G.R. No. L-22261. September 29, 1967

ENRIQUE BALDISIMO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAPIZ AND ANGEL ARBOLEDA, RESPONDENTS.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions September 29, 1967 ZALDIVAR, J.:
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ZALDIVAR, J.:


Petition for mandamus to compel the Court of
First Instance of Capiz to issue a writ of execution
in its Civil Case No.
V-438.

Petitioner Enrique Baldisimo is the
plaintiff in Civil Case No. V-438 of the Court of First Instance of Capiz, where he seeks to recover from respondent Angel Arboleda the ownership and possession of a par­cel of land
described in his complaint.  After trial,
the lower court, on October 27, 1953,
adjudicated to petitioner only a portion of the land sought to be re­covered.  On appeal to the Court of
Appeals, by both parties (docketed as CA-G.
R. No. 14853-R), the appel­late
court rendered a decision, dated October
22, 1957, awarding the whole property in
litigation to petitioner and declaring
him entitled to its possession; the dispositive
portion of which decision reads:

“For all them forgoing considerations, plaintiff Enrique Baldisimo is hereby declared owner of the western portion with an area of
86,504 square meters, of the whole land indicated in the plan, Exhibit A.  The eastern por­tion of the land, with an area of
39,127 square meters, properly belongs to de­fendant Angel Arboleda.  According to Hilaria
Ongas the boundary line between the land of plaintiff
and that of defend­ant is a line drawn northward from a point (which used to be
an old culvert) 60 meters west along the provincial road from point 1 in the plan,
Exhibit A.

“Under the circumstances, defendant Angel Arboleda
should not be made to pay damages because he is a possessor in good faith. He
took possession of plain­tiff’s land under the mistaken belief that it was part
of the land he bought from the Ongas.  With respect to the fishpond constructed by defendant on plaintiff’s land, the
plaintiffs may take one of two alternatives. 
He may elect to refund to defendant the expenses he incurred in
constructing said fishpond or the increases in value which the land acquired by
reason of the construction of the same. 
In such a case, defendant has the right to retain the property until he
has been reimbursed (Article 546, New Civil Code).  Or plaintiff may choose to oblige defendant to
buy the land.  In the latter case,
however, if the value of the land is considerably more than the fish­pond,
defendant cannot be made to buy the
land.  If the plaintiff does not wish to appropriate the fishpond after
paying the proper indemnity then defendant must pay reasonable rent for the use
of plaintiff’s land.  Plaintiff and
defendant shall agree upon the terra of the lease.  In case of disagreement, the lower court is hereby instructed to fix the terms
thereof (Article 448, New Civil Code).

“Premises considered, the appealed
decision is hereby modified as hereto­fore indicated, without any pronounce­ment
as to costs.

“The court a quo
is
hereby instruct­ed to appoint a commissioner who shall be present
during the survey and division of the land in question.  The division there­of shall be accomplished
in the following manner:  From a point 60 meters west to point 1 (in the plan, Exhibit A), a line
shall be drawn northward, which line shall divide the land into two, such that
at the western portion thereof shall have an area of 86,504 square meters,
while the eastern portion thereof shall have an area of 39,127 square
meters.  Considering the plain­tiff’s
land is much bigger than that of defendant, he shall bear two-thirds of the expenses for survey and division,
while defendant Angel Arboleda shall bear one-third
of such expenses.”

Pursuant to the
foregoing judgment, the case was remanded to the
trial court for further proceeding. 
Petitioner Baldisimo elected to refund respondent Arboleda
of the reasonable expenses
incurred by the latter in the construction of the Fishpond on the land in question, pursuant to the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
Evidence was presented by both
parties
regarding the expenses incurred in the
construction of the fishpond, and the respondent
trial court, on June 29, 1962,
rendered a supplemental decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:

“1. Declaring the defendant ANGEL ARBOLEDA entitled to the refund of his expenses for the construction of the fishpond In
question in the amount of P2,958.07;

“2. Ordering the plaintiff ENRIQUE BALDISIMO to pay the said
defendant the amount aforementioned; and

“3. Without additional pronounce­ment as to
costs.”

From the above-stated supplemental decision pe­titioner appealed
to the Court of Appeals (docketed as CA-G. R. No. 31563-R),
alleging that the appraisal by the lower court of the expenses for the
construct­ion of the fishpond is excessive and unfair.
  Respond­ent Arboleda
did not appeal from the supplemental de­cision.

On June 22, 1963, or during the pendency
of the appeal, petitioner deposited with the respondent court the sum of P2,958.07, which is the amount fixed by said court to be
refunded by petitioner to respondent, at the same time notifying the latter of the
deposit and urging said respondent to collect said amount so that possession of
the land in question may be deli­vered to petitioner.  Because respondent Arboleda
failed to collect the amount deposited and he refused to deliver possession of
the property in question to petitioner, petitioner filed several motions before
the respondent court praying that respondent Arboledo
be ordered to withdraw the money deposited with the court and that a writ of
execution be issued for the delivery of the possession of the land in question to
petitioner.  These motions having been
denied, peti­tioner instituted the instant petition for mandamus before this
Court.

We find merit in this petition.

The reason advanced by respondent court in re­fusing to order
respondent Arboleda to collect the amount of P2,958.07 deposited by petitioner and in refusing to issue a writ
of execution in favor of the latter is the pendency
of petitioner’s appeal with the Court of Appeals.  According to said court, as long as
petitioner insists in prosecuting his appeal from the supplemental decision,
respondent can lawfully reject the tender of payment by petitioner and that the
mate­rial possession of the land in controversy cannot be delivered to the
latter.

The stand taken by respondent court cannot be sustained. 
The appeal of the petitioner from the supplemental decision of
respondent court of June 29, 1962 simply involves the reasonableness of the
amount fixed as the value of the improvements introduced by respond­ent on
petitioner’s land, which the latter is ordered
to refund to the
former.  The ownership of the land, and
naturally its possession which is an attribute thereto, is not being questioned
in the appeal, since the Court of Appeals in its decision dated October 22, 1957
had already declared petitioner the owner of the contro­verted
property.  And it is this decision of the
court of Appeals which petitioner sought to enforce by asking the court a
quo to place him in possession of the land, contending that the decision
had already become final and executory, and that he
had complied with the terms of the judgment regarding the refund of the
expenses incurred by respondent Arboleda in the
construction of the fishpond on the land in question.

Under the circumstances,
as recited in the fore­going paragraphs,
We believe that the petitioner is en­titled to be placed in possession of
the entire
property under
litigation, and in refusing to issue the writ to
execute the decision of
the Court of Appeals respondent court had unlawfully neglected to perform an
act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from office.  It is true that the petitioner had appealed
from the supplemental decision, but under Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court, it is within the power of the trial court to issue orders for the
protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve
any matter litigated in the appeal.  What
petitioners asked respondent court – which
respondent court neglected or refused
to do – was to order the delivery to petitioners
of the land where the
fishpond is located, a step that was
merely designed to
protect and deserve the of petitioner
regardless
of the result
the appeal from the supplemental decision – the rights  petitioners to posses the land where the fishpond is located not being litigated in
said appeal.  And this is so in spite of the provision of Article 546 of
them Civil Code, as mentioned in the decision of the Court of Appeals, that respondent has the
right to retain the possession of the
premises until after he is reimburse of his expenses in the construction of the
fishpond – he having constructed the fishpond in good faith – be­cause the
petitioner had already deposited in court
the amount of P2,958.07 which
the trial court had declared as the reasonable expenses incurred by respondent Arboleda in the construction of the fishpond, which amount
said respondent can collect or withdrawn any time.  The fact that the tender was made under
protest in the sense that petitioner appealed the appraisal made by the lower
court, and petitioner refused to withdraw his appeal, is of no moment as the
full expenses for the construction of the fishpond to be refunded to respond­ent
Arboleda was already consigned in court and was at his
disposal.

As We have adverted to, respondent Arboleda did not
appeal from the supplemental decision of the lower court, and so he could not
be awarded by the appellate court more than what was ordered refunded to him in said decision.  Hence, regardless of the outcome of the
appeal, respondent Arboleda cannot be prejudiced if
pos­session of the property is delivered to petitioner, be­cause said
respondent’s rights are duly protected by
the
amount of P2,958.07 already consigned in court by peti­tioner and
made available to him any time.  The record
shows that petitioner had been deprived of the premises for almost sixteen years up to the time when the
judgment of the Court of Appeals
was rendered.  This is a compelling
circumstance that warrants the issuance of the writ of execution prayed for by petitioner.  There is, indeed, no excuse to keep
petitioner waiting for the outcome of the appeal from the supplemental deci­sion,
which obviously will not affect his right to the possession of the
property.  The respondent court can not,
in justice, continue to withhold from petitioner the possession of the land
where the fishpond is located.  The delivery
of the possession of that property to him has long been overdue, and to deny
him that possession under the circumstances is to exclude him from the use and
enjoyment of a right to which he is entitled. 
Certainly, the remedy of mandamus should be made availably to
petitioner, as prayed for by him in the present case.

WHEREFORE, the petition for a writ of Mandamus is granted. 
Respondent court is commanded to issue
a writ of execution to enforce the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G. R. No. L-14853-R (Civil Case V-438 of respondent court), by ordering
respondent Angel Arboleda to collect the amount of
P2,958.07 deposited in court by petitioner Enrique Baldisimo
and ordering the delivery to said petitioner
of the possession of the whole land
involved in
said case, including the fish­pond mentioned in this
decision.  No pronouncement as to costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez,
Castro, Angeles, and Fernando JJ., concur.

Bengzon, J., on official leave of absence.