ARSENIA LACATAN-NUÑEZ, PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, CANLUBANG SUGAR ESTATE, RESPONDENTS.

This has reference to a petition for review on certiorari,
filed in forma pauperis, of the Decision dated October 27,
1975, of the Employee’s Compensation Commission in R05-W.C. Case No. 1993,
entitled “Arsenia Lacatan Nuñez vs. Canlubang Sugar Estate, C.J. Yulo
& Sons”, which denied the grant of death compensation benefits to
petitioner for the demise of her husband under the provisions of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act.

Petitioner Arsenia Lacatan-Nuñez filed the present petition in
her capacity as the widow of the late Victorino Nuñez who had been employed by
private respondent Canlubang Sugar Estate as a locomotive driver with a monthly
salary of P325.00. On February 22,
1967, Victorino was unable to continue with his work due to severe headache and
dizziness. Three days thereafter, or
more specifically, on February 25, 1967, he developed paralysis of the left
half of the body and right half of the face with inability to speak and eat
properly. His left upper extremity was
completely paralyzed. Since complete
recovery was impossible, he was retired from the service for cerebral apoplexy
(stroke) on March 16, 1967. At that
time, the deceased was already 65 years old, with 18 years and 6 months service
to his credit.

On December 31, 1970, or three (3) years and nine (9) months
after retirement, Victorino died due to “bleeding peptic ulcer”. As a consequence thereof, the widow, herein
petitioner, filed on August 13, 1973, a claim for death compensation benefits
with the Regional Office No. 5, Department of Labor, San Pablo City.

Private respondent Canlubang Sugar Estate controverted the claim
on the ground that (a) the claim was filed beyond the reglementary period; (b)
his death was not due to work-connected cause, said death occurring nearly four
(4) years after separation from service; and (c) payment of retire­ment benefits
amounting to P6,012.50 was made to his heirs as of March 16, 1967.

Acting Referee Bonifacio I. Marasigan rendered a deci­sion dated
October 10, 1974, granting disability benefits to the claimant but at the same
time declaring that death benefits cannot be granted for the reason that
Victorino Nuñez died beyond the 2-year period from date of disability and/or
retirement. The dispositive portion of
the said decision reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, finding the above-claim
to be meritorious, judgment is rendered in favor of the claimant/heirs and the
respondent is directed to:

1.  Pay the claimant, thru this Unit, the
sum of SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00) as compensation benefits under Section 14
of the Act, as amended, computed as follows:

Claimant for the decedent is entitled to 60% of his average weekly
wage of P75.00 for the period of disability from March 16, 1967 (date of
medical retirement) up to
December 31, 1970 (date of death), a period of 197 2/7 weeks. Sixty (60%) percent of his average weekly wage
of P75.00 is P45.00 multiplied by 197 2/7 weeks is P8,877.84, reduced to
P6,000.00, the maximum amount of compensation allowed by law, the full amount
of what is now due and demandable.

2.  Pay Feliciano Reyes his attorney’s fee, the
sum of THREE HUNDRED PESOS (P300.00) (Sec. 31).

3.  Pay this Office the sum of SIXTY ONE PESOS
(P61.00 as fee (Sec. 55).

SO ORDERED.”

From the aforesaid decision, private respondent filed a
“Petition for Reconsideration and/or Review.” Treated as an appeal,
the case was elevated to respondent Workmen’s Compensation Commission.

In a decision dated October 27, 1975, respondent Commission
reversed the decision of the acting referee and dismissed the claim of
petitioner, ruling as follows:

“The instant claim for death com­pensation should be
rejected. Deceased died more than three
(3) years after retirement due to bleeding peptic ulcer. In order to hold respondent liable under the
claim it must be shown that the death of the deceased was linked to his
employment with the respondent. And the
only possible connection with which to bridge his relation is to prove that the
deceased suffered an illness during his employment. His illness was hypertension due to arteriesclerosis. Death due to bleeding peptic ulcer occuring
after almost 4 years from retirement or separation from the service definitely
is not proximate, hence, any factor that may have predisposed his illness which
led to his death cannot be related to his employment. (p. 27, Rollo).

Hence, the instant petition, with the petitioner raising this
lone issue that:

“THE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMITTED
A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DISMISSING THE CLAIM ON THE GROUND THAT THE ILLNESS WHICH
CAUSED THE DEATH OF PETITIONER’S HUSBAND WAS NOT WORK-CONNECTED.”

Petitioner argues that no blood chemistry examination was taken
of her husband at the time he was medically retired and that, therefore, it
could have been possible that even at that time he was already suffering from a
bleeding peptic ulcer. This gives rise,
so petitioner argues, to the presumption that Victorino’s ailment was
work-connected.

Petitioner also claims that the decision of respondent Commission
is contrary to the liberal spirit of the law. We have no quarrel with petitioner on this point and we certainly
sympathize with her, for the Workmen’s Compensa­tion Act being a social
legislation aimed at protecting the
rights of the workingman in consonance with the social justice guarantee of the
Constitution, its provisions must be interpreted liberally in favor of laborers
or workers (Alavado vs. City Government of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230). We have tried hard to find some factual and
legal basis to enable us to decide in her favor, but our efforts have been in
vain. Much as we sympathize with petitioner’s
plight, we are constrained to deny her claim.

It is not disputed that Victorino Nuñez died more than three (3)
years after retirement. Under Section 8
of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, it is required that before death benefits
can be awarded to the heirs of a deceased employee, the death of the employee
due to a work-connected disease, must occur within two (2) years
from such sickness. In the cases of International
Oil Factory vs. Doriz (109 Phil. 553) and Central Azucarera Don Pedro
vs. de Leon (L-9449, July 29, 1959), this Court ruled that the 2-year
period shall be counted from the time of the aggravation of the employee’s
ailment or the time he was forced to stop working or became physically disabled
to work. This doctrine was reiterated
in the subsequent cases of Vda. de los Santos vs. WCC (88 SCRA 134); Delana
vs. WCC (83 SCRA 528); and Tolosa vs. ECC (136 SCRA
335). Since Victorino Nuñez stopped
working or became physically disabled to perform his duties at the time of his
retirement on February 25, 1967, the 2-year period spoken of by Section 8 of
the Workmen’s Compensation Act should be counted from that date. Victorino, however, died on December 31,
1970, or more than two years after his retirement. Obviously, no death benefits can be granted under the law.

Regarding the contention that claimant should at least be allowed
to recover disability benefits from the date her husband ceased working on May
16, 1967, to the time of his death on December 31, 1970, this contention has no
legal basis because when the late Victorino Nuñez retired by reason of old age
(65 years) on May 16, 1967, the employeer-employee relationship between him and
private respondent was terminated and absent such tie or relationship, the
grant of compensation benefits cannot be justified. Thus, in Alatco Trans. Inc. vs. WCC, et al. (42 SCRA 391),
it was held:

“The record reveals that the Com­mission computed the amount
due from the petitioner from June 16, 1965; the date of the claimant’s
disability, however, actually started on September 6, 1964, when his illness
compelled him to stop working. Disability compensation represents lost or unpaid earnings of a claimant
due to his illness and becomes due from the time his earning power is lost or
impaired. The liability therefore of
the petitioner to pay the dis­ability compensation accrued on September 6, 1964
(when the claimant’s illness impaired his earning capacity) and subsisted only
until June 16, 1965 when the claimant was actually separated from service or,
more particularly, when the employer-employee relationship between petitioner
and the claimant ceased) … We find no basis to sustain the grant of
compensation after June 16, 1965 — the date of termination of the
employer-employee relationship between petitioner and claimant.” (p. 397)

WHEREFORE,   the
decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

Bidin, Davide, Jr., and
Romero, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., (Chairman), J., on
leave.