SIMEON T. GARCIA, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. ARTURO B. PASCUAL, MAYOR OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JOSE, NUEVA ECIJA, EULOGIO STA. MARIA, MUNICIPAL TREASURER OF SAID MUNICIPALIT…

Appeal
from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Hon.
Felix B. Makasiar, presiding, declaring the appointment of
petitioner-appellee, Simeon T. Garcia as clerk of court of the justice
of the peace court of San Jose, Nueva Ecija valid, and, ordering the
respondents Municipality of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, Arturo B. Pascual
and Eulogio Sta. Maria, Mayor and Treasurer, respectively, of said
Municipality, to approve the vouchers of petitioner-appellee covering
his period of service, as well as to pay petitioner’s salary from July
1, 1958 and directing the respondent municipality to provide for the
necessary appropriations therefore.

Simeon T. Garcia filed a
petition for mandamus on September 11, 1958, which was amended on June
15, 1959. The facts involved in this case may be briefly stated as
follows: The acting justice of the peace of the municipality of San
Jose, Nueva Ecija appointed petitioner Simeon T. Garcia, a junior
typist civil service eligible, as clerk of the justice of the peace
court of said municipality on July 1, 1958. This appointment was
approved by the Department of Justice. On July 7, 1958, the acting
justice of the peace forwarded the appointment, duly approved by the
department and the Civil Service Commission, to the municipal
treasurer. The petitioner submitted certain vouchers supporting his
daily time record, duly approved by the acting justice of the peace,
for payment, but the treasurer returned the vouchers with the
information that they be first approved by the municipal mayor before
payment could be made. The vouchers were submitted to the mayor but the
latter did not want to approve them. The reason of the mayor was an
opinion of the provincial fiscal, that Rep. Act No. 1551 has repealed
Section 75 of Rep. Act No. 296, otherwise known as the judiciary act.

Section
75 of the judiciary act provides that the justices of the peace of
first class municipalities may have clerks of court and other necessary
employees at the expense of said municipalities, which clerks of court
and employees shall be appointed by the respective justices of the
peace. On the other hand, Rep. Act No. 1551, which is claimed to have
repealed section 75 of Rep. Act No. 296, provides—

“Hereafter,
all employees whose salaries are paid out of the general funds of the
municipalities shall, subject to the civil service law, be appointed by
the municipal mayor upon the recommendation of the corresponding chief
of office; Provided, that in case of disagreement between the chief of
office concerned and the municipal Mayor, the matter shall be submitted
for action to the proper provincial department head whose decision
shall be final.* * *. “

The judge below
ruled that said Rep. Act No. 1551 did not expressly repeal section 75
of the judiciary act and that the two laws, although apparently in
conflict with each other, may be reconciled, following the principle of
law that a prior specific statute is not repealed by a subsequent
general law. The judge further ruled that there being no specific grant
of authority in favor of the mayor to appoint the clerk of court of the
justice of the peace, the power to appoint should not be considered
lodged in said mayor. Lastly the judge held that the intent of the law
in placing the appointment of clerks in the justice of the peace is to
prevent the clerk from the importunities and pressure of prejudicial
politics.

On this appeal appellants insist that the
provisions of Rep. Act No. 1551 repealed the provisions of section 75
of the judiciary act because section 1 of Rep. Act No. 1551 provides
that all employees whose salaries are paid by the general funds of the
municipality shall be appointed by the mayor upon recommendation of the
chief of office, so that, as the clerk of court of the justice of the
peace is paid out of the general funds of the municipality, the power
to appoint the said clerk should be lodged in the mayor as with all
other subordinate officials of the municipality.

We find no
merit on the above contention. In the first place, justices of the
peace are appointed by the President of the Philippines, in the same
manner as judges of superior courts, in pursuance of the separation of
powers among the three departments of the government. The independence
of the judiciary from the other departments of the government is one of
the fundamental principles established by the Constitution. This
independence will be greatly hampered if subordinate officials of the
courts are subject to appointment by the head of the municipality or
province. A cursory reading of the provisions of Rep. Act No. 1551
clearly shows that what it intended to be made subject to appointment
by the municipal mayor are the subordinate officials in the
municipality, like employees in the executive branch and employees in
the municipal council or board. There is no reason why said act, as a
general law, may be considered as having repealed the specific
provisions of section 75 of Rep. Act No. 296.

“A
substantially similar rule prevails in cases where the two conflicting
provisions are found in different statutes relating to the same
subject. It is an established rule in the construction of statutes that
a subsequent act, treating a subject in general terms, and not
expressly contradicting the provisions of a prior special statute, is
not to be considered as intended to affect the more particular and
specific provisions of the earlier act, unless it is absolutely
necessary so to construe it in order to give its words any meaning at
all. Hence, where there are two acts or provisions, one of which is
special and particular, and certainly includes the matter in question,
and the other general, which, if standing alone, would include the same
matter, and thus conflict with the special act or provision, the
special act must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to the
general act, as the legislature is not presumed to have intended a
conflict. Thus, when the provisions of a general law, applicable to the
entire state, are repugnant to the provisions of a previously enacted
special law, applicable in a particular locality only, the passage of
such general law does not operate to modify or repeal the special law,
either wholly or in part, unless such modification or repeal is
provided for in express words, or arises by necessary implication.”
(pp.388-329, Black on Interpretation of Laws.)

Another
ground for the legal conclusion arrived at by the court below is that
the Secretary of Justice, in an opinion dated June 7, 1957, Opinion No.
122, has already held that section 75 of the judiciary act has not been
repealed by Rep. Act No. 1551. The Secretary of Justice is the legal
adviser of the government and his opinions override those of provincial
fiscals who are his subordinates. His opinions although not law, should
be given great weight, which in this case is the correct interpretation
of the laws involved.

For the foregoing considerations, the
decision appealed from should be , as it is hereby, affirmed with costs
against the appellants.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.