JOVITO P. DIZON, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. AGAPITA CONCINA, FLORENCIO PONGPONG, ANANIAS CONCINA AND ROSITA REMITIR, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

Suit for forcible
entry.  The land involved is located in
barrio Telegrafo, San Jose, Camarines
Sur, bounded on the north­east by Cornelia and Marcelina Prado, Jovito P. Dizon and Feli­zardo Cilot, on the
northwest by a canal, Jovito P. Dizon
and Heirs of Lucio Pande,
on the southeast by Asuncion Fuentebella and on the southwest
by Rangas River and Felipa Capus before, now Jovito P. Dizon.  The complaint
filed on September 3, 1960 before the Justice of the Peace (Municipal) Court of
San Jose, Camarines Sur,
avers that on April 3, 1960, defendants, confede­rating together and helping
one another, by means of force, stra­tegy and stealth, unlawfully entered the
southwestern portion of the property just described, having an area of 75 ares, more or less, ejecting therefrom
plaintiff’s encargado and depriving plain­tiff of the
possession thereof.  Defendants’ answer
in the inferior court dated October 13, 1960 describes in paragraph 3 thereof
two parcels of land both bounded on the north by Rangas
River which is the southwestern boundary of plaintiff’s land, and avers
“[t]hat if the plaintiff refers to the land described in paragraph 3
hereof, he has no right over the same.” The judgment of the inferior
court, after trial, went for plaintiff. 
Defendants appealed.

In the Court of First Instance of Camarines
Sur, defend­ants in their new answer repeated the
averments just mentioned.

Then, on February 12,
1963, defendants filed an amended answer in the Court of First
Instance.  Their two parcels of land described as such in paragraph 3 of the
two previous answers were there – also in paragraph 3 – consolidated into
one.  To be noted is that this
consolidated parcel describes the boundary on the north by Rangas River (before), by Jovito
P. Dizon (now). 
Then followed the following material amendments:  “5. 
That during the strong typhoon sometime in the year 1948, the Rangas River which, prior thereto, was the natural boundary
between the estates of the parties herein, suddenly changed its course by
traversing the northern portion of the defendants’ lands separating from it the
northern portion thereof; 6.  That the
old river bed has become dry and defendants have taken pos­session thereof and
have never abandoned the possession of the segregated northern portion; 7.  That if the plaintiff refers to the land
described in paragraph 3 hereof and referred to in the two preceding
paragraphs, then he has no right whatsoever over the same.” This amended
answer was admitted by the court on February 28, 1963, the court stating that the claim of
ownership was “only for the purpose of showing the character and extent of
possession.”

On March 23, 1963,
plaintiff filed his amended complaint which repeats the description of his land
showing that the southwest portion thereof is bounded, amongst others, by Rangas River.  The disputed paragraph 3 of the amended
complaint reads:  “3.  That on the SW which is bounded by the Rangas River and Felipa Capus now of the plaintiff there existed a por­tion which
was periodically covered by water during rainy season and hence it was not
included in the survey but later became higher thus forming an accretion to the
plaintiff’s property thru the gradual effect of the current of said river from
which time then it was dedicated to pasture and to casava
and camotes up to April 3, 1960.” Then follows
the allegation of forcible entry.

On May 13, 1964, defendants moved for the dismissal of the
action, in the words of counsel, “for lack of jurisdiction because the
land litigated before this Honorable Court by virtue of the amended complaint
has not been litigated in the inferior court”, and that there was “a
change of theory and cause of action.” They directed their criticism
against paragraph 3 of the amended complaint just adverted to.

On July 20, 1964, the trial court, declaring that “it was
obvious that there is a change of subject matter which this court, as an
appellate court has no jurisdiction”, and that “there is a change of theory and cause of action, now
that the plaintiff is proving that there was accretion which is different from
that of the original case”, dismissed the complaint, and directed the
plaintiff “to reimburse the defendant Agapita Concina the sum of P300.00 representing the costs of survey
of the property of the plaintiff.”

It is now plaintiff’s turn to appeal on purely questions of law.

1. No serious question arises as to plaintiff’s cause of
action.  It is forcible entry.  The subject matter thereof merely is the
material possession or possession de facto over the real
property.  Ownership or the right of
possession as an attribute of ownership is not to be determined.^[1]
The questions to be resolved simply are these: 
First, who had actual possession over the piece of real
property?  Second, was the
possessor ousted therefrom within one year from the
filing of the complaint by force, threat, strategy or stealth?  And lastly,
does he ask for the restoration of his possession?^[2] Mere posture of ownership by plaintiff or
defendant does not take the case out of the jurisdiction of the trial court,
unless the issue of material possession necessarily depends upon the question
of ownership,^[3] which is not the case here.  Any controversy over ownership rights could
and should be settled after the party who had the prior, peaceful and actual
possession is returned to the property.^[4]

Here, plaintiff averred prior material possession; that he was
ousted therefrom by means of force, strategy or
stealth; and that this usurpation was done within the one-year period prior to
the filing of the suit in the inferior court.

Succinctly did this Court explain in one case the nature of the
forcible entry action:  “In giving
recognition to the action of forcible entry and detainer
the purpose of the law is to protect the person who in fact has actual
possession; and in case of con­troverted right, it
requires the parties to preserve the status quo until one or the
other of them sees fit to invoke the decision of a court of competent jurisdiction upon the question of owner­ship.  It is obviously just that the person who has
first acquired possession should remain in possession pending this decision;
and the parties cannot be permitted meanwhile to engage in a petty warfare over
the possession of the property which is the subject of dispute.  To permit this would be highly dangerous to
individual security and disturbing to social order.  There­fore, where a person supposes himself
to be the owner of a piece of property and desires to vindicate his ownership
against the party actually in possession, it is incumbent upon him to institute
an action to this end in a court of competent jurisdic­tion; and he can not be
permitted, by invading the property and excluding the actual possessor, to
place upon the latter the burden of instituting an action to try the property
right.”^[5]

 2.  But
then the trial court, viewing the amendment set forth in paragraph 3 of the
amended complaint, did rule that such amendment changed the subject matter over
which as an appellate court it had no jurisdiction; and that because plain­tiff
would have to prove that there was accretion which was different from the
original cause of action, a change of theory and cause of action likewise
resulted.

Misconception is right
here apparent.  To be observed is that in
the original complaint the technical description of plaintiff’s land^[6] shows that on the southwest its boundary is Rangas River.  To
coincide with this in a general way is that defendants’ answer in the inferior
court and their original answer in the Court of First Instance state that their
two parcels of land, as they were originally described, place the boundary to
the north of their properties as the same Rangas River.  And,
in their amended answer, the two parcels of land (this time consolidated into
one) claimed to be owned by defendants were described by the latter as being
bounded on the north by Rangas River (before), but by Jovito
P. Dizon (now).  But in paragraph 5 thereof, they do aver that
the course of the river suddenly changed by traversing the northern portion of
their lands, segregating each portion from the rest; but that, as
alleged in paragraph 6, the old river bed had become dry, and defendants had
taken possession of the same, and never abandoned such possession of the
segregated northern portion; and that if plaintiff referred to the consolidated
land, the northern portion of their land separated as well as the old river
bed, then plaintiff, in the words of the amended answer, “has no right
whatsoever over the same.”

It thus appears all along
in plaintiff’s original and amended complaints that his land was described as
being bounded on the southwest by the Rangas River – which actually separates it
from defendants’ land.  If he made the
additional averment in the amended complaint stating that on the southwest
portion of his land bounded by the Rangas River a part was added by accretion, and that
defendants forcibly entered the said southwestern portion, it was merely to
clarify the issues of the case and to localize, more particularly, the land in
dispute.  Besides, this amendment was
merely an offshoot of, and was made to meet, the averments in defendants’
amended answer – on appeal – referring to the sudden change in the course of
the Rangas River by traversing the northern portion of their
lands separating it from the rest.

Even on the assumption that there was an apparent con­flict in
the description of the disputed land as set forth in the two complaints, such a
situation would not change the case from a forcible entry suit into a different
action.^[7]
The case must be tried and the identity
of the land alleged in the complaint estab­lished, to determine whether or not
plaintiff’s rights have been violated.

For the foregoing reasons, the order of the trial court of July
20, 1964 dismissing plaintiff’s complaint and ordering him to reimburse
defendant Agapita Concina
in the sum of P300 is hereby set aside, and this case is hereby remanded to the
Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur with instructions to proceed until the determination
thereof on the merits.

Costs against defendants-appellees.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
and Barredo,
JJ., concur.

^[1]
See for example:  Mediran vs. Villanueva, 37 Phil. 752, 757; Masallo vs.
Cesar, 39 Phil. 134, 137; Fuentes vs. The Justice of the Peace of Pila, 67 Phil. 364, 365-366; Lizo vs. Carandang, 73 Phil. 649, 650; Maddammu
vs. Judge of Municipal Court of Manila, 74 Phil. 230, 231; Pitargue vs. Sorilla, 92
Phil. 5, 13; Argenio vs. Marino, G.R. No. L-9299,
December 18, 1956; Lequigan vs. Katalbas, 105 Phil. 645, 647; Subano
vs. Vallecer, 105 Phil. 1264, 1265; De la Cruz
vs. Burgos (1969), 28 SCRA 977, 983.

^[2]
See:  Section 1, Rule 70, Rules of
Court.

^[3]
Fuentes vs. The Justice of the Peace of Pila, supra,
at p. 366.

^[4]
Mediran vs. Villanueva, supra,
at p. 757; De la Cruz vs. Burgos,
supra, at p. 483.

^[5]
Mediran vs. Villanueva, supra,
at p. 757.

^[6]
This land is titled under the Torrens system.

^[7]
Subano vs. Vallecer,
supra, at pp. 1264-1265.