners’ brief and We hold that, on the basis of the facts not questioned
by respondent, they are entitled only to the P6,000.00 as moral damages and the
P13,380.00 as compensatory damages for the loss of earning capacity of the
deceased awarded in the original decision of the Court of Appeals in addition,
of course, to the indemnity for death fixed also by said court at P6,000.00.  This amount of P6,00.00 We cannot increase to
P12,000.00, as allowed in People v. Pantoja, supra, and the subsequent
cases, (People v. Mongaya, G. R. No. L-23708, October 31, 1968, and People v.
Ramos, G. R. No. L-19143, November 29, 1968) because in the instant suit,
neither party has appealed in relation thereto. 
This case is now before Us on appeal by the offended party only as to specific
portions of the civil indemnity to be paid by the respondent.  It would
have been different if the whole criminal case were up for our review
because then, even without any appeal on the part of the offended party, We
could have still increased the said liability of the accused, herein
respondent.  (See Mercado v. Lira, supra.)

At this juncture, for the guidance of parties simi­larly situated
as petitioners herein, and so that there may
be no useless expenses in appeals by offended parties in regard to the
civil aspect of a criminal case
when no separate civil action has been filed by them, it should be made clear
that when there is no such separate civil action and the claim for civil
indemnity is joined with the crimi­nal case, no record on appeal, whether
printed, typewritten or mimeographed, is necessary, except perhaps when formal
pleadings raising complicated questions are filed in connection therewith, and
still, this would be purely optional on the appellant because anyway the whole
original record of the case is elevated in appeals in criminal cases.  It is already settled that appeals relating
to the civil as­pects of a criminal case should follow the procedure for appeal
required by the rules of criminal procedure. 
(People v. Lorredo, 50 Phil. 209, 220-221; People v. Villanueva, G. R.
No. L-18769, May 27, 1966)

WHEREFORE, the amended decision of the Court of Appeals is
modified as hereinabove indicated, in so far as the civil liability of
respondent is concerned, with costs against him in this instance.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., and Sanchez, JJ., in the result.

Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, and Teehankee, JJ., concur.

Capistrano, J., concurs in a
separate opinion.