PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. JUAN DELOSO, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

Appeal on questions of law from the order of the Court of First Instance
of Camarines Sur in its
Civil Case No. 6276 dismissing the plaintiff’s appeal on the ground that the
action for revival of judgment has already been barred by prescription.

On January 25,1951, judgment was rendered by the
above-mentioned court in Civil Case No. 1044 ordering the defend­ants-appellees Juan Deloso, Francisco
Imperial and Magno Jamito
to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff Philippine National Bank,
hereinafter referred to as the PNB, the sum of P600.00 plus interest,
attorney’s fees and costs.  For one
reason or another the said judgment was not executed
within five (5) years from the date of its finality.  On June
28, 1960, the PNB filed with the same court an action (Civil Case
No.4953) against the same defendants for reviv­al of the judgment in Civil Case
No. 1044.  On September 30, 1964, the
case was dismissed by the court for lack of jurisdiction over the
subject-matter, the same being within the original jurisdiction of the City
Court of Naga in ac­cordance with Republic Act No.
2613 (which took effect on August 1, 1959), in view of the amount involved.

Accordingly, on January
11, 1965, the PNB filed with the City Court of Naga
a similar action for revival of the judgment in Civil Case No. 1044.  The same was, however, on motion of the
defendants, dismissed by the said court on August 18, 1966, on the ground that the action was already
barred by prescription, more than ten (10) years having elapsed from the date
the judgment in Civil Case No. 1044 became final.  The PNB filed a motion for reconsideration,
but the same was denied.

The PNB appealed the order of dismissal to the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur;
but that court, finding that the judgment sought to be revived became final and
exe­cutory on February 26, 1951, or thirteen (13)
years, ten (10) months and fifteen (15) days before the filing of the case with
the City Court of Naga, dismissed the appeal on the
ground of prescription, pursuant to Articles 1144 and 1152 of the Civil Code
which respectively provide:

“ART. 1144.  The
following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of
action accrues:

**         **         **         **         **

“(3) Upon a judgment.”

“ART. 1152. 
The period for prescription of actions to demand the fulfillment
of obligations declared by a judgment commences from the time the judgment
became final.”

A motion for reconsideration was filed by
the PNB, but the same was denied.

Plaintiff-appellant has come directly to this Court urging the
reversal of the dismissal order on the following legal grounds: (1) The
complaint in Civil Case No. 4953 – which was dismissed for want of jurisdiction
– should at least be considered an extrajudicial demand under Article 1155 of
the Civil Code, which interrupted the running of the ten-year prescriptive
period; consequently, deducting from the period arrived at by the court below
the period of four (4) years, three (3) months and two (2) days from the filing
of the complaint in Civil Case No. 4953 on June 28, 1960, to its dismissal on
September 30, 1964, it would result that the present action had been instituted
within the ten-year period provided in Article 1144.  (2) Assuming arguendo
that the filing of the complaint did not interrupt prescription, still the
present action should be considered as seasonably instituted because the
ten-year prescriptive period provided for in Article 1144 of the Civil Code com­mences
to run only from the expiration of the five (5) years within which a judgment
may be executed by mere motion under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which reads:

“SEC. 6.  Execution by motion or
by inde­pendent action.  – A
judgment may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its
entry or from the date it becomes final and executory.  After the lapse of such time, and before it
is barred by the statute of li­mitations, a judgment may be enforced by
action,”

inasmuch as
Article 1150 of the Civil Code provides that the prescriptive period for all
kinds of actions shall be counted from the day they may be brought, and an action
for revival of a judgment can only be brought after the lapse of five (5) years
from finality thereof.

Plaintiff-appellant’s contention that the complaint in Civil Case
No. 4953 which, as stated above, was dis­missed by the court a quo for want of
jurisdiction, should be considered a written extrajudicial demand which inter­rupted
the statute of limitations, is unmeritorious. 
Arti­cle 1155 of the Civil Code provides:

“ART. 1155. 
The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed
before the court, when there is a written extrajudicial demand by the
creditors, and when there is any written ack­nowledgment of the debt by the
debtor.”

In Philippine National
Bank vs. Osete, et al., G.R.No.
L-24997, July 18, 1968 (24 SCRA 63), this Court, in hold­ing that Article 1155
of the Civil Code refers to actions to collect not based on a judgment sought
to be revived, said:

“Moreover, the lower court expressed the view that said ‘Art.
1155 of the New Civil Code refers to the tolling of the period of prescrip­tion
of the action to collect, not to the action to enforce’ or revive – a
‘judgment’.  Under­standably, either an
‘extrajudicial demand’ by the creditor or an ‘acknowledgment of the debt’ may
interrupt the prescription of the action to collect, not based upon a
judgment, since the demand indicates that the creditor has not slept on his
rights – and removes the basis of the statute of limitations of actions – but,
was vigilant in the enforcement thereof, where­as an acknowledgment by the
debtor provides a tangible evidence of the existence and validity of the
debt.  Who would, however, make an ‘extra­judicial
demand’ for the payment of a judgment, when the same may be enforced by a writ
of exe­cution? And, how could an acknowledgment or partial payment affect the
rights of a creditor, when the same are based, no longer upon his contract with
the debtor or upon the law, but upon no less than a judicial decree,
which is final and executory?”

The doctrine in the Osete
case was reiterated in Philippine National Bank vs. Pacific Commission House,
G.R. No.L-22675, March 28, 1969 (27 SCRA 766), where this Court added:

“Even under the Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190, a
distinction was made between a debt based on contract and one already confirmed
by judgment insofar as the effect of acknowledgment was concerned.  Under Section 43 thereof an ac­tion upon a
contract or upon a judgment pres­cribed in ten years; but under Section 50 the
renovating effect of payment or of a written acknowledgment of the debt is limited
to the first kind of action, thus: ‘when payment has been made upon any demand
founded upon contract, or a written acknowledgment thereof or a promise
to pay the same has been made and signed by the party sought to be charged, an
action may be brought thereon within the time herein limited, after such
payment, acknowledgment or promise.'”

The conclusion is, therefore, inescapable
that even if the complaint in Civil Case No. 4953 be considered a writ­ten
extrajudicial demand, it could not have interrupted the prescription of the
action to revive the judgment in Civil Case No. 1044.

The other question raised by plaintiff-appellant was squarely
ruled upon by this Court in Gutierrez Hermanos vs. De
la Riva, 46 Phil., 827 (1923), where it held that the ten-year prescriptive
period commences to run from the date of finality of the judgment and not from
the expiration of five (5) years thereafter. 
Three reasons were there ad­vanced, to wit:  (1) Section 447 of the Code of Civil Pro­cedure
(which is similar to the last sentence of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Revised
Rules of Court) should be construed in relation to Section 43, No. 1, of the
said Code (which is similar to Article 1144 of the Civil Code); and as thus
construed, “the conclusion one arrives at is that after the expiration of
the five years within which execution can be issued upon a judgment, the
winning party can revive it only in the manner therein provided so long as the
period of ten years does not expire from the date of said judgment, accord­ing
to section 43, No. 1, of the same Code.” (2) The right of the winning
party to enforce the judgment against the defeated party “begins to exist
the moment the judgment is final; and this right, according to our Code of
Procedure, con­sists in having an execution of the judgment issued during the
first five years next following, and in commencing after that period the
proceeding provided in section 447 to revive it, and this latter remedy can be
pursued only before the judgment prescribes, that is to say, during the five
years next following.  It is so much an
action to ask for an execution as it is to file a complaint for reviving it, be­cause,
as we know, by action is meant the legal demand of the right or rights one may
have.” (3) If it is held that the winning party has still ten (10) years
within which to revive the judgment after the expiration of five (5) years,
then the judgment would not prescribe until after fifteen (15) years, which is
against No. 1 of section 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure, “[a]nd it cannot be said that such is the letter, and much
less, the intention of the law, for there is nothing in section 447 of the said
Code, making this new period different from the one prescribed in said section
43, No. 1, or reconciling these two provisions, there being no other way of
reconciling them than to say that after the expiration of the first five years
next fol­lowing the judgment, there remain to the victorious party only another
five years to revive it.” The doctrine in Gutierrez Hermanos
has tacitly, yet consistently, been adhered to by this Court (Cf. Asociacion Cooperativa de Credito Agricola de Miagao vs. Monteclaro, et al., 74
Phil. 281 (1943); PNB vs. Silo, G.R. No. L-3498, March 19, 1951; Ansaldo vs. Fidelity and Surety Co., G.R.No.L-2378, April
27, 1951; Carrascozo vs. Fuentebella,
G.R.No.L-5888, April 22, 1953; Miciano vs. Watiwat, et al., G.R.No.L-8769, November 21, 1957; Lazaro, et al., vs. Gomez, et al., G.R.Nos.
L-12664-65, September 30, 1960; Potenciano vs. Gruenberg, et al., G.R.No.
L-16956, February 27, 1962; PNB vs. Monroy, G.R. No. L-19374, June 30, 1964; PNB vs. Bondoc, G.R.No.L-20236, July 30, 1965); so that it is now
settled that the ten-year period within which an action for revival of a
judgment should be brought, commences to run from the date of final­ity of the
judgment, and not from the expiration of the five-year period within which the
judgment may be enforced by mere motion (Art. 1152, Civil Code).

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the order of
dismissal appealed from is affirmed, with treble costs against
plaintiff-appellant.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
and Barredo, JJ., concur.