G.R. No. L-22523. September 29, 1967
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR, EDWIN VILLA Y MENDOZA, LUIS E. SANTOS, JR. AND EDIPOLA V. SANTOS, PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR-…
ANGELES, J.:
An appeal from the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court,
in Special Proceeding No. 0001, dismissing
the petition instituted by the spouse Luis R. Santos, Jr. and Edipola V.
Santos for the adoption of the minor Edwin Villa y Mendoza.
The issue before Us is, whether or not
an elder
sister may adopt a younger brother.
The trial court dismissed
the petition reasoning thus:
“A critical
consideration in this case is the fact that the parents of the minor to be
adopted are also the parents of the petitioner-wife. The minor, therefore, is the latter’s
legitimate brother.
“In this proceeding, the adoption will result in an
incongruous situation where the minor Edwin Villa, a legitimate brother of the petitioner-wife, will also be her son. In the opinion of the court, that
incongruity, not neutralized by other circumstances absent herein, should
prevent the adoption.”
The petitioners moved to
reconsider the decision but the decision was denied. Hence, this appeal.
The facts are not
disputed.
The above-named spouses filed the petition before the court a
quo on January 8, 1963, praying that the minor Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years old, be declared their
(petitioner’s) son by adoption. Evidence
was presented that the order setting the case for hearing has been duly
published, Exhibit A. There having been
no opposition registered to the petition, the petitioners were permitted to
adduce their evidence.
It was established that
the petitioners are both 32 years of age, Filipinos, residing in the City of Manila. They
were married in 1957 and have maintained a conjugal home of their own. They do not have a child of their own
blood. Neither spouse has any
legitimate, legitimated, illegitimate, acknowledged natural child,
or natural child by legal fiction; now has any one of them been convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude. Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years old, is a child of Francisco Villa and Florencia Mendoza
who are the common parents of the petitioner-wife Edipola
Villa Santos and the minor. Luis E. Santos,
Jr., is a lawyer, with-business interest
in a textile
development enterprise and the IBA electric plant, and is the general manager
of Medry, Inc. and the secretary-treasurer of Bearen Enterprises.
His income is approximately P600.00 a month. His co-petitioner-wife,
is a nurse by profession, with an average monthly earning of about P300.00.
It was also shown that Edwin Villa y Mendoza was born on May
22, 1958, Exhibit C. He was
a sickly child since birth. Due to the
child’s impairing health, his parents entrusted him to the petitioners who
reared and brought him up for the years thereafter, and as a result, there
developed between the petitioners and the child, a deep Hand profound love for
each other. The natural parents of the minor testified
that they have voluntarily given their consent to the adoption of their son by
the petitioners, and submitted their written consent and conformity to the
adoption, and that they fully understand the legal consequences of the adoption
of their child by the petitioners.
We are not aware of any provision in the law, and none has been
pointed to Us by
the Solicitor General who argues for the State in this case, that
relatives by blood or by
affinity, are prohibited from adopting one another. The only objection raised is the alleged
“incongruity” that will result, in the relation of the
petitioner-wife and the adopted, in the circumstance that the adopted who is
the legitimate brother of the adopter, will also be her son by adoption. The theory is, therefore,
advanced that adoption among people who are related by nature should not be
allowed, in order that dual relationship should not result, reliance being
made upon the views expressed by this Court in McGee vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-5387, April 29, 1954, 94 Phil. 820.
In that case, an American citizen, Clyde E. McGee, married to a
Filipina by whom, he had one child, instituted a proceeding for the adoption of two
minor children of the wife had by her first husband. The lower court granted the petition of McGee
to adopt his two minor step-children. On appeal by the State, We reversed the
decision. We said:
“The purpose of adoption is to establish a relationship of
paternity and filiation where none existed
before. Where therefore the relationship
of parent and child already exists whether by blood or by affinity as in the
case of illegitimate and stepchildren, it would be unnecessary and superfluous
to establish and superimpose another relationship of parent and child through
adoption. Consequently, an express authorization
of law like article 338 is necessary, if not to render it proper and legal, at
least, to remove any and all doubt on the subject matter. Under this view, article 338 may not be
regarded as a surplusage. That may have been the reason why in the old
Code of Civil Procedure, particularly its provisions regarding adoption,
authority to adopt a stepchild by a step-father was provided in section 766
notwithstanding the general authorization in section 765 extended to any inhabitant
of the Philippines to adopt a minor child.
The same argument of surplusage could
plausibly have been advanced as regards section 766, that is to say, section
766 was unnecessary and superfluous because without it a step-father could
adopt a minor step-child anyway.
However, the inserting of section 766 was not entirely without
reason. It seems to be an established
principle in American jurisprudence that a person may not adopt his own
relative, the reason being that it is unnecessary to establish a relationship where
such already exists (the same philosophy underlying our codal
provisions on adoption). So some states
have special laws authorizing the adoption of relatives such as a grandfather
adopting a grandchild and a father adopting his illegitimate or natural
child.”
Notwithstanding the views thus expressed, a study of American
precedents would reveal that there is a variance in the decisions of the courts
in different jurisdictions regarding the matter of adoption of relatives. It cannot be stated as a general proposition
that the adoption of a blood relative is contrary to the policy of the law, for in many states of the Union, no
restriction of that sort is contained in the statute authorizing adoption,
although laws of other jurisdictions expressly
provide that adoption may not take placed
within persons within a certain degree of relationship (1 Am. Jur.
628-629). Courts in some status hold
that in the absence of express statutory restriction, a blood relationship
between the parties is not a legal impediment to the adoption of one by the other, and
there may be a valid adoption where the relation of parent and child already exists by
nature (2 Am. Jur. 2d 869). Principles vary
according to the particular adoption statute of a state under which any given
case is considered. It would seem that in those
states originally influenced by the civil law countries where adoption
originated, the rules are liberally construed, while in other states where
common law principles predominate, adoption laws are more strictly applied because
they are to be in derogation of the common law.
Article 335 of the Civil Code
enumerates those persons who may not adopt, and it has been shown that
petitioners-appellants herein are not among those prohibited from
adopting. Article 339 of the same code
names those who cannot be adopted, and the minor child whose adoption is under
consideration, is not ones of those excluded by the law. Article 338, on the other hand, allows the
adoption of a natural child by the natural father or mother, of other
illegitimate children by their father or mother, and of a
step-child by the step-father or step-mother.
This last article is, of coarse, necessary to remove all doubts that adoption is not prohibited even in
these cases where there already exist
a relationship
of parent and child between them by nature.
To say that adoption should not be allowed when the adopter and the
adopted are related to each other, except in these cases enumerated in Article
338, is to preclude adoption among relatives no matter how far removed or in
whatever degree that relationship might be, which in our opinion is not the
policy of the law. The interest and welfare
of the child to be adopted should be of paramount consideration. Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, and designed to provide
homes, care and education for unfortunate children,
should be construed so as to encourage the adoption of such children by person
who can properly rear and educate them (In re Havsgord’s
Estate, 34 S.D. 131, 147 N.W. 378).
With respect to the objection
that the adoption in this particular case will result in a dual relationship between the parties, that the adopted brother will also be the son of the adopting
elder sister, that fact alone should
not prevent the adoption. One is
by nature, while the other is by fiction of law. The
relationship established by the adoption is limited to the adopting parents and does not extend to their other
relatives, except as expressly provided by law.
Thus, the adopted child
cannot be considered as a relative of the ascendants and collaterals of the
adopting parents, nor of the legitimate
children which they may have after the adoption except that the law imposes
certain impediments to marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are the children of the adopted considered as descendants of the adopter (Tolentino,
Civil Code, Vol. I, 1960 Ed., p. 652, citing 1 Oyuelos 284; Perez Gonzalez and Castan;
4-11 Enneccerus, Kipp &
Wolff 177; Muñoz, p. 104). So even considered in relation to the rules on succession which are in pari materia, the
adoption under consideration would not be objectionable on the ground alone of the resulting dual relationship between
the adopter and the adopted. Similar dual relationship also result under
our law on marriage when persons who are already related, by blood or by
affinity, marry each other. But as long as the relationship is
not within the degrees prohibited by
law, such marriage are allowed, notwithstanding the resulting dual
relationship. And as We
do not
find any provision in the law that
expressly prohibits adoption among
relatives, they ought not to be prevented.
For all the foregoing considerations,
the decision appealed from is set aside, and the petition for the adoption of the subject minor, granted. No pronouncement
as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Castro, and Fernando, JJ.,
concur.