ELIZALDE & CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND APOLINAR PERLADO, RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner’s brief on appeal challenges the correctness of the
decision of the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) declaring that respondent Apolinar Perlado was petitioner’s
employee entitled to overtime pay for work in excess of eight hours and
additional compensation for work on Sundays and legal holidays.^[1]  But before petitioner may ask this Court to
consider the merits of the case, it must first hurdle a roadblock astride its
route erected by CIR’s en banc
resolution of September 16, 1963
dis­missing petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the judgment upon the
ground that the arguments in support thereof were “filed out of
time”.  In effect, this resolution
puts an end to the con­troversy it declares that the judgment has become final,
beyond recall.

Really, errors in a judgment of a court of competent juris­diction,
which has become final, may not be rectified by an appellate court.^[2]
Because:  “Public policy and sound
practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts
should become final at some definite date fixed by law.  The very object for which courts were
instituted was to put an end to
controversies.  To fulfill this purpose
and to do so speedily, certain time limits, more or less arbitrary, have to be
put up to spur on the slothful”.^[3]

As we address ourselves to the threshold question – Has the judgment
become final? – we take stock of the controlling events, viz:

August 6, 1963.  Petitioner received a copy of the decision of
the then Associate Judge Arsenio I.
Martinez, the dispositive
part of which was set forth earlier in this opinion.

August 12,
1963.  Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration, No arguments were advanced in support
thereof.

August 21 1963.  Petitioner moved for additional time to file
its arguments in support of its motion to reconsider.

August 27,
1963.  Petitioner
filed its arguments in support
of its aforesaid motion seeking reconsideration.

September 16,
1963.  CIR en
banc resolved to dismiss the
motion for reconsideration.  Ground therefor was that the arguments were “filed out of
time”.

October 3,
1963.  Petitioner filed
its notice of appeal and at the same time lodged the present petition with this
Court.

Upon respondent Perlado’s return and
petitioner’s brief (respondents did not file their brief), the case is now
before us for resolution.

1. That the judgment appealed
from is a final judgment – not merely an interlocutory order – there is no
doubt.  The fact that there is need for
computation of respondent Perlado’s overtime pay
would not render the decision incomplete. 
This in effect is the holding of this Court in Pan American
World Airways System (Philippines) vs. Pan
American Employees Association,^[4]
which runs thus:  “It is next
contended that in ordering the Chief of the Examining Division or his
representative to compute the com­pensation due the Industrial Court induly delegated its judicial functions and thereby,
rendered an incomplete decision.  We do
not believe so.  Computation of the
overtime pay involves a mechanical function, at most.  And the report would still have to be
submitted to the Industrial Court for its approval, by the very terms of the
order itself.  That there was no
specification of the amount of overtime pay in the decision did not make it
incomplete, since this matter would necessarily be made clear enough in the
implementation of the decision (see Malate Taxicab
& Garage, Inc., vs. CIR, et al., L-8718, May 11, 1956).”

2. But has that judgment reached the stage of finality in the sense
that it can no longer be disturbed?

CIR Rules of Procedure, as
amended, and the jurisprudence of this Court both answer the question in
the affirmative.

Section 15 of the CIR Rules requires that one who seeks to
reconsider the judgment of the trial judge must do so within five (5) days from
the date on which he received notice of the decision, subject of the motion,
Next follows Section 16 which says that
the motion must be submitted with arguments supporting the same.  But if said arguments could not be submitted
simultaneously with the motion, the same section commands that “the movant shall file the same within ten (10) days from the
date of the filing of his motion for reconsideration”.  Section 17 of the same rules admonishes a movant that “[f]ailure to
observe the above-specified periods shall be sufficient cause for dismissal of
the motion for reconsideration or striking out of the answer and/or the
supporting arguments, as the case may be”.

Not that the foregoing rules stand alone.  Jurisprudence
has since stabilized the enforceability thereof.  Thus, in Bien
vs. Castillo,^[5]
we ruled that where a pro forma motion for recon­sideration was
filed out of time its denial is in order pursuant to CIR rules, regardless of
whether the arguments in support of said motion were or were not filed on
time.  Pangasinan
Employees, Laborers & Tenants Association
(PELTA) vs. Martinez,^[6] pronounced that where a motion to reconsider
is filed out of time, the order or decision subject of reconsideration becomes
final.  And so also, where the arguments
in support of the motion for reconsideration are filed beyond the ten-day reglementary period, the pro forma motion for reconsideration although season­ably filed must
nevertheless be denied.  This in essence
is our ruling in Local 7, Press & Printing
Free Workers (FFW) vs. Tabigne,^[7] The teaching in Luzon Stevedoring
Co., Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations,^[8] is that where the motion for reconsideration
is denied upon the ground that the arguments in support thereof were filed out
of time, the order or decision subject of the motion becomes “final
and unappealable“.

We find no difficulty in
applying the foregoing rules and pronouncements of this Court in the case
before us.  On August 6, petitioner
received a copy of the judgment of Judge Arsenio I. Martinez
aforesaid.  Petitioner’s motion to
reconsider – without arguments in
support thereof – of August 12 was filed on time.  For, August 11, the end of the
five-day reglementary period to file a motion for
reconsideration, was a Sunday.^[9]  But, actually, the written arguments in
support of the said motion were submitted to the court on August 27.  The period from August 12 to August 27 is a
space of fifteen (15) days.  Surely
enough, said arguments were filed out of time – five (5) days late.  And the judgment had become final.

3. There is, of course, petitioner’s motion of August 21, 1963
seeking extension of time within which to present its arguments in support of
its motion.  Counsel in his petition
before this Court pleads that the foregoing motion was grounded on the
“extremely busy and difficult schedule of counsel” which would not
enable him to do so within the stated
ten-day reglementary period.^[10] The arguments were only filed on August 27 –
five (5) days late, as aforesaid.

The foregoing
circumstances will not avail petitioner any. 
It is to be noted that the motion for expansion of time was filed only
on August 21, that is, one day before the due date which is August
22.  It was petitioner’s duty to see to
it that the court act on this motion forthwith or at least inquired as to the
fate thereof not later than the 22nd of August. 
It did not.  It merely filed its
arguments on the 27th.

To be underscored at this point is that “obviously to speed
up the disposition of cases”, CIR “has a standing rule against the
extension of the ten-day period for filing supporting arguments”.^[11]That
no–extension policy should have placed petitioner on
guard.  It should not have simply folded
its arms, sit by supinely, and relied on the court’s generosity.^[12] To compound petitioner’s neglect, it filed
the arguments only on August 27, 1963, knowing full well that by that time the reglementary period had expired.

Petitioner cannot complain against CIR’s
ruling of September 16, 1963 dismissing the motion for reconsideration on the
ground that the supporting arguments were filed out of time.  That ruling in effect denied the motion for
extension.^[13]

We rule that CIR’s judgment has become
final and unappealable.  We may not review the same.^[14]

For the reasons
given, the petition for certiorari herein is hereby denied.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro and
Angeles, JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., did not take
part.

^[1]
CIR Case 1721-V, entitled “Apolinar Perlado, Petitioner, versus Elizalde
& Company, Inc., Respondent”.

^[2] Araneta vs. Commonwealth Insurance Co., 103 Phil.
522, 525-526.

^[3] Dy Cay vs. Crossfield
& O’Brien, 38 Phil. 521, 526.

^[4] 1
Supreme Court Reports Anno. 527, 530,

^[5]
97 Phil. 956.

^[6]
L-13846, May 20, 1960.

^[7] L-16093, November 29, 1960.  See also:  Cebu Portland
Cement Company vs, Savellano (Sr.), L-10781, May 29, 1959, 105 Phil. 856,
859.

^[8] L-16682, July 26, 1963.  See also:  Manila Metal Caps and Tin Cans Manufacturing
Company, Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, L-17578, July 31, 1963.

^[9] See:  Manila Electric Company vs. Public
Service Commission, 18 Supreme Court
Reports Anno. 
651, 659-660; Viray vs. Court of
Appeals (Resolution), 16 Supreme Court Reports Anno.
412.

^[10] Par. 6, Petition; Rollo,
p. 3.

^[11] Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, supra.

^[12] See: King vs. Joe,
20 Supreme Court Reports Anno. 1117,1120.

^[13] See: Ong vs. Fonacier, 17 Supreme Court Reports Anno. 616, 622.

^[14] Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company vs.
Medina, 20 Supreme Court Reports Anno. 659, 671-672.