PHILIPPINE MARKETING & MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ANDRES REYES, AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BR. VI, CONVERSE RUBBER CORPORATION AND EDWAR…

The jurisdiction of the then Judge Andres Reyes of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, now a Justice of the Court
of Appeals, to act on a contempt charge, is challenged in this prohibition
proceeding.  Petitioner Philippine
Marketing & Management Corporation contends that it could not thus be cited
as it is not a party to the case out of which the contempt incident arose and
that, moreover, the decision having been rendered and an appeal having been
perfected, respondent Judge was thus bereft of authority to inquire into such
alleged contumacious incident.  Neither
ground for assailing the jurisdiction of respondent Judge appears tenable.  Nor is the invocation by petitioner of the
due process clause any more persuasive, its right to be heard, far from having
been disregarded, accorded respect. 
Prohibition does not lie.

A case for unfair competition filed by private respondents
Converse Rubber Corporation and Edwardson
Manufacturing Corporation against Jacinto Rubber and Plastics Co., Inc. and Ace
Rubber & Plastics Corporations, was decided favorably by respondent Judge
in a decision dated November 2, 1966.  Its dispositive
portion contains the following: “Permanently restraining the defendants,
their agents, employees and other persons acting in their behalf from
manufacturing and selling in the Philippines rubber shoes having the same or
confusingly similar appearance as plaintiff Converse Rubber’s ‘Converse Chuck
Taylor All Star’ rubber shoes, particularly from manufacturing and selling in
the Philippines rubber shoes with (a) ankle patch with a five-pointed blue star
against a white background, (b) red and blue bands, (c) white toe patch with
raised diamond shaped areas, and (d) brown sole of the same or similar design
as the sole of ‘Converse Chuck Taylor All Star’ rubber-soled canvas footwear; *
* *.”^[1]

Thereafter, in an urgent ex-parte
motion requiring petitioner as well as the defendants in such unfair
competition case to explain why they should not be held in contempt of court,
it was alleged: “In defiance of this Court and disobedience of and
resistance to the permanent injunction, the defendants and the Philippine
Marketing & Management Corporation, their exclusive distributor, continue
to manufacture, advertise, and sell in the Philippines their ‘Custombuilt rubber shoes with (a) an ankle patch with
five-pointed blue star against a white background, (b) red and blue bands, (c) a
white toe patch with raised diamond shaped areas, and (d) brown sole of the
same or similar design as the sole of a ‘Converse Chuck Taylor All Star’ rubber
canvas footwear.”^[2]

Such conduct on the part of defendants as well as petitioner was
characterized in such petition as “a willful and concerted disobedience
of, and resistance to, the permanent injunction and constitutes a direct
challenge of the authority of this Court which tends to degrade the
administration of justice.  The wilfulness and contumacious conduct of defendants and
Philippine Marketing & Management Corporation are underscored by their
conduct throughout the proceedings of this Court.”^[3]

Then came the challenged order. 
Thus: “Considering the urgent ex-parte
motion to require defendants Jacinto Rubber & Plastics Co., Inc. and Ace
Rubber & Plastics Corporation together with the Philippine Marketing &
Management Corporation, their respective presidents and general managers, to
explain why they should not be held in contempt of court, this Court resolves
to set the said motion for hearing with notice to the respondents in this
contempt complaint on [December] 23, 1966, at 8:30 A. M., and the said
respondents are hereby ordered to explain and show cause why they should not be
declared in contempt of this Court for having allegedly committed the acts set
forth in the motion on or before the hearing of this incident as aforestated.”^[4]

It should be stated likewise that as early as December 14, 1966
the appeals on the part of plaintiffs in that case, now private respondents, as
well as defendants therein, were approved in an order of respondent Judge, the
opening paragraph of which reads: “Both plaintiffs and defendants have
filed their notice of appeal and record on appeal, as well as deposited a cash
appeal bond in the sum of P120.00, the former taking their appeal to the
Honorable Supreme Court and the latter to the Honorable Court of Appeals, * * *.”^[5]

On the above undeniable facts and considering the applicable
principles of law, petitioner has not made out a case for prohibition.

1.     
The first point raised by petitioner is that
respondent Judge acted without and in excess of his jurisdiction in citing and
ordering it to appear before him and explain why it should not be held in
contempt of court as it is “an entity distinct and separate from the
defendants in the case, * * *.”^[6]
It would thus argue that for a contempt charge of disobedience to a writ,
process, order, judg­ment, or command of a court to prosper, the individual or
entity thus proceeded against should have previously been a party to such case
or controversy.  That is not the
law.  We have categorically declared
otherwise.  As held by us in Ferrer v. Rodriguez:^[7]
“Nevertheless, persons who are not parties in a proceeding may be declared
guilty of contempt for willful violation of an order issued in the case if said
persons are guilty of conspiracy with any of the parties in violating the
court’s order.”

It was alleged in the urgent motion to require petitioner to show
cause why it should not be held in contempt of court that it is the exclusive
distributor of the defendants against whom the injunction was ordered by the
lower court.^[8]
In the answer of respondents to such petition, a transcript of the stipulation
of facts was set forth in which counsel for petitioner made the express
admission that it takes care of the advertisement of defendant Jacinto Rubber
and Plastic Co., Inc., of which it is the exclusive distributor and that it had
the same stockholders and incorporators.^[9]
All that is alleged in the memorandum for petitioner is that it “is a
corporation duly organized and with distinct and separate personality from the
two defendants” Jacinto Rubber and Plastic Co., Inc. and Ace Rubber and
Plastic Corporation.” It would stress further that there is no proof of
its being their agent.  It would appear
obvious, therefore, that the doctrine in Ferrer v.
Rodriguez calls for application.  While
we do not prejudge the guilt of petitioner for contempt, enough has been shown
for the lower court to take action on a motion requiring it to show cause why
it should not be so punished.

2.     
Petitioner, in its attempt to show absence of
jurisdiction, would call attention to the challenged order having been issued
after the approval of the appeal bonds and records on appeal on December 14, 1966.^[10]
The argument does not impress us.  While
it is true that according to the Rules of Court, upon perfection of an appeal,
the lower court loses its jurisdiction over the case, it retains, however, the
power “to issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights
of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal.”^[11]
Moreover, it is not to be lost sight of that where the judgment is for
injunction, the appeal does not stay its execution unless otherwise ordered by
the court.^[12]
As correctly noted in the answer of respondents: “To this date, [not one
of] the defendants in Civil Case No. 9380 nor the petitioner herein has moved
for the suspension of the injunction during the pendency
of the appeal.  Hence the said defendants
and ‘their agents, employees and other persons acting in their behalf, ‘like the
petitioner, are bound to obey the injunction and to desist from doing that
which was absolutely prohibited.”^[13]

Our ruling in Manila Railroad Company v. Yatco^[14]
furnishes an analogy. While in that case the decision had become final and executory, still, as is made clear by the above provision
of the Rules of Court, a judgment of injunction is not stayed during the pendency of the appeal unless otherwise ordered by the
court.  It is thus executory
in character.  In the Manila Railroad
Company case, the argument about lack of jurisdiction was unavailing.  “The contention that respondent judge
had lost jurisdiction over the case is without merit.  True, there is a judgment which is final and executory.  But this
does not mean that the court has lost any and all power regarding the
case.  By the finality of the judgment,
what the lower court lost is its jurisdiction to amend, modify, or alter the
same.  It, however, retains its jurisdiction
to enforce said judgment ‘even after the judgment has become final for the
purpose of execution and enforcement of the judgment.’ Petitioner’s June 3
motion does not seek to amend, alter or modify the judgment.  It merely asks for the lower court’s
assistance because its officers, the special sheriff and other law enforcing agencies,
have been enforcing the judgment in a way not in accord with its terms.”^[15]

3.  In its memorandum,
petitioner would complain that to subject it to contempt proceedings would be
to deny it the fundamental right to procedural due process.  A reading of the challenged order would
indicate that such objection is without basis. It was therein explicitly
provided that the urgent motion on the part of private respondents to require
petitioner to explain why it should not be held in contempt of court was set for
hearing so that it may have the opportunity of meeting such a charge.  That is all that procedural due process
requires.  There is here no possible
condemnation without a hearing, the inquiry is to be conducted according to the
regular procedure, and whatever conclusion may be arrived at would appear to be
not in defiance of but precisely according to the legal requisites.  To allege under these circumstances that the
safeguard of due process has been ignored is to close one’s eyes to the
realities of the situation.

WHEREFORE, this petition for prohibition is denied.  With costs against petitioner.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, and Villamor, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Petition, Annex B.

^[2] Ibid.,
Annex D, par. 3.

^[3] Ibid.,
par. 4.

^[4] Ibid.,
Annex C.

^[5] Ibid.,
Annex F.

^[6] Ibid.,
par. 9.

^[7] L-17507,
August 6, 1962, 5 SCRA 854.

^[8]
Petition, Annex D, par. 3.

^[9]
Annex 1, Answer of Respondents.

^[10]
Petition, par. 8.

^[11]
Rule 41, Section 9, Rules of Court.

^[12]
Rule 39, Section 4, ibid.

^[13] Answer
of Respondents, par. 5.

^[14]
L-23056, May 27, 1968, 23
SCRA 735.

^[15] Ibid.,
pp. 751-752.