G.R. Nos. L-23331-32. December 27, 1969
HEIRS OF TEODOLO M. CRUZ, (REPRESENTED BY ARSENIA, FREDESWINDA, TEODOLO, JR., ERLINDA, EDGARDO AND MYRNA, ALL SURNAMED CRUZ), MARY CONCEPCION AND EDGARDO CRUZ, PETITIONERS, VS. …
TEEHANKEE, J.:
These cases are separate appeals filed by respective petitioners
from respondent Court’s Orders of November 8, 1963 and March 9, 1964 approving
by a split 3 to 1 vote the settlement for P110,000.00 of the estimated
P423,756.74 – judgment liability of respondent firm in favor of the
claimants-members of the Santiago Labor Union, executed on November 8, 1963
between respondent firm and the labor union as represented by a majority of its
board of directors. The appeals are
jointly resolved in this decision.
Petitioners in Cases L-23331-32 are the retained lawyers of the
Santiago Labor Union who question respondent Court’s approval of respondent
firm’s settlement of the union members’ judgment claims with the union board
of directors, without their knowledge and consent, notwithstanding their duly
recorded attorneys’ lien, and over the objection of a board member that the
union board had no authority to compromise or quit-claim the judgment rights of
the union members.[1]
Petitioners in Cases L-23361-62 are forty-nine (49) claimants-members
of the Santiago Labor Union who assail respondent Court’s approval of the
questioned settlement, without their authority as the real parties in interest,
and who denounce the settlement as unconscionable and having been entered into
by the majority of the union board “under circumstances of fraud, deceit,
misrepresentation and/or concealment, especially where a member of the Court
has actively used his official and personal influence to effect the settlement
which is manifestly unjust to laborers who by reason of their financial
disadvantages in a conflict with their employers need all the aid of the Court
for their protection, consonant with law, justice and equity.”[2]
The factual background goes as far back as June 21, 1952, when
the Santiago Labor Union, composed of workers of the Santiago Rice Mill, a
business enterprise engaged in the buying and milling of palay
at Santiago, Isabela, and owned and operated by King
Hong Co., Inc., filed before the respondent Court of Industrial Relations Cases
Nos. 709-V and V-1 thereof, a petition for overtime pay, premium pay for
night, Sunday and holiday work, and for reinstatement of workers illegally laid
off. As of then, the total sum claimed
by the workers, as itemized in their amended petition of September 2, 1952 –
P100,816.36 for overtime pay, P19,350.00 for premium pay and P3,360.00 for
differential pay under the Minimum Wage Law – amounted to P123,526.36.[3]
As recorded in this Court’s decision of August 31, 1962, in
Santiago Rice Mill et al vs. Santiago Labor Union,[4]
which affirmed the Court of Industrial Relations judgment in favor of the
workers, “on September 19, 1958, after a protracted hearing during which
scores of witnesses and voluminous exhibits were presented, the court, thru
Judge Emiliano G. Tabigne,
rendered decision dismissing the petition of the union for lack of merit and
want of jurisdiction; but, upon a motion for reconsideration, the Court of
Industrial Relations en banc, by a split decision of 3-2 vote,
issued a resolution reversing the decision of the trial judge. The dispositive
part of said resolution reads:
“‘WHEREFORE, the respondents are hereby ordered to pay the
overtime claim of both male and female claimants herein computed at their basic
pay for each period in question; the legal premium for night, Sunday and
holiday work or services rendered by the male claimants herein computed also on
the proven basic wage or salary at the time in question; to pay the overtime
claim of their drivers computed on their respective monthly salaries; to pay
the differentials due each of the women claimants on their wages from August 4,
1951 at the rate of P2.00 daily and P3.00 daily from August 4, 1952; and to
reinstate the claimants both male and female, who have testified and proved
their having been illegally laid-off, with the right of respondents to deduct
from the back wages due each claimant any amount earned during the period of
the illegal dismissal.'”
The workers’ decade of travail was not yet to be at an end,
however, despite this Court’s affirmance of the
judgment for the workers. After the
remand of the records for enforcement by respondent Court, and the
corresponding examination of books, said Court’s Chief Examiner filed his
Partial Report of December 14, 1962,
wherein the judgment award in favor of the workers was determined and computed,
as follows:
|
………….. P288,160.00 |
|
|
|
|
TOTAL ……..…….P423,756.74
Petitioners claim, furthermore, that “in this computation, however,
the field examiners did not include the claims of seventy (70) other laborers
whose total claims (for back wages), at the rate of P6,300.00 each, would be
P441,000.00. Therefore, the correct
grand total amount due the laborers would be P864,756.74.”[6]
The Chief Examiner’s Report showed respondent firm’s total assets
as at October 31, 1962 to be P191,151.08 (cash account of P148,411.20, fixed
assets of buildings, machinery & equipment, corn mill, etc. with a book
value of P40,073.75 and deferred charges of P2,666.13), and its net worth to be
in the same amount of P191,151.08, (capital stock paid up of P232,000.00 less
deficit of P40,848.92). The Report
further stated that in January, 1962 and on August 9, 1962, respondent firm sold its trucks, jeep and
one car, with a net book value of P2,628.71 for P27,000.00 or a net gain of
P24,371.29. Petitioners claim that the
book value of respondent firm’s fixed assets is only one-sixth of their actual
market value of P240,442.50, and that its total leviable
assets therefore amounted to close to P390,000.00, without taking into account
the huge income potential of its rice mill operations. Respondent firm disputes such a figure as
“completely gratuitous and without basis in fact.”[7]
A general opposition to the Chief Examiner’s Report was filed by
respondent firm. Judge Emiliano G. Tabigne, as the trial
judge, supra, ordered a hearing thereon on December 22, 1962, as a condition precedent to execution
of the judgment. Such Report was
submitted for resolution and approval at the hearing of December 22, 1962, but the records before us
fail to show that the trial judge ever acted on or approved the Report.
Before and after the submittal of the Chief Examiner’s Report of December 14, 1962, the union pressed
for execution of the final judgment in favor of its claimants-members. It filed, furthermore, on December 20, 1962,
an Urgent Motion for Preliminary Attachment, in view of the disposition by
respondent firm of its trucks and automotive equipment and by virtue of the
fact admitted by respondent firm that it had stopped operations preparatory to
liquidation, by reason of the alien nationality of most of its stockholders,
under the provisions of Republic Act No. 3018 nationalizing the rice and corn
industry. In another motion of December 4, 1962, the union had asked
that the Court at least order respondent firm to put up a bond of P500,000.00
to answer for the payment of the judgment or to deposit said amount in Court.
Petitioners assert that these motions were left hanging until the
union filed a mandamus petition with this Court,[8]
after which the trial judge issued and released on April 15, 1963 his Order dated March 30, 1963. In this Order, the trial Judge, recognizing
that “petitioner (union) and its members concerned should be extended the
necessary protection of their rights” ordered respondent firm, within 10
days from its finality, to deposit in Court the sum of one hundred thousand
(P100,000.00) pesos and to file a surety bond of equal amount, “to
guarantee the payment of whatever amount (a) due petitioner (union) and its
members concerned after this Court shall have finally decided the obligation of
herein respondents under the judgment.” This Order was affirmed by
respondent court en banc, in its Resolution denying respondent
firm’s motion for reconsideration thereof.
Respondent sought a review by this Court of the said Order and
Resolution requiring it to deposit P100,000.00 and to file a surety bond of
equal amount to guarantee payment of its judgment obligation in Santiago Rice
Mill et al. vs. Santiago Labor Union, etc., docketed as Cases G.R. Nos.
L-21758-59 of this Court. This Court, in
its Resolution of September 20, 1963,
dismissed for lack of merit respondent’s petition for review, and the dismissal
became final on October 24, 1963.
Earlier, on June 25,
1963, pursuant to the request of the parties, who had advised the
trial judge that they would meet at the premises of respondent firm at Santiago,
Isabela, to take up direct negotiations for the possible
settlement of the judgment, a team of employees of the Court had been sent to
help in the negotiations. The
transcript of the negotiations records that respondent had then offered the Union
the maximum amount of P110,000.00 in full settlement of its obligations to the
members-claimants of the Union under the judgment, but
that the union rejected the offer and counter-offered the minimum amount of
P200,000.00.
The union meanwhile filed to no avail a series of urgent motions
on May 8, July 1, August 29 and September 6, 1963 for approval of the Chief
Examiner’s Partial Report of December 14, 1962 and for enforcement, through a
writ of execution or contempt proceedings, of the Order of March 30, 1963
requiring respondent firm to deposit a total of P200,000.00 in cash and bond to
guarantee payment of the judgment. Upon
the finality of this Court’s Resolution dismissing respondent’s petition for a
review of said Order of March 30, 1963, the union again filed on October 29,
1963 still another Urgent Motion, advising the trial judge of this Court’s
action rejecting respondent’s appeal and invoking the Court’s ministerial duty
of enforcing its said Order – in vain again, as shall presently be seen.
The trial judge took no action on this latest Urgent Motion of
the union, wherein it emphasized that respondent, with this Court’s action
rejecting its appeal, no longer had any excuse for refusing to comply with the
deposit Order. Instead, an unscheduled
conference was called and held on October
31, 1963 in the chambers of the trial judge, and attended by
representatives of respondent firm, including their counsels of record, on one
hand and Segundino S. Maylem,
president of the union and eight directors of the union, on the other. Four of these nine union representatives,
including the union president himself, had no claims or awards whatever under
the judgment. Said union officials were
not assisted by counsel, as petitioner Mary Concepcion,
counsel of record of the union, was not present, not having been notified of
the conference.
At this conference of October 31, 1963, respondent firm made
again the same offer to settle and quitclaim the judgment in favor of the union
members for the same amount of P110,000.00, which offer had already been
rejected by the union at the earlier conference held on June 25, 1963 at
Santiago, Isabela, supra. But this time, as appears from the transcript
of the conference, respondent and the directors of the union decided to settle
the case amicably with the payment by the firm of the same amount of
P110,000.00 which was deposited with the Court’s disbursing officer
“immediately upon the signing of the settlement which will be prepared by
the respondent firm through its counsel.” The complete transcript of the
conference, as reproduced by respondent in its brief, follows:
“COURT:
“The parties have
solicited the intervention of the Court for the settlement of this case. They have decided to settle it amicably with
the condition that the management will pay ONE HUNDRED TEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P110,000.00) cash, and that the said amount will be deposited with the
Disbursing Officer of this Court immediately upon the signing of the settlement
which will be prepared by the respondent firm through its counsel. Now, Mr. Maylem,
make your manifestation on record.
“MAYLEM:
“As per unanimous
decision of the present members of the board composing of nine, the three are
not members of the board, present before this Honorable Court to date, (sic)
they have agreed to accept the profer of ONE HUNDRED
TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P110,000.00) as full settlement of their claims in Cases
Nos. 709-V and 709-V(1).
“ATTY. GARCIA:
“In behalf of the
respondent and the management of the said respondent and also in behalf of Mr. Pino, who is the attorney-in-fact of the respondent
corporation, with full power to enter into this settlement, we wish to
manifest and inform this Honorable Court that the acceptance of the profer of P110,000.00 in full settlement of the claims of
petitioners is with the full agreement of the said respondent. We are disposed to deposit the amount of
P110,000.00 on or about Friday,
November 8, 1963, and said deposit to be made with the Disbursing
Officer of this Court and said deposit to be in certified checks of a local
bank and which is actually equivalent to cash.
In line further with the suggestion of the Honorable Judge, we are
willing to assume the payment of the deposit fee upon our depositing the said
amount of P110,000.00. There is a
previous understanding which was not made of record as to the fact that to
enable the members of the board of directors of the petitioner union to come
back to Manila next week to enable them to sign the settlement papers, we have
agreed to advance the sum of TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P200.00) to the petitioner for
the account of said settlement and which will be used by the said petitioners
in their travelling expenses between Manila and
Santiago, going and coming.
“COURT:
“Noted.
“MR. MAYLEM:
“We request the
Court that Mrs. Mary Concepcion should be present
during the signing of the agreement on or about November 8, 1963, at 2:30
P.M.
“COURT:
“NOTED.”[9]
As against the official transcript of the proceedings of the
conference above reproduced, petitioner Natividad Magalpo, a director of the union, together with
petitioners Lydia Bulos and Paciencia
Batoon, both union members-claimants, filed on
November 5, 1963, through their present counsel, who duly entered their
appearance, their verified “Manifestation and Objection with Ex- Parte Urgent Motion”, relating what transpired at the
conference, charging the union president, Maylem,
with bad faith in that he never previously advised the union representatives
that the conference of October 31, 1963 was to discuss a compromise settlement
nor that this Court’s resolution dismissing respondent’s appeal from the trial
judge’s Order dated March 30, 1963 requiring respondent to deposit P200,000.00
in cash and surety bond had already become final, and asking the trial judge to
shelve the proposed settlement until respondent firm shall have complied with
the said deposit order. The pertinent
portions of said Objection and Urgent Motion read:
“3. That during the conference, the matter of amicably
settling the case was discussed; petitioner’s representatives pressed for at
least P150,000.00 as a fair amount and the representatives of the respondents
were insisting on their offer of a definite sum of P110,000.00;
“4. That in the course of the conference, no mention at all
was made of the entry of judgment in G.R. Nos. L-21758-59, Supreme Court of the
Philippines, entitled ‘Santiago
Rice Mill, et al. vs. Santiago
Labor Union, etc.’ on October
24, 1963, thereby becoming final and executory;
that the aforesaid entry of judgment reads as follows:
‘After a consideration of
the allegation of the petition filed in cases L-21758 and L-21759 (Santiago
Rice Mill, etc., vs. Santiago Labor Union, et al) for review of the order and
resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations referred to therein, the COURT
RESOLVED to dismiss the petition for lack of merit.’
“5. That by the terms of the afore-cited entry of judgment, the
Respondents, in effect, are ordered to deposit the sum of P100,000.00 in cash,
Philippine Currency, and similar amount of P100,000.00 in surety bond, pursuant
to the order of this Honorable Court of March 30, 1963, which was affirmed in
the above-cited Supreme Court resolutions;
“6. That as a consequence of the ignorance of the Board of
Directors of Petitioner of this entry, then present, they tentatively agreed to
the offer of P110,000.00 of Respondents, until November 8, 1963 when the final
conference before this Honorable Court will be held;
“7. That movants consented to come to
Manila on the understanding that the conference was to be held with the
Attorney-in-fact of the petitioner, the ‘CREAM, INC.’, formerly, Credit
Research and Intelligence,’ its exclusive authorized representative for the
evaluation, adjustment and liquidation of its claim against Respondent, that
they were very much taken back in having been taken to the Court of Industrial
Relations on October 31, 1963 by the President of the Petitioner, Mr. Segundino S. Maylem; that even
while they were already inside the building, they were never informed that the
purpose was to talk about a compromise settlement with Respondents
representatives; as a result of these circumstances, your movants
although present, were not able to register their objections to the
proceedings; that immediately after the aforesaid conference, the herein movants came to know of the entry of judgment in the
Supreme Court, infra; (sic)
“8. That the herein Movants
register and manifest their objections to the proceeding held and to the tentative
agreement manifested by the Board of Directors of the Santiago Labor Union then
present, on the following grounds:
a) That the Board of Directors did not have any express authority
of the members of the Santiago Labor Union to enter into any compromise for the
sum of P110,000.00; on the contrary, the latest authority granted its
Attorney-in-fact, the ‘CREAM, INC.’ was for the sum of P150,000.00 which
authority was given only very recently;
b) That the proceedings on
October 31, 1963 was tainted by apparent bad faith on the part of the President
of the Petitioner, Mr. Segundino S. Maylem, in that there never was a time before the
conference when he intimidated or otherwise made known to the movants, that a conference would be held before Judge Emiliano Tabigne. The only reason for the trip to Manila
was the conference with ‘CREAM, Inc.’ officials;
”c) That the effect of the entry of judgment in G.R. Nos.
L-21758-59, infra, was not explained to the members of the Board of Petitioner
at any time, much less made known, although it was later ascertained that
President Segundino S. Maylem
all the time, BEFORE THE CONFERENCE, knew of the existence of the order; what
was emphasized was the claim of the Resondents that
they are unable to pay more than P110,000.00; (italics supplied.)
“d) That the amount of P110,000.00 is unconscionable,
considering that the total claims of the members of the Petitioners, is more
than P400,000.00, not to mention that all the time the negotiations were being
made the Supreme Court’s final order makes mandatory Respondent’s deposit of
P100,000.00, cash in Philippine Currency and P100,000.00 in surety bond.
“9. That Movants vehemently disagree
to any settlement as tentatively agreed upon, for, in effect, they will only
get fourteen percent, (14%) approximately, or one?seventh of the
amounts as computed by the Chief Examiner of this Honorable Court;
x x x
x
‘WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that:
“a) Respondent be required to deposit the sum of P100,000.00
in cash, Philippine Currency, and P100,000.00 in surety bond, pursuant to the
entry of judgment in G.R. Nos.
L-21758-59;
“b) That these movants be afforded
opportunity by this Honorable Court to be heard regarding the surety bond to be
submitted by the Respondent, before approval thereof;
“c) The tentative settlement be shelved;
“d) Any further action on any settlement or compromise be held in
abeyance to await compliance by the Respondent of the entry of judgment in G.R.
Nos. L-21758-59;
“e) Hearings on the Report of the Chief Examiner be resumed
immediately and without interruption in view of the provisions of Republic Act
3018, until final termination as soon as possible long before December 31,
1963.”[10]
These petitioners further filed on the same date, November 4, 1963 an urgent Ex-parte Motion for the issuance of a writ of execution for
the enforcement of the deposit order against respondent firm, and asked the
trial judge to act on their two urgent motions upon receipt thereof.
Both urgent motions were totally ignored by both the trial judge
as well as by respondent firm, despite due notice on the latter. The request of the union president, Maylem, at the October
31, 1963 conference that the trial judge have the union counsel
present during the proposed signing of the settlement agreement set for November 8, 1963, as expressly noted
by the trial judge, was likewise ignored.
Notwithstanding that notice of the conference set for November 8, 1963 at 2:30 p.m. was served on November 5, 1963 on the union
counsel, petitioner Mary Concepcion, the scheduled
conference was never held.
Unexplainedly, Maylem,
the union president and nine other members of the union’s board of directors
(out of 13 board members) even before the scheduled hour of the conference on
November 8, 1963 at 2:30 p.m. had earlier executed a “Settlement” on
said date, without the knowledge, advice, and conformity of the union counsel,
with respondent firm’s attorney-in-fact, who was duly assisted by respondent’s
two counsels, who likewise executed the “Settlement.” In this
“Settlement”, the said union officials claiming to act “with the
authorization of the Board of Directors and its members,” in consideration
of the sum of P110,000.00, or one-fourth of the estimated P423,756.74-judgment
liability of respondent firm, as computed in the respondent Court’s Chief
Examiner’s Partial Report of December 14, 1962, “waived and quitclaimed . .
any and all claims it (the union) may have against the respondent as well as
the claim of each and every one of the members of the said petitioner union
against the respondent firm.” The union further “warranted” in
said “Settlement” “that aside from the petitioner (union) itself and
the members thereof, there are no other persons who have any interest over
the judgment debt and that if it should happen that other persons shall make a
claim against the respondent and/or said judgment debt, that the respondent,
nevertheless, shall no longer be liable therefor.”[11]
The “Settlement” was immediately submitted to the trial
judge who forthwith on the same day, November 8, 1963, issued his Order,
approving the same, and entered into respondent Court’s records at 1:45 p.m. of
the same day, as follows:
“Considering that the bases of the above quoted settlement is
well founded and justified and not contrary to law, morals and/or public
policy, approval of the same is, therefore, in order.
“WHEREFORE, the Court hereby approves the settlement of the
parties in these cases; and shall as between the parties to the same be deemed
to be a decision and/or award in these matters therein treated in the aforesaid
settlement; and upon acknowledgment of the sum of money in the said settlement,
these cases shall be deemed closed and terminated.”
Petitioners-lawyers Mary Concepcion et
al. upon learning of the “Settlement” and respondent’s deposit with
the Court of the sum of P110,000.00 in pursuance thereof filed in the afternoon
of November 8, 1963 a motion for withdrawal of the sum of P33,000.00 equivalent
to their 30% contingent fee, without prejudice to such action as they may take
for enforcing their lien to its full extent.
The trial judge granted such motion in its Order of November 9, 1963.
In due course, said petitioners moved for reconsideration and setting
aside of the trial judge’s Order of November 8, 1963 approving the
“Settlement” and prayed respondent Court en banc to
reinstate the judgment against respondent and to enforce the deposit order
dated March 30, 1963.
Petitioners Magalpo, Bulos and Batoon, likewise moved respondent Court en banc
to reconsider and set aside the trial judge’s approval of tie
“Settlement”, in disregard of their objection and pending motions of
November 5, 1963 to shelve
the proposed settlement and to enforce the deposit Order. On December
26, 1963, they were joined in their plea for reconsideration by
forty-seven other union members-claimants, Co-petitioners at bar.
Respondent, on the other hand, filed its opposition to the
motions for reconsideration, questioning the personality and interest of
petitioners-movants Magalpo
and her 2 other co-movants and asserting that they
were bound by the “Settlement” entered into by their union’s board of
directors. It alleged that it had
deposited with respondent Court the sum of P110,000.00 stipulated in the “Settlement”
on the same day of its approval by the trial judge. It filed with respondent Court on November 21, 1963 a letter of
ratification dated November 10, 1963
addressed to the trial judge and purportedly signed by some 79 union
members-claimants confirming and accepting the settlement executed by the union
board. Petitioners in their brief list
21 of these signatures as questionable, asserting that they are at variance
with other corresponding signatures in the Payroll dated November 8, 1963
submitted to respondent Court on November 21, 1963, such that “either one
or the other signature is a forgery.” Respondent counters that there is
“absolutely no truth to the claim” and that the signers of the
ratification letter “have all received their individual shares of the
P110,000.00 settlement paid by respondent company and this in itself is a
ratification on their part of said settlement.” Nothing appears in the
record, however, as to whether and in what manner the respondent Court
determined the authenticity of the signatures.
Respondent further filed on December
18, 1963 a motion for reconsideration of the trial judge’s Order
approving payment of P33,000.00 to the petitioners-attorneys by way of
attorneys’ fees.
On August 1, 1964, and August 4, 1964, after petitioners had
filed on November 29, December 2 and 17, 1963 and January 16, 1964 various
urgent motions to set for hearing and for resolution, they were served with
copies of respondent Court’s en banc Resolution dated March 9,
1964, penned by the trial judge, “finding no sufficient justifications to set
aside, disturb or modify the Order issued in these cases on November 8 and 9,
1963″ and denying all three motions for reconsideration. Judges Amando C. Bugayong and Ansberto F. Paredes concurred under date of July 29, 1964 with the Resolution, while Judge Arsenio Martinez took no part. No statement of the material allegations of,
and issues raised in, the pertinent pleadings set out in detail hereinabove nor
reasons for the conclusion of insufficient justification reached by the
majority resolution are given therein.
Then Presiding Judge Jose S. Bautista dissented. “Taking into account the precipitate
approval of settlement over the objection of some union members concerned and
without hearing them, on the strength simply of the manifestation of the
petitioner’s Board of Directors that it had authority to compromise when
previously said union members concerned had already manifested in Annex
“E” (Exhibit “G”, at bar) that there was no such authority,”
he voted “that the case be restored to the status quo as of
October 30, 1963, but the payment already made to the union members be
considered as partial payments on account, subject to final liquidation and
adjustment; that an order of execution of the judgment in cases Nos. G.R.
L-21758 and L-21759 of the Supreme Court be issued (upholding the Order of March 30, 1963 for deposit of
P200,000.00 in cash and surety bond) be issued and that the Hearing Officer
shall resume the hearing of the Examiner’s Report.”
Hence, the appeals of petitioners.
The Santiago Labor Union, impleaded as
party respondent in Cases L-23361-62, filed its Answer on September 24, 1964, “putting its weight behind
the prayers of the petitioners.” The Answer reveals that the union
members, feeling betrayed, had disauthorized and
removed from office Maylem, the union president and
his board of directors who had executed the “Settlement” with
respondent firm and disclaimed the documents of ratification that they had
signed at the behest of Maylem. The union averred in its Answer that:
“a) The real parties in interest in Cases 709-V and
709-V(1), CIR, are the members of respondent Labor Union;
“b) The records of the respondent labor union do not show
any grant by the members to the former incumbency of any previous authority to
negotiate the claim or subsequent ratification of the settlement for
P110,000.00 for it is unthinkable and ridiculous for the real parties in
interest to give away gratuitously what had been awarded to them in a final
judgment, for a much lesser amount than that of the award;
“c) The members are unanimous in the assertion that the
documents they signed at the behest of former President Segundino
S. Maylem were represented and understood to be but
an authority to collect a part of the court award to the members;
“d) That the records of the respondent labor union disclose that
the members of the union have unanimously acted, in their individual capacities
to proceed with the prosecution and collection of whatever sums they might yet
be entitled to collect, in order to show unequivocally that the negotiation
made by former President Segundino S. Maylem and his board of directors was unauthorized, and to
spotlight the betrayal of the members of the Union by said Segundino
S. Maylem and
his board of directors of the former union incumbency;
6. That fundamentally, there is no contentious issue between the
petitioners and respondent labor union; if at all, the only distinction is
between the personality of the real parties in interest, the union members who
have initiated and instituted this petition as against the limited and formal
personality of the respondent labor union to represent them when so authorized
by their collective will.”[12]
The core question is whether this Court can give its sanction to
respondent Court’s majority resolution upholding the trial judge’s approval of
the union board’s settlement for P110,000.00 of the estimated P423,756.74 –
judgment liability of respondent firm in favor of the individual union members,
over the timely opposition formally filed by three members (later joined by
forty-seven other members) expressly calling attention to the union board’s bad
faith in the premises and lack of any express authority to enter into the
settlement, and without giving the union the opportunity of being heard and
assisted by counsel, and notwithstanding the fact that respondent firm, which
had sufficient cash and fixed assets, was under legal compulsion by virtue of
respondent court’s own final order to deposit P100,000.00 in cash and another
P100,000.00 in surety bond to guarantee payment of the union members’ judgment
claims?
The question answers itself.
The precipitate approval of the purported settlement under the
circumstances goes against the grain of fundamental considerations of justice,
equity and due process.
1. To begin with, petitioners were not accorded due process of
law, when, for reasons unexplained in the record, the conference set for November
8, 1963 at 2:30 p.m. to take up formally the proposed settlement was cancelled
and never held. (supra, pp. 8-9)
Notice thereof had been served on the union counsel, in accordance with the
express request of the union president, as expressly noted by the trial
judge. Yet, such notice was deliberately
disregarded and the union was deprived of the assistance of its counsel.[13]
Instead, the settlement as unilaterally drafted by respondent’s counsel (supra,
p. 7) was executed ahead of the scheduled hour of the conference that turned
out to be a non-conference, by the union president with nine other members of
the union’s board of directors, without the knowledge, advice and conformity
of the union counsel, while respondent was duly assisted by its two counsels. By 1:45 p.m.
of the same day, the settlement had been approved by the trial judge as
“not contrary to law, morals and public policy.” Similarly,
petitioners Magalpo, a board member herself and her
co-petitioners Bulos and Batoon
were not accorded an opportunity for a fair hearing on their grave charges
against the union leadership and their urgent motions to shelve the proposed
settlement and to enforce the final order of respondent court requiring
respondent firm to deposit P200,000.00 in cash and surety bond for satisfaction
of the union members’ judgment, as said motions were totally ignored by the
trial judge and not touched upon at all in his Order rashly approving the
settlement.
2. The lack of due deliberation and caution in the trial judge’s
instant approval of the settlement is seen from the stipulations therein that
the union thereby waived and quitclaimed any and all claims which it may have
against the respondent, as well as the claim of each and every one of the
members of the union against respondent, when precisely the authority of
the union board members to enter into any such compromise or settlement was
under express challenge by petitioner Magalpo, a
board member herself in her Objection and Urgent Motion to shelve the settlement
filed on November 5, 1963, which the trial judge completely disregarded. Petitioner Magalpo
further made serious charges that Maylem, the union
president, had misled the board members into attending the unscheduled conference
held on October 31, 1963 before the trial judge, and had deliberately concealed
from them the fact of entry on October 24, 1963 of the Order of this Court in
G.R. Nos. L-21758-59 upholding the P200,000.00 deposit Order of respondent
court and the effect thereof of making mandatory upon the trial judge, in
accordance with the terms of his own order, the issuance of a writ for
execution or enforcement to compel respondent to so deposit P100,000.00 in cash
and an equal amount in surety bond to guarantee satisfaction of the union members’
judgment against respondent. In point of
fact, the union’s own Urgent Motion of October 29, 1963, emphasizing that
respondent no longer had any excuse for not complying with the deposit order,
as well as petitioner Magalpo et al’s Urgent ex-parte motion of November 4, 1963 to the same effect were
pending before the trial judge, unresolved and unacted
upon. Petitioners Magalpo
et al. had reason, therefore, to assail the proposed settlement for P110,000.00
as unconscionable, when at the very least the union members could be assured of
P200,000.00 under the deposit order to satisfy their judgment credit, while the
report of respondent court’s examiner showed that respondent firm had
sufficient assets, (supra, p. 5), and considering that their partial judgment
credit, as estimated by respondent court’s examiner, amounted to more than
P400,000.00.
3. The trial judge’s rush approval of the settlement disregarded
the grave adverse consequences thereof to the union members. The settlement, as prepared by respondent’s
counsel, provided for a union warranty that aside from the union itself and the
members thereof, “there are no other persons who have any interest over
the judgment debt and that if it should happen that other persons shall make a
claim against the respondent and/or said judgment debt, that the respondent,
nevertheless, shall no longer be liable therefor.”
Such warranty was against the very facts of record, which showed that as early
as June 21, 1963,
petitioners-counsels in Cases L-23331-32 had duly recorded their attorneys’
lien of “30% of whatever amount may finally be awarded in favor of the
petitioner.” Thus, technically, since the award in favor of the union
members amounted to more than P400,000.00 the settlement for P110,000.00 would
conceivably just about cover the 30% attorneys’ fees payable to the
petitioners-counsels under the contract, if they were so minded to enforce it
and bad faith on the union’s part were shown, with the union members left
holding an empty bag.[14]
Such onerous terms of the settlement could not then properly be approved by the
trial judge as “not contrary to law, morals and public policy.”
4. All these underscore the failure of due process when
petitioners were deprived of the formal conference on the proposed settlement scheduled
for November 8, 1963 and of their right to be assisted by the union counsel as
expressly requested, so that a fair hearing could be accorded petitioners and
an opportunity afforded them to air their serious charges of bad faith and lack
of authority against the union leadership.
Certainly, all these serious questions and charges made by petitioners
could have been threshed out and verified, if the formal conference scheduled
for November 8, 1963 had
been held with the presence of union counsel, considering that the latter
likewise had a right to be heard, since they had duly made of record their
attorneys’ lien upon the judgment.[15]
Respondent, in its brief, asserts that it vividly remembers that the trial
judge repeatedly made mention of the P200,000.00 deposit order during the
unscheduled conference of October 31,
1963 and “even explained the matter to the members of the
board in their native dialect.” But the transcript of the conference
reproduced above (supra, pp. 7-9) does not bear out this assertion. The transcript is obviously deficient and
does not reflect the actual discussions and proceedings. This is to be deplored, for in a matter of
such great importance, especially where the union officials were unassisted by
counsel in an unscheduled conference, care should be taken by the trial judge
that the proceedings are faithfully recorded.
Thus, although the transcript again fails to make any mention of it,
respondent, in its brief, in effect provides support for petitioners’ plaint
against the unscheduled conference and precipitate approval of the settlement
behind the back of union counsel, when it states that “the presiding judge
tried to help the parties reach a settlement by stressing to the union that
there was no sense in demanding more than P110,000.00 from the respondent if
that was all it could afford, and that any more delay in the execution of its
award to the union members might lead to their getting much less than the
P110,000.00 already being offered by respondents,” and “while it is
true that the presiding judge took an active part in helping the parties reach
such settlement, it was only in line with the policy of the law encouraging
settlement of cases even after final judgment.”[16]
The obvious fallacy of this untenable posture assumed by the trial judge, of
course, is that with this Court having upheld his P200,000.00 deposit order, it
made every sense to enforce execution of said order, which it was practically
his ministerial duty to do so, to assure the union members of recovery of their
judgment credit at the very least to the extent of P200,000.00, as the trial
judge had expressly recognized therein that ‘petitioner (union) and its
members concerned should be extended the necessary protection of their
rights.” Any further delay in the execution of the judgment award in favor
of the union members could readily be obviated, if the trial judge would but
expedite the hearings for approval of the Court examiner’s Report which had
been filed and left pending since December
14, 1962. As correctly
contended by petitioners, he could have placed the union members, unassisted as
they were by counsel, on an equal footing in negotiating with respondent by a
mere stroke of his pen by ordering the enforcement of his final P200,000.00 deposit
order, as to which there no longer existed any obstacle. We find the forcing through of the
settlement, under such circumstances, arbitrary, unfair and unconscionable.
5. Another vital reason for striking down the settlement is the
lack of any express or specific authority of the president and majority of the
union board of directors to execute the same and scale down the estimated
P423,756.74 – judgment liability of respondent firm in favor of the individuals
union members to P110,000.00. On the contrary,
petitioner board member Magalpo timely challenged the
authority of the union board to execute any such settlement, expressly
informing the trial judge that the union had specifically appointed an entity
in Manila, the “CREAM, Inc.”, formerly Credit Research and
Intelligence, as its attorney-in-fact and “exclusive authorized
representative for the evaluation, adjustment and liquidation of its claim
against respondent.” Forty-seven other union members-claimants joined
petitioner Magalpo in their denunciation of the union
board’s unauthorized action, and in their plea for reconsideration with
respondent court. Forty-nine union
members-claimants entitled to the bulk of the judgment award have filed this
appeal from the adverse rulings of the Court below. These union members have repudiated the
former union president, Maylem and his board of
directors, for having betrayed the union members, and the new union leadership,
in its Answer filed with the Court, has joined petitioners in their prayer for
redress, categorically asserting that the union records do not show any grant
by the members to the former union board under Maylem
to “negotiate the claim or subsequent ratification of the settlement for
P110,000.00″ which is “unthinkable and ridiculous.” (supra, p.
15) Under such circumstances, the letter of ratification of the settlement
purportedly signed by some 79 members, many of whose signatures thereon are
denounced as forgeries and which ratification was not authenticated in the
proceedings below and has been expressly disowned by petitioners herein, cannot
be given any legal significance or effect.
6. When it is further taken into consideration that the judgment
award, as affirmed by this Court’s decision of August 31, 1962,[17]
was for the payment of overtime, premium and differential pay to the individual
union members as claimants and for the reinstatement of the individual
union members who testified and proved their having been illegally laid-off,
which represent a personal material interest directly in favor of the individual
union members, as against the lack of material interest on the part of the
union as such, the union’s lack of authority to execute the settlement, in the
absence of express or specific authorization by the union members, becomes
patent. The authority of the union as
such, to execute a settlement of the judgment award in favor of the individual
union members, cannot be presumed but must be expressly granted.
7. Recently, in the analogous case of La Campana
Food Products, Inc. etc. Employees Ass’n. vs. Court
of Industrial Relations, et al.,[18]
this Court ruled upon the merits of the union’s appeal, and set aside the
Industrial Court’s questioned orders which would reopen its previous judgment
finding the employer guilty of unfair labor practice and ordering the
reinstatement of, and payment of back wages from December 4, 1963 to,
twenty-one (21) union members. In
handing down its decision, this Court disregarded the petitioner union’s motion
to dismiss the appeal, filed through new counsel while the case was pending
decision, alleging that the union’s legislative council had adopted a
resolution relieving the former union counsel of his services and authorizing
the dismissal of the case, on the premise that such dismissal “would serve the
best interests of both parties who are now in the process of formulating a
collective bargaining agreement in their earnest desire to establish industrial
peace and promote the economic well-being of all the parties concerned.”
For this Court ruled that the union’s loss of interest in the case was no
ground for dismissing the case, since “the labor union as a body in reality
has not so great a material interest in the controversy as would prejudice it
in the event of dismissal. It is the
twenty-one (21) members for whose benefit the ULP case was prosecuted who stand
to take tremendous losses” and suffer injustice. Upholding the individual union members in
their stand of vindicating their rights acquired under the final judgment as
against the union’s legislative council’s resolution to dismiss the case, this
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Sanchez, thus held: –
“We now come to the motion to dismiss filed in this Court on March 10, 1969 by new counsel for
petitioner. In that motion, we read the
averment that the petitioning union, ‘after careful and serious consideration
of their Petition, taken in the light of recent developments affecting their
relationship with the respondent-company, have decided that they have lost
interest in the further prosecution of their claims’; that the union’s
legislative council, on February 5, 1969, adopted a resolution authorizing the
new counsel to file a motion dismissing this case; that the former counsel who
directed this case before this Court.
Atty. Eulogio R. Lerum,
had been relieved of his services in a letter of the union dated January 13,
1969; and that ‘the dismissal of this instant case would serve the best
interests of both parties who are now in the process of formulating a
collective bargaining agreement in their earnest desire to establish industrial
peace and promote the economic well-being of all parties concerned.’ This drew
a reply from Atty. Eulogio R. Lerum
that ‘while he admits that he had received termination notice from the alleged
officers of the above-named union, he had not been disauthorized
by the complainants who had retained him to appear in their behalf’ and that
‘said complainants are against the dismissal of their case for the reason that
they want to vindicate their rights and it is against public policy to settle
an unfair labor practice by amicable settlement (Sec. 5(a), Rep. Act 875).’
“While it may be true that the labor union itself has lost
interest in the case, we do not believe that such should give ground for the
dismissal of this case. The labor union
as a body in reality has not so great a material interest in the controversy
as would prejudice it in the event of dismissal. It is the twenty-one (21) members for whose
benefit the ULP case was prosecuted who stand to take tremendous losses. Nor is the argument that union and employer
are now in the process of formulating a collective bargaining agreement of any
consequence. That would not be affected
by the decision we now render as an aftermath of the ULP case. Unless of course such a dismissal is a quid
pro quo before the parties could sit around the bargaining
table. Which surely enough is not to the
‘best interests’ of the laborers.
“And, as we examine the
record, we observe none of the members of the legislative council who adopted
the resolution relied upon in the motion to dismiss is personally
affected by the decision rendered by the CIR in Case 3985-ULP. That decision, it will be recalled, directs
private respondents herein not only to reinstate the twenty one (21) union
members without loss of seniority and other benefits and privileges but also to
pay their respective backwages from December 4, 1963, date of filing of
the charge, basis of the complaint, until actual reinstatement. It is easy enough to perceive the injustice
which may be visited upon these twenty-one (21) union members if the petition
herein were to be dismissed. For then, a
new trial will be had, with the consequent trouble, expense, anxiety and
another long delay before they could enjoy the fruits of their victory which
they have legally and definitely won only after a long and
protracted legal battle. At any rate, it
is better on balance that we foreclose a flanking movement which could destroy
rather than uphold the rights — to reinstatement and monetary award — of
individual laborers acquired under the final judgment.”
8. Just as this Court has stricken down unjust exploitation of
laborers by oppressive employers, so will it strike down their unfair treatment
by their own unworthy leaders. The
Constitution enjoins the State to afford protection to labor.[19]
Fair dealing is equally demanded of unions as well as of employers in their
dealings with employees. The union has
been evolved as an organization of collective strength for the protection of
labor against the unjust exactions of capital, but equally important is the
requirement of fair dealing between the union and its members, which is
fiduciary in nature, and arises out of two factors: “one is the degree of dependence of the
individual employee on the union organization; the other, a corollary of the
first, is the comprehensive power vested in the union with respect to the
individual.”[20]
The union may be considered but the agent of its members for the purpose of
securing for them fair and just wages and good working conditions and is
subject to the obligation of giving the members as its principals all
information relevant to union and labor matters entrusted to it. As already discussed above, the union
leadership in the case at bar was recreant in its duty towards the union
members in apparently having failed to disclose to the union members the full
situation of their judgment credit against respondent, to wit, that they were
in the advantageous position of being able to require enforcement of the
respondent court’s P200,000.00 – deposit order, and in presuming that it had
authority to waive and quitclaim the estimated P423,756.74 – judgment credit
of the union members for the unconscionable amount of P110,000.00, which had
already been previously rejected by the workers. Respondent firm could not claim that it dealt
in good faith with the union officials, for it hastily executed the purported
settlement notwithstanding the serious charges of bad faith against the union
leadership, and the non-holding of the scheduled conference where the union
leaders, at their express request, could be duly assisted by union
counsel. It is noteworthy that
respondent never filed with the court below any denial or responsive pleading
traversing the factual allegations in petitioner Magalpo’s
Manifestation and Objection charging that at the unscheduled conference of
October 31, 1963, the proposed settlement was in effect railroaded with the
fact of the finality of the P200,000.00 – deposit order not having been
disclosed to the union representatives.
Such failure on the part of respondent constitutes an implied admission
of the material averments. Respondent’s
justification now that it did not file any responsive pleading or denial
because Magalpo and her co-petitioners had no
personality to file their pleadings as they were not parties to the cases in
the lower court is of no avail, for they were actually the awardees and
beneficiaries under the judgment against respondent and the union was but their
agent. Deplorable also is the failure of
the trial judge to defer precipitate action on approval of the settlement until
the union could be afforded the opportunity of a hearing thereon duly assisted
by counsel, and failure later of the majority of respondent court in the
reconsideration proceedings as well, to look seriously into the grave charges
of bad faith and deception against the union officials and their lack of authority
to execute the settlement. All of these
charges were just swept under the rug, and summarily dismissed, without even
being mentioned, in the unreasoned en banc Resolution, finding
arbitrarily as against the facts herein collated by this Court from the
pertinent pleadings and annexes furnished it, “no sufficient justification
to set aside, disturb or modify” the questioned approval of the
settlement.
9. The cases of Jesalva et
al. vs. Bautista,[21]
and Diomela et al. vs. Court of Industrial
Relations,[22] cited
by respondent, clearly have no application in the present case. In Jesalva,
seventeen cases in different stages of hearing or execution before the Industrial
Court were settled by a compromise agreement, and
this Court held that the three petitioners who questioned the settlement were
“bound by the actions of the Union, that is to say,
a majority of the members of the union.” There was no question there that
the union had acted with the authority of the union membership. No deceit or concealment or misrepresentation
tainted the settlement. Neither was the
amount of the settlement denounced as unconscionable. The employer there, Premiere Productions,
Inc., agreed to pay the amount of P200,000.00 which appeared to be a reasonable
settlement as against the judgment credit of the union workers, and further
agreed to lease to the union its equipment and facilities for the Union to
produce two moving pictures, apparently to cover the other wage claims of the
union workers which were still pending trial and resolution. In Diomela,
the labor-management disputes were settled amicably with the unfair labor
practice charge against the employer, Squibband Sons
(Phil.) being withdrawn, upon motion signed by the union president and the
three employees against whom the acts of unfair labor practice charged in the
complaint had been allegedly committed, to which motion the Court’s prosecutor
gave his conformity, and with the employer, which had secured a permanent writ
of injunction restraining the strikers who had apparently declared an illegal
strike, against the commission of acts of violence, threats and intimidation,
agreeing to pay three months separation pay to each striking employee. There was no question, therefore, of the
authority of the union president to withdraw the unfair labor practice charge,
as the three employees directly affected had co-signed the withdrawal motion
with him. The subsequent move of Diomela and 23 co-petitioners to disauthorize
the union and its counsel of record, was by their own pleading, overruled by
the majority of the union membership.
The other acts of unfair labor practice sought to be filed by Diomela and his companions were there ruled out as
splitting a cause of action and harassing the employer with subsequent charges,
based upon acts committed during the same period of time and which should have
been included in the charges first preferred.
What should be borne in mind is that the interests of the individual
worker can be better protected on the whole by a strong union aware of its
moral and legal obligations to represent the rank and file faithfully and
secure for them the best wages and working terms and conditions in the process
of collective bargaining. As has been
aptly pointed out, the will of the majority must prevail over that of the
minority in the process, for “under the philosophy of collective
responsibility, an employer who bargains in good faith should be entitled to
rely upon the promises and agreements of the union representatives with whom
he must deal under the compulsion of law and contract. The collective bargaining process should be
carried on between parties who can mutually respect and rely upon the authority
of each other.”[23]
Where, however, collective bargaining process is not involved, and what is at
stake are back wages already earned by the individual workers by way of
overtime, premium and differential pay, and final judgment has been rendered in
their favor, as in the present case, the real parties in interest with direct
material interest, as against the union which has only served as a vehicle for
collective action to enforce their just claims, are the individual workers
themselves.[24]
Authority of the union to waive or quitclaim all or part of the judgment award
in favor of the individual workers cannot be lightly presumed but must be
expressly granted, and the employer, as judgment debtor, must deal in all good
faith with the union as the agent of the individual workers. The Court in turn should certainly verify and
assure itself of the fact and extent of the authority of the union leadership
to execute any compromise or settlement of the judgment on behalf of the
individual workers who are the real judgment creditors.
We therefore sustain the minority opinion of then Presiding Judge
Bautista of respondent Court that the settlement was precipitately approved
without verification of the union board’s authority to execute the compromise
settlement, and find that there was no such authority. The said settlement is therefore set aside and
the cases below are restored to the status quo, as of October 30,
1963, with the payments already made to the union members to be considered as
partial payments on account, subject to final liquidation and adjustment. It is directed that an order for the
enforcement of the P200,000.00 – deposit order dated March 30, 1963 issued in the cases below, and
upheld in Cases G.R. Nos. L-21758-59 of this Court dismissing the respondent’s
petition for review, be forthwith issued, and that hearings on the Chief Examiner’s
Report of December 14, 1962
be resumed immediately and without interruption so that the amounts due under
the judgment to the individual union members may be finally determined without
further delay. It is unfortunate that
pending these proceedings, no application for preliminary injunction
restraining respondent firm from disposing of its assets was made, since as
stated above, (supra, p. 5) respondent had stopped operations in 1962
preparatory to liquidation, by virtue of the provisions of Republic Act No.
3018 nationalizing the rice and corn industry.
The respondent firm’s stockholders are, however, charged with notice of
the firm’s liability by virtue of the pendency of
these appeals, and should any liquidating dividends have been distributed and
paid to them in the meantime, they shall stand liable for the satisfaction of
the union workers’ judgment against respondent to the extent of such dividends
respectively paid to and received by them.
Similarly, any outstanding unpaid subscriptions or balances of
subscriptions to the firm’s capital stock, estimated at P20,000.00,[25]
shall be subject to garnishment and execution in satisfaction of the judgment. As to the contingent 30% attorneys’ fees of
petitioners-lawyers, the Court deems it proper at this stage, to direct in the
exercise of its authority to control the amount of such fees, that
petitioners-lawyers may collect their stipulated contingent 30% attorneys’ fees
to the extent that additional amounts may be realized on the union workers’ judgment
up to the sum of P150,000.00, including the initial payment of P110,000.00, (on
which they have already collected their corresponding fee), such that any
further amounts collected beyond said sum of P150,000.00 shall no longer be
subject to said contingent fee.
WHEREFORE, the
respondent Court’s Orders of November
8, 1963 and March 9, 1964
are hereby declared null and void and set aside. The respondent court is directed to proceed
immediately with the execution of the judgment rendered by it against
respondent firm in Cases Nos. 709-V and V-1 as affirmed by this Court’s
decision of August 31, 1962,[26]
in accordance with the directives set forth in the next preceding paragraph,
which is incorporated by reference as an integral portion of the dispositive part of this decision. With costs against private respondent in both
cases herein decided.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Dizon, Makalintal,
and Barredo,
JJ., took no
part.
[1]
Atty. Teodulo M. Cruz, during his lifetime, was the
counsel who successfully prosecuted the cases at bar on behalf of the union,
Cases Nos. 709-V and V(1) in the Court of Industrial Relations, affirmed in
G.R. L-18040 of this Court promulgated on August 31, 1962.
Upon his death on May 13, 1960,
he was succeeded as counsel by petitioners Mary Concepcion
and Atty. Edgardo Cruz, his son. The other petitioners join the petition as
his heirs.
[2]
Petition, p. 9.
[3] Santiago
Rice Mill et al. vs. Santiago
Labor Union, G.R. No. L-18040, August
31, 1962, 5 SCRA 1118.
[4]
See fn. 3.
[5]
The total number of workers-claimants appears to be 104; of this number, 60 of
them have awards, in addition to overtime and premium pay, for minimum wage
differentials, per item (c) and 35 of them have an additional substantial
award for back wages due to illegal lay-off, per item (a).
[6]
Petitioners Bulos et al.’s Brief, p. 3; Petition,
par. 3, p. 3 note in parentheses supplied.
[7]
Respondents’ Brief, in G.R. No. L-23361-62, p. 3.
[8]
Santiago Labor Union etc. vs. Hon. Emiliano Tabigne, et al., docketed as G.R. Nos. L-21028-29 on March 4, 1963. The writ of mandamus was denied by this Court
in its Decision of May 27, 1966 on the ground that respondent judge had
properly issued his order of September 25, 1962 directing the court examiner to
determine the amounts due for overtime pay, etc. and his subsequent order dated
March 30, 1963 to deposit P200,000.00 in cash and surety bond to guarantee
payment of the judgment.
[9]
Respondent’s Brief in G.R. No. L-23361-62, pp. 18-22.
[10] Exh. G, Emphasis supplied.
[11] Exh. I, petition, pp. 57-60.
[12]
Emphasis supplied.
[13]
Cf. Macabinkil v. Yatco
21 SCRA 150 (1967).
[14]
See Recto Vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 427; Aro vs.
Nañawa, 27 SCRA 1090.
[15] Rule
138, section 37 provides that upon notice of such lien, an attorney “shall
have the same right and power over such judgments and executions as his client
would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and
disbursements.
[16]
Respondents’ brief in G.R. No.L-23361-62,
p. 27.
[17] Santiago
Rice Mill vs. Santiago Labor
Union 5 SCRA 1118.
[18]
18 SCRA 314 (May 22, 1969).
[19]
Art. XIV, sec. 6, Philippine Constitution.
[20]
International Union of Electrical R. & M. Workers vs.
NLRB 307 F. 2d 679.
[21]
105 Phil. 348 (Mar. 24, 1959).
[22]
8 SCRA 832 (Aug. 31, 1963.
[23]
Union News Co. vs. Hildreth 295 F 2d. 658.
[24]
Cf. National Brewery & Allied Industries Labor Union vs. San Miguel
Brewery, Inc. 9 SCRA 847 (Dec. 17,
1963).
[25]
Petitioners’ brief in G.R. No. L-23361-62, p.51.
[26] Santiago
Rice Mill et al. vs. Santiago
Labor Union, G.R. No. L-18040, 5 SCRA 1118.