G.R. No. L-22119. September 29, 1967
PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. MELANIO SALCEDO, PHILIPPINE AIR LINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION AND COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
It is not clear from the record whether this is an original
action for certiorari, or whether the Philippine Air Lines, Inc. – hereinafter
referred to as petitioner – merely seeks the review by certiorari of a
resolution of the Court of Appeals, the pertinent part of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, the judgment rendered by this Court, as well as
the appealed judgment, is hereby VACATED, and a new trial is granted. The lower court is directed to receive the
testimony of Romulo Matro
and to render a new decision in the case thereafter, as may be warranted by the
facts established by the whole evidence of record. Let the records of this case be remanded to
the court of origin to accomplish this purpose.
In either case, the contested resolution must be upheld.
On August 8 1958, Melanio Salcedo and the
Philippine Air Lines Employees Association (PALEA) – hereinafter referred to
collectively as respondents – filed, against petitioner Civil Case No. 37135 of the Court of Instance of
Manila, for the reinstatement of Salcedo as
petitioner’s employee, with back salaries, damages and attorney’s fees. In due course, petitioner filed its answer to
respondent’s complaint and, after due trial, on February 20, 1961, said court rendered judgment the dispositive part of which is of the following tenor:
“x
x x In view of the
foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff
and against the defendant ordering the latter to reinstate plaintiff Melanio Salcedo to his former
position and to pay him his salary from the date of his separation from office
up to the time
when he shall have been reinstated plus P15.00 as supplementary pay and
transportation allowances of P12.50 a month also from the date of his
separation up to the time when he shall have been reinstated. Defendant is hereby ordered also to pay the
amount of P2,000.00 attorney’s fees and costs.”
On appeal therefrom, taken by petitioner, on May 3,
1963, the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and dismissed respondents’
complaint. Respondents seasonably moved
for a reconsideration, which was denied by the appellate court, on June 5,
1963, but,
seemingly, before receipt of notice of the resolution to this effect,
respondents filed, on June 11, 1963, an “Additional Petition in support”
of said motion for reconsideration.
This additional petition was followed, on June 15, 1963, by respondents’ “Petition for New
Trial Based on the Ground of Newly Discovered Evidence.” Despite
petitioner’s opposition thereto, on September 28, 1963, the Court of Appeals, after hearing both
parties on oral argument, issued the resolution complained of. Hence, this petition for review by certiorari
of petitioner herein, which maintains that:
“I – In Granting Salcedo’s motion
for new trial based on nothing more than the affidavit of his co-employee, Romulo Matro, executed under
suspicious circumstances six (6) years
after the occurrence of the facts alleged therein and only after the
judgment in Salcedo favor rendered by the trial court
was reversed on appeal by respondent court, which affidavit is not only
uncorroborated, patently incredible, based on hearsay and contains
merely collateral matters, but furthermore, cannot in any way produce a
different result on the merits of the trial even if accepted as true,
Respondent Court not only acted
with grave abuse of discretion but also contrary to law and the heretofore unreversed rulings of this Honorable Court in U. S. vs. Luzon, 4 Phil. 343; U. S. vs. Quijano, 11 Phil. 368; Mortera de
Eceiza vs. West of Scotland Insurance Office, 36
Phil. 994; People vs. Cu Unjieng, 61 Phil. 906,
establishing stringent and indispensable fundamental requirements for the
allowance of new trial based on newly discovered evidence;
“ll – People vs. Adolfo Saez, G. R. No. L-15776, November 29, 1961, invoked by respondent Court and upon which it relied in
granting respondent Salcedo’s motion for new trial is
absolutely not applicable here;
“III – The grant of Salcedo’s motion
for new trial will cause prejudice to PAL and aggravate its contingent
liability, for not only will it unduly delay this case, but what is worse will
force PAL to incur additional expense and costs of litigation and in the remote
possibility that Salcedo is later conclusively
ordered reinstated with back wages will also correspondingly increase the
back wages it may have to pay.”
In support of its first
proposition, petitioner alleges: 1)
that respondents have not exercised
reasonable diligence in producing heretofore the new evidence they now seek to introduce; 2) that said new evidence
is unworthy of belief; and 3) that, apart from being corroborative, said
evidence cannot alter the result of the case.
Proper consideration of
the reasons adduced by the petitioner in support of its first proposition
demands a brief review of the relevant facts.
In their complaint herein respondents
pray for the reinstatement of Salcedo as petitioner’s
with back salary, as well as
damages and attorney’s fees,
upon the ground that he had been
arbitrarily dismissed by
petitioner herein
on June 28, 1957; that to justify its action, petitioner subsequently filed against him a false charge of qualified theft, with the
office of the Pasay City Attorney, which, after a protracted investigation, covering a period of eight (8) months, exonerated him; that, this notwithstanding, petitioner had refused either to reinstate Salcedo or to give him a clearance,
the absence of which barred him from getting employment
elsewhere; and that, as a consequence, he was humiliated and ostracised socially,
apart from he and his family
suffering physical and mental anguish.
Petitioner, in turn,
contended and endeavored to prove that Salcedo had
been dismissed for cause, because he
had stolen ball bearings
belonging to his employer and conveyed
about 150 of said effects, for
P30, to one Romualdo Abalajon, who, in turn, sold the
goods to the Talastas Diesel Parts Store, at Evangelista St., Quiapo, Manila,
for P45 and that, subsequently, five (5) of these ball bearings were in fact
located in and recovered from said store by the authorities. For
this purpose, petitioner had
introduced the testimony of Abalajon, in addition to
that of its employees, Romualdo Calderon and Jesus Cartagena. According
to petitioner herein, it came to know, through Cartagena, of the intervention of Salcedo
and Abalajon, in the sale of said allegedly stolen
goods, and later located the store in which some of those goods were.
Although Salcedo denied the charge against him and asserted that the
same had been fabricated, the Court of Appeals did not believe his testimony
and gave credence to that of Abalajon, Cartagena and Calderon, and accordingly reversed the
decision of the Court of First Instance in favor of respondents herein.
Notice of the decision of
the appellate court was received by respondents on May 8, 1963. A week later, or on May 15,
1963, they filed a
motion for reconsideration, which was denied on June 5, 1963.
Before notice of the resolution to this effect had been, apparently,
served upon them, respondents
filed, on June 11, 1963, an
Additional Petition and on
June 15, 1963, the petition
for new trial in question. Attached to
both petitions was the sworn statement of Romulo Matro, an employee of petitioner herein.
Matro stated, in his affidavit, that
the ball-bearings found in the store of Talastas
Diesels Parts were purchased by the
latter from him; that said ball-bearings were delivered to him by
Cartagena and Calderon; that
both persuaded him to sell said articles and keep the proceeds thereof,
which he did; that, when he inquired from Cartagena
and Calderon about their reason for acting as they did, they told him that it
was a “military
secret;” that he, later on, learned that said goods were used to back up
the charge of theft against Salcedo; that he (Matro) did not volunteer to give this information before,
because he felt that it would jeopardize his job as petitioner’s employee and
because he believed – or hoped – that
respondents’ counsel would be sufficiently able and resourceful to protect Salcedo; that, when the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the Court of First Instance in favor of respondents, he realized
that Salcedo’s fate was finally dependent upon his
civic spirit and moral courage; and that he, accordingly, approached
respondents’ counsel and executed the aforementioned affidavit, despite the
risks concommitant therewith.
We do not believe that respondents have been negligent in
securing this evidence. They had no
means of knowing it before Matro, allegedly pricked
by his conscience, had approached counsel for the respondents, soon after June 8, 1963, when notice of the
resolution of the Court of Appeals, of June
5, 1963 – denying respondents’ motion for reconsideration of the
decision of said Court was served upon said counsel. Matro’s affidavit
was made on June 10, 1963,
and the next day, respondent’s “additional petition,” in support of
the motion for reconsideration, was filed.
Four (4) days later, or on June
15, 1963, respondents filed a “petition for new trial based on
the ground of newly discovered evidence,” referring to Matro’s
testimony. Obviously, this testimony is
newly discovered evidence and respondents were not negligent in securing the
same, in the light of the attending circumstances.
As regards the question
whether Matrons affidavit is worthy of belief or not, it should be noted that
the question of credibility of
witnesses is one of fact, the findings of the Court of Appeals on which are not
subject to our review. This is
particularly true when we consider that the contents of said affidavit are not
inherently or necessarily incredible.
With respect to the sufficiency of Matrons testimony to change
the result of the case, suffice it to say that the determination of the merits
thereof depends upon the question as to whose testimonial evidence merits
credence. If the Court believes the
testimony of petitioner’s witnesses, the vacated decision of the appellate
Court would be in order. Otherwise, the
resolution appealed from should be affirmed.
And, we believe, it must be affirmed, since we cannot review the findings
of said appellate court on the credibility of witnesses.
At any rate, it is manifest to us that the Court of Appeals has
not abused its discretion in holding that Matro’s testimony,
if admitted in evidence, might change the final outcome of the case. Indeed, from the very beginning, Salcedo had protested innocence and asserted that the
charge against him was fabricated. Without
corroboration, his testimony thereon could hardly prevail over that of Abalajon, who claimed to have bought the ball-bearings from
Salcedo. But,
with the testimony of Matro, to the effect that it
was he – not Salcedo who made the sale to Abalajon, and that the ball-bearings had been given to Matro by
Calderon and Cartagena, it is quite conceivable that the
court may entertain serious doubts on the veracity of said witnesses for the
prosecution.
At this juncture, we must
not lose sight of the fact that, even without Matro‘
s testimony, the City Attorney of Pasay felt that he
should not – as he did not – prosecute Salcedo. And, any doubt on the general soundness of
the judgment of said prosecutor is dispelled by the fact that he was, in
effect, sustained by the Court of First Instance, which rendered judgment for
respondents herein. Neither should we
overlook the circumstance that the aforementioned prosecutor and His Honor the
trial Judge had personally heard the witnesses and observed them in the course
of their testimony, and, that, accordingly, their findings thereon are entitled
to great weight. In short, the factual
issue in this case appears to be precariously dependent upon the credibility of
the testimonial evidence for the petitioner contradicted by that of
respondents, both being, more or less
so evenly balance – judging from
the action taken thereon
by the three (3) sets of officers who have heretofore intervened in this case –
that anything could perhaps tip balance in favor of either side.
In conclusion, we find
that the Court of Appeals had not only, not abused its discretion, but, also,
made good use of its sound judgment in acting as it did. Accordingly, the question whether the case of
People v. Saez,[1] cited in the resolution appealed from is in
point or not, cannot affect the result of this proceedings. Moreover, said case is really in point
because it upheld the propriety of ordering a new trial when the newly
discovered evidence may affect the credibility of the testimony of some witnesses for the
prosecution. In fact, respondents herein
have a stronger claim for a new trial than the accused in the case above-mentioned,
because the newly discovered evidence therein was an affidavit made by another,
before the prosecution of the accused, whereas the affidavit of Matro did not exist until after the rendition of the
decision of the Court of Appeals. Hence,
respondents herein could not have possibly learned, much less, availed of Matro’s affidavit prior thereto.
Neither do the additional
expenses that a new trial would entail justify our disturbing the resolution
appealed from, it being settled that the granting or denial of a new
trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court,[2] which used it properly in the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, said resolution is hereby upheld and
affirmed, with the costs of this instance against petitioner herein.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, J., on leave.
[1]
G.R. No. L-15770. November
29, 1961.
[2]
Tan v. People, 88 Phil., 609; Araneta v. Rodas, 81
Phil., 506; Hodges v. Barrios, 80 Phil., 751; Miranda v. Legaspi,
G.R. No. L-4288, Nev. 26, 1962; Bustamante v. Alfonso, 55
Off. Gaz. 225; Tan v. Go, 47 Phil., 89; Soriano v. Aquino, 37
Phil., 176; Pico v. Cohn, 67 Cal 258, 7 Pac. 680; Drake v. Palmer, 2 Cal. 177 and Palmer v. Steward, 2 Cal. 353.