PASTOR B. CONSTANTINO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. HERMINIA ESPIRITU, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

This is a direct appeal on a question of law taken by Pastor B. Constantino
from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
denying his motion for the admis­sion of his amended complaint in Civil Case
No. 5924, entitled “Pastor B. Constantino vs. Herminia
Espiritu.”

Appellant’s complaint alleged, inter alia,
that he had, by a fictitious deed or absolute
sale annexed thereto, conveyed to appellee on October
30, 1953, for a consideration of P8,000.00, the two-storey house and four (4)
sub­division lots covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 20174 issued by
the Register of Deeds of Rizal on October 25, 1950 in
the name of Pastor B. Constantino, married to Honorata Geukeko, with the
understanding that appellee would hold the properties
in trust for their il­legitimate son, Pastor Constantino,
Jr., still unborn at the time of
the conveyance; that thereafter appellee mort­gaged
said properties to the Republic Savings Bank of Manila twice to secure payment
of two loans, one of P3,000.00 and the other of P2,000.00, and that thereafter
she offered them for sale.  The complaint
then prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction restraining appellee and her agents
or representatives from further alienating or dispos­ing of the
properties, and for judgment ordering her to exe­cute a deed of absolute sale
of said properties in favor of Pastor B. Constantino,
Jr., the beneficiary (who, at the filing
of said complaint, was about five years of age), and to pay attorney’s
fees in the sum of P2,000.00.

As a result of the conveyance mentioned heretofore, TCT No. 20714
in the name of plaintiff was partially can­celled and in lieu thereof, TCT No.
32744 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal in
the name of appellee Herminia
Espiritu.

On December 16, 1959, appellee moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
it stated no cause of action because Pastor Constantino,
Jr., the beneficiary of the alleged trust, was not included as party-plaintiff, and on the further ground that appellant’s
cause of action was unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds.

In his opposition to said motion to dismiss, appel­lant argued
that the Statute of Frauds does not apply to trustee and cestui
que trust as in the case of appellee and her illegitimate child, and that for this
reason appellant would not be barred from proving by parol
evidence an implied trust existing under Article 1453 of the Civil Code.  On the other hand, in her rejoinder to
appellant’s opposition, appellee argued that what the
former was invoking in his complaint (Paragraph V, Complaint) was an implied
trust under Article 1453 of the Civil Code and not an express trust under
Section 3, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.  Finding the grounds alleged in the motion to
dismiss to be meritorious, the trial court dismissed the complaint, with costs.

Immediately after receiving notice of said order of dismissal,
appellant filed a motion for the admission of an amended complaint, attaching
thereto a copy thereof, the amendment consisting mainly of the inclusion of the
minor, Pastor Constantino, Jr. as co-plaintiff.  The amended com­plaint further prayed for the
appointment of appellant as said minor’s guardian ad litem.  An opposition thereto was filed on the ground
that the amendment aforesaid was not an inclusion but a substitution of the
party plaintiff.  As the latter had no
interest whatsoever in the subject matter of the case, it was argued that the
substitution was not allowed in this jurisdiction.  Appellant’s answer to appel­lee’s
opposition alleged that, as the ground relied upon in said opposition was
purely technical, even the substitution of the party plaintiff should be
allowed under Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court.  Thereafter the lower court issued the
appealed order denying appellant’s motion for the admission of his amended
complaint.  Hence, the
instant direct appeal.

The original as well as the amended complaint men­tioned above
allege that the sale made by appellant Cons­tantino
in favor of appellee of the properties described in
said pleadings was subject to the agreement that the vendee would hold them in trust for their at that
time already conceived but unborn illegitimate child; that the vendee violated
this agreement, firstly, by subjecting them to two different contracts of
mortgage, and later by trying to sell them, this being not only in violation of
the aforesaid agreement but prejudicial to the cestui
que trust; that the action was commenced to compel
the vendee to comply with their agreement by executing the correspond­ing deed
of conveyance in favor of their minor son, and to desist from further doing any
act prejudicial to the inter­ests of the latter.

It appears then that, upon the facts alleged by appellant, the
contract between him and appellee was a contract pour autrui,
although couched in the form of a deed of absolute sale, and that appellant’s
action was, in effect, one for specific performance.  That one of the par­ties to a contract is
entitled to bring an action for its enforcement or to prevent its breach is too
clear to need any extensive discussion. 
Upon the other hand, that the contract involved contained a stipulation pour autrui am­plifies this settled
rule only in the sense that the third person for whose benefit the contract was
entered into may also demand its fulfillment provided he had communicated his
acceptance thereof to the obligor before the stipula­tion in his favor is
revoked.

It appearing that the amended complaint submitted by appellant to
the lower court impleaded the beneficiary under the
contract as a party co-plaintiff, it seems clear that the three parties
concerned therewith would, as a result, be before the court and the latter’s
adjudication would be complete and binding upon them.

The ruling in the case of Echaus vs. Gan, 55 Phil. 527 involving facts similar to the ones
before Us is of obvious application to the
latter.  We quote the following pertinent
portions of our decision in said case:

“This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance or
Occidental Negros by Adoracion
Rosales de Echaus, assisted by her husband En­rique Echaus, for the purpose of obtaining a judicial order requiring
the defendant Maria Gan, as administratrix
of the estate of her deceased husband, Manuel Gay Yulingco,
as well as the heirs of said decedent, to execute in due form a contract, with
appropriate descrip­tion of the real property involved, in con­formity with the
terms of an agreement dated
September 3, 1927, executed by the deceased Manuel Gay Yulingco,
in life, and Enrique Echaus, one of the plaintiffs in
the case (Exhibit A).  To this action the
defendants interposed a general answer and cross-com­plaint, in the latter of
which they sought a decree annulling the contract Exhibit A as excessively
onerous and illegal.  Upon hearing the
cause the trial court absolved the plaintiffs from the cross-complaint and gave
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs upon the complaint, requiring the
defendants, within thirty days from the date of the finality of the decision,
to execute before a notary public and deliver to the plaintiffs a con­tract
similar in terms to that indicated in the Exhibit A but containing, in addition,
a description of the real property involved, in such form as would enable the
plaintiff’s to procure said contract to be inscribed on the certificate of
title corresponding to said property, with costs against the defendants.  From this judgment the defendants appealed.

x     x     x     x

The contract in question, Exhibit A, on which this action is based,
was executed by Manuel Gay Yulingco and Enrique Echaus, and although the contract binds Yulingco
to pay to Adoracion Rosales de Echaus,
the wife of Enrique Echaus, the sum of fifty centavos
for each picul of sugar that may be produced upon the
two haciendas covered by the contract during the fourteen years beginning with
the crop for 1927-1928, nevertheless this action is not instituted by the nominal
beneficiary, Adoracion Rosales de Echaus,
directly for the purpose of obtaining
the benefit which said contract purports to con­fer upon her.  The purpose of the action is to compel the
defendants to execute a con­tract pursuant to the tenor of the contract Exhibit
A, but containing an adequate de­scription
of the property contained in the two haciendas, for the purpose of
enabling Echaus to procure the annotation of said
contract on the Torrens certificates of title.  It is therefore evident that, technically
speaking, the proper person to bring this action is Enrique Echaus,
the person with whom the contract was made by Yulingco.  It is, nevertheless, equally obvious that the
wife of Enrique Echaus is a party in interest, and
she is certainly a proper, if not an entirely necessary party to the ac­tion.  It results that there is really no improper joinder of parties
plaintiff.”

Whether the contract of sale entered into between appellant and appellee was – as claimed in the amended complaint –
subject to the agreement that appellee would hold the
properties in trust for their unborn child is a question of fact
that appellee may raise in her answer for the lower
court to determine after trial.  On the
other hand, the contention that the contract in question is not enforceable by
action by reason of the provisions of the Statute of Frauds does not appear to
be indubitable, it being clear upon the facts alleged in the amended
complaint that the contract between the parties had already been partially performed by the ex­ecution of the deed of sale, the action
brought below being only for the enforcement of another phase thereof, namely,
the execution by appellee of a deed of conveyance in favor of the beneficiary thereunder.

WHEREFORE, the appealed order is hereby set aside and the
case is remanded to the lower court
for further proceedings in accordance with law.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Makalintal, J., in the result.

Barredo, J., concurs in a separate opinion.

Makasiar, J., concurs in the separate opinion of Justice Barredo.