G.R. No. L-43043. March 31, 1977
DOLORES BAGALANON, WENIFREDO MARVILE, AND WILLIAM SEVILLA, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ANIANO AMATONG AND MARIANITO BALLADORES, RESPONDENTS.
MARTIN, J.:
The only issue raised in this petition for certiorari to
review the decision of the Court of Appeals,[1]
in CA-ÂG.R. No. SP-04793, entitled “Dolores Bagalanon, Wenifredo Marvile
and William Sevilla, petitioners, vs. The Honorable Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga del Norte, Branch II, Aniano
Amatong and Marianito Balladores, respondents”, is whether or not respondent
Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
petition for review of the decision of the trial Court in the aforesaid cases
for having been filed out of time.
On July 18, 1971, a collision between a motor cab and a passenger
jeepney took place in the City of Dipolog
rise to two civil cases – Civil Cases Nos. B-1592 “entitled Aniano L. Amatong
vs. Wenifredo Marvile, Dolores
Bagalanon and William A. Sevilla,
operating under the name and style of Sevilla Lines
and B-1603, entitled Marianito Balladores
vs. Wenifredo Marvile,
Dolores Bagalanon and William A. Sevilla,
operating under the name and style of Sevilla
Lines”. Both cases were jointly
tried in the City Court of Dipolog City, Branch II,
for damages arising from quasi delict. After trial, the City Court of Dipolog City rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, their liability having been established by clear
and convincing evidence defendants Wenifredo Marvile, Dolores Bagalanon and
William A. Sevilla, the latter operating under the
name and style of Sevilla
Lines, are hereby condemned to pay plaintiffs Aniano
L. Amatong and Marianito Balladores in the manner, as follows:
A. To plaintiff Aniano L. Amatong:
1. P2,600.00
for the actual value of the motor cab which was damaged;
2. P500.00 for moral
damages; and
3. P500.00 for attorney’s
fees
B. To plaintiff Marianito Balladores:
1.
P1,400.00 for salaries he failed
to receive by reason of his incapacity due to injuries sustained:
2.
P200.00 for moral damages;
3.
P300.00 for attorney’s fees and
costs in both cases.
IT IS SO ORDERED”.
Both cases were appealed to the Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte. On August 29, 1975, the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga del
Norte, Branch II affirmed the decision of the City Court of Dipolog
City. Petitioners received the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del
Norte, Branch II on September 25, 1975 but due to pressure of work of the
petitioners’ counsel, the petition for review was actually finished only on
October 25, 1975 at about 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon of that day which was a
Saturday. As the Post Office of Dipolog City opened its offices only up to 12:00 o’clock on
that day, petitioners’ counsel was not able to mail the petition for review on
October 25, 1975. He was able to
register the same on the next working day on October 27, 1975, October 26,
being a Sunday. According to the resolution of the respondent Court of Appeals,
en banc dated August 12, 1971, regarding cases elevated to the
Court of Appeals under Republic Act 6031, the petition for review must be filed
within 30 days from notice of the judgment or decision in civil cases (Section
3, Rule 41, Revised Rules of Court). There is no dispute that the petitioners
failed to file their petition for review on October 25, 1975 because when they
arrived at the Post Office of Dipolog City on
Saturday afternoon, the office was already closed. They were late by a few hours because the
office closed at exactly 12:00 o’clock on that day. And that was the reason why the petition had
to be filed on October 27, 1975, October 26, 1975 being a Saturday. Actually, petitioners were late only a few
hours in beating the deadline for filing their petition. It may be argued, however, that it was the
fault of the petitioners not to have come on time to the Post Office to mail
the petition, but the fault was not serious enough as to amount to inexcusable
negÂligence. It is evident from the
records that the delay of the filing of the petition for review by petitioners
was far from being intentional and dilatory.
At least it could be deduced from the conduct of the petitioners that they
were in earnest in meeting the deadline for the filing of the petition by going
to the Post Office of Dipolog City on the very same
day only that they were late by a few hours.
It has been held in a number of cases that pleadings, as well as
remedial laws, should be construed liberally, in, order that litigants may have
ample opportunity to prove their respective claims, and that a possible denial
of substantial justice, due to legal technicalities, may be avoided.[2] Certainly, to dismiss the petition for review due to its late filing for a few
hours or even a day or two without regard to the circumstances for the delay is
giving too much importance to legal technicalities which may unfortunately
amount to a denial of substantial justice to petitioners. Normally, a petition for review of the
decision of the lower court could be thrown out for being filed out of time
except when there is a special circumstance that may warrant a liberal attitude
of the Court. For this Court has already
considered Section 1, Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court[3] as discretionary, not mandatory. Thus, in Maqui v.
Court of Appeals,[4] this Court had reiterated the caveat we have
enunciated in Philippine National Bank vs. Philippine Milling Co., Inc.,[5] to the effect that “Rule 50, Section 1
of the Revised Rules of Court which provides specific grounds for dismissal
of appeal manifestly ‘confers a power and does not impose a duty. What is more it is directory, not manÂdatory.'”
This Court reasoned out:
“A right adherence to the technical rules of procedure
disregards the fundamenÂtal aim of procedure to serve as an aid to justice, not
as a means for its frustration (Economic Ins. Co. v. Uy
Realty Co., 34 SCRA 744, 749) and the objective of the Rules of Court to afford
litigants just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their controversy. Thus, excusable imÂperfections of form and
technicalities of procedure or lapses in the literal or rigid observance of a
procedural rule or non-jurisdictional deadline provided therein should be
overlooked and brushed aside as trivial and indecisive in the interest of fair
play and justice when public policy is not involved, no prejudice has been
caused the adverse party and the court has not been deprived of its authority
or jurisdiction.”
Since it is within the discretion of the
respondent Court to dismiss or not to dismiss the petition for review filed by
petitioners and this discretion is supposed to be a sound one, to be exercised
in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the
circumstances obtaining in each case, the respondent Court should have
considered the circumstance for the delay in the filing of the petition in
question in petitioners’ favor as one deserving the respondent Court’s
leniency. Besides there
is no showing that the dismissed appeal was frivolous and for the purpose of
delay.
WHEREFORE, the resolution sought to be reviewed in this
case is set aside and the respondent Court ordered to reinstate the petition
for review and give due course to the same. Without pronounceÂment as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Muñoz Palma, and Concepcion, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
[1]
Second Division, composed of Justices Mariano Serrano, Ramon
G. Gaviola and Delfin Batacan.
[2]
Quibuyen vs. Court of Appeals, 9 SCRA 741; Lurteveco Employees Association, CCLU vs. Luzteco, Inc., 15 SCRA 660; Arches vs. Bellosilli, 20 SCRA 32.
[3]
“Section 1.
Grounds for dismissal of appeal. – An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of
Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee,
on the following grounds x x x
x;
(b) Failure to file, within the period prescribed
by these rules, the notice of appeal, appeal bond or record on appeal. (Alonzo v. Villamor,
16 Phil. 315).” x
x x x
x.”
[4]
G. R. No. L-41609, February 24, 1976.
[5]
26 SCRA 712.