THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. FRANCISCO DIAZ, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

On November 24, 1951, Francisco Diaz was accused in the Municipal
Court of Pasay City of a violation if Section 52 of Act 3992 known as
the Revised Motor Vehicles Law committed as follows:

“That on or about the 12th day of November, 1951, in
Pasay City, Philippines, the above-named accused Francisco Diaz being
then the driver and person in charge of Automobile bearing plate No.
12348 (should be 1560), did then and there wilfully and unlawfully
drive and operate said automobile along Taft Avenue, this city, in a
fast and reckless manner, without taking the necessary precautions to
avoid accident to persons and damage to property, thereby causing an
accident.” Diaz pleaded not guilty to the charge and after the case was
called for hearing twice without the prosecution appearing, the
Municipal Court on motion of the defense dismissed the case “for
failure of the Government to prosecute.” This was on December 22, 1951.

On May 9, 1952, the Assistant City Attorney of Pasay City filed an
information in the Court of First Instance of Rizal charging the same
Francisco Diaz with Damage to Property thru Reckless Imprudence
committed as follows:

“That on or about the 12th day of November, 1951, in
Pasay City, Philippines, the above-named accused Francisco Diaz being
the driver and person in charge of automobile bearing plate No. 1560,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloneously drive, operate
and manage the same along Taft Avenue, this city, in a reckless,
negligent and imprudent manner, without taking the necessary
precautions to avoid accident to persons and damage to property,
causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence the said
automobile with plate No. 1560, hit, bumped and collided against an
Oldsmobile car with plate No. 12348 driven by Potenciano Eria, thereby
causing damage to the latter vehicle in the amount of P249.50 to the
damage and prejudice of the owner Say Koc Chuan in the aforesaid sum of
P249.50.”

On October 10, 1952, the Rizal Court issued an order postponing the
arraignment of the accused to October 27, 1952, giving counsel for the
defendant until October 16th within which to file a motion to quash. On
said date defendant’s counsel filed his motion based on double jeopardy
because of the previous charge of violation of the Revised Motor
Vehicle Law (sec. 52 thereof) with the Municipal Court of Pasay City.
On November 17, 1952, the Rizal Court issued an order sustaining the
motion to quash and dismissing the case with costs de oficio.
The Government is appealing from that order and because the appeal
involves only questions of law, the same was taken directly to this
Court.

Is there double jeopardy in the present case?

As regards the dismissal of the first case in the Municipal Court of
Pasay City, it is true that since the defendant himself asked for said
dismissal, at first blush, it may not be considered as coming under the
provisions of Rule 113, section 9 of the Rules of Court which provides
that there is former jeopardy “when a defendant shall have been
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the defendant.” But in the case of Gandicela vs. Hon. Lutero, 88 Phil., 299, w held:

“If the defendant wants to exercise his
constitutional right to a speedy trial, he should ask, not for the
dismissal but for the trial of the case. If the prosecution asks for
the postponement of the hearing and the court believes that the hearing
cannot be postponed anymore without violating the right of the accused
to a speedy trial, the court shall deny the postponement and proceed
with the trial and require the fiscal to present the witnesses for the
prosecution; and if the fiscal does not or cannot produce his evidence
and consequently fails to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, the Court, upon the motion of the defendant, shall dismiss the
case. Such dismissal is not in reality a mere dismissal although it is
generally so called, but an acquittal of the defendant because of the
prosecution’s failure to prove the guilt of the defendant, and it will
be a bar to another prosecution for the offense even though it was
ordered by the Court upon motion or with the express consent of the
defendant, in exactly the same way as judgment of acquittal obtained
upon the defendant’s motion (People vs. Salico, 84 Phil., 722).”

The dismissal of the charge in the Pasay City Municipal Court is
even a stronger case than the example considered in the case of
Gandicela above referred to. Here the prosecution was not even present
on the day of trial so as to be in a position to proceed with the
presentation of evidence to prove the guilt of the accused. The case
was set for hearing twice and the prosecution without asking for
postponement or giving any explanation, just failed to appear. So the
dismissal of the case, tho at the instance of defendant Diaz may,
according to what we said in the Gandicela case, be regarded as an
acquittal.

The next question to determine is the relation between the first
offense of violation of the Motor Vehicles Law prosecuted before the
Pasay City Municipal Court and the offense of damage to property thru
reckless imprudence charged in the Rizal Court of First Instance. One
of the tests of double jeopardy is whether or not the second offense
charged necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information
(Rule 113, section 9). Another test is whether the evidence which
proves one would prove the others, that is to say, whether the facts
alleged in the first charge if proven, would have been sufficient to
support the second charge and vice versa; or whether one crime is an
ingredient of the other.^[1]

It is clear that in the present case the second charge of Damage to
Property thru Reckless Imprudence includes the first charge of reckless
driving; that the facts alleged in the information on damage to
property thru reckless driving, if proven, would have been sufficient
to support the first charge of reckless driving, and finally, that the
offense of reckless driving is an ingredient of the offense of damage
to property thru reckless imprudence, all for the simple reason that
the basic element in both offenses is reckless driving. Thus it is
evident that we have here a case of double jeopardy. And there is no
explanation why when Diaz was first charged with a violation of the
Motor Vehicle Law because of reckless driving, the damage to property
was not included.

A defendant should not be harassed with various prosecutions based
on the same act by splitting the same into various charges, all
emanating from the same law violation, when the prosecution could
easily and well embody them in a single information.

The order of dismissal by the Rizal Court of First Instance is affirmed, with costs de oficio.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Diokno, JJ., concur.

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^[1] 16
C. J. 264 quoted in People vs. Martinez, 55 Phil. 9.