AGRIPINO PADRE, FAUSTA PADRE, SILVINA PADRE, AND OCTAVIO PADRE, AND SABAS PAA AND ROSARIO PAA, PETITIONERS, VS. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ALFREDO P. DE VERA, PRESIDING JU…

Assailed in the petition for certiorari before Us is the
decision of respondent Court of Appeals in Civil Cases No. 08658 and 08659
penned by Justice Celso L. Magsino, concurred in by then Presiding Justice
Oscar R. Victoriano and Justice Luis L. Victor, and which set aside the
appealed judgment, thus:

“1.   Declaring the defendants-appellees entitled
to the possession of the parcels of land described in paragraph 2 of both
complaints (Civil Cases Nos. 2954-V and 2964-V);

2.     
Ordering the plaintiff-appellants to vacate the aforesaid
parcels of land and restore its possession to the defendants-appellees;

3.     
Dismissing the claim for damages of the plaintiffs against
defendants as well as the claim of damages of the latter against the former in
both complaints.

Without pronouncement as to costs.”

(pp. 12-13, Decision; pp. 26-27, Rollo.)

Inasmuch as the parties herein do not dispute the factual
antecedents of the suits for quieting of title as formulated by respondent
Court, We hereby adopt said findings which We quote verbatim hereunder:

“This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, First Judicial Region, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, Branch XX, in Civil Cases Nos.
2954-V and 2964-V, the dispositive portion of which, reads as follows:

‘WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered:

A).   Dismissing the complaint in Civil Cases Nos.
2954 and 2964;

B).   Declaring the defend­ants as the absolute
owners and are now entitled to the posses­sion of the land in suit described in
page 1 above (paragraph 2 in both complaints);

C).   Dismissing the claim for damages of the plaintiffs
against the defendants, and likewise dismissing the claim for damages of the
latter against the former in both complaints; and

D).   Without pronounce­ments as to costs.

SO ORDERED’.

The factual antecedents show that plaintiffs in both cases seek to
quiet title to two (2) parcels of land described in paragraph 2 of their
respective complaint, both situated at Taleb, Bantay, Ilocos Sur, covered by
Tax Declaration No. 18719 and Tax Declaration No. 20879-C, respectively.

After summarizing the testimonies of the witnesses as well as the
documentary exhibits presented by both parties in the two cases (Civil Case
Nos. 2954 and 2964), the lower court made its findings of facts and conclusion,
to wit:

‘x x x            x x x   x x x

‘Let us consider the plain­tiffs’ evidence of ownership in Civil
Case No. 2954. The land was originally
owned by Jose Padre until a time when he gave the land to Fausta Padre (there
is no document showing trans­fer) and the latter declared the land for taxation
purposes in her name. On December 2,
1966 she sold a portion of the land to Avelino Paranada married to Vicente
Viernes. His father, the late Jose
Padre, had been in possession of the same up to the time it was given to
her. She is also in possession of the
disputed property until the years 1973, 1974 and 1975 when Juliana Pacleb Parel
began to cut down trees on the land. The plain­tiffs contended that they are in possession of the land but
filed this case upon the advise of a PC soldier when he went to the PC
Headquarters.

Let us consider the evi­dence of the plaintiffs’ ownership in Civil
Case No. 2964. The land was originally
owned by Calixto Paa when he gave the land to the plaintiffs Sabas Paa (there
is no evidence showing the transfer of owner­ship) and the latter declared the
land for taxation purposes in his name. He paid the realty estate taxes due the land to evidence
possession. The complaint was filed
because Juliana Pacleb Parel cut down some trees on the portion of the land in
question.

Let us now consider the defendants’ evidence of ownership in both
civil cases. The disputed parcel of
land was formerly owned by the late Silvestre Paa who sold it to Blas Pacleb
(there is no deed of transfer or conveyance). Some of the adjoining lots were the properties of Bartola Pero, the
deceased grandmother of Juliana Parel, one of the defendants and a portion of
it was the land of Roman Pacleb (no document of ownership), the
predecessors-in-interest of the defendant Juliana Pacleb Parel. During the cadastral survey, the said
parcels of land were consolidated into one parcel of land under one Tax
Declaration but with different Lot numbers. Plaintiffs tried to assert their ownership when defendants cut down
trees and tried to bulldoze the land subject of controversy sometime in 1968.

The parties marked in evi­dence tax declarations, tax declarations
in the names of Fausta Padre and Sabas Paa in Civil Case No. 2954. The plaintiffs also marked in evi­dence tax
receipts and certification showing payment of taxes from the office of the
Municipal Treasurer of Bantay, Ilocos Sur, as well as the document showing
disposition of a por­tion of the land by plaintiff Fausta Padre. The defendants in both cases marked in
evidence, the sketch plan showing the whole tract of land of the late Roman
Pacleb, Bartola Pero and Blas Pacleb. They also marked in evidence the tax declarations in the names of Roman
Pacleb, Juliana Pacleb Parel, Bartola Pero, Santos Pacleb, Lorenzo Pacleb and
Blas Pacleb.

Both parties in Civil Cases Nos. 2954 and 2964 also marked in
evidence their respective tax receipts showing that they paid the real estate
taxes on the land in dispute. And also
certifications from the office of the municipal treasurer showing payment of
realty taxes.

Tax declarations and tax receipts are mere indicias of the claim of
ownership and possession. By themselves
they are insufficient to prove ownership and possession in concept of owner
(Alzate, et al. vs. Cidro, et al., CA No. 40963-R, April 14, 1970). The parties admitted the identity of the
land in dispute that the land is identified as Lots Nos. 10219; 10214, 10213
and 10212, of the Bantay Cadastre and that it is the same land being applied
for a free patent title under application No. I-3-8988 by Fausta Padre and No.
I-3-8989 by Sabas Paa.

The defendants in both Civil Cases Nos. 2954 and 2964 are in actual
possession of the land in dispute. Being in actual possession under claim of ownership, it is presumed that
defendants are the owners (Art. 433, New Civil Code). Plaintiffs assert the affirmative issue that they are the owners
and not the defendants. The related
rule is that because as plaintiffs, they dispute the presumption of ownership
of the defendants, they have the burden of proof of rebutting that
presumption. The plaintiffs have the
duty of proving their own affirmative allegations. One who asserts, and not one who denies, must prove. The Court finds that plaintiffs in Civil
Cases Nos. 2954 and 2964 have net come forward with sufficient evidence to
discharge such duty. Plaintiff’s
evidence in both cases is far from what is considered sufficient.

After carefully consider­ing the evidence adduced by the parties in
Civil Cases Nos. 2954 and 2964, the Court finds that the plaintiffs have not established
their cause of preponderance of evidence. The Court finds defendants to have been in possession under claim of
ownership, publicly, continuously, and uninterruptedly and long before that,
the land was in the possession of their grandfather, grandmother and father,
under similar circum­stances.

The Court denies, however, the claims of defendants for damages,
attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation. The plaintiffs have the right to litigate and it is not sound public
policy to punish a party by making him pay damages, attorney’s fees and
expenses of litigation for having exercised their right erroneously. And adverse decision does not mean that
plaintiffs are in bad faith in filing the complaint and that their complaint is
entirely unfounded.’

In this appeal the appellants raise several errors of the lower
court, as follows:

I.             
IN FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANTS (APPELLEES BELOW) ARE IN ACTUAL
POSSESSION OF THE LAND IN QUESTION.

II.           
IN FINDING THAT THE DISPUTED LAND (FORMERLY OWNED BY SILVESTRE
PAA [sic]) WAS SOLD TO BLAS PACLEB (PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST OF HEREIN
APPELLEES), DESPITE THE LACK/ABSENCE OF ANY DOCUMENT INDICATE (SIC) SUCH
PURCHASE.

III.          
IN FINDING THAT THE DISPUTED LAND CLAIMED BY APPEL­LEES AS
DECLARED IN TAX DECLA­RATION NO. 20148-C WERE OWNED BY APPELLEES WHEN IN FACT
SUCH TAX DECLARATION IS IN THE NAME OF JAMES PORTE, MARIE ANN PORTE, NAPOLEON
PORTE AND ROSEMARIE PORTE, WHICH IS LOCATED AT CABUSLIGAN, BANTAY, ILOCOS SUR
AND NOT AT TALEB, BANTAY, ILOCOS SUR AS SHOWN BY A CERTIFICATION ISSUED BY THE
PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR.

IV.        
IN FINDING THAT THE LAND BEING CLAIMED BY APPELLEES IS LOCATED
AT TALEB, BANTAY, ILOCOS SUR, WHEN IN TRUTH THE LAND IS LOCATED AT MAGBAUGAN
TALEB, ILOCOS SUR, WHICH IS ONE AND ONE HALF (1 1/2) KILOMETERS DISTANCE FROM
TALEB PROPER, BANTAY.

V.          
IN DISREGARDING THE FACT THAT APPELLANTS HAVE FILED TAX
DECLARATIONS AND PAID TAXES ON THE LAND SINCE 1952 (JOSE PADRE) UP TO THE
PRESENT (FAUSTA PADRE); AND SINCE 1949 (SABAS PAA) UP TO THE PRESENT (ROSARIO
PAA) WHILE CONSIDERING THAT APPELLEES UNDER TAX DECLARATION NO. 20148-C ARE
OWNERS THEREOF ALTHOUGH SAID TAX DECLARATION IS IN THE NAME OF OTHERS (JAMES
PORTE, ET AL.).

VI.        
IN NOT CONSIDERING OR IN DISREGARDING THE REBUTTAL TESTIMONIES
OF LYDIA MADRIAGA AND CLETO PAA WHO UNEQUIVOCABLY TESTIFIED THAT APPELLANTS
HAVE BEEN IN POSSESSION OF THE DISPUTED LAND FROM THE (SIC) IMMEMORIAL WHILE
APPELLEES DID NOT PRESENT CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF THE SO-CALLED
POSSESSION.

VII.       
IN NOT CONSIDERING AS AN ACT OF OWNERSHIP AND DOMINION, THE
SALE OF A PORTION OF THE DISPUTED LAND BY JOSE PADRE TO JUANA AND SEVERINO
PARANADA.” (pp. 1-6, Decision; pp.
15-20, Rollo.)

Before respondent Court discussed the merits of the appeal, two
major propositions, anchored on doctrinal rules, were impressed upon
plaintiffs-appellants below in that the authority of the Director of Lands over
the disposition of public lands does not necessarily rule out the competencia
of the regular courts over possessory actions (Molina vs. de Bacud, 19
SCRA 956, 959; cited at p. 8, Decision; p. 22, Rollo) and that the Regional
Trial Court has the power to ascertain who has prior possession of public lands
(Espejo vs. Mallate, 120 SCRA 269, 278, among other pertinent cases
cited at p. 8, Decision; p. 22, Rollo). Seemingly, these jurisprudential axioms were utilized by respondent
Court in considering the complaints for quieting of title instituted at the
court of origin as accion publiciana where the query to be resolved
deals with the issue of who between the parties has a prior or better right of
possession independently of title.

The aspect of possession, the first issue raised in the appellate
court by herein petitioners, was resolved on the basis of the greater probative
value given by respondent Court to the documentary evidence adduced by defendants-appellees
whose tax declaration over the disputed property dates back to 1921 as affirmed
on the witness stand by Sixto Corpuz. The conclusion was thus reached that defendants-appellees, private
respondents herein, were ahead in occupying the realty in the light of the
testimony of Agrifino Padre that his father was in possession of the land only
in 1923, and the statement of Emigdio Paranada that Sabas Paa started his
possession of the property only in 1936.

Now, on the question of whether the court of original
jurisdiction properly appreciated the validity of the sale from Silvestre Paet
to Blas Pacleb, even if there was no document to support such purchase,
respondent Court observed that such a defect has no legal bearing on the case
at bar which is not for the enforcement of a contract of sale, apart from the
fact that the statute of frauds is inapplicable to consummated contracts.

Petitioners’ third and fourth ascriptions which focused on the
identity of the subject lots, likewise did not merit consideration by the Court
of Appeals on account of the admission of both parties in this respect that the
litigants are referring to the same property.

Respondent Court did not find it necessary to respond to the
fifth and sixth assigned errors because of the initial perception in regard to
the superior weight of herein private respondents’ evidence of prior
possession.

Dissatisfied with the pronouncements of respondent Court, the
instant petition was resorted to, but We find the same to be devoid of intrinsic
worth.

To buttress the idea that respondent Court erred in converting
the action below from quieting of title into one for plenaria de posession
and in resolving the conflicting claims of the parties, petitioners submit that
it is only the Director of Lands, and not the courts, that can resolve the
confluence of rights over the subject lots (p. 4, Memorandum for Petitioners;
p. 71, Rollo). This subtle experiment
of impugning the jurisdiction or competencia of the original and
appellate courts after adverse repercussions are experienced has time and again
been repudiated, thus:

“… after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an
adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the
jurisdic­tion or power of the court …”

(Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, 36.)

Then, too, concerning the contention that it is the Director of
Lands and not the court which should have ruled on the matter of prior
possession, this Court has, as early as 1967 in Molina vs. de Bacud (19
SCRA 956), ruled that:

“… the authority given to the Lands Department over the
disposition of public lands does not exclude the courts from their jurisdiction
over possessory actions, the public character of the land notwithstanding. This is such an action and the fact that on
her complaint respondent claimed the lands in ownership did not change the
nature of her action. The allegation of
ownership should be regarded as a mere surplusage.” (pp. 959-960)

This was recently clarified in National Development Company
vs. Hervilla (151 SCRA 520) and in Guerrero vs. Amores (159 SCRA
374) that:

“… the administration and dispo­sition of public lands are
committed by law to the Director of Lands primarily, and ultimately, to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. The jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands is confined to the
determination of the respective rights of rival claimants to public lands or to
cases which involve disposition and alienation of public lands. The jurisdiction of courts in possessory actions
involving public lands is limited to the determination of who has the actual
physical possession or occupation of the land in question (in forcible entry
cases, before Municipal Courts) or, the better right of possession (in accion
publiciana, in cases before Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial
Courts.)” (pp. 526-527)

Against these judicial pronouncements,
petitioners can offer no concrete and contrary sentiments other than their cold
protestations that respondent Court overstepped its authority. It follows, therefore, that the Court of
Appeals correctly ordered petitioners’ eviction from the premises in view of
the factual finding that herein private respondents have the better right of
possession.

Neither are We persuaded into accepting petitioners’ contention
that the appellate Court seriously erred in converting the action from quieting
of title into accion publiciana, because in order to afford complete
relief to the parties, the court may determine incidentally the ownership, or
the status of the legal title to the property, or the right to the possession
thereof (Gore vs. Dickinson, 98 Ala. 363, 11 So. 743, cited by Tolentino,
Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, 1990
Reprinting, Volume 2, p. 145).

On the second point raised by petitioners as to whether
respondent Court erred in rejecting the belated submission of proof intended to
show that the lands claimed by respondents herein are distinct from those
involved in the litigation, this, too, can hardly give rise to a cause for
concern which would result in giving relief to petitioners inasmuch as the
theoretical proposition put forward overlooks the previous admission in
judicio of the parties herein that they were referring to the same pieces
of property (p. 4, Decision; p. 18, Rollo; Article 1439, New Civil Code;
Section 4, Rule 129; Section 2(a), Rule 131, Revised Rules on
Evidence; Roosevelt vs. Smith, 40 N.Y.S. 381, 17 Misc. 323; Brooks
vs. Sessoms, 171 S.E. 222, 223, Ga. App. 554; Little Fay Oil Co. vs.
Stanley, 90 Ore. 265, 217 p. 377, 378; cited in Compendium on Evidence, by Sibal
and Salazar, Jr., p. 19).

Moreover, We deem it improper for petitioners to blame their
former lawyer for failing to present evidence to prove that the parcels of land
claimed by respondents are different from those concerned in this case, because
precisely of the previous admission of petitioners as to the identity of the
lands, there was no need — as in fact it would have been improper — to submit
contrary proof. Respondent Court thus merely adhered to the proscription under
adjective law that the court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered (Section 34, Rule 132, Revised Rules on Evidence; De
Castro vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 75 Phil. 824; cited in Remedial Law
Compendium, by Regalado, Volume 2, 1988 edition, p. 547).

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the
decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, without special
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., and Romero,
JJ., concur.

Bidin, J., in the result.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., (Chairman), on
leave.