THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. FAUSTO YADAO ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

The sole question for decision is whether the information filed
against defendant-appellees in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
sufficiently describes a violation of section 1 of Republic Act No.
145, which reads as follows:

“Any person assisting a claimant in the preparation,
presentation and prosecution of his claim for benefits tinder the laws
of the United States administered by the United States Veterans
Administration, who shall, directly or indirectly, solicit, contract,
for charge, or receive, or who shall attempt to solicit, contract for,
charge, or receive any fee or compensation exceeding twenty pesos in
any one claim, or who shall collect his fee before the claim is
actually paid to a beneficiary or claimant, shall be deemed guilty of
an offense and upon conviction thereof shall for every offense be fined
not exceeding one thousand pesos or imprisoned not exceeding two years,
or both, in the discretion of the court.”

Said information alleges that defendants conspiring together,
willfully did “offer to assist one Floverto Jazrain in the prosecution
and expeditious approval of his legitimate claim of $2,207 for benefits
under the laws of the United States administered in the Philippines by
the United States Veterans Administration, and as consideration for
which, said accused directly solicited and/or charged said Floverto
Jazmin as fee or compensation the sum of P800 which is in excess of the
lawful charge of P20 in any one claim.”

The Honorable Julio Villamor, Judge, upheld a motion to quash, on
the ground that the facts charged did not constitute a public offense.
Hence this appeal by the prosecution, raising the juridical issue above
stated.

It is clear, in our opinion, that section 1 of Republic Act 145 punishes:

(a) Any person assisting a claimant etc., * * * who shall directly or indirectly solicit * * * a fee exceeding twenty pesos;

(b) Any person assisting a claimant * * * who shall attempt to solicit, * * * a fee exceeding twenty pesos; and

(c) Any person assisting a claimant * * * who shall collect his fee before the claim is actually paid.

In all the three instances the person must be one “assisting” the claimant^[1]
The participle “assisting” and the clause “assisting a claimant in the
preparation etc.” qualify “any person” as antecedent of the pronoun
“who” in the phrases, “who shall solicit”, “who shall attempt to
solicit” or “who shall collect”.

Examining the information, we find it does not aver that the
defendants assisted or were assisting the claimant for veterans
benefits. It merely asserts they offered to assist, and it is evident
that violation is committed only when a persons assisting a claimant
solicits, contracts for, charges or receives or attempts to solicit
etc. more than is permitted by law. One who offers to assist, but does
not assist, is not included within the penal prohibition, which by its
nature must be restrictively interpreted, or strictly construed against
the government.^[2] Of course
there was an attempt to commit the offense described by Republic Act
No. 145. But the said statute does not expressly punish attempts to
commit the offense, and the provisions of the Penal Code about attempts
(tentativas) do not apply.^[3]

The prosecution relies upon Sanchez vs. U. S. 134 Fed. (2nd) 279, 63 S. Ct. 1325, 319 U. S. 768 wherein this was said:

“A showing that an excessive fee was solicited,
contracted for, charged or received for assistance in preparation and
execution of necessary papers in any application to Veterans’
Administration will support a conviction of violation of fee limitation
for assistance in such application regardless of whether such
assistance was in fact rendered.”

But such adjudication is not conclusive, because the statute therein
construed differs materially from ours. It punishes “any person who
shall directly or indirectly contract for, charge or receive, or who
shall attempt to solicit, contract for excessive compensation.” The
section does not contain the phrase “assisting a claimant” after the
words “any person” and before the words “who shall etc”. That phrase
conditions each and every violation of section 1 of Republic Act No.
145.

The appealed decision quashing the indictment is, therefore, affirmed, without costs.

Paras, C. J., Pablo, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Diokno, JJ., concur.

---

^[1] Whether “assisting” includes
persons engaged by the veteran to assist him, although not yet actually
rendering assistance—we do not decide.

^[2] U. S. vs. Abad Santos, 36 Phil. 243.

^[3] U. S. vs. Basa, 8 Phil. 89.