PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU), ENRIQUE ENTILA & VICTORIANO TENAZAS, PETITIONERS, VS. BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY, COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, & QUI…

May a non-lawyer recover attorney’s fees for legal services
rendered?  This is the issue presented in this petition for review of an
order, dated 12 May 1964,
and the en banc resolution, dated 8 December 1964, of the Court of
Industrial Relations, in its Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo, granting respondent Quintin Muning, a non-lawyer, attorney’s fees for professional services
in the said case.

The above-named petitioners were complainants in Case No.
72-ULP-Iloilo, entitled, “PAFLU, et al. vs. Binalbagan-Isabela
Sugar Co., et al.” After
trial, the Court of Industrial Relations rendered a decision, on 29 March 1961, ordering the
reinstatement with backwages of complainants
Enrique Entila and Victorino
Tenazas.  Said
decision became final.  On 18 October 1963, Cipriano
Cid & Associates, counsel of
record for the winning complainants,
filed a notice of attorney’s
lien equivalent to 30% of the total backwages.  On 22 November 1963, Atty. Atanacio Pacis also filed a similar notice for a reasonable
amount.  Complainants Entila
and Tenazas, on 3 December 1963, filed a manifestation indicating their
non-objection to an award of attorney’s fees for 25% of their backwages, and, on the same day, Quintin
Muning filed a “Petition for Award of Services
Rendered” equivalent to 20% of the backwages.  Muning’s petition
was opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates on the
ground that he is not a lawyer.

The records of Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo
show that the charge was filed by Cipriano Cid &
Associates through Atty. Atanacio Pacis.  All the hearings were held in Bacolod City
and appearances made in behalf of the complainants were at first by Attorney Pacis and subsequently by respondent Quintin
Muning.

On 12 May 1964,
the Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the backwages
as compensation for professional services rendered in the case, apportioned as
follows:

Attys. Cipriano
Cid & Associates—-10%

Quintin Muning————————– 10%

Atty. Atanacio
Pacis——————-   5%

The award of 10% to Quintin Muning, who is not a lawyer according to the order, is
sought to be voided in the present petition.

Respondent Muning moved in this Court
to dismiss the present peti­tion on the ground of late filing but his motion
was overruled on 20 Jan­uary 1965.^[1]
He asked for reconsideration, but, considering that the motion contained
averments that go into the merits of the case, this Court admitted and
considered the motion for reconsideration for all purposes as respondent’s
answer to the petition for review.^[2]
The case was considered submitted for decision without respondent’s brief.^[3]

Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle enunciated in
Amalgamated Laborers’ Association, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et
al., L-23467, 27 March 1968,^[4]
that an agreement providing for the division of attorney’s fees, whereby a
non-lawyer union president is allowed to share in said fees with lawyers, is
condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral and cannot be
justified.  An award by a court of
attorney’s fees is no less immoral in the absence of a contract, as in the
present case.

The provision in Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No. 875 that —

“In the proceeding before the Court or
Hearing Examiner thereof, the parties shall not be required to be represented
by legal counsel. . . . . . . .”

is no justification for a ruling that the
person representing the party-litigant in the Court of Industrial Relations,
even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney’s fees:  for the same section adds that ?

“it shall be the duty and obligation
of the Court or Hearing Officer to examine and cross examine witnesses on
behalf of the parties and to assist in the orderly presentation of evidence
“,

thus making it clear that the representation should be
exclusively entrusted to duly qualified members of the bar.

The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear
or defend in the said court on behalf of a party-litigant does not by itself
entitle the representative to compensation for such representa­tion.  For Section 24, Rule 138, of the Rules of
Court, providing —

“Sec. 24.  Compensation
of attorneys; agree­ment as to fees. 
– An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no
more than a reasonable compensation for his services, . . . . . .”

imports the existence of an
attorney-client relationship as a condition to the recovery of attorney’s
fees.  Such a relationship cannot exist
unless the client’s representative in court be a lawyer.  Since res­pondent Muning
is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenazas or with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover
attorney’s fees.  Certainly public policy
demands that legal work in representation of parties litigant should be
entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications and who are sworn to
observe the rules and the ethics of the profes­sion, as well as being subject
to judicial disciplinary control for the protection of courts, clients and the
public.

On the present issue, the rule in American jurisdictions is per­suasive.  There, it is stated:

“But in practically all jurisdictions statutes have now been
enacted prohibiting persons not licensed or admitted to the bar from practising law, and under statutes of this kind, the great
weight of authority is to the effect that compensation for strictly legal
services cannot be recovered by one who
has not been admitted to practice before the court or in the jurisdiction where
the services were rendered.”^[5]

“No one is entitled to recover compensation for services as an
attorney at law unless he has been duly admitted to practice. . . . .and is an
attorney in good standing at the time.”^[6]

The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should
not be violated^[7];
that acting as an attorney without authority cons­titutes contempt of court,
which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both^[8],
and the law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of an
unlawful act or an act done in violation of law^[9];
and that if fees were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the public
in hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in case of neces­sity and also
leave the bar in a chaotic
condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not amenable to
disciplinary measures.^[10]

“And the general rule above-stated (referring to non-recovery
of attorney’s fees by non-lawyers) cannot be circumvented when the services
were purely legal, by seeking to recover as an ‘agent’ and not as an
attorney.”^[11]

The weight of the reasons heretofore stated why a non-lawyer may
not be awarded attorney’s fees should suffice to refute the possible argument
that appearances by non-lawyers before the Court of Industrial Relations should
be excepted on the ground that said court is a court of special jurisdiction;
such special jurisdiction does not outweigh the aforesaid reasons and cannot justify an exception.

The other issue in this case is whether or not a union may appeal
an award of attorney’s fees which are deductible from the backpay
of some of its members.  This issue arose
because it was the union PAFLU, alone,
that moved for an extension of time to file the present petition for review;
union members Entila and Tenazas did not ask for extension
but they were included as petitioners in the present petition that
was subsequently filed, it being contended that, as to them (Entila and Tenazas), their inclusion in the petition as
co-petitioners was belated.

We hold that a union or legitimate labor organization may appeal
an award of attorney’s fees which are deductible from the backpay
of its members because such union or labor organization is permitted to
institute an action in the industrial court^[12],
on behalf of its members; and the union was organized “for the promotion
of the employees’ moral, social and economic well-being”^[13];
hence, if an award is disadvantageous to its members, the union may prosecute
an appeal as an aggrieved party, under Section 6, Republic Act 875, which
provides:

“Sec. 6.  Unfair Labor Practice Cases – Appeals.  – Any person aggrieved by any order of the
Court may appeal to the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
. . . . . .”,

since more often than not the individual
unionist is not in a position to bear the financial burden of litigations.

Petitioners allege that respondent Muning
is engaged in the habitual practice of law before the Court of Industrial
Relations, and many others like him who are not licensed to practice,
registering their appearances as “re­presentatives” and appearing
daily before the said court.  If true,
this is a serious situation demanding corrective action that respondent court
should actively pursue and enforce by positive action to that purpose.  But since this matter was not brought in
issue before the court a quo, it may not be taken up in the
present case.  Petitioners, however, may
file proper action against the persons alleged to be illegally engaged in the
practice of law.

WHEREFORE, the orders under review are hereby set aside
insofar as they awarded 10% of the backwages as
attorney’s fees for respondent Quintin Muning.  Said orders
are affirmed in all other respects. 
Costs against respondent Muning.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, page 37.

^[2]
Rollo, page 62. 

^[3]
Rollo, page 75.

^[4]
22 SCRA, 1266.

^[5]
4 A.L.R. 1088, Editorial note.

^[6]
7 C.J.S. 1022.

^[7]
See also
Foundation Finance Co. vs. Robins, 153 So. 833, 179 La. 259, reversing (App.) 149 So. 166.

^[8]
Rule 71, Rules of Court.

^[9]
Harris v. Clark, 142 N. E. 881, 81 Ind.
App. 494.

^[10]
Harriman v. Straham, 33 P. 2d 1067, 47 Wyo. 208.

^[11]
4 A.L.R. 1089.

^[12]
NLU v. Dinglasan, L-7945, 23 March 1956, 52 O.G. No. 4, 1933.

^[13]
Section 1(a), Republic Act 875.