G.R. No. L-16825. December 22, 1961

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES CHUA PUN BAPTIZED AS LEONCIO SY PENG BEN, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OP…

Decisions / Signed Resolutions December 22, 1961 REYES, J.B.L., J.:
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REYES, J.B.L., J.:


Appeal
from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila denying the
petition of Chua Pun to be admitted to Philippine citizenship.

The pertinent part of the trial court’s decision follows:

“Under
Section 7 of Commonwealth Act 473, it is required that, in their
supporting affidavit, the character witnesses must state, among other
things, that they know the petitioner to be a person of good repute and
‘morally irreproachable’. In his testimony, character witness
Felicisimo Trinidad testified that the conduct and reputation of the
petitioner as a resident of the country is ‘very good’, while the other
character witness, Constancia Aranda, testified, when asked about the
character and reputation of the petitioner that the latter is a
‘law-abiding citizen.’

It is to be noted that during the
hearing, none of the character witnesses testified that the petitioner
is ‘morally irreproachable’ much less did any one of them testify on
specific facts to show that the petitioner is ‘morally irreproachable’.
It may be stated that it is not sufficient that the character witnesses
should state in their affidavit that the petitioner is ‘morally
irreproachable.’ Neither is it sufficient for them simply to affirm on
the witness stand the truth of the contents of their affidavit.
Considering that the law requires that in the affidavit of witnesses
the latter must assert that the petitioner is personally known to them
to be ‘morally irreproachable;’, it follows, as an inevitable
corollary, that such assertion or statement must be established on the
witness stand by the testimony of the affiants themselves. In short, it
is necessary that there be proof, through the testimony of two credible
witnesses whose affidavits are attached to the petition, that they
personally know the petitioner to be morally irreproachable, (Ong vs. Republic, 55 Off. Gaz. 3290).

It
is not sufficient to establish that the contract [conduct] and
reputation of the petitioner in the community is ‘very good’ and that
the said petitioner is a ‘law-abiding citizen’. The law requires moral
character of the highest order on the part of the petitioner. In short,
it is essential that the character witnesses must establish, through
their testimony in court, that the petitioner is ‘morally
irreproachable’. This, the witnesses of the petitioner in the present
petition have failed to do. Hence, the court is of the opinion that the
second ground relied upon by the Government in its opposition is
Well-taken.”

A review of the record
convinces us that this appeal is untenable. Apart from allegations in
their affidavit to that effect, petitioner’s witnesses should prove at
the trial that the applicant is morally irreproachable (Ong vs. Republic, 103 Phil., 964; 55 Off. Gaz., [18] 3290; Dy Shui Sheng vs.
Republic, 107 Phil., 718; 58 Off. Gaz., [14] 2904 not merely that he is
a “very good” or a “law-abiding” person. As found by the trial court,
however, not only have the applicant’s witnesses failed to state
categorically that applicant is morally irreproachable, but they failed
to establish specific facts and events from which to infer that
irreproachability. Moreover, since the law requires proper and
irreproachable conduct. during the entire period of his
residence in the Philippines (Section 2, par. 3, Com. Act 473), the
evidence falls far short when only two witnesses are presented who came
to know applicant only in 1945 and 1946 respectively (see Di Tian vs.
Republic, 103 Phil., 363 Off. Gaz. 420) and who were, therefore, in no
position to testify as to applicant’s conduct from the time he arrived
in the Philippines on October 2, 1924. Needless to say, it takes much
more than the uncorroborated assertions of applicant himself to
establish this vital fact. Even within the span of time that the two
witnesses allegedly have known the applicant, it is not convincingly
shown that the nature of their association with the applicant was such
as to “keep them reasonably posted on his qualifications (cf. Deetuanka
vs. Republic, 109 Phil., 940; 61 Off. Gaz., [5] 537). As a customer who merely takes his merienda
in the applicant’s soda fountain, the witness Felicisimo Trinidad has
not shown himself to be sufficiently familiar with the personal
circumstances and background of the applicant to .vouch for his
character; and the fact that Trinidad, being In charge of rental
collections for Roces Hermanos, may have had contact with their tenants
(one of whom is the applicant) did not, of itself, qualify him to
testify about appellant’s character1 and conduct.

Without
casting aspersion on the personal integrity of appellant’s witnesses,
We have noted that the record has not proven them to be the “credible
persons” referred to in the Naturalization law.

“Within the purview of the Naturalization Law, a ‘credible’ person is, to our mind, not only
individual who has not been previously convicted of a crime; who is not
a police character and has no police record; who has not perjured in
the past; or whose ‘affidavit’ or testimony is not incredible. What
must be ‘credible’ is not the declaration made, but the person making
it. This implies that such person must have a goodstanding in the community; that he is known to be honesty and upright; that he is reputed to be trustworthy and reliable; and that his word may be taken on its face value, as a good warranty of the worthiness of the petitioner, * * *” (Ong vs. Republic supra; Dy Shui Sheng vs. Republic supra, Sy Ang Hok vs. Republic, 111 Phil., 473; 58 Off. Gaz., [34] 5629.

The
applicant-appellant quotes American authorities on the sufficiency of
proof as to “good moral character”. These authorities are not
pertinent, since our law requires “morally irreproachable character”
which is, as correctly observed by the trial court, a much higher
standard.

Wherefore, the judgment under appeal denying naturalization is affirmed, with costs against petitioner-appellant.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.