MARCELINA P. VITUG, PETITIONER, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (BUREAU OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS), THE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, DEFUNCT, AND/OR THE SECRETARY OF LABOR, AND/OR…

The Court annuls respondent Commission’s decision and reinstates
the referee’s award of disability compensation in
favor of petitioner-claimant on the fundamental ground of the commission’s lack
of jurisdiction and authority to set aside an award that had already become
final and executory or to grant a petition for relief
from judgment that was filed beyond the reglementary
grace period therefor.

After due hearing on petitioner’s controverted
claim for disability compensation (dislocation of hip joint as a result of an
injury suffered in the course of attending an official conference which
eventually disabled her from her work as classroom teacher since June 1, 1927),
the Manila Workmen’s Compensation Unit awarded petitioner in its decision of
February 4, 1974 disability compensation of P6,000.00 and P300.00 for her
attorney’s fees and ordered respondent to pay P61.00-administrative fee.

Copy of the said decision was served on the Office of the
Solicitor General as counsel for respondent Bureau of Public Schools only on November 4, 1975.  It is not disputed that government counsel
filed no motion for reconsideration (for appeal purposes) within the reglementary fifteen-day period and that it was only on
January 8, 1976 (sixty-five [65] days after notice or knowledge of judgment)
that they filed a petition to elevate records for relief from judgment based on
“the volume and pressure of work of the undersigned Solicitor.”

Notwithstanding that it is evident from the record that the
decision-award had long become final and executory
and that the petition for relief was filed outside the reglementary
grace period therefor (within 30 days from
knowledge/notice of the decision-award and within 3 months from entry thereof ^[1]),
respondent commission nevertheless took cognizance thereof and in its
single-page decision of February 13, 1976 reversed the said decision-award and
dismissed the claim “for lack of merit.”

Hence, the petition at bar which raises the sole issue of lack of
authority on the part of respondent commission to set aside an award that had
already become final and executory.

The petition must be granted.

As the Court reaffirmed in Ramos vs. Republic,^[2]
the basic rule of finality of judgments is applicable indiscriminately to one
and all and regardless of whether respondent employer be a public or private
employer, since the rule is grounded on fundamental considerations of public
policy and sound practice that at risk of occasional error, the judgment of
courts and award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some definite
date fixed by law.

The Court stressed once again in Luzsteveco
vs. Reyes,^[3]
that “(I)t is of course beyond question that the perfection of an appeal
within the statutory or reglementary period is
mandatory and jurisdic­tional and that failure to so perfect an appeal renders
final and executory the questioned decision and
deprives the appellate court of juris­diction to entertain the appeal.  The lapse of the appeal period deprives the
courts of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment.”

Our ruling in Luzsteveco as
reaffirmed in Martinez vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission,^[4]
as to respondent’s failure to timely avail of the 30-day grace period from
knowledge/ notice of the decision-award to file a petition for relief from judg­ment
is fully applicable here:  such failure
is fatal since the grace period by its very nature is absolutely fixed, inextendible, never interrupted and cannot
be subjected to any condition or contingency.  Prescinding therefrom, the proffered justification of “volume and
pressure of work” for failing to take an appeal or to file even a petition
for extension of time to appeal as permitted by the Commission Rules is,
to say the least, not the excusable negligence or mistake that
would warrant the granting of the exceptional and equi­table remedy of relief
from judgment.

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered setting aside
respondent commission’s decision of February
13, 1976 and reinstating the decision-award of February 4, 1974, with the sole modification that
the attorney’s fees are increased to Six hundred (P600.00) pesos.  This decision shall be immediately executory upon promulgation.

Makasiar, Muñoz
Palma, Concepcion, Jr., and
Martin, JJ., concur.

^[1] Rule 22 of the 1973 Revised Rules of the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission.

^[2]
69 SCRA 576 (Feb. 27, 1976).

^[3]
????? SCRA ????? (June ?????, 1976)

^[4]
L-43744, Sept. 30, 1976.