NATIONAL WATERWORKS & SEWERAGE AUTHORITY, PETITIONER, VS. NWSA CONSOLIDATED UNION, JESUS CENTENO, ET AL., & THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, RESPONDENTS.

In National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority v. NWSA
Consolidated Unions,^[1]
we made clear beyond doubt that employees of such govern­ment owned and
controlled corporation, who intervened therein, were entitled to the benefits
not only of the Eight-Hour Labor Law^[2]
but also to those arising from any contractual obligation that might have been
incurred by it.  Subsequently, on May 12,
1965, the aforesaid labor union, acting for and in behalf of Aurelio B. Zurbano,^[3]
Francisco P. Domingo^[4]
and Rufo R. Fabregas,^[5]
filed a motion alleging that such
individuals were similarly situated as they rendered work in excess of the
regular eight-hour period, including nighttime, having performed overtime
services as well on Sundays and legal holidays and therefore entitled to a
similar award in accordance with the aforesaid decision.  The National Waterworks & Sewerage
Authority, hereinafter referred to as the Nawasa, was
duly heard.  After which, on August 10, 1966, such a claim for
financial benefits was granted in the respective amounts of P29,640.81 for Zurbano, P9,212.78 for Domingo and P22,711.24 for Fabregas, the order being issued by the Hon. Joaquin M.
Salvador, Associate Judge of respondent Court of Industrial Relations.  This order was subsequently affirmed by
respondent Court en banc in a resolution dated September 22, 1966, denying a motion
for reconsideration.  Dissatisfied with
such turn of events, this petition for review was filed by the Nawasa.  We sustain
respon­dent Court.

The intervenors in the first Nawasa case decided by us in 1964 were admittedly
“holding positions of responsibility.” That we duly noted, for one of
them was the Secretary of the Board of Directors, another was the private
secretary of the general manager, a third, the public relations officer, while
many were division or section chiefs, including supervisors and overseers.  Nonetheless, the Court of Industrial
Relations, as pointed out in such decision, “after exam­ining carefully
their respective functions, duties and responsibilities found that their
primary duties do not bear any direct relation with the management of the Nawasa, nor do they participate in the formu­lation of its
policies nor in the hiring and firing of its employees.  The chiefs of divisions and sections are
given ready policies to execute and standard practices to observe for their
execution.  Hence, it con­cludes, they
have little freedom of action, as their main function is merely to carry out
the company’s orders, plans and policies.”

We made clear in that decision our agreement with respondent Court,
our opinion likewise containing the following: 
“As a matter of fact, they are required to observe working hours
and record their time work and are not free to come and go to their offices,
nor move about at their own discretion. 
They do not, therefore, come within the category of ‘managerial
employees’ within the meaning of the law.”

So it is in the case before us. 
What was set forth in the challenged order of August 10, 1966 by
respondent Court adhered to the above appraisal insofar as the work performed
by Domingo, who discharged the function of a supervisor and later coordinating
engineer, Zurbano, who since September 13, 1955 until
the date of his retirement was corporate legal counsel and Fabregas,
who was the chief of the administrative division during the period of his claim
were concerned.  Thus:  “The most obvious distinction of a
‘managerial employee’ is his participation in formulating company policies.  Another is his power to hire or fire
employees, and under Rep. Act No. 2377, his exemption from the rigid observance
of regular office hours.  Exam­ining the
above described duties of the three movants, the
Court fails to find any indication that their primary duties bear any direct re­lation
with the [Nawasa] management or that they help formulate
its policies.  Neither is there any
indication that the three movants have the power to
hire or fire employees of the [Nawasa].  On the contrary, the very exhibits presented
by the [Nawasa] * * * show that the power to hire and
fire, and to formulate policies exclusive­ly belong to the Board of Directors
and the General Manager.  What is more,
all the three movants were required to observe
official time, so much so that any undertime or
absence incurred by them were deducted from their accrued vacation or sick
leave.  They had to accomplish their
daily time records in Civil Service Form No. 48, wherein they had to record
their time of arrivals and departures, hence lack the freedom to come and go to
their offices, or move about at their own pleasure, which is the unmistakable
mark of a ‘managerial employee.”‘^[6]

It was the conclusion of respondent Court then:  “For the purpose of Rep. Act No. 2377,
therefore, the movants do not fall within the
category of ‘managerial employees’, hence are not barred from claiming
overtime.”^[7]

As noted at the outset, we sustain respondent Court.  Our August
31, 1964 decision in the main Nawasa suit
is decisive of the case at hand.  It
furnishes the law of the case.  As was
recently held by this Court, speaking through Justice J. B. L. Reyes, in People
v. Olarte,^[8]
a ruling constituting the law of the case, “even if erroneous, * * * may
no longer be disturbed or modified since it has become final * * *.  A subsequent reinterpretation of the law may
be applied to new cases but certainly not to an old one finally and
conclusively determined. * * *.”
To the same effect is the following from the pen of Justice Makalintal:  “It need not be stated that the Supreme
Court, being the court of last resort, is the final arbiter of all legal
questions properly brought before it and that its decision in any given case
constitutes the law of that particular case. 
Once its judgment becomes final it is binding on all inferior courts,
and hence beyond their power and authority to alter or modify.”^[9]
So it has always been from 1919, when we announced that a decision that has
become the law of the case “is not subject to review or reversal in any
court.”^[10]

The challenged order then bears on the face the impress of
validity.  Clearly, the burden of proof
is on petitioner, if it were to succeed in setting it aside.

How did petitioner propose to discharge it?  It would assign as errors allegedly committed
the holding of respondent Court that it had jurisdiction over the claim of
Domingo; the award to Zurbano, Domingo and Fabregas of the aforesaid additional compensation for work
rendered during Sundays and legal holidays on the ground that previously
respondent Court did deny such a claim and that no amount should have been
granted for work rendered in excess of eight hours a day as there was no
written authorization by petitioner’s general manager; and the failure to
sustain its plea of prescription of whatever claim could have been made by the
aforesaid individuals.  We are satisfied
that on the above facts as found by the Court of Industrial Relations and the
law as previously declared by us, such errors alleged cannot be accorded
acceptance.

1. The first error alleged is the holding of respondent Court that
it had jurisdiction over the claim of Domingo. 
Petitioner’s basis for so asserting that respondent Court erred in that
respect was the allegation that at the time the motion to extend benefits was
filed, “Francisco P. Domingo was no longer in the service of the National
Waterworks and Sewerage Authority because he reached the retirement age.  Since there was no employer-employee rela­tionship
when the action was filed in court, the respondent CIR did not have
jurisdiction over the same.”^[11]

It is to be admitted that it was not until May 11, 1965 that there was such a motion to that
effect.  It cannot be denied either that
as of October 11, 1961,
Domingo was no longer in service of the petition­er, having retired on that
day.  Nonetheless, the assertion of
petitioner in this assignment of error is not entitled to prevail.  The second paragraph of our opinion in the
main case states clearly that the dispute which resulted in its certification
by the President bet­ween petitioner and its employees as duly represented by
their unions occurred earlier than December
5, 1957, when the hearing was con­ducted by respondent Court.  Thereafter, a stipulation of facts was
submitted on December 13, 1957.  Petitioner in that case filed a motion to
dismiss on February 5, 1958.  The decision of respondent Court was rendered
on January 16, 1961 and
affirmed by us on August 31, 1964.

It would appear, therefore, that whatever right Domingo could
assert was in existence all the while the main case was being heard both before
respondent Court and by this Court.  It
could not be denied that until
his retirement on October 11, 1961, he was in the employ of petitioner.  As noted, our August 31, 1964 decision, which
affirmed the action taken by respondent Court, supplies the law of the case.  The allegation, therefore, that respondent
Court lacked jurisdiction because of the absence of an employer-employee rela­tionship
falls of its own weight, or more appropriately, of its own lack of weight.  The decision referred to in petitioner’s
brief in support of such assignment of error,^[12]
while announcing the correct principle that after the termination of
employer-employee relationship and no reinstatement being sought, the claim for
pecuniary benefits comes within the jurisdiction of regular courts, while
undoubtedly correct, is not controlling as it finds no application to the case
before us.

2. The second assigned error is equally without merit.  It is there alleged that respondent Court
committed a grave abuse of dis­cretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, when
it awarded to Zurbano, Domingo and Fabregas additional compensation for work rendered during
Sundays and legal holidays considering that such a demand was denied by it in
the main case.

In support of such an alleged error, petitioner cited in its
brief this portion of the order of January 16, 1961 of respondent Court:  “‘The intervenors,
in their Memorandum, wanted to include the claim for additional compensation
for services rendered on Sundays and legal holidays before and after the effectivity of R. A. No. 1880 and also on Saturdays after
the effectivity of the said law, contending that
Saturday becomes an off-day or day of rest. This particular claim is not
covered by the present petition, which only seeks pay­ment of additional
payment for night work and overtime pay. 
The records show that the respondent Company interposed its timely
objection to the evidence tending to establish such claim.  The inter­venors
did not file any amended petition covering the claim for extra premium for work
performed on Saturdays, Sundays and legal holi­days, contrary to their
announcement made in open court.  And
neither was it touched by the respondent Company during the presentation of its
evidence.’”^[13]
Its very own brief, however, two pages later, duly took note of this excerpt
from the aforesaid order thus:  “‘It
is, therefore, our resolution that respondent NWSA should pay its employees and
laborers concerned additional compensation equivalent to 25% of their basic
salaries or wages for work on Sundays and legal holidays even if the same should
fall within the staggered five working days effective on the date their working
days were staggered.”’^[14]

Respondents, in their brief, could thus correctly conclude:  “The awardees are not solely the
petitioners in the said cases, but all ‘the employees and laborers concerned’
of the NWSA.  Obviously, a member of the
NWSA Consolidated Unions, who has not rendered work on Sundays and legal
holidays, is not concerned with the benefit in question.  The Industrial Court did not impose any
limitation affecting the qualification of the intended recipients of the award,
except that they should be employees, or laborers, of the NWSA, and must be
concerned with the benefit in question, i.e., that they rendered services on
Sundays and legal holidays.  Indeed, the intervenors were very much concerned about the afore-stated
benefit because they did actually perform said services; so much so, that they
demanded it during the hearing and likewise in their memorandum.”^[15]

Whatever doubt could conceivably exist should be erased if heed
be paid to what was explicitly set forth by us in our opinion in the main
case.  As we stated there:  “It is to be noted, however, that in the
case at bar it has been stipulated that prior to the enactment of Republic Act
No. 1880, providing for the implementa­tion of the 40-Hour Week Law, the
Metropolitan Water District had been paying 25% additional compensation for
work on Sundays and legal holidays to its employees and laborers by virtue of
Resolution No. 47, series of 1948, of its Board of Directors, which practice
was continued by the [Nawasa] when the latter took
over the service.  And in the collective
bargaining agreement entered into between the [Nawasa]
and respondent unions it was agreed that all existing benefits enjoyed by the
employees and laborers prior to its effec­tivity
shall remain in force and shall form part of the agreement, among which
certainly is the 25% additional compensation for work on Sundays and legal
holidays theretofore enjoyed by said laborers and employees.  It may, therefore, be said that while under Commonwealth Act No. 444 a public utility is
not required to pay additional compensation to its employees and workers
for work done on Sundays and legal holidays, there is, however, no prohibition
for it to pay such additional compensation if it voluntarily agrees to do
so.  The [Nawasa]
committed itself to pay this additional compensation.  It must pay not because of compulsion of law
but because of contractual obligation.”^[16]

It would be to defy rather to defer to the above decision, which
is the law of the case, if petitioner is to be indulged in its unwar­ranted
assertion that the award of additional compensation for work rendered during
Sundays and legal holidays was done with grave abuse of discretion.

3. The third assigned error suffers from grave inaccuracy.  Moreover, on its face it is indicative of a
failure to abide by what has long been settled law.  It would impute to respondent Court a grave
abuse of discretion when it granted to Zurbano,
Domingo and Fabregas additional compensation for work
rendered in excess of eight hours a day as well as nighttime compensation in
the absence, so it is alleged, of a written authorization by the general
manager of the Nawasa.

The third assigned error would boldly assert that all three, Zurbano, Domingo and Fabregas,
were not authorized in writing to perform overtime work.  Nonetheless, in the discussion thereof
explicit reference was made not to all the three individuals but only to Zurbano and Fabregas.  It would quote the order of res­pondent Court
of August 10, 1966 thus:  “‘Aurelio Zurbano and Rufo Fabregas, on the other hand, had no prior written authority
to do overtime or night work similar to the directives of Domingo.'”^[17]

As is clear from the above statement, Domingo had such a
directive and therefore should not have been included in this alleged
error.  Moreover, what is to be deplored
is that only a portion of the order of August 10, 1966 is quoted by petitioner,
perhaps, be­cause of the realization that if the paragraph were quoted in full
this particular assignment of error would be exposed as baseless.

The brief for respondents, quoting the paragraph in full, renders
the matter crystal clear.  Thus:  “‘Aurelio Zurbano
and Rufo Fabregas, on the
other hand, had no prior written authority to do overtime or night work similar
to the directives of Domingo.  The
records is replete with their declaration, however, made again and again, that
they had been verbally ordered by the general manager to perform almost daily
overtime and night work and in addition to work on Saturdays, Sundays and legal
holidays.  Not only was this evidence
corroborated by other witnesses, it was also unrefuted
by respondent NWSA.”‘^[18]

What was thus omitted by petitioner would erase all doubts as to
the existence of such authorization. 
Under the circumstances, such an omission is to be deplored.  It could yield the highly un­favorable
impression that through inadvertence, to say the least, this Court could have
been misled.  Greater care is therefore
in­cumbent on petitioner.

What petitioner would therefore seek is a reversal of a finding
of fact of respondent Court.  That cannot
be done.  It would be different if there
were no evidence in support thereof. 
Then there would be a grave abuse of discretion.  That is not the case however.  According to the proven facts, it would be to
trifle with the truth to assert that no such authorization to the three
above-named indivi­duals was given.

The controlling doctrine recognizes the wide discretion enjoyed
by respondent Court in ascertaining what actually did occur in labor disputes
of whatever sort.  Its conclusion once
reached is invariably accorded the seal of our acceptance.  Its disposition of a case before it usually
elicits assent from us.  It could happen
of course that we may fail to view matters similarly.  We have that power; it must be made use of
when warranted.  It does not occur often
though.  That is not merely so as to the
facts found.  The acceptance of its legal
conclusion reached is not a rare event either. 
This is merely to recognize that on labor matters, its recognized
expertise has well-nigh earned for its decrees the title-deed to recognition,
unless there be a rank failure to observe the constitutional and statutory
limitations which it must observe.

In the more familiar terminology, only on a showing of clear and
grave abuse of discretion are we justified in disturbing its finding of
facts.  So it has been uniformly and
uninterruptedly held from Manila Electric Company v. National Labor Union,^[19]
a 1940 decision, the opinion being rendered by Justice Laurel, to Philippine
Educational Institution v. MLQSEA Faculty Association,^[20]
decided late last year.

We reiterate such a doctrine. 
The third error assigned, like the first two, is thus clearly bereft of
any persuasive force.

4. Nor is there anything in the fourth assigned error that would
call for a reversal.  What is there
relied upon is the alleged prescription of the claims of Zurbano,
Domingo and Fabregas under Republic Act No. 1993,
which would bar any action to enforce any claim under the Eight-Hour Labor Law
if not commenced with­in three years after the accrual of such a cause of
action.  At the most what could be
challenged even assuming that this contention was impressed with plausibility
would be the statutory claim, not that arising from the collective bargaining
agreement.

Even as to that aspect, this alleged error need not occasion
further thought.  Petitioner must be
aware that before our 1964 decision, there were doubts sincerely and honestly
entertained as to whether or not officials of the category now seeking to enjoy
the benefits of the Eight-Hour Labor Law were managerial employees.  Only upon such rendition were such doubts
erased.  In addition, we made certain in
such decision that the benefits must be conferred to all similarly situated and
not to be withheld from some.  To now
assert that the three officials, whose claims are under considera­tion, are
barred is to misread the import of our decision, which, as made clear from the
beginning, supplies the law of the case. 
The last assigned error is thus equally groundless.

It would be unfortunate and unwarranted if a recognition of both
statutory and contractual obligation sustained alike by the express terms of a
previous decision which is the law of the case and the dictates of equity would now be frustrated.  Such a result does not commend itself for
acceptance.

WHEREFORE, the order of August 10, 1966, the reconsidera­tion of which was denied
in a resolution of September 22, 1966,
is affirmed.  With costs against
petitioner.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Makalintal, and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Dizon, Castro, and Teehankee, JJ., in the result.

Sanchez, J., did not take part.

^[1]
G.R. No.  L-18938, August 31,1964.

^[2]
Commonwealth Act No. 444 as amended by Republic Act No. 2377.

^[3]
G.R. No. L-26894.

^[4]
G.R. No. L-26895.

^[5]
G.R. No. L-26896.

^[6]
Brief for Petitioners, pp. 29-30.

^[7]
Ibid, p. 30.

^[8]
G.R. No. L-22465, February 28, 1967.

^[9]
Kabigting v. Acting Director of Prisons, G.R.
No. L-15548, October 30, 1962.

^[10]Compagnie Franco-Indochinoise
v. Deutsch-­Australische Dampschiffs          

     Gesellschaft, 39
Phil. 474, 476.

^[11]
Brief for Petitioner, p. 13.

^[12]
Price Stabilization Corporation v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R.
No. L-13806, May 23, 1960.

^[13]
Brief for Petitioner, pp. 14-15.

^[14]
Ibid, p. 17.

^[15]
Brief for Respondents, p. 11.

^[16]
National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority v. NWSA Consolidated
Unions, L-18938, August 31, 1964.

^[17]
Brief for Petitioner, p. 19.

^[18]
Brief for Respondents, p. 16.

^[19]
70 Phil. 617.

^[20]
G.R. No. L-24019, November 29, 1968.