G.R. No. L-26100. February 28, 1969
CITY OF BAGUIO, REFORESTATION ADMINISTRATION, FRANCISCO G. JOAQUIN, SR., FRANCISCO G. JOAQUIN, JR., AND TERESITA J. BUCHHOLZ, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. PIO R. MARCOS, JUDGE OF THE C…
SANCHEZ, J.:
Petitioners attack the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Baguio
to reopen cadastral proceedings under Republic Act 931. Private petitioners
specifically question the ruling of the Court of Appeals that they have no
personality to oppose reopening. The
three-pronged contentions of all the petitioners are: (1) the reopening petition was filed outside
the 40-year period next preceding the approval of Republic Act 9 31; (2) said
petition was not published; and (3) private petitioners, as lessees of the
public land in question, have court standing under Republic Act 931. The facts follow:
On April 12, 1912 the cadastral proceedings sought to be
reopened, Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211, Baguio Townsite, were instituted
by the Director of Lands in the Court of First Instance of Baguio. It is not disputed that the land here
involved (described in Plan Psu-186187) was amongst those declared public lands by final decision rendered
in that case on November 13, 1992.
On July 25,
1961 respondent Belong Lutes petitioned the cadastral court
to reopen said Civil Reservation Case No. 1 as to the parcel of land he
claims. His prayer was that the land be
registered in his name upon the grounds that:
(1) he and his predecessors have been in actual, open, adverse, peaceful
and continuous possession and cultivation of the land since Spanish times, or
before July 26, 1894, paying the taxes thereon; and (2) his predecessors were
illiterate lgorots without personal notice of the
cadastral proceedings aforestated and were not able
to file their claim to the land in question within the statutory period.
On December 18, 1961,
private petitioners Francisco G. Joaquin, Sr., Francisco G. Joaquin, Jr., and Teresita J. Buchholz registered opposition to the
reopening. Ground: They are tree farm
lessees upon agreements executed by the Bureau of Forestry in their favor for
15,395.65 square meters on March 16,
1959, for 12,108 square meters on July 24, 1959, and for 14,771 square meters on July 17, 1959, respectively.
On May 5,
1962, the City of Baguio likewise opposed reopening.
On May 8, 1962, upon Lutes’ opposition, the cadastral court
denied private petitioners’ right to intervene in the case because of a final
declaratory relief judgment dated March 9, 1962 in Yaranon
vs. Castrillo [Civil Case 946, Court of
First Instance of Baguio]] which declared that such
tree farm leases were null and void.
On May 18, 1962,
private petitioners moved to reconsider.
They averred that said declaratory relief judgment did not bind them,
for they were not parties to that action.
On September 14, 1962,
the cadastral court reversed its own ruling of May 8, 1962, allowed petitioners to cross-examine the
witnesses of respondent Lutes,
On October 16, 1962,
Lutes replied to and moved to dismiss private petitioners’ opposition to his
reopening petition. On October 25; 1962,
private petitioners’ rejoinder was filed.
On August 5, 1963,
the cadastral court dismissed private petitioners’ opposition to the
reopening. A motion to reconsider was
rejected by the court on November 5,
1963.
On January 6, 1964,
it was the turn of the City of Baguio
to lodge a motion to dismiss the petition to reopen. This motion was adopted as its own by the
Reforestation Administration. They maintained the position that the declaratory
judgment in Civil Case 946 was not binding on those not parties thereto. Respondent Lutes opposed on February
24, 1964. On April 6, 1964, private petitioners reiterated their motion
to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds.
On September
17, 1964, the court
denied for lack of merit the City’s motion as well as the April 6, 1964 motion to dismiss made by private
petitioners.
On November 13, 1964,
all the petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus with preliminary injunction.[1]
They there questioned the cadastral court’s jurisdiction over the petition to
reopen and the latter’s order of August
5, 1963 dismissing private petitioners’ opposition. The appellate court issued a writ of
preliminary injunction upon a P500-bond.
Then came the judgment of the Court of Appeals of [September 30, 1965. The court held that petitioners were not
bound by the declaratory judgment heretofore stated. Nevertheless, the appellate court ruled that
as lessees, private petitioners had no right to oppose the reopening of the
cadastral case. Petitioners moved to
reconsider. It was thwarted on May 6, 1966.
Petitioners now seek
redress from this Court. On July 6,
1966, respondents
moved to dismiss the petition before us.
On August 5, 1966, petitioners opposed. On August 12, 1966, we gave due course.
1. Do private petitioners
have personality to appear in the reopening proceedings?
First, to the controlling statute, Republic Act 931, effective June 20, 1953.
The title of the Act
reads –
“AN ACT TO
AUTHORIZE THE FILING IN THE PROPER COURT,
UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, OF CERTAIN CLAIMS OF TITLE TO PARCELS OF LAND THAT
HAVE BEEN DECLARED PUBLIC LAND,
BY VIRTUE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS RENDERED WITHIN THE FORTY YEARS NEXT PRECEDING
THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT.”
Section 1 thereof
provides –
“SECTION 1. All persons
claiming title to parcels of land that have been the object of cadastral
proceedings, who at the time of the survey were in actual possession of the
same, but for some justifiable reason had been unable to file their claim in
the proper court during the time limit established by law, in case
such parcels of
land on account
of their failure to file such claims, have been, or are
about to be declared land of the public domain, by
virtue of judicial
proceedings instituted
within the forty years next preceding the
approval of this
Act, are hereby granted the right within five years[2]
after the date on which this Act shall take effect, to petition for a reopening
of the judicial proceedings under the provisions of Act Numbered Twenty-two
hundred and fifty-nine, as amended, only with respect to such of said
parcels of land as have not been alienated, reserved, leased granted, or otherwise provisionally or
permanently disposed of by the Government, and the competent Court of
First instance, upon receiving such petition, shall notify the Government,
through the Solicitor General, and if after hearing the parties, said court
shall find that all conditions herein established have been complied with, and
that all taxes, interests and penalties thereof have been paid from the time
when land tax should have been collected until the day when the motion is
presented, it shall order said judicial proceedings reopened as if no action
has been taken on such parcels.”[3]
We concede that in Leyva vs. Jandoc, G.R. No. L-16965, February 28, 1962,
a land registration case where oppositors were
“foreshore lessees of public land”, a principle was hammered out that
although Section 34, Land Registration Act,[4] “apparently authorizes any person
claiming any kind of interest to file an opposition to an application for registration,
x x x nevertheless x x x the opposition must be based
on a right of dominion or some other real right independent of, and not at all
subordinate to, the rights of the Government.”[5] The opposition, according to the Leyva decision, “must necessarily be predicated
upon the property in question being part of the public domain.” Leyva thus pronounced that “it is incumbent
upon the duly authorized representatives of the Government to represent its
interests as well as private claims intrinsically dependent
upon it.”
But the Leyva case
concerned an ordinary land registration proceeding under the provisions of the
Land Registration Act. Normally and logically, lessees cannot there present
issues of ownership. The case at bar,
however, stands on a different footing.
It involves a special statute, R.A. 931, which allows a petition for
reopening on lands “about to be declared” or already “declared land of the public domain” by virtue of
judicial proceedings. Such right,
however, is made to cover limited cases, i.e., “only with respect to such of said parcels
of land as have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or
otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the
Government.”[6]
The lessee’s right is thus impliedly recognized by R.A. 931. This statutory phrase steers the present case
clear from the impact of the precept forged by Leyva. So it is, that if the land subject of a
petition to reopen has already been leased by the government, that petition can
no Ringer prosper.
This was the holding in Director of Lands vs.
Benitez, G.R. No. L-21368, March
31, 1966. The reopening
petition there filed was opposed by the Director of Lands in behalf of 62 lessees
of public land holding revocable permits issued by the government. We struck down the petition in that case
because the public land, subject-matter of the suit, had already been
leased by the government to private persons.
Of course, the Benitez
ruling came about not by representations of the lessees alone, but through the
Director of Lands. But we may well scale
the heights of injustice or abet violations of R.A. 931 if we entertain the
view that only the Director of Lands[7] can here properly oppose the reopening
petition. Suppose the lands
office fails to do so? Will legitimate lessees
be left at the mercy of government officials? Should the cadastral court close
its eyes to the fact a lease
that may be proved by the lessees themselves, and which is enough to bar the
reopening petition? R.A. 931 could not have intended that this situation should
happen. The point is that, with the fact
of lease, no question of ownership need be inquired into pursuant to R.A. 931.
From this standpoint, lessees have sufficient legal interest in the proceedings.
The right of private
petitioners to oppose a reopening petition here becomes the more patent when
we take stock of their averment that they have introduced improvements on the
land affected. It would seem to us that
lessees, insofar as R.A. 931 is concerned,
come within the purview of those who, according to the Rules of Court,[8]
may intervene in an action. For, they
are persons who have “legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in
the success of either of the parties.”[9]
In the event herein private petitioners
are able to show that they are legitimate lessees, then their lease will
continue. And this because
it is sufficient that it be proven that the land
is leased to withdraw it from the
operation of Republic Act 931 and place
it beyond the reach of a petition for
reopening.[10]
In line with the Court of
Appeals’ conclusion, not disputed by respondent Lutes herein, the cadastral
court should have ruled on the validity of private petitioners’ tree farm
leases – on the merits.
Because there is need for Lutes’ right to reopen and petitioners’ right
to continue as lessees to be threshed out in that court.
We, accordingly, hold
that private petitioners, who aver that they are lessees, have the necessary
personality to intervene in and oppose respondent Lutes’ petition for
reopening.
2. Petitioners next contend that the reopening petition below,
filed under R.A. 931, should have been published in accordance with the
Cadastral Act.
To resolve this contention, we need but refer to a very recent
decision of this Court in De Castro vs. Marcos, supra involving exactly the same set of facts bearing upon the
question. We there held, after a
discussion of law and jurisprudence, that: “In sum, the subject matter of
the petition for reopening – a parcel of land claimed by respondent Akia – was already embraced in the cadastral proceedings
filed by the Director of Lands. Consequently,
the Baguio cadastral court already acquired
jurisdiction over the said property. The
petition, therefore, need not be published.” We find no reason to break
away from such conclusion.
Respondent Lutes attached to the record a certified true copy of
the November 13, 1922 decision in the Baguio Townsite Reservation case to show, amongst others, that the
land here involved was part of that case.
Petitioners do not take issue with respondent Lutes on this point of
fact.
We here reiterate our ruling in De Castro, supra, that the power of the cadastral court below over petitions to
reopen, as in this case, is not jurisdictionally tainted by want of
publication.
3. A question of transcendental importance is this: Does the
cadastral court have power to reopen the cadastral proceedings upon the
application of respondent Lutes?
The facts are: The cadastral,
proceedings sought to be reopened, were instituted on April 12, 1912. Final decision was rendered on November 13, 1922. Lutes filed the petition to reopen on July
25, 1961.
It will be noted that the title of R.A. 931, heretofore transcribed,
authorizes “the filing in the proper court, under certain conditions, of
certain claims of title to parcels of land that have been declared public land,
by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding the approval of this
Act.” The body of the statute, however, in its Section 1, speaks of parcels
of land that “have been, or are about to be declared land of the public
domain, by virtue of judicial proceedings
instituted within the
forty years next preceding the approval of this Act.” There thus appears
to be a seeming inconsistency between title and body.
It must be stressed at this point that R.A. 931 is not under
siege on constitutional grounds. No
charge has been made here or in the courts below that the statute offends the
constitutional injunction that the subject of legislation must be expressed in
the title thereof. Well-entrenched in
constitutional law is the precept that constitutional questions will not be
entertained by courts unless they are
“specifically raised, insisted upon and adequately argued.”[11] At
any rate, it cannot be seriously disputed that the subject of R.A. 931 is
expressed in its title.
This narrows our problem
down to one of legal hermeneutics.
Many are the principles
evolved in the interpretation of laws.
It is thus not difficult to stray away from the
true path of construction, unless we constantly bear in mind the goal we
seek. The office of statutory
interpretation, let us not for a moment forget, is to determine legislative
intent. In the words of a well-known
authority, “[t]he true object of all interpretation is to ascertain the
meaning and will of the law-making body, to the end that it may be
enforced.”[12] In varying language, “the purpose of
all rules or maxims” in interpretation “is to discover the true
intention of the law.”[13] They “are only valuable when they subserve this purpose.”[14] in fact, “the spirit or intention of a
statute prevails over the letter thereof,”[15] A statute “should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary, the
letter of the law.”[16]
By this, we do not “correct the
act of the Legislature, but rather x x x carry out and give due course to” its true intent.[17]
It should be certain by
now that when engaged in the task of construing an obscure expression in the
law[18] or
where exact or literal rendering of the words would not carry out the
legislative intent,[19] the title thereof may be resorted to in the
ascertainment of congressional will.
Reason therefor is that the title of the law
may properly be regarded as an index of or clue or guide to legislative
intention.[20] This is especially true in this
jurisdiction. For the reason that by
specific constitutional precept, “[n]o bill which may be enacted into law
shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed
in the title of the bill.”[21]
In such case, courts are compelled by the Constitution to consider both the
body and the title in order to arrive at the legislative intention.”[22]
With the foregoing guideposts on hand, let us go back to the
situation that confronts us. We take
another look at the title of R.A. 931, viz:
“AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE FILING IN THE PROPER COURT, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS,
OF CERTAIN CLAIMS OF TITLE TO PARCELS OF LAND THAT HAVE BEEN DECLARED PUBLIC
LAND, BY VIRTUE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS RENDERED WITHIN THE FORTY YEARS NEXT
PRECEDING THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT.” Readily
to be noted is that the title is not merely composed of catchwords.[23] It expresses in language clear the
very substance of the law itself. From this, it is easy to see that
Congress intended to give some effect to the title of R.A. 931.
To be carefully noted is that the same imperfection in the
language of R.A. 931 aforesaid – from which surfaces a seeming inconsistency
between the title and the body – attended Commonwealth Act 276, the present
statute’s predecessor. That prior law
used the very same language in the body thereof and in its title. We attach meaning to this circumstance. Had the legislature meant to shake off any
legal effects that the title ‘of the statute might have, it had a chance to do
so in the reenactment of the law.
Congress could have altered with great facility the wording of the title
of R.A. 931. The fact is that it did not.
It has been observed that “in modern practice the title is
adopted by the Legislature, more thoroughly read than the act itself, and in
many states is the subject of constitutional regulation.”[24]
The constitutional injunction that the subject of the statute must be expressed
in the title of the bill, breathes the spirit of command because “the
Constitution does not exact of Congress
the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the
bill.”[25] Reliance, therefore, may be placed on the
title of a bill, which, while not an enacting part, no doubt “is in some
sort a part of the act, although only a formal part.”[26] These considerations are all the more valid
here because R. A. 931 was passed without benefit of congressional debate in
the House from which it originated as House Bill 1410,[27] and in the Senate.[28]
The title now under
scrutiny possesses the strength of clarity and positiveness. It recites that it authorizes court
proceedings of claims to parcels of land declared public land “by virtue
of judicial decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding the
approval of this Act.” That title is written “in capital
letters” – by Congress itself; such kind of a title then “is not to
be classed with words or titles used by compilers of statutes” because
“it is the legislature speaking.”[29] Accordingly, it is not hard to come to a
deduction that the phrase last quoted from R.A. 931 – “by virtue of
judicial decisions rendered” – was but inadvertently omitted from the
body. Parting from this premise, there
is, at bottom, no contradiction between title and body. In line with the views herein stated, the
title belongs to that type of titles which should be regarded as part of the
rules or provisions expressed in the body.[30] At the very least, the words “by virtue
of judicial decisions rendered” in the title of the law stand in equal
importance to the phrase in Section 1 thereof, “by virtue of judicial
proceedings instituted.”
Given the fact then that
there are two phrases to consider, the choice of construction we must give to
the statute does not need much reflection.
We lean towards a liberal view.
And this, because of the principle long accepted that remedial
legislation should receive the blessings of liberal construction.[31] And, there should be no quibbling as to the fact that R.A. 931 is a piece of
remedial legislation. In essence, it
provides a mode of relief to landowners who, before the Act, had no legal means
of perfecting their titles. This is
plainly evident from the explanatory note thereof, which reads:
“This bill is intended to give an opportunity to any person or
claimant who has any interest in any parcel of land which has been declared as
public land in cadastral proceeding for failure of said person or claimant to
present his claim within the time prescribed by law.
There are many meritorious cases wherein claimants to certain parcels
of land have not had the opportunity to answer or appear at the hearing of
cases affecting their claims in the corresponding cadastral proceedings for
lack of sufficient notice or for other reasons and circumstances which are
beyond their control. Under C.A. No. 276, said persons or claimants have no
more legal remedy as the effectivity of said Act
expired in 1940.
This measure seeks to remedy the lack of any existing law within
which said persons or claimants with meritorious claims or interests in parcels
of land may seek justice and protection.
This bill proposes to give said persons or claimants their day in court.
Approval of this bill is earnestly requested.
In fine, we say that
lingual imperfections in the drafting of a statute should never be permitted to
hamstring judicial search ‘ for legislative intent, which can otherwise be
discovered. Legal technicalities should
not abort the beneficent effects intended by legislation.
The sum of all the
foregoing is that, as we now
view Republic Act 931, claims of title that may be filed thereunder
embrace those parcels of land that have been declared public land ”by virtue
of judicial decisions rendered within the forty
years next
preceding the approval of this Act.” Therefore, by that statute,
the July 25, 1961 petition of respondent Belong Lutes to reopen Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211 of the
cadastral court of Baguio, the decision on which was
rendered on November 13, 1922, comes within the 40-year period.
For the reasons given, the petition for certiorari is
hereby granted; the cadastral court’s orders of August 5, 1963, November
5, 1963 and. September 17,
1964 are hereby declared null and void; and the cadastral court is
hereby directed to admit petitioners, oppositions and proceed accordingly.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, C.J., Castro and Capistrano, JJ., did not take part.
Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee,
and Barredo, JJ., concur.
[1]
City of Baguio,
et al., Petitioners, versus Hon. Pio R.
Marcos, et al., Respondents, CA-G.R. No. 34909-R
[2]
Extended until December 31, 1968
by Republic Act 2061, effective June
13, 1958.
[3]
Emphasis supplied.
[4]
The text of Section 34, Act No. 496, as amended, reads: “Any person claiming an interest,
whether named in the notice or not, may appear and file an answer on or before
the return day, or within such further time as may be allowed by the
court. The answer shall state all the objections to the application, and
shall set forth the interest claimed by the party filing the same and apply for
the remedy desired and shall be
signed and sworn to by him or by some person in his behalf.”
[5]
See also: Aduan vs. Alba, G.R. No. L-17046, April 25, 1961.
[6]
Emphasis supplied.
[7]
On the Director of Lands is primarily lodged the power of executive control,
administration, management, distribution and disposition of public lands. Director of Lands vs. Lim, 91 Phil.
912; Mari vs. Secretary, 92 Phil. 410, 414; Kiamko
vs. Maceren, 92 Phil. 1057, 1060; Lubugan vs. Castrillo, 101
Phil. 1229, 1230; Municipality of San Carlos vs. Morfe,
G.R. No. L-17990, July 24, 1962;
Jarnisola vs. Ballesteros,
G.R. No. L-17466, September 18, 1965;
Ganitano vs. Secretary, G.R. No. L-21167, March 31, 1966.
[8]
Rule 143, Rules of Court, provides:
“These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral
and election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases
not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a
suppletory character and whenever
practicable and convenient.” Emphasis supplied.
[9]
Section 2, Rule 12, Rules of Court.
[10]
See: De Castro vs. Marcos,
G.R. No. L-26093, January 27, 1969.
[11]
I Tañada and Carreon,
Political Law of the Philippines, 1961 ed., p. 412, citing Santiago vs.
Far Eastern, 73 Phil. 438 and Phil. Ass’n. of Coll. & Univ. vs. Secretary of
Education, 51 0.G. 6230.
[12]
Black, Construction and Interpretation of the Laws, 2nd ed., p. 11.
[13]
82 C.J.S., p. 526.
[14]
Sedalia vs. Smith, 104 S. W.
15, 19.
[15]
Tañada vs. Cuenco,
G.R. No. L-10520, February 28, 1957,
citing 82 C.J.S., p. 613.
[16]
Lopez & Sons, Inc. vs.
Court of Tax Appeals, 100 Phil. 850, 855.
[17]
Id.
[18]
82 C.J.S., p. 731. See: Commissioner of Customs vs. Relunia, G.R. No. L-11860, May 29, 1959.
[19]
Bell vs. New
York, 11 N.E. 495, 497, citing Smith vs.
People, 47 N.Y. 330; People vs. Davenport,
91 N.Y. 574.
[20]
82 C.J.S., p. 734. See: Pruitt vs.
Sebastian County
Cole and Mining Co., 222 S.W. 2d. 50, 57, citing Reynolds vs. Holland,
35 Ark. 56.
[21]
Section 21(1), Article VI, Constitution; emphasis supplied.
[22]
37 A.L.R., p. 952, citing
Joyce vs. Woods, 78 Ky.
386. See also p. 937, referring
to O’Connor vs. Nova Scotia Teleph. Co.,
22 Can, S.C. 276, reversing 23 N.S. 509.
[23]
Cf. People vs. Yabut, 58 Phil. 499, 504,
which in substance held that “mere catchwords” cannot control the
body of the statute, which is otherwise unambiguous.
[24]
Sedalia vs. Smith, supra, at pp. 19-20.
[25]
Lidasan vs. Commission on Elections, L-28089, October 25, 1967.
[26]
Sedalia vs. Smith, supra,
at p. 20.
[27]
See: Congressional Record (House of Representatives), vol. II, Second
Congress, Second Regular Session, pp. 1921-1922.
[28]
See: Congressional Record
(Senate), vol. IV, Second Congress, Fourth Session, pp. 1108-1109.
[29]
Berger vs. Jackson, 23 So.
2d. 265, 267.
[30]
See: People vs. Lamphier, 172 N.Y.S. 247, 248-249; Newman vs.
Newman, 91 N.Y.S. 2d. 330, 331.
[31]
Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney General, 20 Phil. 523, 530; Rodrigo vs.
Cantor (unreported), L-4398, May 28,
1952, 91 Phil. 918; Maniego vs. Castelo, 101 Phil. 293, 296, citing Sibulo vs. Altar, 83 Phil. 513.