REGINA S. BIBOSO, NENITA B. BISO, FE CUBIN, MAGELENDE H. DEMEGILLO, EMERITA O. PANALIGAN, NILDA P. TAYO, NELDA TORMON, ARDE M. VALENCIANO, MA. LINDA E. VILLA, AND THE VICMICO SU…

The present Constitution in expanding the mandate of protection
to labor specifically casts on the State the obligation to assure workers
security of tenure.^[1]
The decisive question in the controversy now before this Court is whether the
mantle of such guarantee covers the case of the nine petitioners, whose
employment admittedly were on a probationary basis. It was the ruling of respondent Presidential Executive Assistant
Jacobo C. Clave that its beneficent effects could not be invoked by them that
is assailed before this Court. While
their pleading is captioned petition for review, this Court considered it as a certiorari
proceeding in view of the imputation that there was a grave abuse of discretion
on his part, the issue of an alleged unfair labor practice indulged in by
private respondent Victorias Milling Company being likewise raised by
them. A careful examination of the
records does not justify the rather serious accusation against respondent
public official, who acted on behalf of the Office of the President. The petition is not impressed with merit.

The order of respondent Jacobo C. Clave, who as Presidential
Executive Assistant acted on an appeal by private respondent from a decision of
the Secretary of Labor dismissed the complaint of petitioners for rein­statement. He noted at the outset of such challenged
order: “Individual complainant’s
herein were employed by respondent as academic teachers in respondent’s school,
the St. Mary Mazzarello School, which is operated by respondent. On or about April 14, 1973, complainants
were notified by the school Directress that they (complainants) were not going
to be rehired for the school year 1973-74. The necessary report for such action was filed by respondent with the
Department of Labor on May 28, 1973, informing that complainants’ services were
thus terminated after the business hours on June 30, 1973.”^[2] He then pointed out that petitioners were
quite successful with the Arbitrator, the former National Labor Relations
Commission under Presidential Decree No. 21, and the Secretary of Labor. It was private respondent that appealed to
the Office of the President. After
which, his order went into the basic issue thus: “This Office had examined and analyzed the various contracts
identified during the hearing below and admitted by the complainants to have
been signed by them which clearly show that the complainants were hired as
teachers of the school on a year-to-year basis and that they reapplied before
the expiration of the contracts and/or signed
new ones, as the case may be, if the school decided to renew the same. None of the complainants who testified
disputed the fact that they all signed identical contracts of employment which
provided for a definite period of employ­ment expiring June 30 of the
particular school year. Thus, under
‘Status of Employment’ of said contracts, the complainants were hired as
‘Temporary as and when required until June 30, 1973,’ or whatever year the contract
is supposed to terminate. To be
specific, Exhs. ‘4’, ‘5’ and ‘6’ signed by complainant Arde Valenciano show
that she was hired on a yearly basis for school year 1970-71, and 1971-72. The same is true with Exhs. ’13’ and ’14’
signed by Linda Villa; Exhs. ’16’,
’17’, ’18’ and ’19’, signed by Emerita O. Panaligan; and Exhs. ’22’ and ’23’, signed by
Magelinde Demegillo, all showing that they were hired on a year-to-year
basis.”^[3] Reference was then made to “the
official stand of the Department of Labor respecting recognition by the Labor
Code of the policy of the Bureau of Private Schools settling the maximum
probationary period for teachers at three years. Of pertinence hereto is the official letter dated March 12, 1975,
of Undersecretary of Labor Amado G. Inciong to the President of the
Coordinating Council of Private Educational Associations touching on the
probationary period for teachers at three years, to wit: * * * ‘This refers to your letter of 5 March
1975 in connection with the probationary period for teachers. The Labor Code does not set the maximum
probationary period at six months. Under the Labor Code, the probationary
period is the period required to learn a skill, trade, occupation or
profession. In other words, the Labor
Code recognizes the policy of the Bureau of Private Schools settling the
maximum probationary period for teachers at three years.'”^[4] It was likewise made plain therein that as
regards the allegation of unfair labor practice, the Office of the President
“finds the same untenable.”^[5]

The petition, as noted at the outset, cannot prosper.

1. It is to be noted that in Philippine Air Lines, Inc. v.
Philippine Air Lines Employees Association,^[6] after
reference was made to the specific provision in the present Constitution not
found in the 1935 Charter requiring the State to assure workers security of
tenure, it was stressed that there should be “fealty to [such]
constitutional command.”^[7] Such
a mandate was construed in the subsequent case of Almira v. B. F. Goodrich
Philippines, Inc.,^[8]
that even in cases affording justification for disciplinary action to be taken
by management against an employee, “where a penalty less punitive [than
dismissal] would suffice, whatever missteps may be committed by [the latter]
ought not to be visited with a consequence so severe.”^[9] The opinion then went on to
state: “It is not only because of
the law’s concern for the workingman. There is, in addition, his family to
consider. Unemployment brings untold
hardships and sorrows on those dependent on the wage-earner. The misery and pain attendant on the loss of
jobs then could be avoided if there be acceptance of the view that under all
the circumstances of this case, petitioners should not be deprived of their means
of livelihood. Nor is this to condone
what had been done by them. For all
this while, since private respondent considered them separated from the
service, they had not been paid. From
the strictly juridical standpoint, it cannot be too strongly stressed, to
follow Davis in his masterly work, Discretionary Justice, that where a decision
may be made to rest on informed judgment rather than rigid rules, all the
equities of the case must be accorded their due weight. Finally, labor law determinations, to quote
from Bultmann, should be not only secundum rationem but also secundum
caritatem.“^[10] That is a doctrine to which this Court is
firmly committed. The specific issue in
this case is whether it applies to the case of petitioners. The Office of the President answered in the
negative. Thus it exercised its
discretion. It cannot be said that an
abuse could rightfully be imputed to it, much less one that is of such gravity
that calls for judicial correction. What is decisive is that petitioners were well aware all the time that
their tenure was for a limited duration. Upon its termination, both parties to the employment relationship were
free to renew it or to let it lapse. It
was the decision of private respondent that it should cease. The Office of the President could find
nothing objectionable when it determined that the will of the parties as to the
limited duration thereof should be respected. That was all that was decided.

2. This is by no means to assert that the security of tenure
protection of the Constitution does not apply to probationary employees. The Labor Code has wisely provided for such
a case thus: “The termination of
employment of probationary employees and those employed with a fixed period
shall be subject to such regulations as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe to
prevent the circumvention of the right of the employees to be secured in their
employment as provided herein.”^[11]
There is no question here, as noted in the assailed order of Presidential
Executive Assistant Clave, that petitioners did not enjoy a permanent status. During such period they could remain in
their positions and any circumvention of their rights, in accordance with the
statutory scheme, subject to inquiry and thereafter correction by the
Department of Labor. Thus there was the
safeguard as to the duration of their employment being respected. To that extent, their tenure was secure. The moment, however, the period expired in accordance with
contracts freely entered into, they could no longer invoke the constitutional
protection. To repeat, that was what
transpired in this case. The ruling of
the Office of the President, now assailed, is not without support in law.

3. It would be a different matter of course had the failure to
renew the contracts of petitioners been justly attributable to their joining
petitioner labor union, Vicmico Supervisory Employees Association. That would be a clear case of an unfair
labor practice.^[12]
There was such an allegation by
them. The Office of the President found
“the same untenable.”^[13] Nor did it stop there. It explained why: “The records disclose, and it is a fact admitted by
the union, that the teachers of Don Bosco Technical Institute, also run and
operated by respondent, are all members of the VICSEA. The allegation that the Company refused
re-employment of complainants simply because they joined the VICSEA is negated
by the fact that in a much bigger school, the Don Bosco Technical Institute,
respondent has allowed the members of the faculty to join the VICSEA without
any serious objection or reprisals. If
at all the respondent had objected to the teachers of the St. Mary Mazzarello
school being considered within the same bargaining unit as the other employees
of the company, it was for the reason that the collective bargaining agreement
itself provided for the exemption from coverage of employees hired for a
definite period of employment, like the complainants herein, who were
indisputably shown that the term of their contract of employment prior to the
time that they become permanent under the Manual of the Bureau of Private
Schools, was temporary in nature or for a definite period.”^[14]

In the comment submitted on behalf of respondent public official,
reference was made to the admission by individual petitioners that before they
joined such labor union, “they had serious differences with the school
officials respecting their methods of teaching and conduct in school.”^[15]
That was followed by a recital of what was testified to by some of the
petitioners. Then came this portion of
the comment: “The above-quoted testimonies
of individual petitioners clearly show that their competence, efficiency,
loyalty and integrity were in question long before they became members of
petitioner union VICSEA and it was because of these failings on their part that
their contracts to teach were not renewed. This also shown by Exhibit 39, * * *. (3) Some of the teachers retained
to teach in the school were also members of petitioner union VICSEA * * *. If respondent VICMICO was against individual
petitioners joining the union, why did it not terminate the employment of these
two teachers as well? (4) Don Bosco of
Bacolod City, another school run by respondent VICMICO, is manned by teachers
who are members of petitioner union VICSEA. * * * Considering the foregoing
circumstances, it is difficult to believe the submission of individual
petitioners that they were terminated from employment because they joined
petitioner union VICSEA. It would
appear that it was the other way around. Knowing that their contracts were about to expire and that they would
probably not be extended new ones, petitioners sought membership in petitioner
union VICSEA to render it more difficult for respondent VICMICO to remove them
from their teaching positions. This is
indicated by the fact that petitioners became members of petitioner union
VICSEA only in January, 1973. Before
this date, individual petitioners were already being closely observed to gauge
their performance for purposes of determining who shall be accorded permanent
status. Thus, individual petitioners
knew that they would either be made permanent or will be dropped from the
faculty roster at the end of the school year 1972-73. So they joined the union. That the purpose of individual petitioners in joining the union is to
avert their forthcoming removal from the faculty roster was impliedly admitted
by one of the individual petitioners in her testimony: ‘Q- But according to you, precisely, the
reason why you joined the union was because it would be very hard for the
school to terminate you if you are already a member of the union, did you not
say that? A- I said it!”^[16]
The memorandum for petitioners did stress testimony coming from the Directress
of the school in question to show that the refusal to retain them in employment
was due to their membership in the union. Certainly, it cannot be assumed that the Office of the President in the
evaluation of the conflicting evidence did not take it into consideration. The conclusion it reached was adverse to
petitioners. It is now well-settled that
the certiorari jurisdiction of this Tribunal extends only to a grave
abuse of discretion. There must be the
element of arbitrariness or caprice. In
the light of what appears of record, the conclusion that the decision reached
by it is tainted by such infirmity is unwarranted.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is
dismissed.

Barredo, Antonio, and
Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., in the result.

^[1]
According to Article II, Section 9 of
the Constitution: “The State shall
afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in employment,
ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate
the relations between workers and employers. The State shall assure the rights
of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and
just and humane conditions of work. The
State may provide for compulsory arbitration.”

^[2]
Petition, Annex I, 1.

^[3]
Ibid, 2-3.

^[4]
Ibid, 3-4.

^[5]
Ibid, 2.

^[6]
L-24626, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 489.

^[7]
Ibid, 496.

^[8]
L-34974, July 25, 1974, 58 SCRA 120.

^[9]
Ibid, 131

^[10]
Ibid.

^[11]
Article 271 of the Labor Code (1974).

^[12]
According to Article 247 of the Labor Code: “Unfair labor practices of employers. – It shall be unfair labor practice for an
employer: (a) To interfere with,
restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to
self-organization; * * *.”

^[13]
Petition, Annex I, 2

^[14]
Ibid, 4-5.

^[15]
Comment of the then Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. and
Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno, 4.

^[16]
Ibid, 8-10.