G.R. No. L-25496. December 27, 1969
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF CACERES, PETITIONER, VS. JUDGE RAFAEL DE LA CRUZ OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAMARINES SUR, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF CAMARINES SUR, CATAL…
BARREDO, J.:
Petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of the order of the
Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur in its Civil Case No. 4309 granting
herein private respondents’ motion for a writ of possession to place them in
possession of the land involved which is being used by herein petitioner as a
cemetery for the Catholic
Parish of Manguiring, Calabanga, Camarines Sur, and of the subsequent order of
the court a quo denying
the motion of petitioner for the reconsideration of said order.
It appears that on January 24, 1955, herein private respondents
obtained Original Certificate of Title No. 545 to their land in said
Manguiring, Calabanga, Camarines Sur, through an ordinary registration
proceeding. Embraced in the said
certificate of title, however, is the Catholic Cemetery used by petitioner,
together with the surrounding area which is admittedly owned by said respondents. Petitioner
then commenced action against private respondents on October 17, 1958, by
filing the complaint (for reconveyance) in Civil Case No. 4309 of the Court of
First Instance of Camarines Sur, praying for judgment (1) to declare herein
petitioner the owner of the portion it
uses as a cemetery; (2)
to order private respondents to reconvey said portion to petitioner; and (3)
to condemn respondents to pay it P1,000.00 in damages plus costs.
Respondents answered with a denial of petitioner’s claim of title and an
assertion of its own ownership of the land in question, and by way of counterclaim alleged the existence of a lease and prayed
for payment of rentals. After due trial,
the court, Judge Jose L. Moya presiding, rendered judgment on June 4, 1959,
with the following dispositive portion:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is
hereby rendered declaring the
plaintiff to be the owner of the land described above and commanding the
defendants to reconvey it to
him, with costs against them.”
The judgment above-quoted was, however,
reversed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 27303-R upon appeal thereto by
private respondents, the said appellate court finding and holding thus:
“x x x
x x x x
“In this appeal the defendants contend that the lower court
erred in holding (1) that the plaintiff
acquired title to the land in question by prescription; (2) that the
defendants sold the land to the plaintiff as early as 1934; (3) in compelling them to reconvey the land to the plaintiff and
(4) in sentencing them to pay damages.
“We
have gone over the evidence carefully, particularly the transcript of the
stenographic notes taken during the hearing
on March 13, 1959, and found
nothing to show in what manner the plaintiff
acquired ownership of the land in question
from the defendants. The
statement in the pre–trial order
that ‘the defendants had been demanding payment
for the land since 1934 but the plaintiff failed to pay and merely made repeated promises to pay’ does not
afford a safe basis for determining that
the land in question was sold by the defendants to the plaintiff. No testimony whatsoever was offered by the
plaintiff to show how it acquired the land
from the defendants. x x x x
“x x x
x x x x
“The documentary evidence does not show that the land involved
in the same is that declared by the
plaintiff in its name for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 6148 of the
municipality of Naga, province of Camarines Sur (Exhibit C). This tax
declaration, the commencement year of which is not indicated, shows that the land is bounded on the North by that of Paulino Bonco; on the east by public land, and on the south and the west by that of Paulino Bonco. In other words, the adjoining owner on all sides except on the east is Paulino Bonco. According to
the sketch, Exhibit A, showing
the dimensions and boundaries of
the land (and this was agreed upon by both parties to be correct), the adjoining owner on all sides is the
defendant, Marcos Atienza, one of the registered owners of the area covered by Certificate of Title No. 545
of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Camarines Sur. This area indubitably contains the land in
dispute as an integral part. It has not
been sufficiently proven that the plaintiff has been in
possession of said land since
1934 as its tax declaration, Exhibit C, does not show
when it became effective as the
land covered thereby is exempt from
taxation. On the contrary it shows that
the land described therein is altogether different and distinct from the
one involved herein and no testimony was presented by the plaintiff to explain the discrepancy.
“The statement in paragraph 3 of the pre-trial order that
defendants have been demanding payment for the land since 1934 does not
necessarily show that it was sold to it by the defendants. It may be construed in relation to paragraph
4 thereof stating ‘that the reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy
of the land is P30.00 a month’. The
demand for payment mentioned in paragraph 3 may possibly refer to the payment
of monthly rentals of P30.00. These
doubtful and obscure points could have been threshed out or clarified at the
pre-trial conference or at the trial itself, but unfortunately the record of
the hearing is a memorial of the incompleteness and deficiency of plaintiff’s
evidence.
“Plaintiff’s acquisition of ownership of the land by
prescription has not been satisfactorily established, the defendants
maintaining that in using the land as
cemetery plaintiff has always recognized their rights thereto. Although this was denied by the plaintiff’s lone witness, Fr. Amado Camaya, this
mode was not established by positive evidence.
During the direct examination of Fr. Amado Camaya he was not given a
chance to state what was the nature of the plaintiff’s possession and how it
was obtained. The transcript of the
stenographic notes previously quoted shows that when he was asked about the nature of the plaintiff’s possession, the
attorney for the defendants objected to the question for lack of basis. The plaintiff’s attorney, instead of reforming
his question and pressing on the matter so as to establish the plaintiff’s
uninterrupted, peaceful and public possession thereof in the concept of an
owner, desisted and closed his evidence
by saying: ‘In that case, Your Honor
please, that will be all for the witness’.
“The admission by the defendants that the plaintiff has been
in possession of the land and using it as
a cemetery since 1934, is open to varied interpretations and does not
shut out the possibility that the use of
the land for that purpose was with the tolerance or permission of the
defendants, for which reason they have been demanding payment of rentals at the
rate of P30.00 monthly (t.s.n., p. 8, Esplago).
“We are not in accord with the trial court’s theory that the
demand for payment of the land is an admission that it was sold to the
plaintiff by the defendants. In the
absence of other evidence showing that the plaintiff became the owner under any
of the modes of acquiring ownership established by law, that ownership cannot be merely presumed or implied
therefrom. For a reconveyance action to prosper, the plaintiff must show that
he is the owner of the land involved, the foundation of such kind of action
being an indubitable title which is defeated or rendered ineffectual by fraudulent
registration in the name of another under Act No. 496 (Section 55, Act 496, as amended
by Act No. 3322; Consunji v. Tison, 15 Phil. 81; Macapinlac v. Gutierrez Repido, 43 Phil.
770; Severino v. Severino, 44 Phil. 343; Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres
v. Municipality of Tabaco, 46 Phil. 271; Government of the Philippine Islands v.
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, 49 Phil. 433; Rodriguez v. Llorente, 49
Phil., 823; Philippines Land Improvement Co. v. Blas, 55 Phil. 540; Palet v. Tejedor, 55 Phil. 790; Bayagas v. Guilao, 64 Phil. 347; Sorsogon v. Salcedo, 87 Phil.
25;
Beriones v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L?5980, March 22, 1954; Sanchez v. Tamsi, G.R.
No. L-16736, June 30, 1961; Macapanas, et al., v. Macawile, et al., CA-G.R. No. 22361-R,
September 12, 1963).
“Having shown that plaintiff is not the owner of the land in dispute, it was not, therefore, fraudulently
deprived thereof by the registration in the name of the defendants of the area
containing it as an integral
part. No actionable fraud was, therefore, perpetrated by the
defendants in not notifying the plaintiff of its application. Such failure to notify the plaintiff is not
the kind of fraud which, under Article 38 of Act 496, serves as a ground for reopening
the decree of registration within
one year after its issuance or
for compelling, under Section 55 of
said Act, the reconveyance of
the registered property, or portion thereof, to the rightful owner (De la Cruz v. Fabio, 35 Phil. 144; Loyola v. Barruela, et al., CA-G.R.
No. 12420-R, Dec. 21, 1955). Perhaps it
would be easier to believe that the defendants acted fraudulently in gobbling
up the land involved had it been shown by the plaintiff that it purchased the
same from the former, and
that despite such alienation they
proceeded to include it clandestinely in the registration of the area containing it. Even then, it would be hardly possible for the plaintiff not to have
known of the application for
registration and to oppose it,
considering its capacity and its economic and social standing. The publication of the notice of
hearing in the Official Gazette, which
serves as a notice to the whole world in land registration its proceeding in
rem, precludes any imputation to the defendants of fraud or concealment in
obtaining registered title thereto.
But it is unnecessary to dwell further on the question of whether or not there was fraud,
inasmuch as it is our conclusion that
plaintiff has no valid title to the land involved and is not the owner of the same.
“WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby
reversed and the case dismissed with cost against the plaintiff-appellee.”
This decision of the
Court of Appeals having become final, on October 11, 1965, herein private
respondents filed a motion for execution
with the lower court, praying that a “writ of possession be issued in this case, commanding the
Provincial Sheriff to deliver the land in question” to them; and,
notwithstanding petitioner’s opposition to this motion, respondent Judge Rafael
de la Cruz granted the same in his order of November 24, 1965, as follows:
“A careful reading of the decision appealed from, it is very clear that defendant-appellant was deprived
of the possession of the land treated
in the decision which is part of the property described in Original Certificate of Title No. 545 of the land records of
Camarines Sur.
“To enforce the pronouncements of the appellate court, we find
no reason to deny the prevailing defendant-appellant from enforcing the decision. It would indeed be a useless ceremony to
ventilate another action just
to compel plaintiff-appellee to restore
defendants to the possession of the property in question.
“Petition granted.”
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration
of this order, but his motion was denied by respondent judge in his order of December 15, 1965, with the following rationale:
“The carefully prepared motion for reconsideration citing
cases to support the said motion finds
no practical applicability to the present case.
“It would be noted that the
land in question is a titled property, the ownership of
which has been and still with the
defendant. Supported by the
pronouncements of the Court of Appeals, the basic and elementary concept of ownership attached to it the right
of possession.
“To deny the prevailing party, the defendant, from the exercise of ownership and dominion over his property will be tantamount to giving a premium to the plaintiff which he never did deserve.
“While it is true that the cases cited by plaintiff-appellee
were in consonance with the laws then
existing, nevertheless the pronouncements of the Court of Appeals finds no
support under Article 22 of the
Civil Code which seemed to do away with further unnecessary litigations after the very fundamental object and motive
of the action has been duly passed upon and decided.
“WHEREFORE, the motion for
reconsideration should be, as it is hereby not favorably granted.”
In effect, petitioner
assails these orders on the following grounds:
first, that the
issuance of a writ of possession
ordering petitioner to deliver
the land to private respondents would not be in accordance with the dispositive portion of the decision of the
Court of Appeals
which merely states “Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby
reversed and the case dismissed with cost against plaintiff-appellee”;
and, second, that since private respondents themselves maintain “that if
the plaintiff (herein petitioner) is in
possession of the same (the portion of the land used by petitioner as a
cemetery) it is because the plaintiff had asked permission sometime in the year
1934 from the defendants’ (herein private respondents’) father to utilize said
portion of land as cemetery with the agreement that the plaintiff shall pay the
defendants the reasonable rental thereof”, then, petitioner “cannot
be deprived of the possession of the land merely by means of a writ of
possession” but respondents “must file an action for unlawful
detainer on account of the failure of petitioner to pay the rent as contended
by them”. (Par. 15, Petition, and
Appendices “E” and “G”)
Petitioner is right
on both scores. Evidently, respondent judge has misread the
decision of the Court of Appeals. There
is nothing therein indicating that respondents have been illegally deprived of
the possession of their land or that the continued possession thereof by
petitioner is against their will. Oh the
contrary, what appears strongly suggested to the point of appearing as a
factual premise for the decision is the existence of a lease agreement between
petitioner and respondent covering the land in question. Indeed, if anything is to be gathered
regarding this matter from the records, it is that the counter-claim of respondents for the payment of
rentals must be considered as having
been dismissed by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, considering
the same was properly pleaded
and yet it was not passed upon
by said courts. Accordingly, the only
rentals which would appear to be recoverable by respondents are those which
accrued after the decision of the Court of Appeals became final.
Ordinarily, as precedents
have it,[1] a
judgment declaring a party the owner of a land entitles such party to an
execution to recover possession thereof from the losing party even if there is
no prayer therefore in the
complaint. This rule holds, however,
only when the matter of possession is not otherwise litigated separately from
that of ownership. It is only proper
that when possession is dealt with by the parties in any manner that separates
it from the matter of ownership or title, the two things be also considered as separable
in the judgment. There is nothing
inconsistent in ownership and possession being in distinct parties when there
are relations or agreements between them to such effect. In this particular case, for instance, while indisputably the title over the
subject land belongs to the respondents, it is equally clear that petitioner is using the same as a cemetery, no less, by virtue of a
contract of lease. In such circumstance, petitioner’s contention
must be upheld that it is only by a separate action of ejectment, if such be warranted,
that respondents may recover the possession of their land.
In Talens v. Garcia,[2] one Felipe Garcia filed a complaint (1) to annul a deed of sale
executed by Laureano Estefanio in favor of his co-defendant Jose L.
Talens involving a parcel of land (a homestead)
in Laur, Nueva Ecija, (2) to compel Laureano Estefanio to convey the property
to him, and (3) to recover damages. It
appears that after selling the lot to Felipe Garcia in 1938, Estefanio sold it
again to Jose L. Talens in 1943. The
lower court ruled in favor of Garcia; but on appeal, the Court of Appeals found
for the defendant Jose L. Talens, and said:
“Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and defendant-appellant Jose Talens absolved
from the complaint, with costs against the plaintiff-appellee, Felipe
Garcia.”
Upon finality of the decision, Talens
filed with the lower court a motion for an
order to the provincial sheriff “for the possession of the
controverted land by Jose L. Talens by evicting the plaintiff therefrom”
and for collection of costs. The court
denied the petition as to possession, explaining that after having gone “over the decision of the Court of
Appeals we have found no disposition regarding the return of the possession to
defendant Jose L. Talens”. Talens
instituted an action for mandamus in this Court to compel the respondent judge
to order the delivery of the land to him, but the same was denied by this Court
in the following rationale:
“It may be admitted that the judgment absolving defendant
Talens was in effect a declaration
that the sale to him was valid. It may
also be admitted, though with some reluctance or reservation, that it was a declaration of ownership of the
lot. But it is doubtful whether it also
included a direction to surrender it to him.
Although it is true that the owner is generally entitled to possession,
it is equally true that there
may be cases where the actual possessor has some rights which must be
respected or defined. A lessee is not
the owner; yet a declaration of ownership in another person does not
necessarily mean his ouster.
“Touching the case at
bar, if the possessor Garcia had made necessary improvements for which
he is entitled to compensation, an order of possession would deprive him of
such payment without having had an opportunity to claim for them and prove
their value. His Honor, the trial judge,
obviously foresaw this possibility among others, and refused to decree the
restitution, taking ‘into consideration that said decision (of the Court of
Appeals) seems not to close all doors for the parties to protect their
respective interests, if they still have any.'”
The same rationale was echoed in Jabon, et al. v. Alo,[3]
where this Court held:
“x x x Rule 39, section 45, provides that ‘that only is deemed to
have been adjudged in a former judgment which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included
therein or necessary thereto’. Here
there has been only a declaration of ownership.
No other relief is
awarded to the plaintiff. In the absence
of any other declaration, can we consider a mere declaration of ownership as necessarily including the
possession of the property adjudicated?
We do not believe so, for ownership is different from possession.
A person may be declared owner, but
he may not be entitled to possession.
The possession may be in the
hands of another either as a lessee or a tenant. A person may have improvements thereon of
which he may not be deprived without due hearing. He may have other valid defenses to resist
surrender of possession. We therefore,
hold that a judgment for ownership, does not necessarily include possession as a necessary incident.”
As correctly pointed out in the Perez v. Evite case,[4]
“it may
be observed that in both decisions (referring to the Talens and Jabon
cases just cited), this Court underscored the possibility that the actual
possessor has
some rights which must be respected and defined”, and that
“the pronouncement was made having in mind cases wherein the actual
possessor has
a valid right over the property enforceable even against the owner
thereof”. It is Our view that this doctrine is squarely
applicable to the present case where, admittedly, petitioner came into
the possession of the property in dispute with prior consent of and agreement
with herein private respondents’ predecessor-in-interest, and upon the promise
of the former to the latter to pay “the reasonable rental
thereof”. It is Our conclusion then
that petitioner is legally in possession of the property and its right of possession must be respected by private respondents. If at all,
the alleged non-payment of rents may be the basis of an action for ejectment;
but the declaration of ownership in the
action
for reconveyance here involved does not justify the issuing of a writ of possession under
the circumstances of this case.
Consequently, We hold that the respondent judge acted in excess of
jurisdiction in granting herein private respondents’ motion for a writ of
possession.
Incidentally, it
may be stated before closing, the writ of
possession issued by respondent judge could not be the appropriate remedy, even
if it
were assumed that the judgment of the Court of Appeals carries with it a
recognition of respondents’ right to have possession of the disputed land. The writ of possession is available to an
applicant for registration and his successors-in-interest only as against a
party who has acquired possession thereof adversely to such applicant prior to
the issuance of the decree, but not against one who has been legitimately given
such possession like petitioner
in this case who, by respondents’ own admission is a lessee. The proper remedy against a lessee is
ejectment under Rule 70. Besides, a writ of
possession is supposed to be issued by the court issuing the decree of
registration as a consequence thereof and not by virtue
of a counterclaim in ordinary action as in this case.
WHEREFORE, the
orders of November 24, 1965 and December 15, 1965 are set aside, with costs
against private respondents.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Ruiz Castro, and Teehankee, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., in the result.
[1] See Pasay Estate Company v. Del Rosario, 11
Phil. 391; Manlapas v. Llorente, 48 Phil. 298; Marcelo vs. Mencias, L-15609,
April 29, 1960; Perez v. Evite, L-16003, March 29, 1961, 1 SCRA 949; Unson v.
Lacson, L-13798, July 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 861.
[2]
87 Phil. 173.
[3]
91 Phil. 750.
[4] Supra.