BEATRIZ C. ARAGONES, ET AL, PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS, VS. ABELARDO SUBIDO, ACTING CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONER, RESPONDENT-APPELLEE.

Revolving around this appeal
are the following facts:

Petitioners, 63 in number,^[1]
are first-grade civil service eligibles under
Republic Act 1080, as amended by Republic Act 1844, duly accredited as such.  They are certified public accountants except
for four^[2]
who are both certified public accountants and members of the Philippine Bar.

Petitioners were,
sometime in 1963, extended permanent appointments by the Auditor General, some
as auditors, others as supervising
auditors.  These appointments were either
original or promotional.

Petitioners’ appointment
papers were forwarded to respondent Acting Civil Service Commissioner for
attestation.  The hitch came when the
latter refused to so attest.  Instead,
he declared that he was willing
to approve the appointments as “provisional” only under Section 24(c)
of the Civil Service Act. 

The controversy actually
started with the question as to whether lawyers are eligible to the
positions of auditors and supervising auditors. 
Respondent Commissioner opined that they are not.  Contending that they are, the Auditor General
sent a communication dated May 3, 1963
to respondent Commissioner.  The former
submitted therewith his memorandum of April
25, 1963 setting forth at length the justification for his view
that lawyers are eligible.  Respondent
Commissioner, on September 2, 1963,
disagreed.^[3]
On October 8, 1963, the
Auditor General elevated the matter to the President of the Philippines
for resolution.  The Office of the
President referred back the question to the Commissioner, who, by his 2nd indorsement of July
31, 1964, not only reiterated the opinion he expressed on September 2, 1963 but added:

“It is clear from the above that the appropriate examination
for the position of Auditor is the Auditor examination and no other.  This is also borne out by the actual survey
and evaluation of functions of the said position.  In view thereof, this Office will
no longer recognize the first grade, senior teacher,
junior teacher, CPA or any other eligibility appropriate for
the position of Auditor.  For supervising positions in the Auditing
service, the supervising auditor’s eligibility shall be considered the
appropriate eligibility.”^[4]

Then came respondent Commissioner’s announcement of September 8, 1964 that there would be
qualifying examinations for auditing examiner and auditor on January 16, 1965, with the deadline
for filing applications on November
27, 1964.

On November 25, 1964,
two days before the aforesaid dead­line for filing applications, petitioners
went to the Court of First Instance of Manila on mandamus and prohibition with
preliminary injunction, naming the Commissioner as respondent.^[5]
They there alleged, amongst others, that by Republic Act 2716, appoint­ments by
the Auditor General are not to be subject to approval or review by any one,
except that such appointments should be attested only by respondent
Commissioner; and that the acts of said re­spondent in reference to their
appointments were “not only illegal and arbitrary, but also done in bad
faith in direct violation of petitioners rights.”^[6]
The reliefs specifically sought by petitioners
were:  (1) to declare respondent
Commissioner without authority to act as he did or to do the threatened acts
complained of; (2) to nullify their provisional appointments and compel re­spondent
Commissioner to attest to their permanent appointments; (3) to hold that
lawyers and certified public accountants are eligible to petitioners’
positions; (4) to enjoin respondent Commissioner from forcing petitioners and
all those similarly situated to take the qualifying
examinations scheduled on January 16, 1965; and (5) to order respondent
Commissioner to pay petitioners the sum of P10,000.00 as damages by way of
attorneys’ fees.

On December 18, 1964, the
Solicitor General, for and in behalf of respondent Commissioner filed, instead
of an answer to the petition, a “Manifestation and Motion to Declare Case
as Moot”.  Basis therefor
was respondent Commissioner’s Memorandum
Circular dated December 14, 1964.  It reads in pertinent part:

“In view thereof and as there is no register of auditor eligibles available, the Bar, CPA and First Grade
eligibilities are hereby considered as the most nearly
appropriate eligibilities for the position of auditor and supervising auditor.

Wherefore, incumbent auditors and supervising auditors and those who may be appointed as auditors and supervising auditors prior to
the establishment of the civil service register for auditors, and who possess any
of the said eligibilities (Bar, CPA and First Grade) may receive permanent
appointments  as auditors
or supervising auditors, as the case may be, subject to the provisions of the Civil Service Law and
rules on appointments.

However, upon the establishment of an appropriate register of
auditor eligibles, no appointment or promotion
as auditor or super­vising auditor may be allowed as permanent unless the
appointee concerned is an auditor eligible.  In other words, while the permanent status of
those who hold the most nearly appropriate eligibility will be respected as
regards their positions as of the date prior to the estab­lishment of the
register, they may no longer be promoted as auditor or supervising auditor,
either in salary or position thereafter unless they have qualified in the
Auditor examination.

Finally, this Office does not compel incumbents of auditor and
supervising auditor positions to take the Auditor examination.  In view, however, of the mandatory provisions
of the Civil Service Law and considering this Memorandum Circular, and the fact
that those entitled to the qualifying examination for auditor are given a
maximum rating of 50% for their satisfactory training and experience, it is
urged that they take the said examination. 
For their benefit, the deadline for the submission of appli­cations for
the Auditor examination is hereby extended up to December 29, 1964.”^[7]

Permanent appointments, as
sought by petitioners, were then given
to them.

On January
6, 1965, petitioners
registered written opposition.  Their
legal prop is that said
Memorandum Circular “has not resolved
the legal issues raised in the
instant case.” The Solicitor General replied to the opposition.

On January
11, 1965, the court
below dismissed the case as moot “since there is no more controversy between
the parties.”

Petitioners’ attempt, by its February 1, 1965 motion, to have the court’s decision of
January 11 reconsidered was
blocked by the Solicitor General’s opposition of February 5.  And the court, on February 12, refused
reconsideration.

Petitioners now come to
this Court on appeal.

1. Left unresolved, according to petitioners, is the scope and
extent of the authority of the Auditor General to make appoint­ments.  For, while the Civil Service Act (Republic
Act 2260) gives the Commissioner of Civil Service power to approve
appointments, Republic Act 2716 (An Act to insure the Independence of the
General Auditing Office) states in specific terms in its Section 1 that
“[t]he appointments of the subordinate officials and employees of the
General Auditing Office x x x
shall be made by the Auditor General in accordance with the Civil Service Law
but shall not be subject to the approval or review of any other official,
board, commission or executive office
as a prerequisite for the payment of their salaries:  Provided, That such appointments shall
be submitted to the Bureau of Civil Service for attestation x x x.”^[8] 
Petitioners would want to bring home the point that the memorandum
circular itself is indicative of the fact that respondent Commissioner
exercises acts of approval, not merely of attestation.

We find that the
views just articulated are – at present – less than compelling.  Whether respondent Commissioner attested or
approved petitioners’ permanent appointments, the unadulterated fact is that
the Commissioner gave his nod to and recognized their appointments.  He has removed the obstacle he first put up
astride petitioners’ route to secure permanent appointments.  Petitioners now hold their positions in a
permanent capacity.  If, indeed, the Commissioner approved petitioners’
appointments, rather than merely attest to them, we see no resulting prejudice
to petitioners.  We perceive of no
further gripe on this point.

Any resolution of this
issue is thus pure academic exercise.^[9]

2. Another issue
petitioners seek to keep alive is: 
“Should a CPA whose eligibility has been converted into first grade
under Republic Act 1080, take an auditor examination for the position of
auditor and supervising auditor?”^[10]

Appropriately to be recalled is that the case now on appeal is
one for mandamus and prohibition with preliminary injunction.  Petitioners’ purpose in seeking the
extraordinary writs is to compel respondent Commissioner to allow their permanent
appointments and to enjoin the latter from compelling them to take the qualifying examinations on January
16, 1965.

As heretofore
stated, petitioners’ appointments in question have already been made permanent
without the prerequisite of petitioners’ passing any examination.  No justifiable controversy on this score
exists.

Besides, any relevance now of the qualifying examinations would
be with respect to future appointments of petitioners, which, for one
reason or another, may not even happen at all.

Nonetheless, even if we close our eyes to this circumstance, one
supervening event should deter us now from prohibiting or enjoining the holding
of the examinations.  And this is the
fact that the qualifying examinations – for auditing examiner and auditor –
sought to be enjoined were actually conducted by respondent Com­missioner on February 28, 1965.  This is of public knowledge, borne out by
public records.^[11]
We are thus left under no doubt
as to the applicability here of the principle that when the events sought to be
prevented by injunction or prohibition have already happened, nothing more
could be enjoined or prohibited.  Because
nothing more could be done in reference thereto.^[12]

3. There remains for consideration petitioners’ argument that the
prayer in their petition for damages in the form of attorneys’ fees saves the
case below from summary dismissal.

The question of damages – by way of attorneys’ fees – was brought
by petitioners to the attention of the trial court in their opposition to the Solicitor General’s motion
to dismiss the case as moot.  In granting
the motion to dismiss, the court
passed this question sub–silentio.  And with reason.  Bad faith was
alleged in the petition herein merely in conclusionary
terms.  There were no specifications.^[13] This on the one hand.  On the other, the reason for the suit has
ceased to exist.  All incidents relative
thereto including the prayer for attorneys’ fees should be considered ipso
facto extinguished with it.^[14] No compelling reason exists why we should hold the contrary.

In fine, we say that since the question of attorneys’ fees was addressed to the
sound discretion of the court we cannot so easily go forward with a declaration
that the trial court was wrong.

4. Petitioners’ final point is that, even if the case is moot and
academic, public interest should justify a court ruling on the issues
raised.  And this, because they say that
respondent Commis­sioner’s acts are capable of repetition to the detriment of
the smooth functioning of government. 
They cite authorities.^[15]

We need but state here that under the circumstances, we find no
element of pressing urgency; and, we have not been shown any, to induce a
decision on the merits.  The general rule
has always been that courts cannot furnish answers to purposeless questions
that do not exist.^[16]
Even in cases of declaratory relief, there must be an actual and justifiable,
not merely theoretical, con­troversy.^[17]

In the face of respondent Commissioner’s decision to give
petitioners permanent appointments at first refused, and the qualifying
examinations sought to be enjoined having already taken place, we remain
unwilling to go along with the suggestion that we should take this case out of
the reach of the general rule just adverted to. 
For, it is not altogether clear whether there exists such a paralyzing
friction between the government agencies here involved that demands the
intervention of courts of justice.  In
fact, no act or conduct of respondent inimical to petitioners’ present
interests after he gave the examinations of February 28, 1965, was ever drawn to our attention.

For the reasons given, the lower court’s orders of January 11, 1965 dismissing the case,
and of February 12, 1965
denying reconsideration, are hereby affirmed.

No costs allowed.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Angeles, and
Fernando, J.J., concur.

^[1]
Beatriz C. Aragones, Florentino
R. Arcega, Sergio A. Barot,
Rafael G. Binaday,
Asuncion M. Burgos, Amado C. Butawan,
Charito C. Cacal, Leona T. Calantuan, Carmencita
P. Carreon, Milagros H. Caliwag,
Natividad L. Cleofe, Felisa S. Constantino, Ricardo V.
Cortes, Leonardo M. Crisostomo,
Edita A. de la Cruz, Felicitas
G. Cruz, Ma. Lourdes G. de Leon, Melitona G. de Leon,
Renato M. de Leon, Edna B. de Vera, Milagros M. del Castillo, Louisiana P. Diza, Estela V. Domantay, Alberto Ramon M. Dominguez, Soledad B. Donato, Alejandro C. Duzon,
Romanita P. Ebro, Carmen T.
Espiritu, Daria S. Fajardo, Eufrosina S. Fajardo, Ma. Athena C. Flores, Isagani
A. Francisco, Elisa Gervasio,
Edmundo V. Hernandez, Emmanuel J. Jaena,
Efren L. Javier, Ernestina G. Job, Leticia S. Landas, Rafael B. Lawenko, Renato D. Leveriza, Salvador Lintag, Alfredo B. Lising,
Bernardo L. Mendoza, Normita B. Nazaire,
Nenita H. Olaez, Bonifacio M. Ona, Carmelita
B. Orbeta, Oliva G. Panaligan, Ligaya D. Pereña, Querubin S. Regala, Mercedes C. Romana, Emma
T. Sakay, Manuel C. Samson, Brigido
G. Sanchez, Teodoro J. Santiago, Bienvenido
B. Sebastian, Marcos S. Segarra, Fidelina
G. Sunio, Lolita L. Tabano, Gloria C. Tablante,
Jose B. Tambaoan, Jr., Efren
E. Velasco, and Adelaida
I. Villanueva.

^[2]
Record, pp. 30, 50, 58, 72.

^[3]
Civil Service Opinions and Rulings, Volume IV, 1964.  Annex C of
Petition.

^[4]
Emphasis supplied.

^[5]
Civil Case 59125, “Beatriz C. Aragones, et al.,
Petitioners, versus Abelardo Subido, Acting Civil Service Commissioner,
Respondent”.

^[6]
Par. XV, Petition.

^[7]
Emphasis supplied.

^[8]
Emphasis supplied.

^[9]
Remonte vs. Bonto,
L-19900, February 28, 1966; Auyong Hian vs. Commissioner, L-23395, October 31, 1967;
Vivo vs. Morfe & Pitcock,
L-24510, December 18, 1967; Agawin vs.
Cabrera, L-23885, April 25, 1968, citing cases.

^[10]
Appellants’ Brief, p. 15.

^[11]
1965-1966 Annual Report, Civil Service Commission.

^[12]
Manila Railroad Company vs. Yatco, L-23056, May 27, 1968, citing Villaseñor vs. Abaño,
1967C Phild. 882, 885 and cases cited.

^[13]
Rodriguez vs. Tan, 91 Phil. 724, 726; Remonte vs.
Bonto, supra; Llanto
vs. Dimaporo, L-21905, March 31, 1966, citing cases.

^[14]
See:  Urdaneta
Rural Bank vs. San Juan,
L-28346, June 29, 1968.

^[15]
E.g. Rivera vs. Villegas, L-17835, May 3I, 1962.

^[16]
Remonte vs. Bonto, supra,
citing cases.

^[17]
2 Martin, Rules of Court in the Philippines,
1964 ed., p. 467, citing authorities.