THE CITY OF BUTUAN, PETITIONER, VS. HON. JUDGE MONTANO A. ORTIZ, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

The
amended petition in the above-entitled case seeks to annul an order of
the Court of First Instance of Agusan, Hon. Montano Ortiz, presiding,
dated January 13, 1960, ordering the execution of the court’s decision
in Special Civil Action No. 16 of that court, entitled “Julieto Semine
and Justiniano Soriano, petitioners, vs. Zacarias Pizarro,
respondent”, dated August 13, 1954, rendered by Judge Francisco Area,
in which decision the court ordered Zacarias Pizarro, respondent, to
reinstate immediately as police corporal petitioner therein Soriano.

The
record discloses that on March 9, 1954, administrative charges for
physical injuries and electioneering were filed with the Municipal
Board of Butuan City against Justiniano Soriano. On March 11, 1954,
Soriano was suspended by Mayor Pizarro of Butuan City. The decision of
the Board dated May 9, 1954 found Soriano guilty as charged. On the
same date, appeal was brought by Soriano to the Commissioner of Civil
Service.

Said Special Civil Action No. 16 was filed in the
Court of First Instance of Agusan on June 1, 1954. In the petition it
is alleged that the 60 day period of suspension provided for in
Republic Act No. 557 had already elapsed and the case against Soriano
had not been finally decided. So Soriano sought to compel Mayor Pizarro
to reinstate him pursuant to said Act. Decision was rendered on August
13, 1954, favorable to petitioner Soriano, ordering Soriano reinstated
pending termination of the administrative charges filed against him.

On
November 27, 1954 the Commissioner of Civil Service to whom the
decision of the Municipal Board had been appealed by petitioner
Soriano, affirmed the decision of the Municipal Board, finding
respondent Soriano guilty and separating him from the service. On
January 12, 1960 (less than five years from the date of the judgment)
attorney for Soriano filed an ex-parte motion to execute the judgment
of Judge Area for reinstatement. This motion was granted by the court.
The court refused to reconsider said order of execution, hence the
petition in;this case was presented to set aside the order of
execution, on the ground that the court committed a grave abuse of
discretion in ordering the said execution of the judgment as the
Commissioner of Civil Service has already affirmed the decision of the
Municipal Board finding Soriano guilty of the charges and separating
him from the service.

We find merit in the petition. When on
January 12, 1960, Soriano demanded the execution of the judgment in
Special Civil Action No. 16 of the Court of First Instance of Agusan,
appeal by Soriano to the Civil Service Commissioner from the decision
of the Municipal Board had long ago been decided against him by the
Commissioner of Civil Service, said decision being dated November 29,
1954. It is to be noted that the right of action invoked by Soriano in
Special Civil Action No. 16 in the Court of First Instance of Agusan
was based on the failure of the Municipal Board to decide the case
within 60 days as required by Republic Act No. 557. It is true that the
judgment was correct because the suspension was ordered on March 11,
1954 and by June 1, 1954, when the petition for mandamus was filed in
the Court pf First Instance, more than 60 days have already expired
without the case having been decided. It is true that the decision of
the Court of First Instance in said special civil action continued to
be executory when the motion for execution was presented, because the
5-year period within which a decision of the court may be enforced by
motion had not yet expired, but as it was alleged and shown in the
motion for the reconsideration of the order granting execution, that
the Commissioner of Civil Service had already affirmed the decision of
the Municipal Board finding Soriano guilty on November 29, 1954, the
right to reinstatement was barred by the decision of the Commissioner
of Civil Service. This decision of the Civil Service Commissioner
finding Soriano guilty was a valid impediment to the execution of the
aforesaid decision for reinstatement. In other words, a supervening
cause or reason had arisen which has rendered the decision of the court
ordering reinstatement, no longer enforceable.

“Obviously
a prevailing party in a civil action is entitled to a writ of execution
of the final judgment obtained by him within five years from its entry
(section 443, Code of Civil Procedure). But it has been repeatedly
held, and it is now well-settled in this jurisdiction, that when after
judgment has been rendered and the latter has become final, facts and
circumstances transpire which render its execution impossible or
unjust, the interested party may ask the court to modify or alter the
judgment to harmonize the same with justice and the facts (Molina vs. De la Riva, 8 Phil., 569; Behn, Meyer & Co. vs. McMicking, 11 Phil., 276; Warner, Barnes & Co. vs. Jaucian, 13 Phil., 4; Espiritu vs. Crossfield and Guash, 14 Phil., 588; Flor Mata vs.
Lichauco and Salinas, 36 Phil., 809). In the instant case the
respondent Cleofas alleged that subsequent to the judgment obtained by
Sto. Domingo, they entered into an agreement which showed that he was
no longer indebted in the amount claimed of P995, but in a lesser
amount. Sto. Domingo had no right to an execution for the amount
claimed by him.” ( De la Costa vs. Cleofas, 67 Phil., 686-693).

For
the foregoing considerations the writ prayed for is hereby granted, and
the order for the execution of the judgment of the Court of First
Instance in Special Civil Action No. 16 “Soriano vs. Pizarro” is hereby set aside. With costs against respondent Justiniano Soriano.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and De Leon, JJ., concur.