REPUBLIC BANK, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND NARCISO MACARAEG, RESPONDENTS.

The first action for recovery of overtime pay was Case No. 1104-V
of the Court of Industrial Relations entitled “Narciso
Macaraeg, complainant, vs. Republic Savings Bank,
respondent.”  The complaint, on
motion of the respondent Bank, was dismissed by the trial Judge for lack of
jurisdiction, but the order of dismissal was set aside by a resolution of the
court en banc.  The case
was elevated to this Court in a petition for certiorari (G. R. No. L-16637) on
the sole issue of jurisdiction.  On June 30, 1961 this Court held that
the respondent court was without jurisdiction, considering that the action was
purely a money claim cognizable by the ordinary courts, and set aside the
appealed resolution en banc “without prejudice to the filing
of the claim of Macaraeg in any competent
court.”

It appears that in another case filed in the Court of Industrial
Relations on September 15, 1958, entitled ­”Rosendo
T. Resuello, et al., complainants, vs. Republic
Savings Bank, respondent” (Case No. 1751-ULP)1 – for unfair labor practice with
demand for reinstatement and back-wages – Macaraeg
(respondent herein) was one of the com­plainants.  While that case was pending Macaraeg filed with the same court, purportedly in
accordance with the decision of this Court in G. R. No. L-16637, a complaint
for over­time pay (Case No. 1538-V),
this time including a demand for reinstatement, which was already the subject
of Case No. 1751-ULP.  The respondent
Bank (petitioner herein) pleaded res adjudicate
in its answer and moved to dismiss the com­plaint, alleging that the question
of jurisdiction had already been settled by this Court in G. R. No.
L-16637.  The trial Judge sustained the
plea and dismissed the case in an
order dated March 13, 1962.  Upon motion for reconsideration, the court en
banc, in a resolution dated February 8, 1963, set aside the order of dismissal and gave due course to
the complaint.  Said the court:

“The doctrine of res judicata invoked by the Trial Court in
justifying the dis­missal of this case is not applicable, be­cause the prior
dismissal before the Supreme Court in G. R. No. L-16637 was not a con­clusive
adjudication of the controversy.  It was
not a prior judgment on the merits, since the Supreme Court, in dismissing a
complaint without a claim for reinstate­ment, ruled ‘without prejudice to the
filing of the claim of Macaraeg in any competent
court’.

 We vote that the order of March 13, 1962, be set aside, and the
case be given due course.”

Not satisfied, the Republic Bank filed the instant petition for
review.  Respondents here maintain that
the doctrine of res judicata
does not apply because the deci­sion
of this Court in G. R. No. L-16637 was without pre­judice to the riling of the
claim with any competent court and, therefore, not a judgment on the merits.

It must be stated that during the pendency here of G. R. NO.
L-16637, respondent Macaraeg filed a supplementary answer, alleging that he had
a pending claim with the Court of Industrial Relations for reinstatement and
backwages in Case No. 1751-ULP.  This Court
deferred action thereon “until the case is considered on the merits.” Obviously the purpose of the
supplementary answer was to manifest to this Court that respondent Macaraeg’s claim for overtime pay was coupled with a demand
for reinstatement.  It was, a
manifestation which, if intended as an amendment to the complaint below, could
not be entertained because it would change substantially the cause of
action.  In any event, the manifestation
proved futile when this Court rendered its decision in the afore­said case, G.
R. No. L-16637, wherein it was stated:

“No claim is made that his separa­tion is illegal or that he
still has the right to continue in the service or to be reinstated, by virtue
of a contract or otherwise.  Under this
circumstance, the action is purely a money claim cog­nizable by the ordinary
courts of justice in accordance with the provi­sions of Republic Act No.
602.”

The foregoing decision was on the merits insofar as the issue of jurisdiction was concerned.  That issue was settled with finality in
connection with the claim for overtime pay.

The complaint in the present action (Case No. 1538-V) is a
reiteration of the same claim, although it contains in addition a prayer for
reinstatement, obviously to circumvent our denial of jurisdiction to the Court
of Industrial Rela­tions.  The attempt
must be thwarted not only on that ground but also because the question of
reinstatement was already the subject of another action in the Court of
Industrial Relations (Case No. 1751-ULP) which in fact was decided by said
Court on September 27, 1967.

Wherefore,
the resolution of the lower court en banc dated February 8, 1963, is
hereby set aside, and the complaint is ordered dismissed, without pronouncement
as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro,
Angeles, and Fernandez, JJ., concur.

1 Decided by the CIR on July 4, 1962 finding the Bank
guilty of unfair labor practice and ordering the respondents to be reinstated
with full back wages, which was affirmed 
by the court en banc on August 9, following.  This decision was affirmed by us in G.R. No.
L-20303, September 27, 1967.