MARGARITA ESTACIO VDA. DE POSADAS, PETITIONER, VS. MARIA NIEVRE ET AL., AND HON. JOSE P. FLORES, ETC., RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for mandamus to compel the execution of a
judgment of the Justice of the Peace of Rosario, La Union, in a
forcible entry and detainer case. The Judgment orders the defendants
therein to vacate the land object of the suit and to pay a monthly
rental of P5.00 from January, 1953, until possession was delivered to
plaintiff. But the judgment was appealed to the Court of First Instance
of La Union, and while the appeal was pending in that court, the Judge
thereof, at the instance of plaintiff ordered the issuance on January
13, 1953, of a writ of execution for failure of the appellant to file a
supersedeas bond or to deposit in court all back rents due.
Implementing this order, the clerk of court issued the corresponding
writ on July 14 and the same was served upon defendants by the sheriff
on July 18. Instead of complying with the writ, the appellants on July
21 asked that they be permitted to file a supersedeas bond to stay
execution and the court in its order of August 6 allowed them to file
such bond in the sum of P200.00 and ordered the sheriff to hold in
abeyance the execution of the judgment, the court further declaring
that the order superseded that of July 13. Reconsideration of the order
having been denied, the appellee filed the present petition for
mandamus to compel the court to order the execution of the judgment,
contending that the order suspending the execution was void and that
the court had no authority to issue the same.

It is settled that failure of the defendant in a forcible entry and
detainer case to file a supersedeas bond or to pay on time the adjudged
monthly rentals for the occupation of the property is a ground for
execution under Section 8, of Rules 72, Rules of Court, and the duty of
the court to order such execution is ministerial and imperative. The
Court of First Instance to which such case has been appealed has no
jurisdiction to allow extensions of time for the payment of such rents.
(II Moran on Rules of Court, 3rd ed., pp. 294-295.) According to the
same author, “neither has the court authority to accept a bond instead
of the cash payments. A payment made out of time prior to the order of
the court cannot be accepted as an excuse for not ordering execution of
the payment; and so with a payment made after the motion for execution
was filed.” (Ibid.)

It is, however, urged in the answer, which is not under oath, that
the delay in the filing of the bond and the payment of the monthly
rents was due to the illness of the defendants and their lawyer’s
preoccupation in election matters and in connection with the sickness
of his own wife. But there is no showing that an honest attempt has
been made at the proper time to comply with the requirement of the Rule
on these matters and that the attempt was frustrated by causes beyond
the control of the parties. The case is not covered by the ruling laid
down in the decisions invoked by the respondents. On the other hand,
the following from a subsequent decision of this Court Ambrosio
Carbungco vs. Rafael Amparo, 46 Off. Gaz. (Supp. 11) p. 91, 83 Phil.,
638, is decisive on the present case:

“The fact that the actual deposit was made shortly
after the expiration of the first ten days of the succeeding month
should not and cannot make any difference. The law has prescribed a
period, and this requirement should be complied with strictly and its
observance and compliance should be enjoined and enforced by the
courts, not only for the protection of parties in whose favor the law
happens to have been made and promulgated, but also for the information
and guidance of those otherwise affected thereby. Otherwise, there
would be confusion and misunderstanding as to whether or not an
appellant in a forcible entry and detainer case could avoid execution
if he shall have made the monthly deposit, say, on the 11th, 12th 13th
or 14th day etc. of the succeeding month, just as long as the delay is
not too long.

“Pending appeal, failure to make the deposit of
rental within the period fixed by law, however short the delay, gives
the appellee the right to execution of the judgment, which the court is
bound to grant and enforce.” (syllabus.)

In view of the foregoing, the petition for Mandamus is granted and
the respondent judge is required immediately to issue and order for the
execution of the judgment of the justice of the peace of Rosario, La
Union, now on appeal to the Court of First Instance of that province
with costs against the respondents other than the Judge of First
Instance.

Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Diokno, JJ., concur.