CARLOS SANDICO, SR., AND TEOPISTO P. TIMBOL, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HONORABLE MINERVA R. INOCENCIO PIGUING, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PAMPANGA, AND DESIDERIO PARAS, …

On April 16, 1960
the spouses Carlos Sandico and Enrica
Timbol, and Teopisto P. Timbol, administrator of the estate of the late Sixta Paras, obtained a judgment
in their favor against Desiderio Paras
(hereinafter referred to as the respondent) in civil case 1554, an action for
easement and damages in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga.  On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed and
modified the judgment, as follows:

“IN VIEW WHEREOF, judgment affirmed and modified; as a
consequence, defendant is condemned to recognize the easement which is held
binding as to him; he is sentenced to pay plaintiffs the sums of P5,000.00
actual, and P500.00 exemplary damages,
and P500.00 attorney’s fees; plus costs in both ins­tances.”^[1]

Thereafter, upon remand to the court a quo of civil
case 1554, the Sandicos and Timbol
(hereinafter referred to as the petitioners) moved for the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the appellate
court’s judgment which had acquired finality. 
Acting upon the motion, the court a quo issued a writ of
execution on July 22, 1964.  This
writ the provincial sheriff served upon the respondent on August
22, 1964.

Meanwhile the petitioners and the respondent reached a
settlement, finally agreeing to the reduction of the money judgment from P6,000
to P4,000.  Thus, the respondent, on August 5, 1964, paid the petitioners
the sum of P3,000; on August 31, 1964,
he made another payment in the amount of P1,000 as evidenced by a receipt
issued by the petitioners’ counsel.  This
receipt is hereunder repro­duced in full:

“P1,000.00

“RECEIVED from Mr.
Desiderio Paras the sum of
ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00), Philippine Currency, in full satisfaction of
the money judgment rendered against him in Civil Case No. 1554 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, it being under­stood that the portion of the
final judgment rendered in the said case ordering him to reconstruct the irri­gation
canal in question shall be complied with by
him immediately.

“City of Angeles, August 31, 1964.

“(SGD.) DALMACIO P. TIMBOL

“Counsel for Plaintiffs

in Civil Case No. 1554

“I AGREE:

(SGD.) DESIDERIO PARAS”

Subsequently, the petitioners sent the respondent a letter dated November 5, 1964 demanding compliance
by the latter with the portion of the judgment in civil case 1554 relative to
the reconstruction and reopening of the irrigation canal.

On February 12, 1965
the provincial sheriff returned the writ of execution issued on July 22, 1964 unsatisfied.

Upon failure and refusal of the respondent to rebuild and reopen the irrigation
canal, the petitioners, on March
3, 1965, filed with the court a quo, with Judge Minerva R. Inocencio Piguing (hereinafter re­ferred
to as the respondent judge) presiding, a motion to declare the said private
respondent in contempt of court, pursuant to the provi­sions of section 9, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court.  Opposing the
motion, the respondent alleged recognition by him of the existence of the easement and compliance with the appellate
court’s judgment, stating that he
had dug a canal in its former
place, measuring about one-and-a-half feet deep, for the
petitioners’ use.

On September 8, 1965
the respondent judge issued an order denying the petitioners’ motion to declare
the respondent in contempt of court, ruling that

“… it appears from the dispositive
part of the decision that the defendant was only ordered to re­cognize the
easement which is held binding as to him and to pay the plaintiffs the sums of
P5,000.00 actual, and P500.00 exemplary damages.

“Apparently, it is clear from the dispositive
part of the decision that there is nothing to show that the defendant was
ordered to reconstruct the canal.”

On September 16, 1965
the petitioners moved for the issuance of an alias writ of execution to
enforce the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
This motion the respondent judge granted in an order dated September 25, 1965.  On November
3, 1965, the respondent moved to
set aside the said alias writ, alleging full satisfaction of the money
judgment per agreement of the parties when the petitioners received the sum of
P4,000 in August, 1964 as evidenced by the receipt dated August
31, 1964.

The respondent judge then issued an order dated November 11, 1965 directing the
provincial sheriff to suspend the execution of the alias writ until
further orders.  On February 3, 1966 the respondent judge issued an
order recalling and directing the quashal of the alias
writ of execution.  The respondent judge
stated in her order that the agreement of the parties “novated”
the money judgment provided for in the decision of the Court of Appeals, ruling
that the said decision

“… which is sought now to be executed by this Court, has
already been fully satisfied as to the money judgment and nothing more is left
to be executed from the aforesaid Decision as it does not allege (aside from
money judgment) any other condition except for the de­fendants to recognize the
easement therein.”

With their subsequent motion for reconsideration denied by the
respondent judge, the petitioners, on May 27, 1966, filed with this Court the
present petition^[2]
for certiorari seeking to set aside (1) the order of the respondent
judge dated September 8, 1965 denying their motion to declare the respondent in
contempt of court in civil case 1554, and (2) the orders of the respondent
judge dated February 3, 1966 and March 30, 1966 granting the respondent’s
motion to set aside the alias writ of execution issued in the same civil
case, on the ground that the respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion.

Here tendered for resolution are the following issues:

(1)  Whether the respondent judge correctly
construed the judgment of the Court of Appeals as not requiring he respondent to
reconstruct and reopen the irrigation canal, and consequently, whether the said
respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in denying the petitioners’ motion to declare the respondent in
contempt of court for failing and refusing to comply with the appellate court’s
judgment; and

(2)  Whether the payment by the respondent to the
petitioners of the amount of P4,000 extinguished the money judgment, and, con­sequently,
whether the respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion in ordering the recall and quashal
of the alias writ of execution.

1.  Anent the first issue,
the petitioners argue that although the dispositive
portion of the appellate court’s judgment omitted any directive to the
respondent to reconstruct and reopen the irrigation canal, the Court of
Appeals’ order requiring recognition of the easement on the part of the said
respondent suffices to make him aware of his obligation under the judgment.  The only way of recognizing the easement, the
petitioners continue, consists in performing positive act – the reconstruction
and restoration of the irrigation canal to its former condition.  Moreover, to understand the full intendment
of the dispositive portion of the judgment directing
the respondent “to recognize the easement” necessitates reference to
a statement in the decision of the Court of Appeals that reads:

“… the result of this must be to justify the conclusion prayed
for by the plaintiffs that the easement should be held to be existing and
binding upon defendant and he should be held to have acted without authority in
closing the canal which should be ordered reopened.”

On the other hand, the respondent alleges that there is no
ambiguity in the phraseology of the portion of the Court of Appeals’ judgment
condemning him to recognize the easement. 
Said decision requires him only to “recognize” the easement
and in compliance therewith, he gives the petitioners permission to reconstruct
and reopen the irrigation canal themselves. 
Neither the decision a quo nor that of the appellate court
orders him to reconstruct and reopen the irrigation canal.

The agreement reached by the petitioners and the respondent in
August, 1964 relative to the judgment of the appellate court which had acquired
finality and the interpretation by the parties themselves of the said judgment,
specifically its dispositive portion, as embodied in
the receipt dated August 31, 1964, constitute the considerations of prime
importance in the resolution of the first question.  No doubt exists that the parties entered into the agreement, fully aware of the judgment
of the appellate court ordering the respondent to comply with two obligations,
to wit, payment of a sum of money and recognition of the easement.  The receipt evidencing the agreement, aside
from providing for the reduction of the money judgment, provides for the
reconstruction of the irrigation canal. 
Such constitutes the interpretation accorded by the parties to that part
of the dispositive portion of the appellate court’s
judgment condemning the respondent to recognize the easement.  This stipulation – one wherein the respondent
clearly recognizes his obligation “to reconstruct the irrigation
canal” – embodied in precise and clear terms in the receipt binds the said
respondent, a signatory to the said receipt, and requires from him full
compliance.  We thus fail to perceive any
reason to sustain the contention of the respondent that he has no obligation at
all to reconstruct and reopen the irrigation canal, a position utterly in­consistent
with his agreement with the petitioners as embodied in the receipt dated August 31, 1964.

The record, however, shows that the respondent exerted efforts to
reconstruct the portion of the irrigation canal running through his land by
digging a canal about one meter wide and about one-and-a-half feet deep.  This partial reconstruction of the irriga­tion
canal the petitioners admit.  Still, the
petitioners demand the reconstruction of the irrigation canal to its former condition
– ­measuring four meters wide, five feet deep, and one-hundred and twenty-eight
meters long – contending that the rebuilt canal serves no useful purpose
because the water passing through it overflows, which overflow ultimately
causes the destruction of the canal itself. 
Nonetheless, we believe that need to give full force and effect to the
existence of the easement demands that the respondent reconstruct the
irrigation canal to its condition before he closed and destroyed the same.  After all, the respondent himself in his
answer dated June 16, 1959
filed with the court a quo admitted the original dimen­sions of
the irrigation canal as four meters wide and one-hundred and twenty-eight
meters long.  The respondent’s attempt to
rebuild the irrigation canal, partially and not in conformity with the dimen­sions
of the original one, does not constitute satisfactory and sub­stantial
compliance with his obligation to recognize the easement per the appellate
court’s judgment and to reconstruct the irrigation canal pursuant to his
agreement with the petitioners in August, 1964.

Due to the respondent’s failure and refusal to reconstruct and
reopen the irrigation canal, the petitioners sought to declare him in contempt
of court, under the provisions of section 9 of Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court.  The respondent judge, however,
believing that the appellate court’s judgment required the respondent merely to
recognize the easement without doing any positive act of reconstruction and
reopening of the irrigation canal, dismissed the petitioners’ motion to declare
the respondent in contempt of court.  In
doing so, the petitioners allege, the respondent judge acted in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. 
The petitioners thus ask us now to annul the order of the respondent
judge denying their motion to declare the respondent in contempt of court or,
by way of alternative, to declare the
respondent in contempt of court and to punish him accordingly.

The petitioners predicate their stand mainly upon the provisions
of section 9 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. 
Said section reads:

“Sec. 9.  Writ of
execution of special judgment.  –
When a judgment requires the performance of any other act than the payment of
money, or the sale or delivery of real or personal property, a certified copy
of the judgment shall be attached to the writ of execu­tion and shall be served
by the officer upon the party against whom the same is rendered, or upon any
other person required thereby, or by law, to obey the same, and such party or
person may be punished for contempt if
he disobeys such judgment.”

Section 9 applies to specific acts other
than those covered by section 10 of the same rule.  Section 10 pertinently provides:

“Sec. 10.  Judgment
for specific acts; vesting title.  –
If a judgment directs a party to
execute a conveyance of land, or to deliver deeds or other documents, or to
perform any other specific act, and the party fails to comply within the time specified, the court may direct the
act to be done at the cost of the disobedient party by some other person
appointed by the court and the act when so done shall have like effect as if
done by the party….”

Section 9 refers to a judgment directing the performance of a
specific act which the said judgment requires the party or person to personally
do because of his personal qualifications and circumstances.  Section 10 refers to a judgment requiring the
execution of a conveyance of land or the delivery of deeds or other documents
or the performance of any other specific act susceptible of execution by some
other person or in some other
way provided by law with the same effect. 
Under section 10, the court may designate some other person to do the
act ordained to be done by the judgment, the reasonable cost of its per­formance
chargeable to the disobedient party.  The
act, when so done, shall have the same effect as if performed by the party
himself.  In such an instance, the
disobedient party incurs no liability for con­tempt.^[3]
Under section 9, the court may resort to proceedings for contempt in order to
enforce obedience to a judgment which requires the personal performance of a
specific act other than the payment of money, or the sale or delivery of real
or personal property.

An examination of the case at bar makes it apparent that the same
falls within the contemplation of section 10, and not of sec­tion 9 as the
petitioners contend.  The reconstruction
and reopening of the irrigation canal may be done by some other person
designated by the court, at the cost of the respondent.  In fact, the respondent, in his attempt to
rebuild the irrigation canal, contracted the services of one Gerardo Salenga. 
Accordingly, in conformity with the appellate court’s judgment as
further mutually interpreted by the parties themselves, the court a quo,
because of the failure and refusal of the
respondent to restore the irrigation canal to its former condition and to
reopen it, should have appointed some other person to do the reconstruction,
charging the expenses therefor to the said respondent.

2.  As to the second
question, which relates to the money judgment, the petitioners vehemently
insist on their right to recover an additional sum of P2,000 – the alleged
unsatisfied portion of the ap­pellate court’s judgment requiring the respondent
to pay to the peti­tioners the total amount of P6,000 corresponding to damages
and attorney’s fees.  The petitioners
allege that their agreement with the respondent in August, 1964, reducing the
amount due from the respondent, constitutes neither waiver of their claim for
the sum of P2,000 nor novation of the money judgment
provided for in the Court of Appeals’ decision. 
They state that their agreement with the respondent reduced the amount
of the money judgment, subject to the condition that the latter reconstruct and
reopen the irrigation canal immediately. 
This, they argue, does not constitute alteration of the appellate
court’s judgment.

For his part, the respondent contends that his payment of the sum
of P4,000, received and acknowledged by the petitioners through their counsel
as “in full satisfaction of the money judgment” in civil case 1554,
extinguished his pecuniary liability. 
Thus, when the peti­tioners, notwithstanding the admitted payment of the
judgment debt in the lesser amount of P4,000, still sought to enforce the money
judgment for the full amount of P6,000 through an alias writ of execu­tion,
the court a quo in recalling and quashing the alias writ
pre­viously issued, acted correctly and within its authority.

Parenthetically, the petitioners’ application for the issuance of
the alias writ of execution dated September 16, 1965, the alias
writ of execution dated September 29, 1965, and the levy on execution and the
notice of sheriff’s sale, both dated October 21, 1965, all refer to the amount
of P6,000 and make no mention whatsoever
of the true status of the judgment debt. 
On this point, the respondent charges the petitioners with concealing
from the court a quo the true amount, if any, still due from
him.  And in effect, he alleges, the petitioners
apparently seek the payment of the judgment debt twice.  The petitioners,
however, emphasize that they demand payment of only the balance of P2,000.  To rebut the respondent’s charge of concealment, they
state that they informed the court a quo that the respondent al­ready
paid them the sum of P4,000. 
Furthermore, they allege that another
lawyer, a former associate of their counsel, prepared their motion for the
issuance of the alias writ of execution, received the alias writ
and delivered the same to the sheriff. 
Impliedly, there­fore, they attribute the inconsistency regarding the
amount still allegedly due from
the respondent to the former associate of their counsel.

Reverting to the second question, the appellate court’s judgment
obliges the respondent to do two things: 
(1) to recognize the easement,
and (2) to pay the petitioners the sums of P5,000 actual and P500
exemplary damages and P500 attorney’s fees, or a total of P6,000.  The full satisfaction of the said judgment
requires spe­cific performance and payment of a sum of money by the respondent.

We adjudge the respondent’s judgment debt as having been fully
satisfied.  We see no valid objection to
the petitioners and the res­pondent entering into an agreement regarding the
monetary obligation of the latter under the judgment of the Court of Appeals,
reducing the same from P6,000 to P4,000. 
The payment by the respondent of the lesser amount of P4,000, accepted
by the petitioners without any protest or objection and acknowledged by them as
“in full satisfaction of the money judgment” in civil case 1554,
completely extinguished the judgment debt and released the respondent from his
pecuniary liability.

Both the petitioners and the respondent take exception to the
respondent judge’s ruling that their agreement of August, 1964 to reduce the
judgment debt, as evidenced by the receipt hereinbefore adverted to, “novated” the money judgment rendered by the appellate
court.

Novation results in two stipulations –
one to extinguish an existing obligation, the other to substitute a new one in
its place.^[4]
Fundamental it is that novation effects a
substitution or modification of an obligation by another or an extinguishment
of one obligation by the creation of another. 
In the case at hand, we fail to see what new or modified obligation
arose out of the payment by the respondent of the reduced amount of P4,000 and
substituted the monetary liability for P6,000 of the said respondent under the
appellate court’s judg­ment. 
Additionally, to sustain novation necessitates
that the same be so declared in unequivocal terms – clearly and unmistakably
shown by the express agreement of the parties or by acts of equivalent import –
or that there complete and substantial incompatibility between the two
obligations.^[5]

Neither do we appreciate the petitioners’ stand that, according
to their agreement with the
respondent, their assent to the
reduction of the money judgment was subject to the condition that the
respondent reconstruct and reopen the
portion of the irrigation canal passing through his land
immediately.  The petitioners even state
that   the receipt of August
31, 1964 embodies this condition.

The terms of the receipt dated August
31, 1964, we find clear and definite.  The receipt neither
expressly nor impliedly declares
that the reduction of the money judgment was conditioned on the respondent‘s reconstruction and reopening of the irrigation canal.  The receipt merely embodies the recognition
by the respondent of his
obligation to reconstruct the irrigation canal. 
And the receipt simply requires the respondent to comply with such
obligation “immediately.” The obligation of the respondent remains as a portion
of the Court of Appeals’ judgment.  In
fact, the petitioners themselves, in their
letter dated November 5, 1964, sent to the respondent, demanding that the latter reconstruct the irrigation canal
immediately, referred to the same not as a condition but as “the portion of the
judgment” in civil case 1554.

Consequently, the respondent judge, when she granted the motion
of the respondent to set aside the alias writ of execution and issued
the order dated February 3, 1966
recalling and quashing the said alias writ, acted correctly.  Courts have jurisdiction to entertain motions
to quash previously issued writs of execution because courts have the inherent
power, for the advancement of justice, to correct the errors of their
ministerial officers and to control their own processes.  However, this power, well circumscribed, to
quash the writ, may be exercised only in certain situations, as when it appears
that (a) the writ has been improvidently issued, or (b) the writ is defective
in substance; or (c) the writ has been issued against the wrong party, or (d)
the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or (e) the writ has
been issued without authority, or (f) there has been a change in the situation
of the parties which renders such execution inequitable, or (g) the controversy
has never been submitted to the judgment of the court, and, therefore, no judgment
at all has ever been rendered thereon.^[6]
In the instant case, the payment of the judgment debt by the respondent,
although in a reduced amount but accepted by the petitioners as “in full satisfaction of the money
judgment,” warrants the quashal of the alias
writ.

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered, (1) declaring that the respondent judge did not act in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the order dated February 3, 1966 (granting the respondent’s motion to set aside the alias writ of
execu­tion, and recalling and quashing the said alias writ) and the
order dated March 30, 1966 (denying the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration
of the order dated February 3, 1966); and (2) remanding the case to the court a
quo with instructions that the respondent court (a) conduct an ocular
inspection of the irrigation canal passing through the res­pondent’s land to
determine whether or not the said canal has been rebuilt in accordance with its
original dimensions; (b) in the event that the said canal fails to meet the
measurements of the original one, order the respondent to reconstruct the same
to its former condition; and (3) in the event of the respondent’s further
refusal or failure to do so, appoint some other person to reconstruct the canal
in accordance with its original dimensions, at the cost of the said respondent,
pursuant to section 10 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.  Without pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Fernando, Barredo,
Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Reyes, J.B.L., J., in the result.

Teehankee, J., concurs and adds brief remarks in a separate concurrence.

^[1]
CA -GR 28414-R, November 18, 1963.

^[2]
Amended on September 15, 1966.

^[3]
Caluag and Garcia vs. Pecson,
et al., 82 Phil. 8.

^[4]
Tiu Siuco vs. Habina, 45 Phil. 707.

^[5]
Article 1292, Civil Code of the Philippines.

^[6]
Cobb-Perez and Perez vs. Lantin, et al., L-22320, May 22,
1968, 23 SCRA 637.

200

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