G.R. No. L-30734. July 28, 1969
JUAN DIOSAMITO ET AL., PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS, VS. BENJAMIN BALANQUE, ET AL., DEFENDANT-APPELLEES.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
On the morning of November 12, 1962 in Aringay,
La Union, a joint team of Philippine Constabulary and local police apprehended
two trucks loaded with 666 cases of assorted untaxed “blue seal”
cigarettes. On the same date the two trucks were impounded in the PC
compound under the custody of the Provincial Commander while the Provincial
Fiscal filed an information in the Court of First
Instance of La Union against the drivers for violation of the Tariff and Customs
Code. On November 19, 1962 the Collector
of Customs issued a Customs Warrant of Seizure and Detention to the Provincial
Commander with instruction to detain, hold and/or keep the said trucks in
custody and instituted Seizure-Forfeiture
Proceedings Identification No. 28/62
pursuant to Section 2530,
paragraphs (f) and (k), of the Tariff and Customs Code, which provide as
follows:
“Any vessel or aircraft, cargo, articles and other objects
shall, under the following conditions, be subject to forfeiture:
x x x x x
x x
x x
“f. Any article of
prohibited importation or exportation, the importation or exportation of which
is effected or attempted contrary to law, and all other articles which, in the opinion of the Collector, have been
used, are or were intended to be used as instruments in the importation or
exportation of the former.
x x x x x
x x
x x
“k. Any beast actually being used for the
conveyance of articles subject to forfeiture under the customs and tariff laws,
with its equipage or trappings, and any vehicle similarly used, together with
its equipage and appurtenances, including the beast, team or other motive power
drawing or propelling the same; but the
forfeiture shall not be effected if it is established that the owner of the means of conveyance used as
aforesaid, or his agent in charge thereof at the time, has no knowledge of the
unlawful act.”
On December 7, 1962,
during the pendency of Seizure-Forfeiture Proceedings
Identification No. 28/62, the plaintiffs, claiming to be the owners of one of
the trucks (identified in the complaint) filed a suit in the court a quo,
with a prayer for damages. The Collector
of Customs, however, was not included as party-defendant. The court a quo ordered the
release of the truck to the plaintiffs upon a bond of P10,000.
On December
12, 1962 the
Collector of Customs, thru the Office of the Solicitor General, filed an urgent
motion to intervene, with the answer in intervention attached thereto. The motion was granted and the answer
admitted. The Collector of Customs
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and failure
to state a cause of action. The
Provincial Commander, likewise thru the Office of the Solicitor General, filed
an answer adopting that of the Collector of Customs. Upon motion of the defendant and the intervenor, a preliminary hearing was held on the
affirmative defense of lack of jurisdiction.
On June 28, 1963 the court a quo issued an order the dispositive
portion of which reads:
“Wherefore, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered DISMISSED, for lack
of jurisdiction, without special pronouncement as to costs.
Consequently, the order for the seizure of personal property issued
by this Court is hereby set aside, and since no return of the service thereof
has been submitted to the Court it is hereby ordered recalled and counsel for
the plaintiffs given a period of ten (10) days from receipt hereof within which
to return the same to the Court.”
Both parties moved to reconsider.
The Solicitor General’s motion was limited to the dispositive
portion of the order “so as to include therein a directive that the
plaintiffs should forthwith return to the Collector of Customs for San
Fernando the truck subject matter of the complaint to
be dealt with under the Tariff and Customs Code.” In an order dated August 10, 1963, the trial court
granted the Solicitor General’s motion and denied that of the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
subsequently certified the case to us, the only issue being whether or not the
court a quo has jurisdiction over the
subject-matter of the case.
The issue presented is not one of first impression. In Pacis vs. Averia, L-22526, November 29, 1966 and in De Joya,
et al., vs. David, et al., L-23504, December
29, 1967, we said:
“At issue is the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance
of Cavite to entertain Civil Case No. TM-114, and the existence of therein plaintiff’s cause of action.
x x x This original jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance, when exercised in an action for recovery of personal property which
is a subject of a forfeiture proceeding in the Bureau of Customs, tends to
encroach upon, and to render futile, the jurisdiction of the Collector of
Customs in seizure and forfeiture proceedings.
x x x
“Should Section 44(c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 give way to the provisions of the
Tariff and Customs Code, or vice versa?
In our opinion, in this particular case, the Court of First Instance should yield
to the jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs. The jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs
is provided for in Republic Act 1937 which
took effect on July 1, 1957, much later than the Judiciary Act of
1948. It is axiomatic that a later law
prevails over a prior statute. Moreover,
on grounds of public policy, it is more reasonable to conclude that the
legislators intended to divest the Court of First Instance of the prerogative
to replevin a property which is a subject of a
seizure and forfeiture proceedings for violation of the Tariff and Customs
Code. Otherwise, actions for forfeiture
or property for violation of Customs laws could easily be undermined by the
simple device of replevin.
“Furthermore Section 2303 of the Tariff and Customs Code
requires the Collector of Customs to give to the owner of the property sought
to be forfeited, written notice of the seizure and to give him the opportunity
to be heard in his defense. This
provision clearly indicates the intention of the law to confine in the Bureau of
Customs the determination of all questions affecting the disposal of property
proceeded against in a seizure and forfeiture case. The judicial recourse of the property owner
is not in the Court of First Instance but in the Court of Tax Appeals, and only
after exhausting administrative remedies in the Bureau of Customs.”
Appellants
argue that the truck in question could not be the subject of seizure,
confiscation or forfeiture in the absence of any evidence showing that the
cigarettes loaded therein had been imported illegally. This argument is gratuitous and begs the
question at issue before the Collector of Customs. Prima facie, at least, the cigarettes that
were loaded on the truck in question when it was apprehended, being of the
“blue seal” or untaxed category, had been imported illegally; and it
was before the Collector of Customs in the seizure-forfeiture proceeding he had
instituted that evidence to the contrary should be adduced by the
plaintiffs. And as may be gathered from
the pleadings, that administrative proceeding had been set for hearing twice
with due notice to the parties, but no actual hearing had yet been conducted
when the instant case was instituted in the court a quo. The law grants the Collector of Customs
sufficient latitude in determining whether or not a certain article is subject
to seizure or forfeiture (Sec. 2530, pars. (f) and
(k), Tariff and Customs Code of 1957, supra); and his decision on the matter is
appealable to the Commissioner of Customs and then to
the Court of Tax Appeals, not to the Court of First Instance.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs
against appellants.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Zaldivar, J., did not take part.