ANGEL DE CASTRO, JR., PETITIONER, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (BUREAU OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS) AND WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS.

Aida Villamor
de Castro was employed by the Bureau of Public Schools as a teacher at the Altura Elementary School in the City of Manila.  Her
service record shows that she entered the government service
in a provisional status on August 6, 1965, was dropped on May 8, 1966,
reappointed on July 14, 1966, dropped on April 30, 1967, but reappointed on
July 7, 1967 this time in a permanent status, and served continuously until she
died on February 1, 1975, of “congestive heart failure due to chronic
rheumatic heart disease with mitral stenosis and insufficiency due to cardiac cathetarization.”

A claim for death
compensation benefits was filed by Angel de Castro, Jr., husband of the
deceased Aida de Castro, with the Regional Office No. 4 of the Department of
Labor, on March 31, 1975 which was the last day for filing
compensation claims occurring prior to the effectivity
of the New Labor Code, Presidential Decree No. 442.^[1]

In an order dated November
7, 1975, issued by
Acting Referee Roberto Blanco of Regional Office No. 4, the claim of Angel de
Castro, Jr. was dismissed on the alleged ground that said office was without
jurisdiction inasmuch as the death of the employee occurred on February
1, 1975, during the effectivity of the New Labor Code.  This order of dismissal was affirmed by the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission in its decision dated January
19, 1976, which
held:

“We shall affirm the order of dismissal grounded on lack of
jurisdiction because the record shows that from the period beginning January 3,
1975 to January 31, 1975, the claimant was not on sick leave of absence or on
vacation leave of absence and must have been working for the respondent
immediately prior to her fatal attack causing death on February 1, 1975 which was congestive heart
failure and rheumatic heart disease with mitral stenosis.  Her death
on February 1, 1975 is
cognizable under the Labor Code by the GSIS subject to appeal to the Employee’s
Compensation Commission.

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order appealed from is
hereby, as it is affirmed without prejudice to the filing of this claim with
the Government Service Insurance System, as the case may be, and with the
further pronouncement that no service fee shall be charged against any of the
parties as cost of review.” (p. 28, rollo)

The claim is now before Us through this Petition filed by Angel
de Castro, Jr. for a review of the decision of the respondent, now defunct,
Workmen’s Compensation Commission. 
Petitioner asserts that the Workmen’s Compensation Commission gravely
erred in disclaiming jurisdiction and in not awarding disability and/or death
compensation to the claimant considering that the cause of action or right to
claim for such compensation accrued from the very moment the employee Aida de
Castro became sick as early as January, 1974, and was disabled to continue with
her work until she succumbed to her illness on February 1, 1975.

To Us the merit of petitioner’s submittal on the questions of
jurisdiction and compensability is self-evident.  Aida de Castro’s ailment occurred in the course
of her employment, it was aggravated by the nature of her work, it disabled her
from continuing with her classroom teaching since December 19, 1973, and there was no timely controversion by the employer notwithstanding its knowledge
of the illness since said date, as will be shown below.  The fact that Aida’s death occurred during
the effectivity of the New Labor Code did not divest
the Workmen’s Compensation Commission of its jurisdiction over the claim for
compensation as the death was the direct result of an illness which supervened
at a time when the Workmen’s Compensation Act was in full force and effect.

In his Comment on this petition for review, the Solicitor General speaking for respondent
Republic of the Philippines, argues, however, that what was filed here was a
death claim and consequently, the cause of action arose not in 1974 but on
February 1, 1975, the date of death; that no claim for sickness or disability benefits was ever filed
by the employee during her lifetime which could be transmitted to her heirs
upon her death; that inasmuch as the approved leave of absence of the employee
ended on January 2, 1975, it is to be assumed that she was no longer
sick and was able to return to work after that date during which time the New
Labor Code was already in effect and the Government Service Insurance System
and the Employees’ Compen­sation Commission had acquired jurisdiction over the
claim.

It is truly lamentable that a short-sighted appraisal of the
situation resulted in the denial of petitioner’s claim for compensation for the
illness and death of Aida de Castro.

It is undisputable that, as found by Dr. Yolanda Sulit, Aida de Castro was afflicted with chronic rheumatic
heart disease which resulted fatally into congestive heart failure.  Heart or cardiac failure is a disease of the
heart caused, among others, by infection,^[2]
and rheumatic fever is the most common causitive factor in heart disease.^[3] Aida’s rheumatic heart disease was chronic
in nature, meaning that it had been in existence for a long period of time,^[4] causing her to go on extended leave of
absence without pay as shown in her service record thus:

“AUTHORIZED LEAVE OF ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY

Due to illness            –
February 11 to April 25, 1970

Due to illness            –
February 24 to March 23, 1974

Due to illness            –
June 2, 1974
to January 2, 1975“

(p. 19, rollo,
underline Ours)

The gravity of the illness of Aida was attested by no less than
her “separation record” prepared by the respondent employer, Bureau
of Public Schools, stating that Aida’s last day of actual service was
December 19, 1973, and since that date she was on sick leave at
first with pay and later without pay after consuming her leave credit, until
she died on February 1, 1975 which was the “effective date of her
separation.”^[5]

All these facts were laid before respondent Commission by Aida’s
mother, Segunda Villamor,
in whose favor a Special Power of Attorney was executed by Angel de Castro, Jr.
on September 23, 1975,
granting her authority to prosecute the claim.^[6]
Segunda Villamor likewise
submitted a letter to the Chief of Regional Office No. 4 re­questing that her
claim be amended to one for sickness benefits,^[7]
but this communication was simply ignored by the Regional Office as well as by
the Workmen’s Compensation Commission.

With the amendment
of petitioner’s claim We hold that there was no legal impediment to an outright
award for disability compensation
although the employee, Aida de Castro, had not filed any claim during her
lifetime.

The right to compensation for an illness which supervened and was
aggravated in the course of employment is one that may be enforced by the heirs
of the employee upon the latter’ s death notwithstanding the failure of the employee to file a claim for
disability compensation.  Such is the
ruling of this Court in Adelaida Vda. de Calado, et al. vs.
Workmen’s Compensation Commission
and Acoje Mining Co.,Inc.,
L-26149, April 30, 1971,
which We reiterate.

In Calado, the employee, Tomas Calado, contracted tuberculosis in the course of his
employment with Acoje and his illness was known to
his employer, so much so, that the latter persuaded him to resign from the
company; two years thereafter, Calado died of the
same sickness.  The widow and children of
the deceased employee then filed a claim for death benefits.  The Acting Referee who heard the case denied
death benefits but granted physical disability benefits.  On a motion for reconsideration of Acoje, the Workmen’s Compensation Commission reversed the
Referee’s decision and absolved the employer holding inter alia that the heirs of the employee were not
entitled to recover physical disability benefits because it is a right that
personally belongs to the sick worker which is not transferable to his
dependants upon his death.  This Court
set aside the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission and held among
others, in the words of Justice Antonio Barredo:

“We do not hesitate to reverse the Commission’s decision.  It is clear to Us that the Acting Referee’s
decision which the Commission refused to affirm is more in consonance with the
humane spirit of the Workmen’s Compensation Act as a measure of social
justice.  Indeed, to recognize
petitioner’s claim as covered by the law, one does not have to resort to
generous liberality in construing its provisions; all that needs be done is to
apply them fairly and reason­ably so that the clearly discernible noble
objective of their enactment may not be defeated.  . . . .

“xx                 xx                     xx                     xx

“. . . had the respondent Commission only properly analyzed
all the relevant circumstances of this case…..it would have undoubtedly
realized that in the law in equity, and precisely because Acoje
failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of the Act for it to report Calado’s illness and controvert its resulting liability therefor an omission for whose consequences it should
naturally suffer, Calado should be deemed a
having effectively filed the
required claim for disability compensation, within the
meaning of Section 25 of the Act, the moment he reported to the company
hospital and physician and was actually diagnosed and treated thereat for
tuberculosis, a statutory compensable disease . . . . as a matter of law,
Calado must be considered as having actually filed
the required claim, and, in consequence, his right to compensation for
disability corresponding to the period up to his demise, had already
accrued before his death and, accordingly, the same constitutes an asset
of his estate transmissible to
his heirs, herein petitioners, free, on account of its special
nature, from any liens or obligations.” (38 SCRA 567, 573, 583, 584)

The statement in the Comment of the Solicitor General (p.3.) that
the Calado decision is not applicable to the case at
bar because in Calado “the deceased-employee
filed a disability claim during his lifetime” is completely
erroneous.  We cannot but emphasize that
such mistaken assertions which may mislead the Court are to be avoided.

Aida de Castro is
similarly situated as Tomas Calado.  In the case of Aida de Castro, her employer, respondent Bureau of Public
Schools, had knowledge of her illness and of its serious nature when she did
not return to work from December 19, 1973, and was on con­tinued leave of
absence due to such illness as shown in her service record, and yet the
employer did not controvert the compensability of the illness as required in
Section 45 of the Workmen’s Compen­sation Act. 
Like Tomas Calado, Aida de Castro is deemed
under the law to have actually filed a claim for compensation for her
disability from the time she was unable to resume her classroom teaching, and
her right to compensation survived upon her death and is enforceable by her
heirs.  Her failure to ask for
continuation of her leave of absence from January 3, 1975, is understandable
because as explained by petitioner herein at that time Aida was in a critical
period being “already in her last stretch against her battle with
death” and it is a cruel and gratuitous assertion to assume that because
there was no application for extension of sick leave from January 3, 1975, she
was strong enough to go back to her work.

Failure to controvert
results in ultimate admission of
compensability and an employer cannot escape liability even if no formal notice
was given by the employee of his
claim for compensation when it is shown that the employer had in fact knowledge
of the illness.^[8]

The compensability of the
ailment of Aida de Castro cannot be questioned. 
Her heart disease was incurred in the course of her employment and was
aggravated by the strenuous work of teaching school children of tender
age.  In a number of cases decided in the
year 1976 this Court upheld the compensability of heart failure of an employee.  In Talip
vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, et al., L- 42574, May 31, 1976, the deceased employee died of “massive
myocardial infarction” while asleep in his home (per Teehankee,
J.).  In Catibog,
et al. vs. WCC and Republic of the Phllippines,
L-43416, December 8, 1976, the employee was sick and died of
“hypertensive heart disease with left ventricular hypertrophy hypercholesterolemia,
angina pectoris.” (per Makasiar, J.).  In Caparas
vs. WCC, et al., L-42450, September 30, 1976, the employee suffered from
“hyperthyroid heart disease and rheumatoid arthritis” (per Martin,
J.).  In Leorna
vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, et al., L-42543, September
30, 1976, the
laborer concerned died of rheumatism with heart complication (per Makasiar, J.).

In Catibog, it is worthy to note
that Socorro Catibog, a public school teacher, filed
on March 10, 1975 a claim for compensation benefits under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act for her illness of high blood pressure which occurred sometime
on or prior to July, 1974 and caused her to go on sick leave on various
occasions and eventually to retire on December 20, 1974.  Her claim for compensation was granted by the
Referee of Regional Office No. 5 for failure of the respondent employer to
controvert the claim, but this was set aside by the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission.  From that decision Socorro Catibog appealed to this Court and during the pendency of her appeal the Court received a notice of death
showing that Socorro Catibog died on May 1, 1976 of “coronary
thrombosis and hypertension.” The Court awarded to the heirs of the
employee, Socorro Catibog, “dis­ability and/or
death benefits” in the amount of P6,000.00.

Our decision is therefor but a
reaffirmation of the spirit and purpose; of the enactment of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act which is a social legislation to effect social justice,^[9]
a welfare measure,^[10]
conceived under the “doctrine of
man’s humanity to man,”^[11]
which “humane spirit” has
found itself in the Philippine Constitution of 1973 which provides in its
Section 9, Article II, Declaration of Principles and State Policies, that the
State shall afford protection to labor.

IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING, We hereby set
aside the decision under review, and order respondent
Republic of the Philippines (Bureau of Public Schools):

(1) to pay the heirs of Aida de Castro the following:

a.  Six Thousand Pesos
(P6,000.00) representing disability and/or death benefits;

b.  Two Hundred Pesos
(P200.00) as burial expenses;

c.  Six Hundred Pesos
(P600.00) for attorney’s fees; and

(2) to pay Sixty one Pesos (P61.00) as administrative fee.

So Ordered.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., and Martin, JJ., concur.

^[1]
The New Labor Code, which took effect on November 1, 1974, abolished the Workmen’ s Compensation
Commission and in its stead, the Employees’ Compensation Commission was
created. The Code vests the original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims
arising from disability of private employees on the Social Security System and
of government employees on the Government Service Insurance System. To allow
the Workmen’s Compensation Commission to wind up its affairs and “to
enable the Department of Labor, the Social Security System, the Government
Service Insurance System and the Philippine Medical Care Commission to perfect
the organiza­tion of the Employees’ Compensation Commission and all the
programs under it,” Presidential Decree No. 608 was issued, suspending the
effectivity of the operation of Titles II and III or
Book IV of the same Code on “Employees’ Compensation and State Insurance
Fund” and “Medicare”, respectively, from November 1, 1974 to
January 1, 1975. To provide guidelines as to the disposition of claims arising
during the transition period, Presidential Decree No. 626 was likewise issued,
thus introducing new provisions to the New Labor Code, Title II, Book on
Prescription of Offenses and Claims of the original Labor Code finally reads as
follows:

“Art. 281. Money claims. – x x x

“Workmen’s compensation claims
accruing prior to the effectivity of this Code and
during the period from November 1,
1974 up to December 31,
1974, shall be filed with the appropriate regional offices of the
Department of Labor not later than March
31, 1975; otherwise, they shall be forever barred.  These claims shall be processed and
adjudicated in accordance with the law and rules at the time their causes of
action accrued.” (As amended by P.D. No. 626, Section 3)

“Art. 286. Termination of the
workmen’s compensation program – The Bureau of Workmen’s Compensation, the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission and the Workmen’s Compensation Units in the
regional offices of the Department of Labor shall continue to exercise the
functions and the respective jurisdictions over workmen’s compen­sation cases
vested upon them by Act No. 3428, as amended, otherwise known as the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, until March 31, 1976. x x x ” (As amended by P.D. No.
865-A, Section 1.)

“Art. 289. Disposition of pending cases. – x x x

“All workmen’s compensation
cases pending before the Workmen’s Compensation Units in the regional offices
of the Department of Labor and those pending before the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission as of March 31, 1975,
shall be processed and adjudicated in accordance with the law, rules and
procedure existing prior to the effectivity of the
Employees’ Compensation and State Insurance Fund.” (As amended by P.D. No.
850, December 16, 1975)

To further implement the provisions
of Title II, Book IV of the Code, the Employees’ Compensation Commission
adopted on March 17, 1975
the “Rules on Employees Compensation.” The rules provide in part:

“Rule
Ill – Compensability

“Section 1. Grounds – (a) x x x

“(c) Only injury or sickness
that occurred on or after January 1,
1975 and the resulting disability or death shall be compensable
under these Rules.”

^[2]
Frank vs . Atlanta Life Insurance Co. 211 SWR,
2d Series 940

^[3]
GRAY’S Attorney’s Textbook of Medicine, Second Edition, pp. 531-532

^[4]
SCHMIDT’S Attorney’s Dictionary of Medicine, p. 171

^[5]
p. 20, rollo

^[6]
pp. 15-16, ibid.

^[7]
p. 17, ibid.

^[8]
See Section 27, Workmen’s Compensation
Act; Calado vs. Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, et al., supra; Justo vs.
Workmen’s Compensation Commission, et al. L-43681, January 31, 1977, First Division, among others.

^[9]
Chua Yeng vs. Roma, et al., L-
14827, October 31, 1960 as per Reyes, J.B.L., J.

^[10]
National Development Co. vs.
Galamgam, (1971) 38 SCRA 495, per Fernando, J.

^[11]
Valencia vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, et al., July 30, 1976,
per Muñoz Palma, J., citing Mobile & O.R.
Co. v. Industrial Commission of Illinois
28 F. (2d) 228, 229.