FELIPA FAJA, SUBSTITUTED BY:  NEMESIO GARDOSE, ANICIA GARDOSE AND EUFROSINO GARDOSE, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. TOMAS R. LEONIDAS, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST …

The summary judgment rendered by Judge Tomas R. Leonidas of the Court of First Instance of Capiz, in Civil Case No. M-355, entitled “Levine Frial, plaintiff versus Felipa Faja, defendant”, and affirmed by respondent Court of
Appeals, is sought to be set aside in this Petition for having been rendered in
gross violation of law resulting in a deprivation of petitioners’ right to due
process.

We find this Petition meritorious under the rule that summary
judgment may be rendered only when,
except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law, which as a matter of law, which is not the situation between the
parties in this case.^[1]

Levine Frial filed with the Court of
First Instance of Capiz, Branch III, situated in Mambusao, Capiz, a complaint
docketed as Civil Case No. M-355 for
“Recovery of Possession and Damages” of a parcel of land situated in
Barrio San Agustin, Dumalag, Capiz,
with an area of 235,854 square meters more or less, covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. RO-1496 in the name of Indalecio
Frial, father of Levine Frial.  The complaint alleged that since 1945 up to the present (the complaint is dated April 15, 1975)
the defendant Felipa Faja
had been illegally possessing and occupying the above-ementioned
property without the knowledge and consent of the registered owner, Indalecio Frial now deceased, nor
of his heirs, one of whom is Levine Frial; that when
plaintiff Frial came to know that Felipa
Faja was occupying the property the former
immediately demanded its return but Faja refused,
hence, the complaint for recovery of possession of the land in question and the
unearned income from the land during the period of not less than 30 years
amounting to around P150,000.00.^[2]

Defendant Felipa Faja
in her Answer specifically denied under oath the allegations in the complaint
as to the ownership of plaintiff Frial, and by way of
special and affirmative defenses claimed: 
that she is the lawful owner and in actual possession of the property
which is identical to Lot No. 4010 of the Cadastral Survey of Dumalag, Capiz, which she
inherited from her father, Marcelino Faja, who died in 1925, the latter in turn having inherited
the same property from his father, Antonio Faja, who
died in 1915; that she and her predecessors-in-interest have been in possession
of the property publicly, peacefully, continuously, and adversely, in the
concept of owners, for more than 60 years, the property having been declared
for taxation purposes in the name of Marcelino Faja under Tax Declaration No. 4807, revised under Tax
Declaration No. 10031 in the year 1921, and presently in the name of Felipa Faja under Tax Declaration
No. 5523 and for which the land taxes have been paid since the time Felipa Faja’s predecessors have
been in possession; that Felipa Faja
is actually living on the land in question, and that the same is planted with
coconut trees, mangoes, bananas, santol, buri, while around 8 hectares are devoted to rice and corn;
that neither plaintiff Levine Frial nor his father Indalecio Frial ever lived on or
possessed said property “even for a single moment”, and any Certificate
of Title secured by Indalecio Frial
was obtained through fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation, the latter not being
the owner thereof and not having occupied or possessed the property in concept
of owner; that as her counterclaim, defendant Faja
prays that she be declared the lawful owner of the property, that plaintiff Frial be directed to reconvey the
property to her in the sense that the Certificate of Title covering said
property be cancelled and, in lieu thereof, a Transfer Certificate of Title be
issued in her favor.^[3]

In his Reply to Felipa Faja’s Answer, plaintiff Levine Frial
denied that the Certificate of Title of Indalecio Frial was secured through fraud and misrepresentation, and
alleged that Faja’s right to question the validity of
the Title had prescribed.^[4]

After all responsive pleadings were filed, the case was called
for a pre-trial conference during which Judge Leonidas
directed the parties to submit memoranda on the question of whether or not a
summary judgment may be promulgated.^[5]

In his Memorandum filed with the trial court, plaintiff Levine Frial sustained the view that a summary judgment may
properly be issued on the basis of the pleadings inasmuch as the only issues to
be resolved were:

“(a) Can a registered owner of a piece of land who has
acquired title thereto for almost 35 years still recover possession thereof
from actual occupants who claim long and continuous possession of the same
property but without title?

“(b) Is reconveyance of a titled
property still legally possible, considering that a period of more than 10
years had elapsed since the issuance of the decree of registration?” (p.
36, rollo)

On the other hand, Felipa Faja in her Memorandum averred that the petition for a
summary judgment should be denied as there was a genuine controversy between
the parties which required a trial on the merits and that the alleged
prescription of her counter-claim for reconveyance
cannot be the subject of a summary judgment, aside from the fact that her cause
of action for the reconveyance to her of the property
arose only from the moment she was served copy of the complaint which was in
1975, consequently, her counterclaim was filed well within the statutory
period.^[6]

In an order dated December
3, 1975, the trial Judge sustained Levine Frial’s
submission stating:

“It appearing from the complaint and the answer, as well as
the annexes thereto, and the written arguments of the parties, that there is no
genuine issue as to a material fact, except as to the amount of damages, it is
ordered that a summary judgment be as it is hereby entered in favor of the
plaintiff, and this case is set for trial on the sole issue of damages on
December 22, 1975, at 8:00 on the morning.

“SO ORDERED.” (p. 45, ibid.)

A motion for reconsideration was filed with the trial court^[7]
but the same was denied for lack of merit in an order dated February 9, 1976.^[8]

Because Felipa Faja
died on November 25, 1975,
her children, all surnamed Gardose, in substitution
for their deceased mother, filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari
(CA-G.R. No. SP-05151-R) and prayed that the aforequoted
order for summary judgment be set aside. 
Respondent Appellate Court through its Eighth Division dismissed the
Petition holding that “…… a summary judgment is proper as there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact”, reasoning that inasmuch as the
disputed property is covered by an Original Certificate of Title, any action to
annul that title on the ground of fraud prescribes after the lapse of 10 years
from the issuance of the title and therefore the counterclaim for reconveyance pleaded in the answer of Felipa
Faja cannot be sustained.^[9]

We do not agree with respondent Court for the following reasons:

(1) The counterclaim of Felipa Faja for reconveyance to her of
the litigated property has not prescribed. 
It is an established rule that an action to quiet title to property in
the possession of a plaintiff is imprescriptible.^[10]
Inasmuch as it is alleged in paragraph 3 of Frial’s
complaint, that Felipa Faja
has been in possession of the property since 1945 up to the present or for a
period of 30 years, her cause of action for reconveyance,
which in effect seeks to quiet her title to the property, falls within that
rule.  If at all, the period of
prescription began to run against Felipa Faja only from the time she was served with copy of the
complaint in 1975 giving her notice that the property she was occupying was
titled in the name of Indalecio Frial.  There is settled jurisprudence that one who
is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be owner thereof may
wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking
steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his
undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a
court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature
of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which
right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.^[11]
No better situation can be conceived at the moment for Us to apply this rule on
equity than that of herein petitioners whose mother, Felipa
Faja, was in possession of the litigated property for
no less than 30 years and was suddenly confronted with a claim that the land
she had been occupying and cultivating all these years, was titled in the name
of a third person.  We hold that in such
a situation the right to quiet title to the property, to seek its reconveyance and annul any certificate of title covering
it, accrued only from the time the one in possession was made aware of a claim
adverse to his own, and it is only then that the statutory period of
prescription commences to run against such possessor.

(2) The existence of a Certificate of Title in the name of
respondent Frial’s father is not conclusive on the
question of ownership of the land in controversy, because the validity of such
a certificate is put in issue by allegations of fraud and misrepresentation by
the defendant below, Felipa Faja.  Petitioners herein correctly invoked in their
Petition for certiorari filed before respondent tribunal, what this
Court stated in Monticines, et al. vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., September 4, 1973, 53 SCRA 14, through Justice
Enrique M. Fernando, to wit:

“Nor does the mere fact that respondent-appellee
Marcelo Coral could show a certificate of Torrens
Title in his favor conclude the matter, the question of fraud having been
reasonably raised and the remedy
of reconveyance sought.  Only
recently, in Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Villalva,
(L-28194, November 24, 1972, 48 SCRA 31) this Court had occasion to state:
‘There is, however, a countervailing doctrine, certainly not of lesser weight,
that mitigates the harshness of the iron-clad application of the principle
attaching full faith and credit to a Torrens certificate.  It is inspired by the highest concept of what
is fair and what is equitable.  It would
be a sad day for the law if it were to be oblivious to the demands of justice.  The acceptance accorded the Torrens
system of registration would certainly be impaired if it could be utilized to
perpetrate fraud and chicanery.  If it
were thus, then no stigma would attach to a claim based solely on a narrow and
literal reading of a statutory prescription, devoid of any shadow of moral
right.  That is not the juridical norm as
recognized by this Court.  Deceit is not
to be countenanced; duplicity is not to be rewarded.  Witness the favor with which jurisprudence
has looked on the action for reconveyance as well as
the recognition of the constructive trust. 
There is thus the stress on rectitude.'”(Underline Ours)^[12]

It is regrettable to say the least that the above pronouncements
of this Court failed to impress respondent tribunal with the merits of
petitioners’ case.

(3) There are material facts to be inquired into and resolved on
the basis of evidence adduced by the parties which will determine the legal
precepts to be applied, among which are: 
(a) the circumstances which led to the issuance in 1950 of Original Certificate
of Title RO-1496, a reconstituted title of a supposed Original Certificate of
Title No. 23257 allegedly issued on December 12, 1940, pursuant to a decree of
registration No. 732588 dated November 5, 1940, which was claimed to have been
lost; (b) explanation, if any, for the inaction of the alleged registered owner
Indalecio Frial and of his
heirs for a period of 30 years to take possession of the land in question
thereby permitting Felipa Faja
to cultivate and receive for herself the income from the produce of the land
which as estimated by now respondent Frial amounted
to around P150,000.00 for the entire period; and (c) the claim of ownership and
possession of Felipa Faja
and her predecessors-in-interest which allegedly date as far back as 60
years prior to the filing of Friars complaint in 1975, and her assertions
of fraud and misrepre­sentation committed by Indalecio
Frial in registering the property in his name.  All these matters cannot simply be summarily
disposed of in favor of respondent Frial and
adversely against petitioners without evidence adduced on their conflicting
claims.^[13]

In conclusion, We state that while this Court desires to give
full encouragement to trial courts to take advantage of and apply the
provisions of the Rules of Court on summary judgment as valuable aids to an
expeditious disposition of cases, We cannot but reiterate what was said and
held in Constantino vs. Hon. Estenzo, et al. L-40403, July 31, 1975, and reiterated in Auman
et al. vs. Hon. Estenzo, et al. L-40500, February
27, 1976, to wit:

“x x x The
demands of a fair, impartial, and wise administration of justice call for a
faithful adherence to legal precepts on procedure which ensure to litigants the
opportunity to present their evidence and secure a ruling on all the issues presented in their respective
pleadings.  ‘Shortcuts’ in judicial
processes are to be avoided where they impede rather than promote a judicious
dispensation of justice.”

Again, in Gregorio Loreno and Felisa Lavilla vs. The Hon. Numeriano G. Estenzo, et al., L-43306, October 29, 1976, this
Court set aside a summary judgment rendered by respondent Judge Estenzo of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo,
reiterating the rule that summary judgment can only be entertained where there
are no questions of fact in issue or where the material allegations of the
pleadings are not disputed.^[14]

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision of the
Court of Appeals and the disputed Order of the trial court rendering summary
judgment in favor of respondent Levine Frial are
hereby set aside, and the Presiding Judge of Branch III, Court of First
Instance of Capiz, is directed to proceed with the
trial on the merits of Civil Case No. M-355. 
With costs against private respondent Levine Frial.

So Ordered.

Makasiar, Concepcion,
Jr., and Martin, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., (Chairman), concurs and adds brief remarks in a separate
opinion.

^[1]
Revised Rules of Court, Rule 34, Summary Judgments ?

“Sec. 3.  Motion and proceedings thereon.  – The motion shall be served atleast ten (10) days
before the time specified for the hearing.  The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing
affidavits.  After the hearing, the
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions
on file together with the affidavits,
show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.”

^[2]
pp. 19-26, rollo

^[3]
pp. 27-31, ibid.

^[4]
p. 32, ibid.

^[5]
p. 34, ibid.

^[6]
pp. 39-44, ibid.

^[7]
pp. 46-50, ibid.

^[8]
p. 53, ibid.

^[9]
p. 77, ibid.  The Eighth Division
was composed of Justices Emilio A. Gancayco, Mama D. Busran, and Samuel F. Reyes.

^[10]
Sapto, et al. vs. Fabiana,
per J.B.L. Reyes, J., (1958), 103 Phil. 683, 687, citing 44 Am. Jur. p. 47; Cooper vs. Rhea, 39
L.R.A. 930; Inland Empire Land Co. vs. Grant County, 138 Wash. 439, 245,
Pac. 14.

^[11]
44 Am. Jur. p. 47, cited in Sapto,
et al. vs. Fabiana, supra, p. 687.

^[12]
See also Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank vs. Villalva, supra., p 39.

^[13]
See also Gatchalian vs. Pavilin,
et al., per J.B.L. Reyes, J., 116 Phil. 819.

^[14]
See also Efrencia Tamo vs.
Hon. Leopoldo B. Gironella,
et al., L-41714, October 29, 1976

150
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