EUGENIO DE LA CRUZ AND MANUEL MONSALUD, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND LUIS AGUILAR, RESPONDENTS.

The only issue in this appeal by certiorari is whether the
herein petitioner Eugenio de la Cruz has been
correctly adjudged by the respondent Court in its CA-G.R. No. 27196-R to pay
the sum of P1,000.00 as attorney’s fees to respondent Luis Aguilar.

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals, which are
substantially the same as those found by the trial court, are as follows:

“Pursuant to Reorganization Plan No. 77 implemented by
Executive Orders 257 of July 5, 1957,
the Reorganization Commission, acting upon the authority of Republic Act No.
997 as amended by Republic Act No. 1241, created the Forest Products Research
Institute.  The Institute’s office was at
College, Laguna.  Petitioner Luis Aguilar
was its assistant director; respondent Eugenio de la
Cruz, the director.  Manuel Monsalud, the other respondent, was Chief, Chemical
Investigation Division thereof.

“On March 27, 1958, thirty-nine of the Institute’s employees adopted
a resolution urging the President of the University of the Philippines not to
recommend the fur­ther extension of the services of respon­dent director De la
Cruz after his automatic retirement in July following.

“On April 16, 1958,
Santos Tabuena, a Junior Forestry Research Scientist
of the Institute, wrote the Assistant Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation request­ing that respondent director ‘be investigated for
suspicious and anomalous transactions as a public servant.’

“Respondent director suspected that peti­tioner was behind
these actuations of the employees of the Institute.  On June
12, 1958, Director De la Cruz filed with the Board of the Institute
a complaint charging petitioner with sowing dissensions in said Institute by
organizing factions or cliques therein.

“In July, 1958, a
special committee designated by the Board chairman undertook the investigation
of the director’s June 12 complaint.  It
‘resulted into an amicable settlement only, with a warning that the Board will
not tolerate any further intrigues between the Director and the Assistant Direc­tor.’

“On August 22, 1958,
Santos Tabuena and Emiliano
F. Roldan, employees of the Insti­tute, filed another
administrative complaint with the Presidential Committee on Adminis­trative
Performance Efficiency (PCAPE) charg­ing Director De la Cruz with ‘grave
misconduct in office, oppression of employees and dishonesty’ therein set
forth.  This complaint was thrown on the
lap of the President of University of the Philippines
who, in turn, forwarded the same to the Forest Products Research Board for
investigation.  On Decem­ber 18, 1958, the Board chairman required
De la Cruz to answer the charges, which he did on December 27, 1958 in a letter, Exhibit E, wherein De la
Cruz aired his feelings towards petitioner.

“On January 30, 1959,
De la Cruz filed his answer listing six counts against petitioner Aguilar.  On demand by the Board, Aguilar, on February 3, 1959, filed an itemized
answer to the charges.

“A few days thereafter, that is, on February 12, 1959, respondent, in a letter to
petitioner, advised the latter that he was ‘suspended from office effective
today, February 12, 1959,
until your case shall have been terminated.’ Instead of having said letter
delivered to petitioner whose office was just opposite respondent Director’s,
the latter coursed it through the mails. 
Result:  Aguilar re­ceived the
letter only at 1:00 o’clock, p.m., on
February 13, 1959 when he
had to take delivery thereof at the Post Office of the College
of Agriculture two kilometers
away.  Aguilar protested his suspension.

“On February 16, 1959,
respondent Director issued Office Order No. 20 designating respondent Monsalud as ‘Act­ing Assistant Director’ of the Institute
effective February 17, 1959.

“Early in the morning of February 17, 1959, Aguilar reported for duty.  He found his office padlocked.

“On the same day, February 17, 1959, respondent De la Cruz
promulgated office memorandum addressed to his co-respondent Monsalud, as follows:

‘In view of the open violation by Mr. Luis Aguilar to keep away
from the premises during his suspension, in open disobe­dience to the order of
the under­signed dated February 12, 1959, it is hereby enjoined that begin­ning
today he should not be allowed to enter the building or loiter around its
premises or to enter his office which has been padlocked.  Insistence on his part to violate said order,
he should be turned over to the police authorities by our Security Guards to be
dealt with according to law.  Violence of
any sort should be avoid­ed unless forced to use it so as to keep peace and
order.  Instructions of the same nature
should be passed to the Chiefs of Division and the Chiefs of Section down to
the last man who should not deal with him in any official manner as he is no longer
the Assistant Director of the Institute, neither receive any instructions from him under any category and
each one of them should report any incident where Mr. Luis Aguilar tries to
violate these instructions, for record purposes.’

“Monsalud promptly obeyed by
circulating on even date a directive to that chiefs of division and the chiefs
of section down to the last man enjoining compliance of the Director’s
memorandum.”

On February 20, 1959
Aguilar filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna a petition for
prohibition and quo warranto (Civil Case. No. B-182)
against De la Cruz and Monsalud, praying:

“a –   that a writ of preliminary injunction issue
immediately restraining respondents from enforcing the order of suspension as
well as the Office Order No. 20 and memoranda (Annexes ‘E’, ‘G’, ‘H’, and
‘H-1’, respectively) aforementioned during the pedency
of this action, upon the filing of a bond by petitioner in the amount fixed by
this Honorable Court;

“b –   that after due notice and hear­ing, a writ of
prohibition issue command­ing respondent Director to desist from further
enforcing his said suspension order, for the reason that the same is null and
void; that also a writ of quo warranto issue finding
respondent Monsalud guilty of usurping, intruding into,
or unlawfully holding, as well as illegally exercising and performing the power
and duties attached to, the office of Assistant Director of the Institute and
that said respondent be ousted and altogether excluded therefrom,
and at the same time declaring petitioner the officer legally entitled thereto;

“c –   that petitioner be
allowed to recover his cost and damages against both respondents, jointly and
severally or either of them.

“d –   that such other reliefs just and equitable in the premises be awarded to
petitioner.”

After due hearing, the trial court on August 26, 1959 rendered its decision, of which dispositive portion reads:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

“1)  The order of suspension dated February 12,
1959 issued by defendant Eugenio de la Cruz together
with his office order No. 20 dated February 16, 1959 and memorandum dated
February 17, 1959 as well as the memorandum issued by defendant Manuel R. Monsalud dated February 17, 1959 are hereby declared null
and void and of no further force and
effect.

“2)  The defendant Eugenio
de la Cruz is hereby sentenced to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,000.00 as
compensatory damages and P2,000.00 as exemplary
damages in addition to the costs of suit; and

“3)  The preliminary injunction dated March 2, 1959 is hereby made
permanent.”

The respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which, in turn,
affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance, except with respect to
the award of exemplary damages in the sum of P2,000.00,
which was eliminated.  With respect to
the other award of P1,000.00, the same was sustained,
but in concept of attorney’s fees instead of compensatory damages.  On this point the appellate court said:

“2.  We now go to the award of P1,000.00.  We feel that this does not fall in the
category of “pecuniary and actual loss” or “compensatory
damages”, as recited in the judgment below.  Rather, it is quite clear that such amount is payable in concept of attorney’s fees.  And, this is confirmed by the very decision
itself from which is culled the following, viz:

‘There is evidence on record which stands uncontradicted
that as a result of the illegal suspension of the plaintiff by Director de la Cruz, the former was compelled
and had to retain the services of counsel for the protection of his
rights and has agreed to pay for said purpose the sum of P1,000.’

See Article 2208, paragraph 11, Civil
Code.”

Both parties filed motions for reconsideration,
respectively.  In support of their motion
the appellants, petitioners here, submitted the report of the U.P.
Investigating Committee dated February 29, 1960, dismissing the appellee from his position as Assistant Director of the
Institute, but which report had not been offered in evidence in the trial
court.  In a resolution dated December 17, 1964 the Court of
Appeals denied both mo­tions for reconsideration, whereupon the appellants
instituted the instant petition for review by certiorari.

To show that the respondent court erred in sustaining the award
of P1,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees, the
petitioners quote extensively from the report of the U.P. Investigating
Committee and point out that in the light of the findings of fact therein
petitioner De la Cruz was justified in suspending respondent Aguilar, in
padlocking his office and in prohibiting him from loitering in the premises of
the Institute.  The said report was
considered neither by the trial court nor by the Court of Appeals for the
obvious reason that it had not been properly presented as evidence.  It was merely sub­mitted together with the
herein petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the decision of the trial
court, which was based upon its own evaluation of the evidence before it.

Relevant to the issue of whether or not the order of preventive
suspension was justified are the facts as found by the trial court and
reproduced with approval in the decision of the Court of Appeals.  These facts are binding upon this Court for
purposes of the present appeal, in which only questions of law may be
raised.  The trial court said:

“A review of the actuations of Director de
la Cruz in the light of the surrounding circumstances persuade the Court
to believe that he acted in bad faith end for no other purpose than to wreak
vengeance on the plaintiff.  Director de
la Cruz had long suspected that the plaintiff must have encouraged or prompted
Santos Tabuena in suing him in Court.  This suspicion later became a belief and
finally a conviction because the plaintiff was present during the entire course
of the trial and in fact testified for Santos Tabuena.  All of these must have engendered in the mind
of Director de la Cruz a feeling of resentment or hatred against the plaintiff
which he unwittingly disclosed for the first time when he submitted to the
Forest Products Research Board his reply to the charges filed against him with
the PCAFE by Tabuena and Roldan.  Instead of answering the specific charges him
he merely contended himself to stating that they were groundless and then laid
the blame therefor on the shoulders of Assistant
Director Aguilar.  On page 3 of the
letter complaint were listed the witnesses whom the complain­ants would present
in support of their charges and Assistant Director Aguilar was not among them
and yet in his reply (Exh. E), Director de la Cruz
unnecessarily attacked the plaintiff when he stated among others –

1.  ‘… Assistant Director Aguilar who was bent
on demoralizing the employ­ees of the Institute by injecting the element of
favoritism or regionalistic consideration for any
promotion or appointment …….. (par. 2)

‘The fault is purely his own for having allowed himself to be a
tool of Aguilar ….. (par. 3).

3.  ‘Aguilar feeling guilty of his acts that led
to the termination of Tabuena’s services last June 16,
1958 by the Civil Service is now taking active part in the Civil Case No. 152
for Mandamus and damages against me …… (par.4).

4.  ‘… these
accusations are not only vicious, malicious and purely intended to harass the
undersigned thru the evil machinations of Aguilar …… (par.
6).

5.  ‘… although
maliciously twisted by Aguilar and company …..’ (par. 7).

Not content with the foregoing, Director de la Cruz under the guise
of supplementing his answer to the complaint filed against him with the PCAFE,
made formal charges against the plaintiff in his letter to the Forest Products
Research Board on January 30, 1959
(Exh. F).  By
his own admission Director de la Cruz had not confronted the plaintiff with his
grievances against the alleged actuation of the latter (p. 76, t.s.n. – March 17, 1959).

After the plaintiff has submitted his answer to the charges filed
against him by Director de la Cruz, the latter of his own initiative and
without any action having been taken by the Forest Products Research Board on
his complaint, suspended the plaintiff on the basis that ‘there is a prima
facie case …as shown by the charges filed by him.’ The suspension was made
effective as of February 12, 1959
or the day before the letter containing the order was posted in the mail.  Director de la Cruz sent the letter of
suspension by registered mail instead of causing it to be delivered by a
messenger to the office of the plain­tiff which is only four meters away from
his own –thus making it necessary for the plaintiff to go to the Post Office
situated two kilometers away.

Not content with the suspension he decreed, and to barrow the
language used by counsel for the plaintiff in his memorandum – ‘to add insult
to injury’, Director de la Cruz directed the padlocking of the room of the
plaintiff and issued a memorandum containing among others –

1.   Assistant Director Aguilar ‘should not be
allowed to enter the building or loiter around its premises or to enter his
office which has been padlocked’;

2.   ‘Insistence on his part to violate said
order, he should be turned over to the police authorities by our Security
Guards to be dealt with according to law’;

3.   ‘Instruction of same nature should be passed
to the Chiefs of Divisions and the Chiefs of Section down to the last man who should
not deal with his in any official manner’;

4.   ‘Neither (said Chiefs or Division and
Sections should receive any instruction from him (Aguilar) under any category’;

5.   Aguilar ‘is no longer the Assistant Director
of the Institute’ (Exh. J.)

To justify the issuance of this memorandum, Director de la Cruz
premised it upon the fact that Assistant Director Aguilar committed an open
disobedience to the suspension order of February
12, 1959, to keep away from the premises of the Forest Products
Research Institute during his suspension. 
The order of suspension did not contain any such pro­hibition and for
this reason the plaintiff could not have been guilty of open violation of the
suspension order.  But even if it did, it
would certainly, be high handed, unduly oppressive and outright illegal.”

The conclusions that the Court of Appeals drew from the foregoing
facts are that petitioner De la Cruz acted as “the accused and the Judge
at the same time as to the propriety of his suspension order based on his own complaint
which is not even verified;” “that the bare statement of petitioner
to the effect that there was a prima facie case against Aguilar is not in
accordance with Section 21 of Civil Service Rule XVII which prescribes that no
suspension pending removal should be made unless there are strong
reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant
his removal from the service;” and that “the power of suspension
cannot be used as a strong arm for purposes of giving vent to revenge, hatred
or resentment, or a vehicle for attack or oppression.”

The petitioners do not directly question the ruling of the Court
of Appeals, sustaining the trial court, that under the
law Director De la Cruz was not empowered to suspend Assistant Director Aguilar
preventively during the pendency of an administrative
investigation.  It bears mentioning that
the investigation then pending involved a complaint filed by two employees of
the Research Institute against De la Cruz, and that the order of suspension he
issued was based on his own answer to the said complaint wherein he listed a
number of charges against Aguilar, who was not one of the complainants and
therefore was not a party in the administrative case.

Under Reorganization Plan No. 77 the Director of the Research
Institute has the following powers: 
“Sec. 14…. (d) appoint, with the
approval of the Board, and remove or otherwise discipline for cause, the
officers of the Insti­tute, as 
follows:  Assistant Director and
Chiefs of Divisions; (e) appoint, promote, remove, suspend, or otherwise
discipline for cause, employees of the Institute.” It is noteworthy that
the power to suspend, let alone suspend preventively, is not expressly
mentioned in paragraph (d) as it is in paragraph (e) of Section 14 above-quoted.  But whether or not the power to suspend
preventively may be implied from the power to remove, the Court of Appeals
found that the reason for the exercise of such power, namely, to prevent the
suspended party from hampering the normal course of the investigation with his
influ­ence and authority over possible witnesses, did not exist in this case.

The award of attorney’s fees in favor of respondent Aguilar was
predicated on the finding of the trial court that “as a result of the
illegal suspension of the plaintiff by Director De la Cruz, the former was
compelled and had to retain the services of counsel for the protection of his
rights and has agreed to pay for said purpose the sum of P1,000.00.”

We do not believe that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming
the award of the said amount by way of at­torney’s fees in accordance with
Article 2208, paragraph 11, of the Civil Code, which authorizes recovery of
such fees “in any other case where the court deems it just and equitable
that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.” (See
Estate of Buan v. Camaganacan,
L-21569, February 28, 1966, 16 SCRA 321).

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with
costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.