ANGEL C. BAKING AND SIMEON G. RODRIGUEZ, PETITIONERS, VS. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, RESPONDENT. IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, JOSE LAVA, RAMON ESP…

Before us for resolution are two identical petitions for habeas
corpus filed by petitioners:  (1) Angel C.
Baking and Simeon G. Rodriguez
in L-30364; and (2) Jose Lava, Ramon Espiritu, Fede­rico
R. Maclang, Federico Bautista, Onofre
Mangila, and Cesario Torres
in L-30603.

Petitioners concededly had been under detention for more than
eighteen (18) years under the charge of respondent Director of Prisons when, on
May 16, 1969, this Court in its decision in People vs. Lava,
et al., G.R. L-4974-5-6-7-8, convicted petitioners for the crime
of rebellion and sentenced each of them to ten (10) years’ imprisonment.  This decision has since become final.

Previously, on March
31, 1969,
petitioners Angel C. Baking and Simeon G. Rodriguez registered their petition
for habeas corpus in G.R. L-30364, one of the cases at bar.  They claimed that they had been denied the right to a speedy trial.  On May 24, 1969, after this Court rendered
its decision convicting petitioners of the crime of rebellion, Angel C. Baking and Simeon G. Rodriguez filed a motion for early decision of
their petition for habeas corpus and for their immediate release, based
primarily upon an averment similar to the other petition for habeas corpus
before us in L-30603, filed on June 17, 1969.

The present thrust of the two petitions is that petitioners
should now be released because they have already served the ten (10) year
sentences meted out to them.  They give as reasons:

First.  Petitioners
have been detained in prison pending the decision of their cases for more than
eighteen (18) years and seven (7)
months.  By Article 29 of the Revised
Penal Code,^[1]
one-half of their preventive
imprisonment is to be deducted from their sentence.  In other words, they are already credited
with more than nine (9) years and three (3) months, representing one-half of
eighteen (18) years and seven (7)
months.  This is not disputed.^[2]

Second.  Petitioners
would go farther and claim for themselves benefits accorded by Article 97 of
the Revised Penal Code granting time allowance
for good conduct.  Petitioners would
apply said Arti­cle 97 through all the time of their detention period of over
eighteen years.

We directed respondent
Director of Prisons to produce before us the bodies of the petitioners.  He did. 
In his return, thru the Solicitor General, he balks vehemently at the
application of Article 97 to petitioners’ case.

After hearing and
submission of memoranda, the present cases are now up for decision.

1.       The key problem that
now confronts us in the two petitions at bar is whether or not Article 97 of
the Revised Penal Code is applicable to detention prisoners.  Said provision of law in its English version
reads:

“ART. 97.  Allowance
for good conduct.  –
The good conduct of any prisoner in any penal institution shall entitle him to
the following deductions from the period of
his sentence:

1. During the first two years of his imprison­ment, he shall be
allowed a deduction of five days for each month of good behavior;

2. During the third to the fifth year, inclusive, of his
imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of eight days for each month of
good behavior;

3. During the following years
until the tenth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be
allowed a deduction of ten days for each month of good behavior; and

4. During the eleventh and successive years of his imprisonment, he
shall be allowed a deduction of fifteen days for each month of good
behavior.”

Petitioners, who have
been detention prisoners prior to the finality of this Court’s judgment of May
16, 1969, lay heavy stress on the phrase “any prisoner” in the
English text of Article 97.  In asking
that the provision be made to apply to them when they were still detention
prisoners, they say that the law does not distinguish between a prisoner who is serving sentence and detention prisoner.

The Spanish text of
Article 97 of the Revised Penal Code reads:

“ART. 97.  Abono de tiempo
por buena conducta.  –
La buena conducta, observada por el penado en cualquier establecimiento penal le hara acreedor a las siguientes reducciones del tiempo de su condena:

1.^a Cinco dias cada
mes de buena conducta durante los dos primeros años de privacion de libertad;

2.^a Ocho dias por
mes durante los años tercero
al quinto inclusive;

3.^a Diez dias por
mes, durante los demas años
hasta el decimo inclusive; y

4.^a Quince
dias por mes desde el undecimo
en adelante.”

It must be stated that inasmuch as the Revised Penal Code was
originally approved and enacted in Spanish, the Spanish text governs.^[3]
The term “any prisoner” in the Spanish text is “el penado“.  Who is a convict or a person already sentenced by final
judgment, For, “el penado” means a “delincuente condenado a una pena.”^[4] There is thus no doubt that Article 97 does not embrace detention
prisoners within its reach.  Because it
speaks of the buena conducta
observada por
el penado – not one under “prision preventiva.” The
allowance for good conduct “for each month of good behavior” then
unquestionably refers to good behavior of a prisoner while he is serving
his term as a convict and not otherwise.

Indeed, under Article 24(1), Revised Penal Code, the arrest and temporary detention of accused
persons are not considered as penalties.  By
necessary implication from the statutory scheme of the Revised Penal Code,
especially Article 28 thereof,^[5] the service of a sentence of one
in prison begins only on the day the judgment of conviction
becomes final.

More to this.  While Article 97 talks of “any
prisoner” in the English text, it speaks, however, of that prisoner as
being entitled to deductions for good conduct allowances “from the period
of his sentence” (“del tiempo de su condena“).  An accurate reading, therefore, of the
provision yields the plain implication that the prisoner concerned is one who
already has a sentence clamped upon him, i.e., a definite
sentence by final judgment.  The term
“any prisoner” should thus be limited to those convicted by final
judgment.  This is the import of the law
as written.

2.       And then, there is
the familiar precept that a codal provision is not to
be interpreted in isolation.  It is
axiomatic in legal hermeneutics that a code, such as the Revised Penal Code,
should be construed as a whole.  Courts are duty-bound to harmonize the
various provisions thereof.  The rule we
should go by is that “a
code enacted as a single comprehensive statute, is to be considered as such,
and not as a series of disconnected articles or statutes.”^[6]

The reason why we now take stock of the foregoing rule is that we
find in the same Revised Penal Code, Article 94, which provides as follows:

“ART. 94.  Partial
extinction of criminal liability.  – Criminal liability is extinguished
partially:

1.     
By conditional pardon;

2.     
By commutation of the sentence;
and

3.     
For good conduct allowances which
the culprit may earn while he is serving his
sentence.”^[7]

As originally written in Spanish, this article reads:

“ART. 94.  Como
se extingue parcialmente
la responsabilidad penal.  – La responsabilidad
penal se extin­guira parcialmente:

1.º  Por indulto condicional;

2.º  Por conmutacion de la sentencia; y

3.º  Por abonos de buena conducta que obtenga
el reo mientras este extinguiendo sentencia.”

By the above provision, good conduct allowances are given only to
the culprit who earns the same “while he is serving his sen­tence”
(“el reo mientras este extinguiendo sentencia“).^[8]
What is crystal clear in Article 94 then is that good conduct allowances are
awarded only to those who are serving their sentences.  Petitioners, as detention prisoners, cannot
by any stretch of the imagination, be said to be serving sentence during the
period of their preventive imprisonment. 
And this, even in the face of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code which
reduces petitioners’ respective sentences by one-half of their preventive
imprisonment.  As correctly argued by the
Solicitor General, Article 29 merely credits said time [of one-half of
the preventive imprisonment] to convicts by final judgment.  Said article does not in any way imply that
detention prisoners, there­after convicted by final judgment, have been serving
sentence during their detention period.

So it is, that Article 97 is to be read in conjunction with Arti­cle
94 which, under the circumstances, should likewise be deemed to give meaning to
the term “any prisoner” in Article 97.  Article 94 above-quoted, we must say, is
embraced in the same chapter of the Revised Penal Code as Article 97 relied
upon by petitioners.  Both of them are in
Book One, Title Four, Chapter Two, entitled “PAR­TIAL EXTINCTION OF
CRIMINAL LIABILITY”, the very same head­ing of Article 94.  And Article 94 appears to be the lead article
of Chapter Two, because it talks in general terms of everything con­tained in
said Chapter Two.  To elaborate, Article
95 speaks of conditional pardon, provided in Article 94(1); Article 96 deals
with commutation of sentence, mentioned in Article 94(2); and Articles 97, 98 and 99 (the rest of the Chapter) refer
to good conduct allowances treated by Article 94(3).  Obvious from all these is that it is from
Article 94(3) that Articles 97 (the provision under interpretation), 98 and 99
should take their bearings.  And it says – we repeat – that:  “La responsabilidad
penal se extinguira parcialmente:  x x x 3.º Por abonos de buena conducta que obtenga el reo mientras este extinguiendo sentencia.”

Our view on the meaning
of Article 97 gets a tremendous lift from Article 98 of the Revised Penal Code,
viz:

“ART. 98.  Special
time allowance for loyalty.  – A deduction of one-fifth of the period of
his sentence shall be granted to any prisoner who, having evaded the service
of his sentence under the circumstances mentioned in
Article 158 of this Code, gives himself up to the authorities within 48 hours
following the issuance of a proclamation announcing the passing away of the
calamity or catastrophe referred to in said article.”^[9]

While Article 98 also
contains the phrase “any prisoner” (transmitted from the Spanish text
which uses the words “los penados“),
it is clear that this phrase is confined to convicts who have “evaded the
service of [their] sentence” (“que quebrantaren su sentencia“).

The position we here take is not without jurisprudential
support.  In People vs. Martin,
68 Phil. 122, the accused was convicted of abduction and sentenced to 14 years,
8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal.  After having served 8 years, 1 month and 17
days, he was pardoned “on condition that he should not again be found
guilty of any crime.” He left unserved 6 years,
6 months and 14 days.  Subsequently, he was prosecuted, tried, found guilty of another
crime – attempted robbery in band with physical injuries – and sentenced by
final judgment to pay a fine of 330 pesetas, with the corresponding subsidiary
imprisonment.  He was thereafter charged
with a violation of the condition of his pardon.  After trial, he was adjudged guilty and
sentenced “to suffer the penalty which was remitted in the pardon, namely,
six years, six months and fourteen days.” In upholding that judgment of
conviction on appeal, this Court, amongst others, said:  “The appellant’s contention that there
should be deducted from this remitted penalty the allowance of
time provided in article 97 of the Revised
Penal Code, is unsound. 
This allowance is given in consideration of the good conduct of the
prisoner while serving his sentence.  Not having served this remitted penalty,
there is no reason for the allowance, namely, the good conduct of the appellant
while serving his sentence.”^[10]

We accordingly hold that,
by a consideration of the terms of Article 97 alone, and also in conjunction
with other parts of the Revised Penal Code, the phrase “any
prisoner” in Article 97 thereof is to be regarded as referring only to a
prisoner serving sentence.

3.       A formidable argument
against the tenability of petitioners’ plea is Section 5 of Act 1533 of the Philippine
Commission (enacted on August 30, 1906),
the old law “providing for the diminution of sentences x x x in consideration of good
conduct and diligence.” Section 5 of said Act 1533 reads:

“SEC. 5.  Detention
prisoners who voluntarily offer in writing to perform such labor as may
be assigned to them shall be entitled to a credit in accordance with the
provisions of this Act, which shall be deducted from such sentence as may be
imposed upon them in the event of their conviction.”^[11]

This provision of law, it must be said, still subsists.  The repealing clause of the Revised Penal
Code, Article 367 thereof, expressly abrogated Sections 1, 2 and 6 only of Act
1533.  Section 5 thereof must therefore
be deemed to form part of the present law on good conduct allowances.

By Section 5 just transcribed, detention prisoners are entitled
to good conduct allowances if they “voluntarily offer in writing to perform
such labor as may be assigned to them.” In which case, the credit they
receive “shall be deducted from such sentence as may be imposed upon them
in the event of their conviction.” This is the sole exception to
the rule that only those serving sentence shall be entitled to good conduct
allowances.  If detention prisoners do
not follow the condition imposed by Section 5, Act 1533, they cannot earn
credit for good conduct.

In the cases before us,
there is not as much as an intimation that petitioners have
voluntarily offered in writing to perform such labor as may be assigned to
them.  Petitioners have not even told us
that they worked during the period of their preventive imprisonment.  The burden to show that the condition imposed
by Section 5, Act 1533 has been met, is certainly upon petitioners.  They have not discharged this burden.  It is thus our firm conclusion that they
cannot avail of the benefits granted to detention prisoners under Section 5 of
Act 1533.

Upon the law as we read it, petitioners’ remedy is not with this
Court.  The law is the law.  We cannot change the law under the guise of
interpretation.  Under our system of
government, we may not tread on forbidden grounds; we cannot rewrite the
law.  This is the function of Congress.^[12]

FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the petitions herein to set
petitioners at liberty are hereby denied.

No costs allowed.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, and Teehankee, JJ., concur.

Castro, Capistrano, and Barredo, JJ., did not take
part.

Fernando, J., dissents in a
separate opinion.

^[1]
“ART. 29.  One–half of
the period of the preventive
imprisonment deducted from
term of imprisonment.  –
Offenders who have undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited
in the service
of their sentences consisting of deprivation of liberty, with one-half of
the time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment, except in
the following cases:

1.      
When they are recidivists, or have
been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime;

2.      
When upon being summoned for the
execution of their sentence they have failed to surrender voluntarily;

3.      
When they have been convicted of
robbery, theft, estafa, malversation of public funds, falsification, vagrancy, or
prostitution.

^[2]
Petitioners claimed in a previous
petition for habeas corpus (G.R. L-28151) that Article 29 of the Revised Penal
Code is unconstitutional Petitioners moved to withdraw that petition on the
ground that the petition had become moot and academic, which motion was granted
by this Court on June 19, 1969.

^[3]
People vs. Abilong, 82 Phil. 172, 174, citing People vs. Mamba, 58 Phil. 665, 668.

^[4]
Diccionario de la Lengua Española, Decimoctava ed. (1956),
p. 1002.  See also:  Spanish-English Dictionary by Velasquez (1942), p. 489.

^[5]
The first paragraph of Article 28, in its English and Spanish versions, reads:

“Art. 28.  Computation of penalties.  – If the offender shall be in prison the term
of the duration of the temporary penalties shall be computed from the day on
which the judgment of conviction shall have become final.

x                x                   x.”

“ART. 28.  Modo de
computer las penas.  – Cuando el
culpable estuviese preso,
la duracion de las penas tem­porales empezara a contarse desde el dia en que la sentencia condenatoria hubiere quedado firme.

x                 x                  x.”

^[6]
Crawford, Statutory Construction, 1940
ed., p. 669, citing cases.

^[7]
Emphasis supplied.

^[8]
“Reo”
in Spanish may mean:  “Criminoso, culpado” or
“Persona que por haber cometido una culpa merece castigo.” Diccionario de la Lengua Española, Decimoctava ed. (1956),
pag. 1130.

^[9]
Emphasis supplied.  The Spanish text reads:

“ART. 98.  Abono especial de tiempo
por lealtad.  – A los penados que quebrantaren
su sentencia en las circunstancias previstas en el articulo 158 de este Codigo, y se entregaren a la autoridad dentro de las 48 horas siguientes a la proclama del cese de la calamidad a que se refiere dicho articulo,
se les concedera un abono
de una quinta parte de su condena.”

^[10]
At p. 125; emphasis supplied.  See also:  People vs. Tapel, 64 Phil. 112, 114; Alvarado vs. Director of Prisons, 87 Phil. 157,
158, 159.

^[11]
Emphasis supplied.  The
“credit” mentioned in Sec. 5, Act 1533, appears in Section 1 thereof,
which reads:

“SECTION 1.  Each convict who is sentenced for a definite
term of more than thirty days and less than life shall be entitled to diminish
the period of his sentence under the following rules and regulations:

(a)    
For each full month, commencing
with the first day of his arrival at a provincial or Insular jail or prison,
during which he has not been guilty of a violation of discipline or any of the
rules of the prison, and has labored with diligence and fidelity upon all such
tasks as have been assigned to him, he shall be allowed a deduction of five
days from the period of his sentence.

(b)    
After he has served two full years
of a sentence, the deduction shall be eight days for each month thereafter.

(c)    
After he has served five full
years of a sentence, the deduction shall be ten days for each month thereafter.

(d)    
After he has served ten full years
of his sentence, the deduction from his term shall be fifteen days for each
month thereafter.”

This was supplanted by Article 97
of the Revised Penal Code.

^[12]
The present Article 33 of the Penal
Code of Spain reads:

“ART. 33.  El tiempo de prision preventiva sufrida par el delincuente durante la tramitacion de la causa, se abonara en su totalidad
para el cumplimiento de la condena, cualquiera que sea la clase de la pena impuesta.” (Redaccion de 1944:  RipoIles, Codigo Penal, Tomo 1, pag. 338).

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