G.R. No. L-44113. March 31, 1977
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. JUDGE MERICIA B. PALMA AND ROMULO INTIA Y MORADA, RESPONDENTS.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
The Court resolves the sole issue of conflict of jurisdiction
between the City Court of Naga (presided by respondent judge) and the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Courts for Camarines Sur and Cities of Naga and Iriga
over criminal cases where the accused
is 16 but under 21 years of age and rules that the is suance of the Child and
Youth Welfare Code (PD 603) which includes such accused within the definition
of youthful offenders (over 9 years but under 21 years at the time of the
commission of the offense) did not transfer jurisdiction over such cases
from the regular courts (the City Court in this case) to the Juvenile Courts.
Respondent accused Romulo Intia y Morada, 17 years of age, was
charged on February 10, 1976 by the Naga City fiscal’s office with vagrancy
(Article 202, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code) in respondent judge’s
court. In an Order dated March 6, 1976, respondent judge dismissed the
case on the ground that her court “has no
jurisdiction to continue to take further cognizance of this case” without
prejudice to the refiling thereof in the Juvenile Court.
The prosecution shares the view of the Camarines Sur Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court presided by Judge Ma. Rosario Quetulio-Losa that
jurisdiction over 16-year olds up to under 21 years remains with the regular
courts land has not been by implication transferred to the Juvenile
Court. Hence, the petition at bar.
The Court sustains the petition on the following grounds:
1. Republic Act 6591 which
took effect on September 30, 1972 created the Camarines Sur Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court and expressly conferred upon it special and limited
jurisdiction over “criminal cases wherein the accused is under sixteen
years of age at the time of the filing of the case. “[1]
The subsequent issuance of P. D. 603 known as the Child and Youth
Welfare Code which took effect on June 11, 1975 and defines in Article 189 a
youthful offender as “one who is over nine years but under twenty-one
years of age at the time of the commission of
the offense” did not by such definition transfer jurisdiction over
criminal cases involving accused who are 16 years and below 21 years of age from the regular courts[2] to the Juvenile Court, as opined by
respondent judge.
2. The Child and Youth
Welfare Code (P.D. 603) concerning the welfare of the child and youth
throughout the country is a general law while R.A. 6591 which defines and
confers jurisdiction on the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for Camarines
Sur is a special law,[3]
classifying expressly that it can try in criminal cases involving offenders
below the age of majority only those accused
who are under 16 years of age at the time of the filing of the case.
Jurisdiction is conferred by law and there is nothing in either
R.A. 6591 or P.D. 603 that would sustain respondent judge’s ruling on
reconsideration that “together, these two laws, the latter amending the
former confer jurisdiction on youthful offenders who are above 16 years but
under 21 years of age at the time of
the commission of the crime upon the JDRC of Camarines Sur and remove the same
from the City Court. “
A general law cannot repeal a special law by mere implication. The repeal must be express and
specific. Furthermore, the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court of Camarines Sur is a court of special and limited
jurisdiction and the enlargement or conferment of additional jurisdiction on
said court to include accused persons who are 16 years and under 21 years of
age must positively appear in express terms.
It is quite patent that the mere definition in a single article
of the Child and Youth Welfare Code (P.D. 603, Article 189) of youthful
offenders (over 9 and under 21 years of age) did not withdraw from the regular
courts their jurisdiction to try accused persons who are 16 but below 21 years
of age and transfer the same to the Juvenile Courts whose criminal jurisdiction
is expressly limited to those where the accused is under 16 years of
age.
3. If it were the intent and
purpose of P.D. 603 to remove from the City Court the jurisdiction over
youthful accused who are 16 but below 21 years of age and transfer the same to the Juvenile Court, it would have expressly
so provided for repeal of the corresponding provision as when it repealed the
Civil Code provisions on Adoption in Article 26 thereof.[4]
The issuance of a later decree, P.D. No. 798, which went into
effect on September 11, 1975 strengthens the prosecution’s stand that jurisdiction
over accused who are 16-years old up to 21 years remains with the regular
courts while the Juvenile Courts retain their limited jurisdiction only over
those under 16 years. Thus, P. D. No.
798, “Authorizing the Confinement in Rehabilitation Centers or
Reformatories of Truants and Youths Out of School for No Legitimate
Reason,” retains the classification and provides that the application for
confinement of truants or out of school youths shall be filed with the proper
Court of First Instance of the province
or city save that in the case of youths under 16 years of age the
application shall be filed with the Juvenile Court where such a court has been
established.[5]
4. The Solicitor General has
properly acknowledged respondent judge’s “impressive and commendable
dissertations” on the State’s objective of rehabilitating juvenile delinquents
and the role that Juvenile Courts should play in the attainment of such
objective. The role and jurisdiction of
Juvenile Courts are matters of policy and wisdom, however, and in the face of
the clear letter of the law, the special jurisdiction granted to Juvenile
Courts which is limited to cases where the accused is under 16 years of age cannot
be expanded by judicial fiat. The
lawmakers have limited the jurisdiction of Juvenile Courts only where the
accused is relatively younger, i.e. under 16 years at the time of the filing
of the case and have conferred jurisdiction over the older offenders, i.e. 16
years up to below 21 years at the time of the commission of the offense
to the regular courts, and there has been no claim that this is an unfair or
unreasonable classification.
5. Furthermore, a reading of
the provisions of P.D. 603 shows that measures to promote and enhance the
general welfare and rehabilitation of youthful offenders are therein spelled
out and provided for. The Code
establishes the criteria and guidelines under which all youthful offenders
under 21 years are to be tried and attended to, regardless of whether the cases
be filed with the Juvenile Courts for those under 16 years or with the regular
courts for the older ones. Thus the
Solicitor General points out that Chapter 3 of the Code on youthful offenders
decrees special provisions on the following:
Art. 190. Physical and
mental examination of the youthful offender
191. Care of youthful offender held for examination or trial
192. Suspension of sentence and commitment of youthful offender
193. Appeal by the youthful offenders as in criminal case
194. Care and maintenance of youthful offender
195. Report on the conduct of the child
196. Dismissal of the case against the youthful offender
197. Return of the youthful offender to court
198. Effect of release of child based on good conduct
199. Living quarters for youthful offenders sentenced
The cited codal articles, it may be stressed, adequately provide
as in Article 192 that the courts in general shall suspend sentence instead of
pronouncing a judgment of conviction and commit the youthful offender “to
the custody or care of the Department of Social Welfare, or to any training
institution operated by the government, or duly licensed agencies or any other
responsible person, until he shall have reached twenty-one years of age or, for
a shorter period as the court may deem proper, after considering the reports
and recommendations of the Department of Social Welfare or the agency or
responsible individual under whose care he has been committed.”
ACCORDINGLY, the dismissal orders of respondent judge
dated March 6, 1976 and April 1, 1976 are set aside. The case filed with respondent judge’s court is ordered
reinstated for prompt trial and determination on the merits. In the public interest,[6] this
decision resolving the jurisdictional
conflict shall be immediately executory upon promulgation.
Castro, C.J., Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz Palma, Aquino,
Concepcion, Jr., and Martin, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., reserves his
vote.
[1]
Par. 3 (a), section 1 of the Act. Judge
Losa after appointment took her oath as presiding judge of the Juvenile Court
on June 11, 1975.
[2]
Here the charge of vagrancy filed on February 10, 1976 against the 17-year old
respondent-accused undisputedly falls within the expressly conferred general
criminal jurisdiction of respondent city court. The only question raised by respondent judge is whether such
jurisdiction was transferred by implication to the Juvenile Court because of
the accused falling within the Child and Youth Welfare Code definition of
youthful offender.
[3]
A general law is one which applies to the whole State and operates throughout
the State alike upon all the people or all of a class. A special law is one which applies to a
particular community, individual or thing.
[4]
Article 26 of P.D. 603 provides:
“Art. 26. Repealing Clause – All provisions of the Civil
Code on parental authority which are not inconsistent with the provisions of
this Chapter shall remain in force. Provided, that Articles 334 up to 348 inclusive on Adoption, are hereby
expressly repealed and replaced by Section B of this Chapter.”
[5]
P.D. 798, section 3, provides:
“Upon verified petition of
either of a youth’s parents, or, in their default, his guardian, or of any
person in authority in the municipality or city where such youth resides, filed
with the proper Court of First Instance of the province or city, as the case
may be, or, where such youth is under 16 years of age, with the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court in provinces or cities where such a court has been
established, such youth may upon due finding by said court that he is out of
school for no legitimate reason or a truant within the purview of section 1 or
2 hereof, respectively, be ordered confined at any rehabilitation center or
reformatory as shall be determined by the same court.”
[6]
In the Solicitor General’s manifestation dated January 25, 1977, an early
resolution of this case was requested, since cases in Naga City involving
youthful offenders who are 16-year olds and above are not being tried either by
the Juvenile Court or the City Court pending resolution of the issue at bar as
to which court should properly exercise jurisdiction over such cases. Respondent judge joined in the request for
early decision per her Manifestation February 7, 1977.