file:francisco jr vs the house of representatives 160261 novemb.htm
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Constitutional Law: Judicial review as integral
component of the system if checks and balance; Constitutionality of Rules of
Procedure for Impeachment Proceedings; Validity of Second Impeachment Complaint
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003]
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner, NAGMAMALASAKIT
NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND
MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES
OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE,
REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C.
TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL,
respondent-in-intervention.
[G.R. No. 160262. November
10, 2003]
SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA
RAZON-ABAD, petitioners, ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO
QUADRA, petitioners-in-intervention, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER,
SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents, JAIME
N. SORIANO, respondent–in–intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO
Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
[G.R. No. 160263. November
10, 2003]
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M. CAGAMPANG, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioners-in-intervention,
vs. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, AND JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q.
PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
[G.R. No. 160277. November
10, 2003]
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, WORLD WAR II
VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GILBERT TEODORO, JR., FELIX WILLIAM
FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA IV, HENRY LANOT, KIM BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO
LIBANAN, EMMYLOU TALIÑO-SANTOS, DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN GATCHALIAN, LUIS
BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR ERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY,
SAMUEL DANGWA, ALFREDO MARAÑON, JR., CECILIA CARREON-JALOSJOS, AGAPITO AQUINO,
FAUSTO SEACHON, JR., GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS LACSON, MANUEL ORTEGA,
ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR, WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL DE
GUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO BACULIO, FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO,
ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO PARAS, JOSE
SOLIS, RENATO MATUBO, HERMINO TEVES, AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO MACIAS, ARTHUR
PINGOY, JR., FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO, CONRADO ESTRELLA III, ELIAS BULUT, JR., JURDIN
ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO BONDOC, GENEROSO TULAGAN, PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAEL DUAVIT,
JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI LAPUS, CARLOS COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS
ESCUDERRO, RENE VELARDE, CELSO LOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES, DIDAGEN DILANGALEN,
ABRAHAM MITRA, JOSEPH SANTIAGO, DARLENE ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETA SUAREZ,
RODOLF PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA, GREGORIO
IPONG, GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO, CELIA LAYUS, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI,
BENASING MACARAMBON, JR., JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK COJUANGCO, MAURICIO DOMOGAN,
RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELO MONTILLA, ROSELLER BARINAGA, JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA
NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO, JOAQUIN CHIPECO, JR., AND RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q.
PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
[G.R. No. 160292. November
10, 2003]
HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA
PAPA, NAPOLEON C. REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., ALFREDO C. LIGON, JOAN P.
SERRANO AND GARY S. MALLARI, petitioners, WORLD WAR II VETERANS
LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, IN HIS CAPACITY
AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents, JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
[G.R. No. 160295. November
10, 2003]
SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M. GONZALES, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G.
TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q.
PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
[G.R. No. 160310. November
10, 2003]
LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN
MATIBAG, RAMON MIQUIBAS, RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO MALASAGA, EDUARDO SARMIENTO,
EDGARDO NAOE, LEONARDO GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIO MENDIOLA, MARIO TOREJA,
GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON A. LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR., RONNIE TOQUILLO,
KATE ANN VITAL, ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICO PABLES, JR., JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA A.
AQUINO, MILA P. GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG, ERNA LAHUZ, HOMER
CALIBAG, DR. BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE, WILLIE RIVERO, DANTE
DIAZ, ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO BUENAVISTA, EMILY SENERIS, ANNA CLARISSA
LOYOLA, SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH LEANDRO LOYOLA, ANTONIO
LIBREA, FILEMON SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U. SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND
NOEL ISORENA, MAU RESTRIVERA, MAX
VILLAESTER, AND EDILBERTO GALLOR,
petitioners, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKER JOSE C. DE VENECIA, JR.,
THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. FELIX
FUENTEBELLA, ET AL., respondents.
[G.R. No. 160318. November
10, 2003]
PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners, vs. HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AND ALL MEMBERS,
PHILIPPINE SENATE, respondents.
[G.R. No. 160342. November
10, 2003]
ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF
THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND ENGR. MAXIMO N. MENEZ
JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A TAXPAYER AND MEMBER OF THE ENGINEERING PROFESSION, petitioners, vs. THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES REPRESENTED BY THE 83 HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE LED BY
HON. REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
[G.R. No. 160343. November
10, 2003]
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE
SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO,
JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES
THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents.
[G.R. No. 160360. November
10, 2003]
CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH
THE SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.
[G.R. No. 160365. November
10, 2003]
U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C.
PADERANGA, DANILO V. ORTIZ, GLORIA C. ESTENZO-RAMOS, LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS V.
DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON, ROLANDO P. NONATO, DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSA R.
DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B. CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, SYLVA G. AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FOR
THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES FELIX
FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERTO TEODORO, BY THEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROUP
OF MORE THAN 80 HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES WHO SIGNED AND FILED THE IMPEACHMENT
COMPLAINT AGAINST SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. respondents.
[G.R. No. 160370. November
10, 2003]
FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE
HONORABLE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
[G.R. No. 160376. November
10, 2003]
NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner,
vs. HON. FELIX WILLIAM
FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN REPRESENTATION OF THE 86 SIGNATORIES OF THE
ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. AND THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS
SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, respondents.
[G.R. No. 160392. November
10, 2003]
VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEÑA, petitioners, vs. THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AND THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
[G.R. No. 160397. November
10, 2003]
IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST CHIEF
JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS, JR., petitioner.
[G.R. No. 160403. November
10, 2003]
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE
SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO
G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELA, THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
[G.R. No. 160405. November
10, 2003]
DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY CHAPTER,
MANUEL M. MONZON, PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU PROVINCE, VICTOR A. MAAMBONG,
PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN OF THE COLLEG EOF LAW,
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCAITION OF CEBU, INC. [YLAC], REPRSEENTED
BY ATTY. MANUEL LEGASPI, CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. [CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R. POCA, MANDAUE LAWYERS
ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW], REPRESENTED BY FELIPE VELASQUEZ, FEDERACION
INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS [FIDA], REPRESENTED BY THELMA L. JORDAN, CARLOS G.
CO, PRESIENT OF CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND CEBU LADY LAWYERS
ASSOCIATION, INC. [CELLA, INC.], MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND BERNARDITO FLORIDO, PAST
PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU
CHAPTER, petitioners, vs. THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AS HOUSE SPEAKER
AND THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, AS SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no
matter how passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it may appear to be, over
the determination by the independent branches of government of the nature,
scope and extent of their respective constitutional powers where the
Constitution itself provides for the means and bases for its resolution.
Our nation’s history is replete with vivid illustrations of the
often frictional, at times turbulent, dynamics of the relationship among these
co-equal branches. This Court is
confronted with one such today involving the legislature and the judiciary
which has drawn legal luminaries to chart antipodal courses and not a few of
our countrymen to vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.
There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that
the present controversy subject of the instant petitions – whether the filing
of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in
the Constitution, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question –
has resulted in a political crisis.
Perhaps even more truth to the view that it was brought upon by a
political crisis of conscience.
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our
Constitution is sufficient to address all the issues which this controversy
spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that
the feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither
necessary nor legally permissible. Both
its resolution and protection of the public interest lie in adherence to, not
departure from, the Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy,
this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine
of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches
of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by
each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign
people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances
which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official
acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without destroying
their indispensable co-equality.
Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican
government, intended as they are to insure that governmental power is wielded
only for the good of the people, mandate a relationship of interdependence and
coordination among these branches where the delicate functions of enacting,
interpreting and enforcing laws are harmonized to achieve a unity of
governance, guided only by what is in the greater interest and well-being of
the people. Verily, salus populi est
suprema lex.
Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XI
Accountability of Public Officers
SECTION 1. Public office is a
public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to
the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
SECTION 2. The President, the
Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for,
and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery,
graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other
public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law,
but not by impeachment.
SECTION 3. (1) The House of
Representatives shall have the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of
impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint
for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or
by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which
shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The
Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall
submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral,
together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared
for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least
one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a
favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override
its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified
complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all
the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment,
and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against
the same official more than once within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have
the sole power to try and decide
all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall
be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No
person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of
impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but
the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution,
trial, and punishment according to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of
this section. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the
Constitution, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives
adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House
Impeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding the previous House
Impeachment Rules[1]
approved by the 11th Congress. The relevant distinctions between these two Congresses’ House
Impeachment Rules are shown in the following tabulation:
|
11TH |
12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES |
|
RULE INITIATING
Section 2. Mode of Initiating Impeachment. – Impeachment shall be initiated only by a verified
|
RULE BAR AGAINST INITIATION OF IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST
Section 16. – Impeachment Proceedings Deemed Initiated. – In cases where In cases where a verified complaint or a
|
|
RULE V BAR
Section 14. Scope of Bar. – No impeachment |
Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of Impeachment |
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a
Resolution,[2]
sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the
Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on
the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).”[3]
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint[4]
(first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and
seven Associate Justices[5]
of this Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the
public trust and other high crimes.”[6]
The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B.
Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen,[7]
and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003[8]
in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by
any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution
of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of
Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within
three session days thereafter. The
Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall
submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral,
together with the corresponding resolution.
The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within
ten session days from receipt thereof.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment
complaint was “sufficient in form,”[9]
but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in
substance.[10]
To date, the Committee Report to this
effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the
said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the
first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on
Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint[11]
was filed with the Secretary General of the House[12] by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr.
(First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District,
Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the
alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House
Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution
of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the
Members of the House of Representatives.[13]
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of
Representatives, et. al., most of
which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the
Constitution that “[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year.”
In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that
he has a duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use all
available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment, that the issues
raised in his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of
transcendental importance, and that he “himself was a victim of the capricious
and arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings
introduced by the 12th Congress,”[14]
posits that his right to bring an impeachment complaint against then Ombudsman
Aniano Desierto had been violated due to the capricious and arbitrary changes
in the House Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on November 28, 2001 by the
House of Representatives and prays that
(1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof
be declared unconstitutional; (2) this
Court issue a writ of mandamus directing respondents House of Representatives et.
al. to comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the
Constitution, to return the second impeachment complaint and/or strike it off
the records of the House of Representatives, and to promulgate rules which are
consistent with the Constitution; and (3) this Court permanently enjoin
respondent House of Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment
complaint.
In G.R. No. 160262,
petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens and taxpayers,
alleging that the issues of the case are of transcendental importance, pray, in
their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ “perpetually”
prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from filing any Articles of
Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the Senate; and for the issuance of
a writ “perpetually” prohibiting respondents Senate and Senate President
Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief
Justice or, in the event that the Senate has accepted the same, from proceeding
with the impeachment trial.
In G.R. No. 160263,
petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers,
lawyers and members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that
their petition for Prohibition involves public interest as it involves the use
of public funds necessary to conduct the impeachment trial on the second
impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining
Congress from conducting further proceedings on said second impeachment
complaint.
In G.R. No. 160277,
petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court has recognized that he
has locus standi to bring petitions
of this nature in the cases of Chavez
v. PCGG[15]
and Chavez
v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation,[16] prays in his petition for Injunction that the
second impeachment complaint be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160292,
petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al.,
as taxpayers and members of the legal profession, pray in their petition for
Prohibition for an order prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from
drafting, adopting, approving and transmitting to the Senate the second
impeachment complaint, and respondents De Venecia and Nazareno from
transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.
In G.R. No. 160295,
petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and Deputy Speaker Raul M.
Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of the House of Representatives, they have
a legal interest in ensuring that only constitutional impeachment proceedings
are initiated, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that the
second impeachment complaint and any act proceeding therefrom be declared null
and void.
In G.R. No. 160310,
petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al.,
claiming that they have a right to be protected against all forms of senseless
spending of taxpayers’ money and that they have an obligation to protect the
Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, and the integrity of the Judiciary,
allege in their petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition that it is instituted as “a class suit” and pray that (1) the
House Resolution endorsing the second impeachment complaint as well as all
issuances emanating therefrom be declared null and void; and (2) this Court
enjoin the Senate and the Senate President from taking cognizance of, hearing,
trying and deciding the second impeachment complaint, and issue a writ of prohibition
commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and agents to desist from conducting any
proceedings or to act on the impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160318,
petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members are citizens and
taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a
member of the Philippine Bar, both allege in their petition, which does not
state what its nature is, that the filing of the second impeachment complaint
involves paramount public interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the
House Impeachment Rules and the second impeachment complaint/Articles of
Impeachment be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160342,
petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a member of the Philippine
Bar Association and of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and petitioner
Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in their petition for the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction to enjoin
the House of Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment
complaint.
In G.R. No. 160343,
petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it is mandated by
the Code of Professional Responsibility to uphold the Constitution, prays in
its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V
and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the House Impeachment Rules be
declared unconstitutional and that the House of Representatives be permanently
enjoined from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160360,
petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition that the House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160365,
petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et. al., in their
petition for Prohibition and Injunction which they claim is a class suit filed
in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa
v. Factoran[17]
which was filed in behalf of succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for the
issuance of a writ prohibiting respondents House of Representatives and the
Senate from conducting further proceedings on the second impeachment complaint
and that this Court declare as unconstitutional the second impeachment
complaint and the acts of respondent House of Representatives in interfering
with the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 160370,
petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino, alleging that the issues
in his petition for Prohibition are of national and transcendental significance
and that as an official of the Philippine Judicial Academy, he has a direct and
substantial interest in the unhampered operation of the Supreme Court and its
officials in discharging their duties in accordance with the Constitution,
prays for the issuance of a writ prohibiting the House of Representatives from
transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate and the Senate from
receiving the same or giving the impeachment complaint due course.
In G.R. No. 160376,
petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his petition for
Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at the time they filed the
second impeachment complaint, were “absolutely without any legal power to do
so, as they acted without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of Impeachment
assail the alleged abuse of powers of the Chief Justice to disburse the (JDF).”
In G.R. No. 160392,
petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L. Hofileña, alleging that
as professors of law they have an abiding interest in the subject matter of
their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains to a
constitutional issue “which they are trying to inculcate in the minds of their
students,” pray that the House of Representatives be enjoined from endorsing
and the Senate from trying the Articles of Impeachment and that the second impeachment complaint be declared
null and void.
In G.R. No. 160397,
petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging his locus standi, but alleging that the second impeachment complaint is founded
on the issue of whether or not the Judicial Development Fund (JDF) was spent in
accordance with law and that the House of Representatives does not have
exclusive jurisdiction in the examination and audit thereof, prays in his
petition “To Declare Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Action and
Jurisdiction” that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160403,
petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the issues raised in the
filing of the second impeachment complaint involve matters of transcendental
importance, prays in its petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the
second impeachment complaint and all proceedings arising therefrom be declared
null and void; (2) respondent House of Representatives be prohibited from
transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate; and (3) respondent
Senate be prohibited from accepting the Articles of Impeachment and from
conducting any proceedings thereon.
In G.R. No. 160405,
petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al.,
as citizens and taxpayers, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition
that (1) the second impeachment complaint as well as the resolution of
endorsement and impeachment by the respondent House of Representatives be
declared null and void and (2) respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin
Drilon be prohibited from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the
Chief Justice or, in the event that they have accepted the same, that they be
prohibited from proceeding with the impeachment trial.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261,
160262 and 160263, the first three of the eighteen which were filed before this
Court,[18]
prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or preliminary
injunction to prevent the House of Representatives from transmitting the
Articles of Impeachment arising from the second impeachment complaint to the
Senate. Petition bearing docket number
G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed for the declaration of the
November 28, 2001 House Impeachment Rules as null and void for being
unconstitutional.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and
160295, which were filed on October 28, 2003, sought similar relief. In addition, petition bearing docket number
G.R. No. 160292 alleged that House Resolution No. 260 (calling for a
legislative inquiry into the administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF)
infringes on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and is a
direct violation of the constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the
judiciary.
On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of
Representatives, a motion was put forth that the second impeachment complaint
be formally transmitted to the Senate, but it was not carried because the House
of Representatives adjourned for lack of quorum,[19]
and as reflected above, to date, the Articles of Impeachment have yet to be
forwarded to the Senate.
Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction which were filed on or
before October 28, 2003, Justices Puno and Vitug offered to recuse themselves,
but the Court rejected their offer.
Justice Panganiban inhibited himself, but the Court directed him to
participate.
Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court
in its Resolution of October 28, 2003, resolved to (a) consolidate the
petitions; (b) require respondent House of Representatives and the Senate, as
well as the Solicitor General, to comment on the petitions not later than 4:30
p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for oral arguments on November
5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and (d) appointed distinguished legal experts as amici curiae.[20] In addition, this Court called on petitioners
and respondents to maintain the status
quo, enjoining all the parties and others acting for and in their behalf to
refrain from committing acts that would render the petitions moot.
Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of
Representatives through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its
co-respondents, by way of special appearance, submitted a Manifestation
asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or
enjoin the House of Representatives, which is an independent and co-equal
branch of government under the Constitution, from the performance of its
constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel,
Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela)[21]
and Comment, praying that “the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the impeachment proceedings
and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the
impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases, including the one where
the Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to the
provisions of Article XI of the Constitution.”[22]
Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this
Court resolved to (a) consolidate them with the earlier consolidated petitions;
(b) require respondents to file their comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of
November 3, 2003; and (c) include them for oral arguments on November 5, 2003.
On October 29, 2003, the
Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President Franklin M. Drilon, filed a
Manifestation stating that insofar as it is concerned, the petitions are
plainly premature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding that as of the
time of the filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before
it since (1) its constitutional duty to constitute itself as an impeachment
court commences only upon its receipt of the Articles of Impeachment, which it
had not, and (2) the principal issues raised by the petitions pertain exclusively
to the proceedings in the House of Representatives.
On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a “Petition for
Leave to Intervene” in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263,
160277, 160292, and 160295, questioning the status
quo Resolution issued by this Court on October 28, 2003 on the ground that
it would unnecessarily put Congress and this Court in a “constitutional
deadlock” and praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as the matter in
question is not yet ripe for judicial determination.
On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete
Quirino Quadra filed in G.R. No. 160262 a “Motion for Leave of Court to
Intervene and to Admit the Herein Incorporated Petition in Intervention.”
On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit
na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion for
Intervention in G.R. No. 160261. On November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans
Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. also filed a “Petition-in-Intervention
with Leave to Intervene” in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263,
160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310.
The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator
Pimentel’s Comment and Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra’s Petition in
Intervention were admitted.
On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and the arguments of
petitioners, intervenors Senator Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal, and
Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in an
Advisory issued by this Court on November 3, 2003, to wit:
Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be
invoked; who can invoke it; on what issues and at what time; and whether it
should be exercised by this Court at this time.
In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:
a) locus standi of petitioners;
b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);
c) political question/justiciability;
d) House’s “exclusive” power to initiate
all cases of impeachment;
e) Senate’s “sole” power to try and
decide all cases of impeachment;
f) constitutionality of the House Rules
on Impeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5)
of Article XI of the Constitution; and
g) judicial
restraint (Italics in the original)
In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive
issues arising from the instant petitions as well as the myriad arguments and
opinions presented for and against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this
Court has sifted and determined them to be as follows: (1) the threshold and
novel issue of whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those
arising from impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or not the essential
pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been
fulfilled; and (3) the substantive issues yet remaining. These matters shall now be discussed in seriatim.
Judicial Review
As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise
the power of judicial review to determine the validity of the second
impeachment complaint.
This Court’s power of judicial review is conferred on the
judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present
1987 Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government. (Emphasis supplied)
Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded
upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral Commission[23]
after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose provisions, unlike the
present Constitution, did not contain the present provision in Article VIII,
Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed:
x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the
great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not
entirely obliterated. In cases of
conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be
called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several
departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking
perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our
people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is
the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a
republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole,
under a system of checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and
restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in
no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers
and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be
inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to
direct the course of government along constitutional channels, for then the
distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere
expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political
apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in our
Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the
United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their
constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not
to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest
by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our
case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear
implication from section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who
is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution
itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational
way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries,
it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does
not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and
to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is
involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is
the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power
of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised
after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis
mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics
and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that,
courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments,
not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but
also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed
through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of
the government.[24]
(Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this “moderating power” to
“determine the proper allocation of powers” of the different branches of
government and “to direct the course of government along constitutional
channels” is inherent in all courts[25]
as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is “the
power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable.”[26]
Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial
review is not explicitly conferred upon the courts by its Constitution, such
power has “been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than
one and a half centuries.” To be sure,
it was in the 1803 leading case of Marbury
v. Madison[27]
that the power of judicial review was first articulated by Chief Justice
Marshall, to wit:
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring
what shall be the supreme law of the
land, the constitution itself is
first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those
only which shall be made in pursuance
of the constitution, have that rank.
Thus, the particular
phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and
strengthens the principle, supposed to
be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the
constitution is void; and that courts,
as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.[28]
(Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its
express grant in the 1935 Constitution, the power of judicial review was
exercised by our courts to invalidate constitutionally infirm acts.[29] And as pointed out by noted political law
professor and former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,[30]
the executive and legislative branches of our government in fact effectively
acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil Code, to
wit:
Article 7. Laws are
repealed only by subsequent ones, and their
violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or
practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a
law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the
latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive
acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to
the laws or the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
As indicated in Angara v.
Electoral Commission,[31]
judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of
checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of
powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that
its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it
serves.
The separation of powers is
a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department
of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction,
and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that
the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an
elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings
of the various departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power
to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void
if violative of the Constitution.[32]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice
Florentino Feliciano, “x x x judicial review is essential for the
maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of
powers among the three great departments of government through the
definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between
them.”[33] To him, “[j]udicial review is the chief,
indeed the only, medium of participation – or instrument of intervention – of
the judiciary in that balancing operation.”[34]
To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb
grave abuse of discretion by “any branch
or instrumentalities of government,” the afore-quoted Section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution engraves, for the first time into its history, into
block letter law the so-called “expanded certiorari
jurisdiction” of this Court, the nature of and rationale for which are mirrored
in the following excerpt from the sponsorship speech of its proponent, former
Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:
x x x
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former
Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of
the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of
our experience during martial law.
As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the
role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the
circumstance that in a number of cases against the government, which then had
no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political
questions and got away with it. As a
consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of
courts to order the release of political detainees, and other matters related
to the operation and effect of martial law failed because the government set up
the defense of political question. And
the Supreme Court said: “Well, since it
is political, we have no authority to pass upon it.” The Committee on the Judiciary feels that
this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely
request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect,
encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law regime. x x x
x x x
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power
of the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its
officers. In other words, the judiciary
is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or
any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a
duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means
that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this
nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.[35]
(Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant
petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which
employs the well-settled principles of constitutional construction.
First, verba legis,
that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.
Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v.
Land Tenure Administration,[36]
this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do
not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be
assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express
the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the
significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not
primarily a lawyer’s document, it being essential for the rule of law to
obtain that it should ever be present in the people’s consciousness, its
language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in
common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be
construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter
it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say.
Thus these are the cases where the need for construction is reduced to a
minimum.[37]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The
words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the
intent of its framers. And so did
this Court apply this principle in Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary[38]
in this wise:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the
intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held
that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object
sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be
prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of
the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under which the
Constitution was framed. The object is
to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the
Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be
accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the
words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.[39]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied supplied)
As it did in Nitafan v.
Commissioner on Internal Revenue[40]
where, speaking through Madame Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it
declared:
x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with
the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the
framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect.
The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter
assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the
adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were
guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.[41]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Finally, ut magis valeat
quam pereat. The Constitution is to
be interpreted as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon,[42]
this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:
x x x [T]he members of the
Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a provision of our
Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without considering that it
could also affect others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed,
that said provision should function to the full extent of its substance and its
terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other
provisions of that great document.[43]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, still in Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,[44]
this Court affirmed that:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction
that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others,
to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular
subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate
the great purposes of the instrument.
Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and
interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and
one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable
construction, the two can be made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and
must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative,
rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.[45]
(Emphasis supplied)
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be
clear, resort to other aids is available.
In still the same case of Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court expounded:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the
constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the
resulting Constitution, resort thereto
may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to
vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear.
Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the
views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes,
but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not
talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls
gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon
its face." The proper interpretation
therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than
in the framers’s understanding thereof.[46] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional
refinement and jurisprudential application of the power of judicial review that
respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel
raise the novel argument that the Constitution has excluded impeachment
proceedings from the coverage of judicial review.
Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De
Venecia et. al. that impeachment is a political action which cannot
assume a judicial character. Hence, any
question, issue or incident arising at any stage of the impeachment proceeding
is beyond the reach of judicial review.[47]
For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate’s
“sole power to try” impeachment cases[48]
(1) entirely excludes the application of judicial review over it; and (2)
necessarily includes the Senate’s power to determine constitutional questions
relative to impeachment proceedings.[49]
In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment
proceedings are outside the scope of judicial review, respondents Speaker De
Venecia, et. al. and intervenor
Senator Pimentel rely heavily on American authorities, principally the majority
opinion in the case of Nixon v. United
States.[50]
Thus, they contend that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment
proceedings is inappropriate since it runs counter to the framers’ decision to
allocate to different fora the powers to try impeachments and to try crimes; it
disturbs the system of checks and balances, under which impeachment is the only
legislative check on the judiciary; and it would create a lack of finality and
difficulty in fashioning relief.[51] Respondents likewise point to deliberations
on the US Constitution to show the intent to isolate judicial power of review
in cases of impeachment.
Respondents’ and intervenors’ reliance upon American
jurisprudence, the American Constitution and American authorities cannot
be credited to support the proposition that the Senate’s “sole power to try and
decide impeachment cases,” as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the
Constitution, is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of all
issues pertaining to impeachment to the legislature, to the total exclusion of
the power of judicial review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the
impeachment process. Nor can it
reasonably support the interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the
Senate the inherently judicial power to determine constitutional questions
incident to impeachment proceedings.
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the
American Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no longer
controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar
as Philippine constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC,[52]
“[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by
foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have been
dictated by different constitutional settings and needs.”[53]
Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of
the United States, their paths of development have long since diverged. In the colorful words of Father Bernas, “[w]e
have cut the umbilical cord.”
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine
Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of
judicial review is only impliedly granted
to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the
Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but
also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include
the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
government branch or instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution
and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of
Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution
bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without
limitation,[54]
our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive
power to initiate impeachment cases,[55]
provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in
Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of
filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of
one and the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of
impeachments undermines their finality and may also lead to conflicts between
Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they
call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that
“whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of the people
expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of judicial
willfulness and pride.”[56]
But did not the people also express their will when they
instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that
the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole
discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits,
or in the language of Baker v. Carr,[57]
“judicially discoverable standards” for determining the validity of the
exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.
The cases of Romulo
v. Yniguez[58]
and Alejandrino v. Quezon,[59]
cited by respondents in support of the argument that the impeachment power is
beyond the scope of judicial review, are not in point. These cases concern the denial of petitions
for writs of mandamus to compel the legislature to perform
non-ministerial acts, and do not concern the exercise of the power of judicial
review.
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised
the power of judicial review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,[60]
this Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court
to inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the
Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions
and prerogatives. In Tanada v. Angara,[61]
in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it
contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition raises a justiciable
controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but
in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,[62]
this Court declared null and void a resolution of the House of Representatives
withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a congressman as a
member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17,
Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng
v. Mitra,[63]
it held that the resolution of whether the House representation in the
Commission on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the
political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is
subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson,[64]
it held that the act of the House of Representatives in removing the petitioner
from the Commission on Appointments is subject to judicial review. In Tanada
v. Cuenco,[65]
it held that although under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested
exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to
pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral
Commission,[66]
it ruled that confirmation
by the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whether
his election is contested, is not essential before such member-elect may
discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National
Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention
that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset
the system of checks and balances.
Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and “one
section is not to be allowed to defeat another.”[67]
Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and
interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers
assigned to it by the Constitution.
Essential Requisites for Judicial Review
As clearly stated in Angara
v. Electoral Commission, the courts’ power of judicial review, like almost
all powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations,
namely: (1) an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person
challenging the act must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4)
the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
x x x Even then, this power of judicial
review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis
mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics
and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that,
courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments,
not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but
also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed
through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of
the government.[68]
(Italics in the original)
Standing
Locus standi or legal
standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of
the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of
standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.[69]
Intervenor Soriano, in
praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that petitioners do not have
standing since only the Chief Justice has sustained and will sustain direct
personal injury. Amicus curiae former
Justice Minister and Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza similarly contends.
Upon the other hand, the
Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing since this
Court had, in the past, accorded standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned
citizens, legislators in cases involving paramount public interest[70]
and transcendental importance,[71]
and that procedural matters are
subordinate to the need to determine whether or not the other branches of the
government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the
laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them.[72] Amicus
curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is of the same
opinion, citing transcendental importance and the well-entrenched rule
exception that, when the real party in interest is unable to vindicate his
rights by seeking the same remedies, as in the case of the Chief Justice who,
for ethical reasons, cannot himself invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the
courts will grant petitioners standing.
There is, however, a difference between the rule on
real-party-in-interest and the rule on standing, for the former is a concept of
civil procedure[73]
while the latter has constitutional underpinnings.[74]
In view of the arguments set forth regarding standing, it behooves the Court to
reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc.
v. Morato[75] to clarify what is meant by locus standi and to distinguish it from
real party-in-interest.
The difference between the rule on standing and real party in
interest has been noted by authorities thus: “It is important to note . . .
that standing because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is
very different from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the
real party in interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three requirements
are directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action,
standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as
broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain
areas.
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some
cases suits are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the
operation of a law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens,
taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Hence the question
in standing is whether such parties have “alleged such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.”
x x x
On the other hand, the question as to "real party in
interest" is whether he is “the party who would be benefited or injured by
the judgment, or the ‘party entitled to the avails of the suit.’”[76]
(Citations omitted)
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured
by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, none of
the petitioners before us asserts a violation of the personal rights of the
Chief Justice. On the contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of their
own rights – as taxpayers; members of Congress;
citizens, individually or in a class suit; and members of the bar and of
the legal profession – which were supposedly violated by the alleged
unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives.
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers
and legislators when specific requirements have been met have been given
standing by this Court.
When suing as a citizen,
the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute
must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or
any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not
merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the
person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to
which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some
burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.[77]
In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right,[78]
the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal
interest.
In the case of a taxpayer,
he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or
that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid
or unconstitutional law.[79]
Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he must
specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct
injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It
is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members
of the public.[80]
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or
not a taxpayer’s suit should be entertained.[81]
This Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their
allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of
Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve
the expenditure of public funds.
As for a legislator, he
is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he
claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator.[82]
Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain
inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in
his office.[83]
While an association has legal
personality to represent its members,[84]
especially when it is composed of substantial taxpayers and the outcome will
affect their vital interests,[85]
the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines or any member of
the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing
more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with standing.
Its interest is too general. It is
shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. However, a reading of the
petitions shows that it has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the
attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents.[86] It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax
the rules on standing and to resolve the issues presented by it.
In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons intervening
must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned[87]
to enable the court to deal properly with all interests involved in the suit,[88]
for a judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class,
is, under the res judicata principle,
binding on all members of the class whether or not they were before the court.[89]
Where it clearly appears that not all interests can be sufficiently represented
as shown by the divergent issues raised in the numerous petitions before this
Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail. Since petitioners additionally
allege standing as citizens and taxpayers, however, their petition will stand.
The Philippine Bar
Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole ground of transcendental
importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397, is mum on his
standing.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance,
the following instructive determinants formulated by former Supreme Court
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds
or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of
disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent
agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other
party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being
raised.[90]
Applying these determinants, this Court is satisfied that the issues raised
herein are indeed of transcendental importance.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal
attitude on the locus standi of a
petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental
significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of paramount
importance to the public.[91]
Such liberality does not, however, mean that the requirement that a party
should have an interest in the matter is totally eliminated. A party must, at the very least, still plead
the existence of such interest, it not being one of which courts can take
judicial notice. In petitioner Vallejos’ case, he failed to allege any interest
in the case. He does not thus have
standing.
With respect to the
motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of Court requires an
intervenor to possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or
in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of
property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. While intervention is not a matter of right,
it may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows facts which satisfy
the requirements of the law authorizing intervention.[92]
In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino
Quadra’s case, they seek to join petitioners Candelaria, et. al. in G.R.
No. 160262. Since, save for one additional issue, they raise the same issues
and the same standing, and no objection on the part of petitioners Candelaria, et.
al. has been interposed, this Court as earlier stated, granted the Motion
for Leave of Court to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino,
Inc., et. al. sought to join petitioner Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking their
right as citizens to intervene, alleging that “they will suffer if this
insidious scheme of the minority members of the House of Representatives is
successful,” this Court found the requisites for intervention had been complied
with.
Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310 were
of transcendental importance, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the
Philippines, Inc. filed a “Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene” to
raise the additional issue of whether or not the second impeachment complaint
against the Chief Justice is valid and based on any of the grounds prescribed
by the Constitution.
Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al.
and World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal interest in the
matter in litigation the respective motions to intervene were hereby granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene
for the limited purpose of making of record and arguing a point of view that
differs with Senate President Drilon’s. He alleges that submitting to this
Court’s jurisdiction as the Senate President does will undermine the
independence of the Senate which will sit as an impeachment court once the
Articles of Impeachment are transmitted to it from the House of
Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a legal interest in the matter in litigation, he being
a member of Congress against which the herein petitions are directed. For this
reason, and to fully ventilate all substantial issues relating to the matter at
hand, his Motion to Intervene was granted and he was, as earlier stated,
allowed to argue.
Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano’s motion to intervene, the same
must be denied for, while he asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to
meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer’s suits as set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec,[93]
to wit:
x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the
expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners
allege that their tax money is “being extracted and spent in violation of
specific constitutional protection against abuses of legislative power,” or
that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC, or that
public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners
seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement
of an invalid or unconstitutional law.[94]
(Citations omitted)
In praying for the dismissal of the
petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the act of petitioners will
result in illegal disbursement of public funds or in public money being
deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally, his mere interest as a member
of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him with standing.
Ripeness and
Prematurity
In Tan v. Macapagal,[95]
this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a case to be
considered ripe for adjudication, “it is a prerequisite that something had by
then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come
into the picture.”[96]
Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what was done, if and when the
latter is challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity
of the filing of the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice in
accordance with the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th
Congress, the constitutionality of which is questioned. The questioned acts
having been carried out, i.e., the
second impeachment complaint had been filed with the House of Representatives
and the 2001 Rules have already been already promulgated and enforced, the
prerequisite that the alleged unconstitutional act should be accomplished and
performed before suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been complied with.
Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the
instant petitions are premature. Amicus
curiae former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga opines that there may be
no urgent need for this Court to render a decision at this time, it being the
final arbiter on questions of constitutionality anyway. He thus recommends that all remedies in the
House and Senate should first be exhausted.
Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College
of Law who suggests to this Court to take judicial notice of on-going attempts
to encourage signatories to the second impeachment complaint to withdraw their
signatures and opines that the House Impeachment Rules provide for an
opportunity for members to raise constitutional questions themselves when the
Articles of Impeachment are presented on a motion to transmit to the same to
the Senate. The dean maintains that even
assuming that the Articles are transmitted to the Senate, the Chief Justice can
raise the issue of their constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to
dismiss.
The dean’s position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the Representatives
of their signatures would not, by itself, cure the House Impeachment Rules of
their constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a withdrawal, by itself,
obliterate the questioned second impeachment complaint since it would only
place it under the ambit of Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI of the
Constitution[97]
and, therefore, petitioners would continue to suffer their injuries.
Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies
from either or both Houses of Congress before coming to this Court is shown by
the fact that, as previously discussed, neither the House of Representatives nor
the Senate is clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness on the issue
of constitutionality, whether concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise,
as said power is exclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlier quoted
Section I, Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought from a
body which is bereft of power to grant it.
Justiciability
In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,[98]
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion defined the term “political question,” viz:
[T]he term “political question” connotes, in legal parlance, what
it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in
the language of Corpus Juris Secundum,
it refers to “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive
branch of the Government.” It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.[99]
(Italics in the original)
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly
without any rhyme or reason, this Court vacillated on its stance of taking
cognizance of cases which involved political questions. In some cases, this Court hid behind the
cover of the political question doctrine and refused to exercise its power of
judicial review.[100]
In other cases, however, despite the seeming political nature of the therein
issues involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction whenever it found constitutionally
imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.[101]
Even in the landmark 1988 case of Javellana v. Executive Secretary[102]
which raised the issue of whether the 1973 Constitution was ratified, hence, in
force, this Court shunted the political question doctrine and took cognizance
thereof. Ratification by the people of a
Constitution is a political question, it being a question decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity.
The frequency with which this Court invoked the political
question doctrine to refuse to take jurisdiction over certain cases during the
Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a
Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify this Court’s power of judicial review
and its application on issues involving
political questions, viz:
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you,
Mr. Presiding Officer.
I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I
suppose, the usual comment that the judiciary is the weakest among the three
major branches of the service. Since the
legislature holds the purse and the executive the sword, the judiciary has
nothing with which to enforce its decisions or commands except the power of
reason and appeal to conscience which, after all, reflects the will of God, and
is the most powerful of all other powers without exception. x x x And so, with the body’s indulgence, I
will proceed to read the provisions drafted by the Committee on the Judiciary.
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former
Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or
instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of
our experience during martial law. As a
matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the
judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance
that in a number of cases against the government, which then had no legal
defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political questions
and got away with it. As a consequence,
certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the
release of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and
effect of martial law failed because the government set up the defense of
political question. And the Supreme
Court said: “Well, since it is
political, we have no authority to pass upon it.” The Committee on the Judiciary feels that
this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely
request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect,
encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law regime. I am sure the members of the Bar are familiar
with this situation. But for the benefit
of the Members of the Commission who are not lawyers, allow me to explain. I will start with a decision of the Supreme
Court in 1973 on the case of Javellana
vs. the Secretary of Justice, if I am not mistaken. Martial law was announced on September 22,
although the proclamation was dated September 21. The obvious reason for the delay in its
publication was that the administration had apprehended and detained prominent
newsmen on September 21. So that when
martial law was announced on September 22, the media hardly published anything
about it. In fact, the media could not
publish any story not only because our main writers were already incarcerated,
but also because those who succeeded them in their jobs were under mortal
threat of being the object of wrath of the ruling party. The 1971 Constitutional Convention had begun
on June 1, 1971 and by September 21 or 22 had not finished the Constitution; it
had barely agreed in the fundamentals of the Constitution. I forgot to say that upon the proclamation of
martial law, some delegates to that 1971 Constitutional Convention, dozens of
them, were picked up. One of them was
our very own colleague, Commissioner Calderon.
So, the unfinished draft of the Constitution was taken over by
representatives of Malacañang. In 17
days, they finished what the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention
had been unable to accomplish for about 14 months. The draft of the 1973 Constitution was
presented to the President around December 1, 1972, whereupon the President issued
a decree calling a plebiscite which suspended the operation of some provisions
in the martial law decree which prohibited discussions, much less public
discussions of certain matters of public concern. The purpose was presumably to allow a free
discussion on the draft of the Constitution on which a plebiscite was to be
held sometime in January 1973. If I may
use a word famous by our colleague, Commissioner Ople, during the interregnum,
however, the draft of the Constitution was analyzed and criticized with such a
telling effect that Malacañang felt the danger of its approval. So, the President suspended indefinitely the
holding of the plebiscite and announced that he would consult the people in a
referendum to be held from January 10 to January 15. But the questions to be submitted in the
referendum were not announced until the eve of its scheduled beginning, under
the supposed supervision not of the Commission on Elections, but of what was
then designated as “citizens assemblies or barangays.” Thus the barangays came into existence. The questions to be propounded were released
with proposed answers thereto, suggesting that it was unnecessary to hold a
plebiscite because the answers given in the referendum should be regarded as
the votes cast in the plebiscite.
Thereupon, a motion was filed with the Supreme Court praying that the
holding of the referendum be suspended.
When the motion was being heard before the Supreme Court, the Minister
of Justice delivered to the Court a proclamation of the President declaring
that the new Constitution was already in force because the overwhelming
majority of the votes cast in the referendum favored the Constitution. Immediately after the departure of the
Minister of Justice, I proceeded to the session room where the case was being
heard. I then informed the Court and the
parties the presidential proclamation declaring that the 1973 Constitution had
been ratified by the people and is now in force.
A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential
proclamation null and void. The main defense
put up by the government was that the issue was a political question and that
the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.
x x x
The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to
January 15, the vast majority ratified the draft of the Constitution. Note that all members of the Supreme Court
were residents of Manila, but none of them had been notified of any referendum
in their respective places of residence, much less did they participate in the
alleged referendum. None of them saw any
referendum proceeding.
In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a majority of the members of the Court
felt that there had been no referendum.
Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a big difference between a
referendum and a plebiscite. But
another group of justices upheld the defense that the issue was a political
question. Whereupon, they dismissed the
case. This is not the only major case in
which the plea of “political question” was set up. There have been a number of other cases in
the past.
x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because
the issue was clearly justiciable.
x x x
x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its
functions, it faced the following questions:
What is judicial power? What is a
political question?
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main
function: to settle actual controversies
involving conflicts of rights which are demandable and enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed by law
but cannot be enforced by a judiciary party.
In a decided case, a husband complained that his wife was unwilling to
perform her duties as a wife. The Court
said: “We can tell your wife what her
duties as such are and that she is bound to comply with them, but we cannot
force her physically to discharge her main marital duty to her husband. There are some rights guaranteed by law, but
they are so personal that to enforce them by actual compulsion would be highly
derogatory to human dignity.”
This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I
provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable or enforceable . .
.
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide,
hypothetical questions. In a
presidential system of government, the Supreme Court has, also another
important function. The powers of
government are generally considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the
Judiciary. Each one is supreme within
its own sphere and independent of the others.
Because of that supremacy power to determine whether a given law is
valid or not is vested in courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power
of the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its
officers. In other words, the judiciary
is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or
any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty
to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means
that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this
nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.
I have made these extended remarks to the end that the
Commissioners may have an initial food for thought on the subject of the
judiciary.[103] (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief
Justice Concepcion further clarified the concept of judicial power, thus:
MR. NOLLEDO. The
Gentleman used the term “judicial power” but judicial power is not vested in
the Supreme Court alone but also in other lower courts as may be created by
law.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is
this only an example?
MR. CONCEPCION. No, I
know this is not. The Gentleman seems to
identify political questions with jurisdictional questions. But there is a difference.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because of
the expression “judicial power”?
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary
cases but where there is a question as to whether the government had authority
or had abused its authority to the extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess of
jurisdiction, that is not a political question.
Therefore, the court has the duty to decide.
x x x
FR. BERNAS. Ultimately,
therefore, it will always have to be decided by the Supreme Court according to
the new numerical need for votes.
On another point, is it the
intention of Section 1 to do away with the political question doctrine?
MR. CONCEPCION. No.
FR. BERNAS. It is not.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of
discretion, amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. . .
FR. BERNAS. So, I am
satisfied with the answer that it is not intended to do away with the political
question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. No,
certainly not.
When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define
what is judicial power. But the
Gentleman will notice it says, “judicial power includes” and the reason being
that the definition that we might make may not cover all possible areas.
FR. BERNAS. So, this is
not an attempt to solve the problems arising from the political question
doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. It
definitely does not eliminate the fact that truly political questions are
beyond the pale of judicial power.[104] (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power;
it is also a duty, a duty which
cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political
question doctrine. Chief Justice
Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not
intended to do away with “truly political questions.” From this clarification it is gathered that
there are two species of political questions:
(1) “truly political questions” and (2) those which “are not truly
political questions.”
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the
reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be
maintained. On the other hand, by virtue
of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions
which are not truly political in nature.
As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of
the UP College of Law, this Court has in fact in a number of cases taken
jurisdiction over questions which are not truly political following the
effectivity of the present Constitution.
In Marcos v. Manglapus,[105]
this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene Cortes, held:
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question
doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court,
under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political
departments to decide.[106]
x x x
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,[107]
through Justice Teodoro Padilla, this Court
declared:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that
this Court must perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent
case, “(t)he political question doctrine
neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims.
The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this
Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987
Constitution, although said provision by no means does away with the
applicability of the principle in appropriate cases.”[108] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
And in Daza v. Singson,[109]
speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes
even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to
assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would
still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper
cases, even the political question.[110]
x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are
justiciable political questions and non-justiciable political questions,
however. Identification of these two
species of political questions may be problematic. There has been no clear standard. The American case of Baker v. Carr[111]
attempts to provide some:
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a
political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack
of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
questioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality
of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.[112]
(Underscoring supplied)
Of these standards, the more reliable
have been the first three: (1) a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial
discretion. These standards are not
separate and distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in that the
presence of one strengthens the conclusion that the others are also
present.
The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the
American concept of judicial review is radically different from our current
concept, for Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides our courts
with far less discretion in determining whether they should pass upon a
constitutional issue.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political
question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to the
question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies.
If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the
branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such
limits. This Court shall thus now apply
this standard to the present controversy.
These petitions raise five substantial issues:
I. Whether the offenses
alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable
offenses under the Constitution.
II. Whether the second
impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI of
the Constitution.
III. Whether the legislative
inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial Development Fund is
an unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally mandated fiscal
autonomy of the judiciary.
IV. Whether Sections 15 and
16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th
Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3,
Article XI of the Constitution.
V. Whether the second
impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment
complaint over which this Court has no jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this
issue would require this Court to make a determination of what constitutes an
impeachable offense. Such a
determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to
the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.[113]
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates
six grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and
betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the
1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the framers could find no better way
to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes
than by alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without
arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard therefor.[114] Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to
decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its
judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII.
Lis Mota
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue
assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act should be avoided
whenever possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission on Elections,[115]
this Court held:
x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass
upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or
invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is
raised, if the record also presents some
other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be
adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until
a case arises in which a decision upon such question will be unavoidable.[116]
[Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,[117]
where this Court invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No. 6657 for
being confiscatory and violative of due process, to wit:
It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction
over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential
requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or
controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial
determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by
the proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably
necessary to the decision of the case itself.[118]
[Emphasis supplied]
Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of
constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all
seeking the invalidity of the second impeachment complaint, collectively raise
several constitutional issues upon which the outcome of this controversy could
possibly be made to rest. In determining
whether one, some or all of the remaining substantial issues should be passed
upon, this Court is guided by the related cannon of adjudication that “the
court should not form a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by
the precise facts to which it is applied.”[119]
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among other reasons,
the second impeachment complaint is invalid since it directly resulted from a
Resolution[120]
calling for a legislative inquiry into the JDF, which Resolution and
legislative inquiry petitioners claim to likewise be unconstitutional for being: (a) a
violation of the rules and jurisprudence on investigations in aid of
legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of separation of powers;
(c) a violation of the constitutionally
mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an assault on the
independence of the judiciary.[121]
Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.’s claims, it is the studied
opinion of this Court that the issue of the constitutionality of the said
Resolution and resulting legislative inquiry is too far removed from the issue
of the validity of the second impeachment complaint. Moreover, the resolution
of said issue would, in the Court’s opinion, require it to form a rule of
constitutional law touching on the separate and distinct matter of legislative
inquiries in general, which would thus be broader than is required by the facts
of these consolidated cases. This
opinion is further strengthened by the fact that said petitioners have raised
other grounds in support of their petition which would not be adversely
affected by the Court’s ruling.
En passant, this Court
notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative inquiries has already been
enunciated by this Court in Bengzon, Jr.
v. Senate Blue Ribbon Commttee,[122]
viz:
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses
of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof
provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its
duly published rules of procedure. The
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is not, therefore absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the
afore-quoted provision of the Constitution.
Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be “in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure” and that
“the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.” It follows then that the
right rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including
the right to due process and the right not be compelled to testify against
one’s self.[123]
In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete
Quirino Quadra, while joining the original petition of petitioners Candelaria, et. al., introduce the new argument that
since the second impeachment complaint was verified and filed only by
Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella, the same
does not fall under the provisions of Section 3 (4), Article XI of the
Constitution which reads:
Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the
same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate
shall forthwith proceed.
They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of
Representatives signed a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did
not satisfy the requisites for the application of the afore-mentioned section
in that the “verified complaint or resolution of impeachment” was not filed
“by at least one-third of all the Members of the House.” With the exception of Representatives Teodoro
and Fuentebella, the signatories to said Resolution are alleged to have
verified the same merely as a “Resolution of Endorsement.” Intervenors point to
the “Verification” of the Resolution of Endorsement which states that:
“We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of
the abovementioned Complaint of Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix
William B. Fuentebella x x x”[124]
Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the
Constitution requires in order for said second impeachment complaint to
automatically become the Articles of Impeachment and for trial in the Senate to
begin “forthwith,” is that the verified complaint be “filed,” not
merely endorsed, by at least one-third of the Members of the House of
Representatives. Not having complied
with this requirement, they concede that the second impeachment complaint
should have been calendared and referred to the House Committee on Justice
under Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution, viz:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by
any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution
of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of
Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within
three session days thereafter. The
Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall
submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral,
together with the corresponding resolution.
The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within
ten session days from receipt thereof.
Intervenors’ foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who
opined that for Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution to apply, there
should be 76 or more representatives who signed and verified the second
impeachment complaint as complainants,
signed and verified the signatories to a resolution of impeachment. Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the
Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of the
members of the House of Representatives as endorsers is not the
resolution of impeachment contemplated by the Constitution, such resolution of
endorsement being necessary only from at least one Member whenever a citizen
files a verified impeachment complaint.
While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal
and Quadra, does indeed limit the scope of the constitutional issues to the
provisions on impeachment, more compelling considerations militate against its
adoption as the lis mota or crux of the present controversy. Chief among this is the fact that only
Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No. 160262, have raised
this issue as a ground for invalidating the second impeachment complaint. Thus, to adopt this additional ground as the
basis for deciding the instant consolidated petitions would not only render for
naught the efforts of the original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but the
efforts presented by the other petitioners as well.
Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as
unnecessary for the determination of the instant cases is made easier by the
fact that said intervenors Macalintal and Quadra have joined in the petition of
Candelaria, et. al., adopting the
latter’s arguments and issues as their own.
Consequently, they are not unduly prejudiced by this Court’s decision.
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues,
inextricably linked as they are, constitute the very lis mota of the instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16
of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th
Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3,
Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the
second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.
Judicial Restraint
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint
on the ground that the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole
power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Again, this Court reiterates that the power
of judicial review includes the power of review over justiciable issues in
impeachment proceedings.
On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that “[t]here is a moral
compulsion for the Court to not assume jurisdiction over the impeachment
because all the Members thereof are subject to impeachment.”[125]
But this argument is very much like saying the Legislature has a moral
compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses because Members of the House
of Representatives are subject to them.
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not
an option before this Court.
Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is not legally
disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be
renounced as there is no other tribunal to which the controversy may be
referred.”[126]
Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII,
Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than
being clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take cognizance
of the instant petitions.[127]
In the august words of amicus curiae Father
Bernas, “jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not be
renounced. To renounce it, even if it is
vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty.”
Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under
our system of government cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge
because no other office has the authority to do so.[128]
On the occasion that this Court had been an interested party to the controversy
before it, it has acted upon the matter “not with officiousness but in the
discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and fairness.”[129]
After all, “by [his] appointment to the office, the public has laid on [a
member of the judiciary] their confidence that [he] is mentally and morally fit
to pass upon the merits of their varied contentions. For this reason, they expect [him] to be
fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to displease any
person, interest or power and to be equipped with a moral fiber strong enough
to resist the temptations lurking in [his] office.”[130]
The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of
interest had already been settled in the case of Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal.[131]
In that case, the petitioners filed with the respondent Senate Electoral
Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members
thereof from the hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground
that all of them were interested parties to said case as respondents
therein. This would have reduced the
Tribunal’s membership to only its three Justices-Members whose disqualification
was not sought, leaving them to decide the matter. This Court held:
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the
substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other
colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same objections to the
substitute’s competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and
ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no
other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if
shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration — that the
Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty which it alone has the power
to perform, the performance of which is in the highest public interest as
evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that
the framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility
of an election contest that would involve all Senators—elect, six of whom would
inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might
surface again in the wake of the 1992 elections when once more, but for the
last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the Constitution
provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations or for the
substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may
be sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust and hopes
of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the
Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and collectively.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in
judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain
from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that
his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and
impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the light of the
Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such,
absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can
confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a
senatorial election contest.
More recently in the case of Estrada
v. Desierto,[132] it was held that:
Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court,
particularly a majority of them, is nothing short of pro tanto depriving
the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law.
Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. And if that
judge is the one designated by the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of
his court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court, the deprivation of
his or their judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial
power of the court itself. It affects the very heart of judicial independence.
The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the
Court no alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge
if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Justices.[133]
(Italics in the original)
Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the
Court when it exercises its power of judicial review.
In Demetria v. Alba,[134]
this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the “seven pillars” of
limitations of the power of judicial review, enunciated by US Supreme Court
Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA[135]
as follows:
1. The Court will not pass
upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-adversary
proceeding, declining because to decide such questions ‘is legitimate only in
the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and
vital controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that, by means
of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the
courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act.’
2. The Court will not
‘anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of
deciding it.’ . . . ‘It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a
constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.’
3. The Court will not ‘formulate
a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to
which it is to be applied.’
4. The Court will not
pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record,
if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed
of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided
on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a
question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only
the latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state challenging its decision
of a question under the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed because
the judgment can be sustained on an independent state ground.
5. The Court will not
pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show
that he is injured by its operation. Among the many applications of this rule,
none is more striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one who
lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official
interested only in the performance of his official duty will not be entertained
. . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the
Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to have
the Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge of the federal Maternity Act
was not entertained although made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its
citizens.
6. The Court will not
pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has
availed himself of its benefits.
7. When the validity of
an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of
constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will
first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by
which the question may be avoided (citations omitted).
The foregoing “pillars” of limitation of judicial review,
summarized in Ashwander v. TVA from different decisions of the United
States Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following categories:
1. that there be absolute
necessity of deciding a case
2. that rules of
constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts of the
case
3. that judgment may not be
sustained on some other ground
4. that there be actual
injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the statute
5. that the parties are not
in estoppel
6. that the Court upholds
the presumption of constitutionality.
As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by
this Court in the exercise of judicial review:
1. actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power
2. the person challenging
the act must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement
3. the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity
4. the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.[136]
Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial restraint the
possibility that “judicial review of impeachments might also lead to
embarrassing conflicts between the Congress and the [J]udiciary.” They stress the need to avoid the appearance
of impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial hearings, and the scenario
that it would be confusing and humiliating and risk serious political
instability at home and abroad if the judiciary countermanded the vote of
Congress to remove an impeachable official.[137]
Intervenor Soriano echoes this argument by alleging that failure of this Court
to enforce its Resolution against Congress would result in the diminution of
its judicial authority and erode public confidence and faith in the judiciary.
Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated by the Solicitor General,
the possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason
for this Court to refrain from upholding the Constitution in all impeachment
cases. Justices cannot abandon their
constitutional duties just because their action may start, if not precipitate,
a crisis.
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court
refuses to act.
x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or
executive act is not regarded as settled until the Supreme Court has passed
upon the constitutionality of the act involved, the judgment has not only
juridical effects but also political consequences. Those political consequences may follow even
where the Court fails to grant the petitioner’s prayer to nullify an act for
lack of the necessary number of votes.
Frequently, failure to act explicitly, one way or the other, itself
constitutes a decision for the respondent and validation, or at least
quasi-validation, follows.” [138]
Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary[139]
where this Court was split and “in the end there were not enough votes either
to grant the petitions, or to sustain respondent’s claims,”[140]
the pre-existing constitutional order was disrupted which paved the way for the
establishment of the martial law regime.
Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that
the coordinate branches of the government would behave in a lawless manner and
not do their duty under the law to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of
the land. Yet there is no reason to
believe that any of the branches of government will behave in a precipitate
manner and risk social upheaval, violence, chaos and anarchy by encouraging
disrespect for the fundamental law of the land.
Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is
well guided by the doctrine in People v. Veneracion, to wit:[141]
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of
justice. If [public officers], under the
guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted
beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise the duties
of their office, then law becomes meaningless.
A government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad
discretionary powers by those acting under its authority. Under this system, [public officers] are
guided by the Rule of Law, and ought “to protect and enforce it without fear or
favor,” resist encroachments by governments, political parties, or even the
interference of their own personal beliefs.[142]
Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure
for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted
by the 12th Congress
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia,
argues that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not
violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present Constitution, contending
that the term “initiate” does not mean “to file;” that Section 3 (1) is clear
in that it is the House of Representatives, as a collective body, which has the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment; that initiate could not possibly mean “to
file” because filing can, as Section 3
(2), Article XI of the Constitution provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways,
to wit: (1) by a
verified complaint for impeachment by any member of the House of
Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House. Respondent House of Representatives concludes
that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings
against the same officials could not have been violated as the impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not
been initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as the collective
body, has yet to act on it.
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of
the term “initiate.” Resort to statutory
construction is, therefore, in order.
That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the
Constitution, Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who eventually became an Associate
Justice of this Court, agreed on the meaning of “initiate” as “to file,” as
proffered and explained by Constitutional Commissioner Maambong during the
Constitutional Commission proceedings, which he (Commissioner Regalado) as amicus curiae affirmed during the oral
arguments on the instant petitions held on November 5, 2003 at which he added
that the act of “initiating” included the act of taking initial action on the
complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word “initiate” as it twice
appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means to file the
complaint and take initial action on it.
“Initiate” of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as
dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set going. As Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it means
“to perform or facilitate the first action,” which
jibes with Justice Regalado’s position, and that of Father Bernas, who
elucidated during the oral arguments of the instant petitions on November 5,
2003 in this wise:
Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a comlexus of acts consisting of a
beginning, a middle and an end. The end
is the transmittal of the articles of impeachment to the Senate. The middle consists of those deliberative
moments leading to the formulation of the articles of impeachment. The beginning or the initiation is the filing
of the complaint and its referral to the Committee on Justice.
Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by
Representatives Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that impeachment is “deemed
initiated” when the Justice Committee votes in favor of impeachment or when the
House reverses a contrary vote of the Committee. Note that the Rule does not say “impeachment
proceedings” are initiated but rather are “deemed initiated.” The
language is recognition that initiation happened earlier, but by legal fiction
there is an attempt to postpone it to a time after actual initiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As stated earlier, one of
the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into the intent of
the law. Fortunately, the intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution can be pried from its records:
MR. MAAMBONG. With reference
to Section 3, regarding the procedure and the substantive provisions on
impeachment, I understand there have been many proposals and, I think, these
would need some time for Committee action.
However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the
Committee a resolution on impeachment proceedings, copies of which have been
furnished the Members of this body. This
is borne out of my experience as a member of the Committee on Justice, Human
Rights and Good Government which took charge of the last impeachment resolution
filed before the First Batasang Pambansa.
For the information of the Committee, the resolution covers several
steps in the impeachment proceedings starting with initiation, action of
the Speaker committee action, calendaring of report, voting on the report,
transmittal referral to the Senate, trial and judgment by the Senate.
x x x
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding
Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the approval of the amendment
submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking
that we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of Impeachment on the
floor. The procedure, as I
have pointed out earlier, was that the initiation starts with the filing
of the complaint. And what is
actually done on the floor is that the committee resolution containing the
Articles of Impeachment is the one approved by the body.
As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the
Committee on Style, it appears that the initiation starts on the floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples
in the case of the impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein
the Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the resolution,
and the Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was the body who approved
the resolution. It is not the body
which initiates it. It only approves or
disapproves the resolution. So,
on that score, probably the Committee on Style could help in rearranging these
words because we have to be very technical about this. I have been bringing with me The Rules of the House of Representatives
of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules
are with me. The proceedings on the case
of Richard Nixon are with me. I have
submitted my proposal, but the Committee has already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on
record.
x x x
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just
like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at all affect the
substance, but it is only in keeping with the exact formulation of the Rules of
the House of Representatives of the United States regarding impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of
this provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we
delete the words which read: “to initiate impeachment proceedings”
and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word “resolution” the phrase
WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter “i” in “impeachment” and
replace the word “by” with OF, so that the whole section will now read: “A vote of at least one-third of all the
Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a resolution WITH THE
ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the Committee or to override its contrary
resolution. The vote of each Member
shall be recorded.”
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation,
as far as the House of Representatives of the United States is concerned, really
starts from the filing of the verified complaint and every resolution
to impeach always carries with it the Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words “Articles of
Impeachment” are mentioned on line 25 in the case of the direct filing of a
verified compliant of one-third of all the Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam President, that
my amendment will not vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform
procedure of the House of Representatives of the United States Congress. Thank you, Madam President.[143]
(Italics in the original; emphasis and udnerscoring supplied)
This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified
and accepted by the Committee on the Accountability of Public Officers.[144]
It is thus clear that the framers intended “initiation” to start
with the filing of the complaint. In his
amicus curiae brief, Commissioner Maambong explained that “the obvious
reason in deleting the phrase “to initiate impeachment proceedings” as
contained in the text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and
make it understood once and for all that the initiation of impeachment
proceedings starts with the filing of the complaint, and the vote of
one-third of the House in a resolution of impeachment does not initiate
the impeachment proceedings which was already initiated by the filing of a
verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the
Constitution.”[145]
Amicus curiae
Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is Father Bernas,
who was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the word
“initiate” as used in Article XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both adding,
however, that the filing must be accompanied by an action to set the complaint
moving.
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas
clarified that the word “initiate,” appearing in the constitutional provision
on impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
x x x
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against
the same official more than once within a period of one year, (Emphasis supplied)
refers to two objects, “impeachment case”
and “impeachment proceeding.”
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common
verb is “to initiate.” The object in the
first sentence is “impeachment case.”
The object in the second sentence is “impeachment proceeding.” Following the principle of reddendo
singuala sinuilis, the term “cases” must be distinguished from the term
“proceedings.” An impeachment case is
the legal controversy that must be decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that the
House, by a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the
Senate. It is in that sense that the
House has “exclusive power” to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a decision is made to
initiate a case in the Senate, a “proceeding” must be followed to arrive at a
conclusion. A proceeding must be
“initiated.” To initiate, which comes
from the Latin word initium, means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a
progressive noun. It has a beginning, a
middle, and an end. It takes place not
in the Senate but in the House and consists of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified
complaint either by a Member of the House of Representatives or by a private
citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the Representatives; (2)
there is the processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which
may either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the
Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to
the House for further processing; and
(4) there is the processing of the same complaint by the House of
Representatives which either affirms a
favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a
vote of one-third of all the members. If
at least one third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of
Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the House “initiates
an impeachment case.” It
is at this point that an impeachable public official is successfully
impeached. That is, he or she is
successfully charged with an impeachment “case” before the Senate as
impeachment court.
Father Bernas further explains: The “impeachment proceeding” is not
initiated when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because
that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of another
proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is
the “impeachment proceeding” initiated when the House deliberates on the
resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that
has already been done. The action of the
House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or
beginning. Rather, the proceeding is
initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the
Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the
series of steps that follow.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its
ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal
reached the floor proposing that “A vote of at least one-third of all the
Members of the House shall be necessary… to initiate impeachment proceedings,”
this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of
the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a
complaint does.[146]
Thus the line was deleted and is not found in the present Constitution.
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, “No
impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year,” it means that no second verified complaint
may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. By his explanation, this interpretation is
founded on the common understanding of the meaning of “to initiate” which means
to begin. He reminds that the Constitution is ratified by the people, both
ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand it; and that ordinary people
read ordinary meaning into ordinary words and not abstruse meaning, they ratify
words as they understand it and not as sophisticated lawyers confuse it.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body
can initiate impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says “The House of
Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment,” This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the
principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating “impeachment cases”
with “impeachment proceeding.”
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus
curiae briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a
doubt that the term “to initiate” refers to the filing of the impeachment
complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of
filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House
Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of
the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period.
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment
Rules, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there
is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint
and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself
affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified
complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing
or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of
a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the
members of the House. These rules
clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the term
“initiate” a meaning different meaning from filing and referral.
In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits
that this Court could not use contemporaneous construction as an aid in the
interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of Article XI, citing Vera v. Avelino[147]
wherein this Court stated that “their personal opinions (referring to Justices
who were delegates to the Constitution Convention) on the matter at issue
expressed during this Court’s our deliberations stand on a different footing
from the properly recorded utterances of debates and proceedings.” Further citing said case, he states that this
Court likened the former members of the Constitutional Convention to actors who
are so absorbed in their emotional roles that intelligent spectators may know
more about the real meaning because of the latter’s balanced perspectives and
disinterestedness. [148]
Justice Gutierrez’s statements have no application in the present
petitions. There are at present only two
members of this Court who participated in the 1986 Constitutional Commission –
Chief Justice Davide and Justice Adolf Azcuna.
Chief Justice Davide has not taken part in these proceedings for obvious
reasons. Moreover, this Court has not
simply relied on the personal opinions now given by members of the
Constitutional Commission, but has examined the records of the deliberations
and proceedings thereof.
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3
(8) of Article XI, it is clear and unequivocal that it and only it has the
power to make and interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its argument is premised on the assumption
that Congress has absolute power to promulgate its rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced.
Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall
promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of
this section.” Clearly, its power to
promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase “to effectively
carry out the purpose of this section.”
Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the
Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly
provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules, viz:
Section 3. (1) x x x
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member
of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of
Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within
three session days thereafter. The Committee,
after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with
the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least
one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to either affirm a favorable resolution with
the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution.
The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified
complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all
the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of
Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within
a period of one year.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution
which is the fundamental law. If as alleged
Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary
implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution
without need of referendum.
In Osmeña v. Pendatun,[149]
this Court held that it is within the province of either House of Congress to
interpret its rules and that it was the best judge of what constituted
“disorderly behavior” of its members.
However, in Paceta v. Secretary of the Commission on Appointments,[150]
Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking for this Court and
quoting Justice Brandeis in United States
v. Smith,[151]
declared that where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons
other than members of the Legislature, the question becomes judicial in
nature. In Arroyo v. De Venecia,[152]
quoting United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,[153]
Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held that while the
Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings, it
may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental
rights, and further that there should be a reasonable relation between the mode
or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought
to be attained. It is only within
these limitations that all matters of method are open to the determination of
the Legislature. In the same case of Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice Reynato S.
Puno, in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, was even more emphatic as he
stressed that in the Philippine setting there is even more reason for courts to
inquire into the validity of the Rules of Congress, viz:
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the
petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I
agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of power if we assume
jurisdiction over he case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of
separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the
interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure
by legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as a window to view the issues before the
Court. It is in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined the boundaries of
the power of the judiciary to review congressional rules. It held:
“x x x
“The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house
may determine the rules of its proceedings.”
It appears that in pursuance of this authority the House had, prior to
that day, passed this as one of its rules:
Rule XV
3. On the demand of any
member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the names of members sufficient to
make a quorum in the hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted by the
clerk and recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker with the names
of the members voting, and be counted and announced in determining the presence
of a quorum to do business. (House
Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question, therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and not what
methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for determining the
presence of a quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or clerk may of their own
volition place upon the journal. Neither do the advantages or disadvantages,
the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any matters for judicial
consideration. With the courts the question is only one of power. The Constitution empowers each house to
determine its rules of proceedings. It
may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental
rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of
proceedings established by the rule and the result which is sought to be
attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House,
and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be
better, more accurate, or even more just.
It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has
been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one which once
exercised is exhausted. It is a
continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the
limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or
tribunal.”
Ballin, clearly
confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of congressional
rules, i.e, whether they are constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was
found to satisfy the test: (1) that it
did not ignore any constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any
fundamental right; and (3) its method had a reasonable relationship with the result
sought to be attained. By examining
Rule XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere
invocation of the principle of separation of powers.[154]
x x x
In the Philippine setting,
there is a more compelling reason for
courts to categorically reject the political question defense when its
interposition will cover up abuse of power.
For section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower courts “x x x to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.” This power is new and
was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US
Constitution or any foreign state constitution.
The CONCOM granted this enormous power to our courts in view of our
experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state power were
shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political question
doctrine. Led by the eminent former
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the
checking powers of the judiciary vis-à-vis the Executive and the Legislative
departments of government.[155]
x x x
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not a
mere power which it can decline to exercise.
Precisely to deter this disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a
duty of this Court to strike down any act of a branch or instrumentality of government
or any of its officials done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.
Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has elongated the checking powers
of this Court against the other branches of government despite their more
democratic character, the President and the legislators being elected by the
people.[156]
x x x
The provision defining judicial power as including the ‘duty of the
courts of justice. . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government’ constitutes the capstone of the
efforts of the Constitutional Commission to upgrade the powers of this court
vis-à-vis the other branches of government.
This provision was dictated by our experience under martial law which
taught us that a stronger and more independent judiciary is needed to abort
abuses in government. x x x
x x x
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts
of government committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new Constitution
transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This transformation, dictated by our distinct
experience as nation, is not merely evolutionary but revolutionary. Under the
1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional
violations by initially determining what it cannot do; under the 1987
Constitution, there is a shift in stress – this Court is mandated to approach
constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not do but what it must
do. The Court must discharge
this solemn duty by not resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious
consideration to this new constitutional provision as the case at bar once more
calls us to define the parameters of our power to review violations of the
rules of the House. We will not be
true to our trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if we refuse to
exercise this new power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding timidity to
unsheathe the judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened other branches of
government to denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino,
I endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga that this novel provision
stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its
interpretation should not be depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable
foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the
case at bar, the lessons of our own history should provide us the light and not
the experience of foreigners.[157] (Italics in the original emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Thus, the ruling in Osmena
v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant petitions. Here, the third parties alleging the
violation of private rights and the Constitution are involved.
Neither may respondent House of Representatives’ rely on Nixon
v. US[158]
as basis for arguing that this Court may not decide on the constitutionality of
Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules. As already observed, the U.S. Federal
Constitution simply provides that “the House of Representatives shall have the
sole power of impeachment.” It adds
nothing more. It gives no clue
whatsoever as to how this “sole power” is to be exercised. No limitation whatsoever is given. Thus, the
US Supreme Court concluded that there was a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of a constitutional power to the House of
Representatives. This reasoning does not
hold with regard to impeachment power of the Philippine House of
Representatives since our Constitution, as earlier enumerated, furnishes
several provisions articulating how that “exclusive power” is to be exercised.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules which state that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated
(1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified
complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House
itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the
verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by
the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at
least 1/3 of the members of the House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of
Article XI as they give the term “initiate” a meaning different from “filing.”
Validity of the
Second Impeachment Complaint
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of
filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on
Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of
Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may
not be filed against the same official within a one year period following
Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was
filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred
to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment
complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the
constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings
against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
Conclusion
If there is anything constant about this country, it is that
there is always a phenomenon that takes the center stage of our individual and
collective consciousness as a people with our characteristic flair for human
drama, conflict or tragedy. Of course
this is not to demean the seriousness of the controversy over the Davide
impeachment. For many of us, the past
two weeks have proven to be an exasperating, mentally and emotionally
exhausting experience. Both sides have
fought bitterly a dialectical struggle to articulate what they respectively
believe to be the correct position or view on the issues involved. Passions had ran high as demonstrators,
whether for or against the impeachment of the Chief Justice, took to the
streets armed with their familiar slogans and chants to air their voice on the
matter. Various sectors of society –
from the business, retired military, to the academe and denominations of faith
– offered suggestions for a return to a state of normalcy in the official
relations of the governmental branches affected to obviate any perceived
resulting instability upon areas of national life.
Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of
Impeachment had been constituted, this Court was specifically asked, told,
urged and argued to take no action of any kind and form with respect to the
prosecution by the House of Representatives of the impeachment complaint
against the subject respondent public official.
When the present petitions were knocking so to speak at the doorsteps of
this Court, the same clamor for non-interference was made through what are now
the arguments of “lack of jurisdiction,” “non-justiciability,” and “judicial
self-restraint” aimed at halting the Court from any move that may have a
bearing on the impeachment proceedings.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as
far as the question of the constitutionality of initiating the impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Davide is concerned. To reiterate what has been already explained,
the Court found the existence in full of all the requisite conditions for its
exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty of judicial review over
an issue whose resolution precisely called for the construction or interpretation
of a provision of the fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an issue of a genuine
constitutional material which only this Court can properly and competently
address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation of powers
under our system of government.
Face-to-face thus with a matter or problem that squarely falls under the
Court’s jurisdiction, no other course of action can be had but for it to pass
upon that problem head on.
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling
itself with the process of impeachment has effectively set up a regime of
judicial supremacy, is patently without basis in fact and in law.
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial
scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the
impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the
constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming
jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues
out of decidedly political questions.
Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial
dominance over the other two great branches of the government. Rather, the raison d’etre of the judiciary is to complement the discharge by
the executive and legislative of their own powers to bring about ultimately the
beneficent effects of having founded and ordered our society upon the rule of
law.
It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of
constitutionality of the impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice, the
members of this Court have actually closed ranks to protect a brethren. That the members’ interests in ruling on said
issue is as much at stake as is that of the Chief Justice. Nothing could be farther from the truth.
The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other
courts has long held and been entrusted with the judicial power to resolve
conflicting legal rights regardless of the personalities involved in the suits
or actions. This Court has dispensed
justice over the course of time, unaffected by whomsoever stood to benefit or
suffer therefrom, unfraid by whatever imputations or speculations could be made
to it, so long as it rendered judgment according to the law and the facts. Why can it not now be trusted to wield
judicial power in these petitions just because it is the highest ranking
magistrate who is involved when it is an incontrovertible fact that the
fundamental issue is not him but the validity of a government branch’s official
act as tested by the limits set by the Constitution? Of course, there are rules on the inhibition
of any member of the judiciary from taking part in a case in specified
instances. But to disqualify this entire
institution now from the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as likely
incapable of impartiality when one of its members is a party to a case, which
is simply a non sequitur.
No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system
which recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential to the law’s
moral authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and obedience to
its commands. Perhaps, there is no other
government branch or instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that
principle of legal equality other than the Supreme Court which has discerned
its real meaning and ramifications through its application to numerous cases
especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law and
neither is any other member of this Court.
But just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to
have less in law than anybody else. The
law is solicitous of every individual’s rights irrespective of his station in
life.
The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt
been put to test once again by this impeachment case against Chief Justice
Hilario Davide. Accordingly, this Court
has resorted to no other than the Constitution in search for a solution to what
many feared would ripen to a crisis in government. But though it is indeed immensely a blessing
for this Court to have found answers in our bedrock of legal principles, it is
equally important that it went through this crucible of a democratic process,
if only to discover that it can resolve differences without the use of force
and aggression upon each other.
WHEREFORE, Sections 16
and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which
were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are
unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary
General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under
paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., no part.
Bellosillo, J., see
separate opinion.
Puno,
and Ynares-Santiago,
JJ., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Vitug,
J., please see
separate opinion (concurring).
Panganiban,
and Callejo,
Sr., JJ., see separate concurring opinion.
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
J., see separate and concurring opinion
Quisumbing, J., concurring
separate opinion received.
Carpio, J., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., concur in
the majority opinion and in the separate opinion of Justice Vitug.
Corona,
J., will write a separate concurring opinion.
Azcuna, J., concur in the
separate opinion.
Tinga,
J., concur.
Please see separate opinion.
[1]
Rollo, G.R. No. 160261
at 180-182; Annex “H.”
[2]
Per Special Appearance with Manifestation of House Speaker Jose C. De Venecia,
Jr. (Rollo, G.R. No. 160261
at 325-363) the pertinent House Resolution is HR No. 260, but no copy of the
same was submitted before this Court.
[3]
Id. at 329. Created through PD
No. 1949 (July 18, 1984), the JDF was established “to help ensure and guarantee
the independence of the Judiciary as mandated by the Constitution and public
policy and required by the impartial administration of justice” by creating a
special fund to augment the allowances of the members and personnel of the
Judiciary and to finance the acquisition, maintenance and repair of office
equipment and facilities.”
[4]
Rollo, G.R. No. 160261
at 120-139; Annex “E.”
[5]
The initial complaint impleaded only Justices Artemio V. Panganiban, Josue N.
Bellosillo, Reynato S. Puno, Antonio T. Carpio and Renato C. Corona, and was
later amended to include Justices Jose C. Vitug, and Leonardo A. Quisumbing.
[6]
Supra note 4 at 123-124.
[7]
Rollo, G.R. No. 160403 at 48-53;
Annex “A.”
[9]
Rollo, G.R. No. 160262 at 8.
[10]
Rollo, G.R. No. 160295 at 11.
[11]
Rollo, G.R. No. 160262 at 43-84; Annex “B.”
[12]
Supra note 2.
[13]
A perusal of the attachments submitted by the various petitioners reveals the
following signatories to the second impeachment complaint and the accompanying
Resolution/Endorsement. 1. Gilbert
Teodoro, Jr., NPC, Tarlac (principal complainant) 2. Felix Fuentebella, NPC,
Camarines Sur (second principal complainant) 3. Julio Ledesma, IV, NPC, Negros
Occidental 4. Henry Lanot, NPC, Lone District of Pasig City 5. Kim
Bernardo-Lokin, Party List-CIBAC 6. Marcelino Libanan, NPC, Lone District of
Eastern Samar, (Chairman, House Committee on Justice) 7. Emmylou Talino-Santos,
Independent, 1st District, North Cotobato 8. Douglas RA. Cagas, NPC,
1st District, Davao del Sur 9. Sherwin
Gatchalian, NPC, 1st District, Valenzuela City 10. Luis Bersamin, Jr., PDSP-PPC, Lone
District of Abra 11. Nerissa Soon-Ruiz
Alayon, 6th District, Cebu
12. Ernesto Nieva, Lakas, 1st District, Manila 13. Edgar R.
Erice, Lakas, 2nd District, Kalookan City 14. Ismael Mathay III, Independent, 2nd
District, Quezon City 15. Samuel Dangwa,
Reporma, Lone District of Benguet 16.
Alfredo Marañon, Jr., NPC, 2nd District, Negros Occidental 17. Cecilia Jalosjos-Carreon, Reporma, 1st
District, Zamboanga del Norte 18.
Agapito A. Aquino, LDP, 2nd District, Makati City 19. Fausto L.
Seachon, Jr., NPC, 3rd District, Masbate 20. Georgilu Yumul-Hermida, Pwersa ng Masa, 4th
District, Quezon 21. Jose Carlos Lacson,
Lakas, 3rd District, Negros Occidental 22. Manuel C. Ortega, NPC, 1st
District, La Union 23. Uliran Joaquin,
NPC, 1st District, Laguna 24.
Soraya C. Jaafar, Lakas, Lone District of Tawi-Tawi 25. Wilhelmino Sy-Alvarado, Lakas, 1st
District, Bulacan 26. Claude P.
Bautista, NPC, 2nd District, Davao Del Sur 27. Del De Guzman, Lakas, Lone District of Marikina
City 28. Zeneida Cruz-Ducut, NPC, 2nd
District, Pampanga 29. Augusto Baculio,
Independent-LDP, 2nd District, Misamis Oriental 30. Faustino Dy III, NPC-Lakas, 3rd
District, Isabela 31. Agusto Boboy
Syjuco, Lakas, 2nd District, Iloilo
32. Rozzano Rufino B. Biazon, LDP, Lone District of Muntinlupa City 33. Leovigildo B. Banaag, NPC-Lakas, 1st
District, Agusan del Norte 34. Eric
Singson, LP, 2nd District, Ilocos Sur 35. Jacinto Paras, Lakas, 1st
District, Negros Oriental 36. Jose
Solis, Independent, 2nd District, Sorsogon 37. Renato B. Magtubo, Party List-Partido ng
Manggagawa 38. Herminio G. Teves, Lakas, 3rd District, Negros
Oriental 39. Amado T. Espino, Jr.,
Lakas, 2nd District, Pangasinan
40. Emilio Macias, NPC, 2nd District, Negros Oriental 41. Arthur Y. Pingoy, Jr., NPC, 2nd
District, South Cotobato 42. Francis
Nepomuceno, NPC, 1st District, Pampanga 43. Conrado M. Estrella III,
NPC, 6th District, Pangasinan
44. Elias Bulut, Jr., NPC, Lone District of Apayao 45. Jurdin Jesus M. Romualdo, NPC, Lone
District of Camiguin 46. Juan Pablo
Bondoc, NPC, 4th District, Pampanga
47. Generoso DC. Tulagan, NPC, 3rd District, Pangasinan 48. Perpetuo Ylagan, Lakas, Lone District of
Romblon 49. Michael Duavit, NPC, 1st
District, Rizal 50. Joseph Ace H.
Durano, NPC, 5th District, Cebu
51. Jesli Lapus, NPC, 3rd District, Tarlac 52. Carlos Q. Cojuangco, NPC, 4th
District, Negros Occidental 53. Georgidi
B. Aggabao, NPC, 4th District, Santiago, Isabela 54. Francis Escudero, NPC, 1st
District, Sorsogon 55. Rene M. Velarde,
Party List-Buhay 56. Celso L. Lobregat, LDP, Lone District of Zamboanga
City 57. Alipio Cirilo V. Badelles, NPC,
1st District, Lanao del Norte
58. Didagen P. Dilangalen, Pwersa ng Masa, Lone District of
Maguindanao 59. Abraham B. Mitra, LDP, 2nd
District, Palawan 60. Joseph Santiago,
NPC, Lone District of Catanduanes 61.
Darlene Antonino-Custodio, NPC, 1st District of South Cotobato &
General Santos City 62. Aleta C. Suarez,
LP, 3rd District, Quezon 63.
Rodolfo G. Plaza, NPC, Lone District of Agusan del Sur 64. JV Bautista, Party
List-Sanlakas 65. Gregorio Ipong, NPC, 2nd
District, North Cotabato 66. Gilbert C. Remulla, LDP, 2nd District,
Cavite 67. Rolex T. Suplico, LDP, 5th District, Iloilo 68. Celia Layus, NPC, Cagayan 69. Juan Miguel Zubiri, Lakas, 3rd
District, Bukidnon 70. Benasing
Macarambon Jr,. NPC, 2nd District, Lanao del Sur 71. Josefina Joson, NPC, Lone District of
Nueva Ecija 72. Mark Cojuangco, NPC, 5th
District, Pangasinan 73. Mauricio
Domogan, Lakas, Lone District of Baguio City
74. Ronaldo B. Zamora, Pwersa ng Masa, Lone District of San Juan 75. Angelo O. Montilla, NPC, Lone District of
Sultan Kudarat 76. Roseller L. Barinaga,
NPC, 2nd District, Zamboanga del Norte 77. Jesnar R. Falcon, NPC, 2nd District,
Surigao del Sur 78. Ruy Elias Lopez,
NPC, 3rd District, Davao City.
[14]
Rollo, G.R. No. 160261
at 5. Petitioner had previously filed
two separate impeachment complaints before the House of Representatives against
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto.
[15]
299 SCRA 744 (1998). In Chavez v. PCGG, petitioner Chavez argued
that as a taxpayer and a citizen, he had the legal personality to file a
petition demanding that the PCGG make public any and all negotiations and
agreements pertaining to the PCGG’s task of recovering the Marcoses’ ill-gotten
wealth. Petitioner Chavez further argued
that the matter of recovering the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses is an issue
of transcendental importance to the public.
The Supreme Court, citing Tañada
v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985), Legaspi
v. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530 (1987) and Albano v. Reyes, 175 SCRA 264 (1989) ruled that petitioner had
standing. The Court, however, went on to
elaborate that in any event, the question on the standing of petitioner Chavez
was rendered moot by the intervention of the Jopsons who are among the
legitimate claimants to the Marcos wealth.
[16]
384 SCRA 152 (2002). In Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development
Corporation, wherein the petition
sought to compel the Public Estates Authority (PEA) to disclose all facts on
its then on-going negotiations with Amari Coastal Development Corporation to
reclaim portions of Manila Bay, the Supreme Court said that petitioner Chavez
had the standing to bring a taxpayer’s suit because the petition sought to
compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties.
[17]
224 SCRA 792 (1993).
[18]
Subsequent petitions were filed before this Court seeking similar relief. Other than the petitions, this Court also
received Motions for Intervention from among others, Sen. Aquilino Pimentel,
Jr., and Special Appearances by House Speaker Jose C. de Venecia, Jr., and
Senate President Franklin Drilon.
[19]
Supra note 2 at 10.
[20]
Justice Florenz D. Regalado, Former Constitutional Commissioners Justice
Regalado E. Maambong and Father Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, Justice Hugo E.
Gutierrez, Jr., Former Minister of Justice and Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza, Deans Pacifico Agabin and Raul C. Pangalangan, and Former Senate
President Jovito R. Salonga,.
[21]
Rollo, G.R. No. 160261 at 275-292.
[22]
Id. at 292.
[23]
63 Phil 139 (1936).
[24]
Id. at 157-159.
[25]
Vide Alejandrino v. Quezon, 46
Phil 83 (1924); Tañada v. Cuenco, 103
Phil 1051 (1957); Ynot v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 659, 665 (1987).
[26]
Const., art. VIII, sec. 1.
[27]
5 US 137 (1803).
[28]
Id. at 180.
[29]
In In re Prautch, 1 Phil 132 (1902),
this Court held that a statute allowing for imprisonment for non-payment of a
debt was invalid. In Casanovas v. Hord, 8 Phil 125 (1907),
this Court invalidated a statute imposing a tax on mining claims on the ground
that a government grant stipulating that the payment of certain taxes by the
grantee would be in lieu of other taxes was a contractual obligation which
could not be impaired by subsequent legislation. In Concepcion
v. Paredes, 42 Phil 599 (1921), Section 148 (2) of the Administrative Code,
as amended, which provided that judges of the first instance with the same
salaries would, by lot, exchange judicial districts every five years, was
declared invalid for being a usurpation of the power of appointment vested in
the Governor General. In McDaniel v.
Apacible, 42 Phil 749 (1922), Act No. 2932, in so far as it declares open
to lease lands containing petroleum which have been validly located and held,
was declared invalid for being a depravation of property without due process of
law. In U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil
1 (1922), Act No. 2868, in so far as it authorized the Governor-General to fix the
price of rice by proclamation and to make the sale of rice in violation of such
a proclamation a crime, was declared an invalid delegation of legislative
power.
[30]
Vicente V. Mendoza, Sharing The Passion and Action of our Time
62-53 (2003).
[31]
Supra note 23.
[32]
Id. at 156-157.
[33]
Florentino P. Feliciano, The Application of Law: Some Recurring Aspects Of The
Process Of Judicial Review And Decision Making, 37 AMJJUR 17, 24 (1992).
[34]
Ibid.
[35]
I Record of the Constitutional
Commission 434-436 (1986).
[36]
31 SCRA 413 (1970)
[37]
Id. at 422-423; Vide Baranda v.
Gustilo, 165 SCRA 757, 770 (1988); Luz
Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, 192 SCRA 51
(1990); Ordillo v. Commission on
Elections, 192 SCRA 100 (1990).
[38]
194 SCRA 317 (1991).
[39]
Id. at 325 citing Maxwell v. Dow, 176 US 581.
[40]
152 SCRA 284 (1987).
[41]
Id. at 291 citing Gold Creek Mining v.
Rodriguez, 66 Phil 259 (1938), J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc v. Land Tenure Administration, supra note 36, and
I Tañada and Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines 21
(Fourth Ed.).
[42]
82 Phil 771 (1949).
[43]
Id. at 775.
[44]
Supra note 38.
[45]
Id. at 330-331.
[46]
Id. at 337-338 citing 16 CJS 2.31; Commonwealth
v. Ralph, 111 Pa. 365, 3 Atl. 220 and Household
Finance Corporation v. Shaffner, 203, SW 2d, 734, 356 Mo. 808.
[47]
Supra note 2.
[48]
Citing Section 3 (6), Article VIII of the Constitution provides:
(6)
The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation.
When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted
without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
[49]
Supra note 21.
[50]
506 U.S. 224 (1993).
[51]
Supra note 2 at 349-350 citing Gerhardt, Michael J. The Federal Impeachment Process: A
Constitutional and Historical Analysis, 1996, p. 119.
[52]
227 SCRA 100 (1993).
[53]
Id. at 112.
[54]
US Constititon. Section 2. x x x The House of Representatives shall have the
sole Power of Impeachment.
[55]
1987 Constitution, Article XI, Section 3
(1). The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate
all cases of impeachment.
[56]
Supra note 2 at 355 citing Agresto,
The Supreme Court and Constitutional Democracy, 1984, pp. 112-113.
[57]
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
[58]
141 SCRA 263 (1986).
[59]
Supra note 25.
[60]
298 SCRA 756 (1998).
[61]
272 SCRA 18 (1997).
[62]
201 SCRA 792 (1991).
[63]
187 SCRA 377 (1990).
[64]
180 SCRA 496 (1989).
[65]
Supra note 25.
[66]
Supra note 23.
[67]
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary, supra note 38 at
330-331.
[68]
Id. at 158-159.
[69]
IBP v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 (2000) citing Joya
v. PCGG, 225 SCRA 568 (1993); House International Building Tenants
Association, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 703 (1987); Baker
v. Carr, supra note 57.
[70]
Citing Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato,
250 SCRA 130 (1995).
[71]
Citing Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 281
SCRA 330 (1997).
[72]
Citing Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, 163 SCRA 371, 378 (1988).
[73] Rule 3, Section
2. Parties in interest. — A real
party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless
otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest.
[74]
JG Summit Holdings, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 345 SCRA
143, 152 (2000).
[75]
246 SCRA 540 (1995).
[76]
Id. at 562-564.
[77]
Agan v. PIATCO, G.R. No. 155001,
May 5, 2003 citing BAYAN v. Zamora,
342 SCRA 449, 562-563 (2000) and Baker v. Carr, supra note
57; Vide Gonzales v. Narvasa,, 337 SCRA 733 (2000); TELEBAP v. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 337 (1998).
[78]
Chavez v. PCGG, supra note 15.
[79]
Del Mar v. PAGCOR
346 SCRA 485, 501 (2000) citing Kilosbayan, Inc., et.al. v.
Morato, supra note 70; Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392 (1980); Sanidad
v. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333 (1976); Philconsa v. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300
(1966); Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil 331 (1960); Vide
Gonzales v. Narvasa, supra note 77; Pelaez v. Auditor General,
15 SCRA 569 (1965); Philconsa v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 (1965); Iloilo
Palay & Corn Planters Association v. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377 (1965).
[80]
BAYAN v. Zamora, supra note 77
citing Bugnay v. Laron, 176 SCRA 240, 251-252 (1989); Vide
Del Mar v. PAGCOR, supra note 79; Gonzales v. Narvasa, supra note 77; TELEBAP
v. COMELEC, supra note 77; Kilosbayan,
Inc. v. Morato, supra note 70; Joya
v. PCGG, supra note 69; Dumlao v. COMELEC, supra note 79; Sanidad v. COMELEC, supra note
79; Philconsa v. Mathay, supra note
79; Pelaez v. Auditor General, supra note 79; Philconsa v. Gimenez, supra note
79; Iloilo Palay & Corn Planters
Association v. Feliciano, supra note 79; Pascual
v. Sec. of Public Works, supra note 79.
[81]
Gonzales v. Narvasa, supra note
77 citing Dumlao v. COMELEC, supra note 79; Sanidad v. COMELEC,
supra note 79; Tan v. Macapagal,
43 SCRA 677 (1972).
[82]
Tatad v. Garcia, Jr., 243 SCRA 436
(1995); Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, supra
note 70 at 140-141 citing Philconsa v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA
506 (1994); Guingona v. PCGG, 207 SCRA 659 (1992); Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 (1990);
Tolentino v. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702
(1971).
[83] Del Mar v. PAGCOR, supra note 79 at 502-503 citing Philconsa v. Mathay, supra note 79.
[84]
Chinese Flour Importers Association v.
Price Stabilization Board, 89 Phil 439, 461 (1951) citing Gallego et al. vs. Kapisanan
Timbulan ng mga Manggagawa, 46 Off. Gaz, 4245.
[85]
Philippine Constitution Association v.
Gimenez, supra note 79 citing
Gonzales v. Hechanova, 118 Phil. 1065 (1963); Pascual v. Secretary, supra note 79.
[86]
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 338 SCRA
81 (2000).
[87]
MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Da’wah Council of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 135306, January 28, 2003, citing Industrial
Generating Co. v. Jenkins 410
SW 2d 658; Los Angeles County Winans, 109 P 640; Weberpals v. Jenny, 133 NE 62.
[88]
Mathay v. Consolidated Bank and Trust
Company, 58 SCRA 559, 570-571 (1974), citing
Moore’s Federal Practice 2d ed., Vol. III, pages 3423-3424; 4 Federal Rules
Service, pages 454-455; Johnson, et al., vs. Riverland Levee Dist., et al., 117
2d 711, 715; Borlasa v. Polistico, 47
Phil. 345, 348 (1925).
[89]
MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Da’wah
Council of the Philippines, supra note 87, dissenting opinion of
Justice Carpio; Bulig-bulig Kita
Kamag-Anak Assoc. v. Sulpicio Lines, 173 SCRA 514, 514-515 (1989); Re: Request
of the Heirs of the Passengers of Doña Paz, 159 SCRA 623, 627 (1988) citing Moore, Federal Practice, 2d ed.,
Vol. 3B, 23-257, 23-258; Board of
Optometry v. Colet, 260 SCRA 88 (1996), citing
Section 12, Rule 3, Rules of Court; Mathay
v. Consolidated Bank and Trust Co., supra note 88; Oposa v. Factoran, supra note 17.
[90] Kilosbayan v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994).
[91] Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, supra note 70 citing Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, supra note 38; Philconsa v. Giménez, supra note 79; Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association
v. Feliciano, supra note 79; Araneta
v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 (1949); vide Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 281
SCRA 330 (1997); Santiago v. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106 (1997); KMU v.
Garcia, Jr., 239 SCRA 386 (1994); Joya v. PCGG, 225 SCRA 368
(1993); Carpio v. Executive
Secretary, 206 SCRA 290 (1992); Osmeña v. COMELEC, 199 SCRA 750
(1991); Basco v. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52 (1991); Guingona v. Carague, 196
SCRA 221 (1991); Daza v. Singson, supra note 64; Dumlao v. COMELEC,
supra note 79.
[92]
Firestone Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 522,
531 (1999) citing Gibson vs. Revilla, 92 SCRA 219; Magsaysay-Labrador v. Court
of Appeals, 180 SCRA 266, 271 (1989).
[93]
Supra note 79.
[94]
Id. at 403.
[95]
Supra note 81.
[96]
Id. at 681.
[97]
SECTION 3. x x x
(2) A verified
complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten
session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its
Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from
such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall
be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from
receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at
least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to
affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the
Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall
be recorded.
[98]
Supra note 25.
[99]
Id. at 1067.
[100]
Vide Barcelon v. Baker,
5 Phil. 87 (1905); Montenegro v. Castañeda, 91 Phil. 882 (1952); De la Llana v. COMELEC, 80 SCRA 525
(1977).
[101]
Vide Avelino v. Cuenco,
83 Phil. 17 (1949); Macias v. COMELEC, 3 SCRA 1 (1961); Cunanan v.
Tan, Jr., 5 SCRA 1 (1962); Gonzales v. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774
(1967); Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448 (1971); Tolentino v. COMELEC,
supra note 82.
[102]
50 SCRA 30 (1973).
[103]
Record of the Constitution Commission, Vol.
1, July 10, 1986 at 434-436.
[104]
Id. at 439-443.
[105]
177 SCRA 668 (1989).
[106]
Id. at 695.
[107]
203 SCRA 767 (1991).
[108]
Id. at 776 citing Gonzales
v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452, 463 (1990).
[109]
Supra note 64.
[110]
Id. at 501.
[111]
Supra note 57.
[112]
Id at 217
[113]
2 Record of the Constitutional
Commission at 286.
[114]
Id. at 278, 316, 272, 283-284, 286.
[115]
76 Phil 516 (1946).
[116]
Id. at 522.
[117]
Supra note 37.
[118]
Id. at 58 citing Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175
SCRA 343 (1989).
[119]
Vide concurring opinion of
Justice Vicente Mendoza in Estrada
v.Desierto, 353 SCRA 452, 550 (2001); Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208, 210-211 (1987) citing Ashwander v. TVA,
297 U.S. 288 (1936).
[120]
As adverted to earlier, neither a copy the Resolution nor a record of the
hearings conducted by the House Committee on Justice pursuant to said
Resolution was submitted to the Court by any of the parties.
[121]
Rollo, G.R. No. 160310 at 38.
[122]
Supra note 107.
[123]
Id. at 777 (citations omitted).
[124]
Rollo, G.R. No. 160262 at 73.
[125]
Supra note 2 at 342.
[126]
Perfecto v. Meer, 85 Phil 552, 553 (1950).
[127]
Estrada
v. Desierto, 356 SCRA
108, 155-156 (2001); Vide Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, 166
SCRA 651 (1988); Vargas v. Rilloraza, et al., 80 Phil. 297,
315-316 (1948); Planas
v. COMELEC, 49 SCRA 105 (1973),
concurring opinion of J. Concepcion.
[128]
Philippine Judges Association v. Prado,
227 SCRA 703, 705 (1993).
[129]
Ibid.
[130]
Ramirez v. Corpuz-Macandog, 144 SCRA 462, 477 (1986).
[131]
Supra note 127.
[132] Estrada v. Desierto, supra note 127.
[133]
Id. at 155-156 citing Abbas, et al. v. Senate Electoral Tribunal,
supra note 127; Vargas
v. Rilloraza, et al., supra
note 127.
[134]
Supra note 119 at 210-211.
[135]
Supra note 119.
[136]
Board of Optometry v. Colet, 260 SCRA 88, 103
(1996); Joya v. PCGG, supra note 69 at 575; Macasiano v. National
Housing Authority, 224 SCRA 236, 242 (1993); Santos III v. Northwestern Airlines, 210 SCRA 256,
261-262 (1992), National Economic Protectionism Association v. Ongpin,
171 SCRA 657, 665 (1989).
[137]
Supra note 2 at 353.
[138]
Supra note 33 at 32.
[139]
Supra note 102.
[140]
Supra note 33.
[141]
249 SCRA 244, 251 (1995).
[142]
Id. at 251.
[143]
2 Records of the Constitutional Commission
at 342-416.
[144]
Id. at 416.
[145]
Commissioner Maambong’s Amicus Curiae Brief at 15.
[146]
2 Record of the Constitutional
Commission at 375-376, 416
[147]
77 Phil. 192 (1946).
[148]
Justice Hugo Guiterrez’s Amicus Curiae Brief at 7.
[149]
109 Phil. 863 (1960).
[150]
40 SCRA 58, 68 (1971).
[151]
286 U.S. 6, 33 (1932).
[152]
277 SCRA 268, 286 (1997).
[153]
144 U.S. 1 (1862).
[154]
Supra note 152 at 304-306.
[155]
Id at 311.
[156]
Id. at 313.
[157]
Supra note 152 at 314-315.
[158]
Supra note 50.