GUERRA ENTERPRISES COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF LANAO DEL SUR, BRANCH I, AND PABLO LUNA, RESPONDENTS.

Petition
for a writ of mandamus to require the of First Instance of Lanao
del Sur to approve and certify the record of appeal
filed by petitioner Guerra Enterprises Company, Inc., in Civil Case No. 1496 of
the said Court, under date of 9 December 1966.

The
essential facts that led to the filing of this petition may be summarized as
follows:

On 8 October 1965, petitioner herein registered a complaint for
damages and preliminary injunction against herein private respondent, Pablo
Luna, in the Court of First Instance of Lanao.  Acting upon defendant’s motion to dismiss,
the court, on 21 January 1966, issued in order dismissing
the complaint.  Copy of the order was
received by counsel on 21 February 1966.

On 5 March 1966, the plaintiff filed an “Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration”, which was denied by the court by order of 20 October 1966.

On 21
November 1966, plaintiff, in a motion of the same date (Annex “M” of
the Petition), stated that he was appealing to the Court of Appeals and prayed
that he be given 30 days, more specifically, up to 31 December 1966, to perfect
his appeal.  On 2 December 1966, the
court entered an order granting plaintiff “an extension of 15 days from
receipt of this order” to file “an appeal bond and record of
appeal”, and copy whereof was received by appellant on 7 December 1966.

A formal
notice of appeal was filed on 23 November 1966 (even before the extension
was granted), and on 7 December an appeal bond in the sum of P120.00 was
deposited with the Clerk of the Court of First Instance.  On 10 December
1966,
the record of appeal was submitted, and copies were sent to the defendant-appellee.

Upon
objection of the defendant, the court a quo denied approval of the
record of appeal, and dismissed the appeal by order of 29 April 1967 (Petition,
Annex “S”) on the grounds (1) that the “Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration” of the order of dismissal filed by the plaintiff on 5
March 1966 was a pro forma motion that did not interrupt the 30-day
appeal period; and (2) that the record of appeal submitted did not show on its
face when counsel for appellant received copy of the order of 21 January 1966
dismissing the case, nor the date when counsel received copy of the order dated
20 October 1966 denying the motion for reconsideration.

Appellant
thereupon-resorted to this Court for a writ of mandamus against the dismissal
of its appeal.

We find
the petition meritorious.  Contrary to
the finding of the court below that appellant’s motion for reconsideration was
merely pro forma because the arguments therein advanced are
substantially the same as those advanced in the memorandum submitted by
appellant under date of 29 December 1965, our scanning of the motion for
reconsideration convinces us that the same differs substantially from the 29
December memorandum in attacking the lower court’s application of our ruling in
Arroyo vs. Granada and Gentero, 18 Phil. 484, to the
suit filed by attorney-in-fact Montaner in behalf and
in the name of plaintiff Guerra Enterprises Co., Inc.  This portion is not found in the memorandum of
29 December 1965; it could not he for the
reason that, prior to the trial court’s decision, plaintiff could not know that
the Arroyo doctrine would be applied, by the court to the case.  While the question of the personality of the attorney-in-fact
to sue in the name and behalf of his principal had been put in issue by the
defendant Luna, that did not preclude the plaintiff’s contesting the legal
grounds relied upon by the court in up­holding defendant’s contention that
there was lack of capacity to bring the action, and did not make its motion for
reconsideration merely pro forma. 
Among the ends to which a motion for reconsideration is addressed, one
is precisely to convince the court that its ruling is erroneous and improper,
contrary to the law or the evidence^[1] and in doing so, the movant has to dwell of necessity upon the Issues passed
upon by the court. If a motion for reconsideration may not discuss these
issues, the consequence would be that after decision is rendered, the losing
party would be confined to filing only motions for reopening and new trial. We
find in the Rules of Court no warrant for ruling to that effect, a ruling that
would, in effect, eliminate subsection (c) of Section 1 of Rule 37.

It must
also be remembered that the disallowance of pro forma motions for
reconsideration or new trial is mainly predicated upon their being resorted to
solely to gain time and delay the proceedings.^[2] In the case at bar, the
filing of the urgent motion to reconsider the order of dismissal barely twelve
(12) days after its receipt by counsel for the plaintiff strongly argues
against its use as a mere delaying tactic.

On the
second ground relied upon by the court a quo which is that the record of
appeal tendered by appellant failed to specify the date when certain orders
were received by counsel for petitioner-appellant, it is enough to observe that
since the record of appeal was still within the control of the respondent
court, all that was needed was to order appellant to make the requisite
amendments, and not to bar the appeal. It is not amiss to point out that the
date when appellant’s, counsel received copy of the order to dismiss can be
gleaned from appellant’s notice of appeal dated 21
November 1966, which explicitly recites that on that date –

“counsel has just received copy
of the order of the Court dated October
20, 1966, denying the motion for reconsideration” (Petition,
Annex “M”).

Finally,
private respondent’s objection to the verification of the petition filed in
this Court, on the ground that the same is done by counsel “to the best of
my knowledge, information and belief”, is un­meritorious, since this Court
has ruled that such a verification by the attorney is adequate compliance with
Rule 7, Section 6, it being presumed that facts by him alleged are true to his
knowledge in view of the sanctions provided in Section 5 of the Rule Arambulo vs. Perez, 78 Phil. 387: Cajefe
vs. Fernandez, L-15409, 19 October 1960).

Considering
the petition to be one for certiorari, we hold that the court of origin gravely
abused its discretion in dismissing the appeal of petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the respondent court’s
order of 29 April 1967 (Annex “S” of the
Petition) is hereby set aside and the records are ordered remanded to the court
of origin for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.

Dizon, Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
and Villamor,
JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., did not take part.

^[1]
Rule 37, Section 1, subsection (c)

^[2] Dacanay vs. Alvendia,
L-22633, 31 October 1969.