MARTA QUIÑIANO, TEODORICO SOLIS, ALBINO CALDONA, ANTERO SANCHEZ, FELIX CAPITO AND CELEDONIO FERMIN, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, LUISA BARBOSA, MARIA SARMIENTO, A…

What is sought to be reversed in this petition for the review of
a decision of respondent Court of Appeals is its judgment sustaining an action
for reconveyance of three parcels of land in favor of
private respondents.^[1]
They were the victims of a fraud of which principal petitioner Marta Quiñiano^[2]
was held responsible, it being shown
that she was able to obtain a free patent to the disputed lots to which private
respondents were entitled by virtue of an extra-judicial partition, executed
nine years previously.  The law in its
wisdom certainly has not left private respondents remediless.  Any form of deceit being viewed with
disapproval, those victimized can look to its protection.  So it has been attested by the constant
course of decisions of this Court, Hence, petitioner Quiñiano’s
plea for reversal is devoid of merit. 
The other principal petitioner, Celedonio Fermin, bought two of the disputed parcels and
three-fourths of the third from a previous vendee, but failed to obtain a title
on his own behalf.^[3] His claim, therefore, that as to him, the
decision cannot stand, as he is innocent purchaser for value, is likewise
unpersuasive.  We affirm.

The facts as found by respondent Court of Appeals disclosed that
the original owners of the disputed parcels located in Pangasinan
were the spouses Fabiano Sarmiento
and Tomasa de
Guzman who, on October 13, 1894, obtained a “titulo
real de composicion gratuita”
covering the same.^[4] The spouses had two children.  The first was Jose, who in his lifetime was
married to respondent Luisa Barbosa, with whom he had
as issues the other respondents Maria, Agueda, Petra and Rufina, all
surnamed Sarmiento.^[5] The other was Joaquina,
the mother of the principal petitioner, Marta Quiñiano.^[6] In 1932, there was an extra-judicial
partition adjudicating such lots to Jose.^[7] This notwithstanding, Marta Quiñiano filed an application for a free patent in 1941 in
order to acquire the same.^[8] She was successful, a free patent being
granted her on November 12 of that year, thereafter registered on November 26
as a result of which an original certificate of title was issued to her.^[9] The evidence is clear, according to
respondent Court of Appeals that private respondents were unaware of her
machinations.^[10] She was likewise able to take possession
during the early part of the Japanese Occupation,^[11] It was not until “some sort of peace
and order had been restored”, to quote from the appealed decision, that in
November, 1943 a complaint for reconveyance with
damages was filed with private respondents as plaintiffs wherein they
specifically set forth the circumstances under which a free patent was obtained
by Quiñiano without their knowledge.  Thereafter they learned that on the 2nd of
December, 1946, she had sold Lots 6 and 8 as well as three-fourths of Lot 5 to
a certain Felix Capito and on December 7, 1946, she
sold the remaining one-fourth of
Lot 5 to Antero Sanchez, with the former in turn
having transferred his rights to now petitioner Celedonio
Fermin without such vendees, however, obtaining any
certificate of title in their names.  The
complaint was then amended on March 2, 1948 to include the other vendees as defendants.^[12]

It should be noted that the complaint by private respondents, as
plaintiffs, involved ten parcels situated in San Carlos,
Pangasinan. 
They were sustained in the lower court decision as to Lots 1, 3, 4, 7, 9
and 11.  Their action was dismissed as to
Lots 2 and 10 as well as to the present disputed Lots 5, 6 and 8.^[13]
They elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals which, in the light of the
above facts, awarded them Lots 5, 6 and 8, decreeing a reconveyance
in their favor as well as ordering the receiver appointed “to deliver
these properties unto the plaintiffs as
well as the net harvest during his receivership; costs against defendant Marta Quiñiano.”^[14] It is from such a decision that a petition
for review was taken to this Court.

Petitioners, as announced
at the outset, cannot hope to succeed. 
On the facts as found, the law was correctly applied.

1.  The controlling legal
norm was set forth in succinct language by Justice Tuason
in a 1953 decision, Director of Lands v. Register of Deeds of Rizal.^[15]
Thus:  “The sole remedy of the land
owner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another’s
name is, after one year from the date of the decree, not to set aside the
decree, as was done in the instant case, but, respecting the decree as
incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action in
the ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if
the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for
damages.”^[16]
Such a doctrine goes back to the 1919 landmark decision of Cabanos
v. Register of Deeds of Laguna.^[17]
If it were otherwise, the institution of registration
would, to quote from Justice Torres, serve “as a protecting
mantle to cover and shelter bad faith * * *.”^[18] In the language of the then Justice, later
Chief Justice, Bengzon:  “A different view would encourage fraud
and permit one person unjustly to enrich himself at the expense of
another.”^[19] It would indeed be a signal failing of any
legal system if under the circumstances dis­closed, the aggrieved party is
considered as having lost his right to a property to which he is entitled.  It is one thing to protect an innocent third
party; it is entirely a different matter, and one devoid of justification, if
deceit would be rewarded by allowing the perpetrator to enjoy the fruits of his
nefarious deed.  As clearly revealed by the undeviating line of decisions coming from this Court, such an
undesirable eventuality is precisely sought to be guarded against.  So it has been before; so it should continue
to be.

The brief for petitioners would seek to escape from the
unmistakable sense of our past decisions. 
It sought to justify what was done by Marta Quiñiano.  Obviously; such effort was in vain.  It is contended in its first assignment of
error that the defense of prescription would lie.  The patent was obtained in 1941; the complaint was filed in 1943, barely
two years after.  An ordinary action
based on fraud should be filed within four years.^[20]
Where the action is one for reconveyance based on
constructive trust, a ten-year period is
allowed.^[21] The same lack of merit is clearly
discernible insofar as the next seven errors alleged to be committed in
the disposition of the claim of petitioner Marta Quiñiano.  The second and the third alleged errors
concerning the appraisal of certain documentary exhibits are essentially
factual and need not be inquired into. 
So it is with the sixth and the seventh assigned errors to the effect
that the lands in question had already been adjudicated to private respondents
when the free patent was applied for and that they were more­over in possession
as found by this Court.  The fourth and
the fifth alleged errors dealt with the effect of the issuance of the free
patent and would assert contrary to the decisions referred to that thereby
Marta Quiñiano could no longer be compelled to reconvey.  The eighth
alleged error, discussed in one paragraph, was merely a consequence of the
preceding ones.  It would insist contrary
to what had been established that petitioner Quiñiano
did not obtain her free patent and title through fraud.

2.  Insofar as petitioner Celedonio Fermin, who acquired
the rights of a previous vendee, petitioner Felix Capito,
from petitioner Quiñiano, the appealed decision did
not consider him an innocent purchaser for value.  It is undisputed that neither the first vendee,
Capito, nor petitioner Fermin
took the trouble of securing certificates of title in their names.^[22]
Necessarily then, in the light of our applicable decisions, respondent Court
could not consider them as innocent purchasers for value.

So it was held in Mirasol v. Gerochi,^[23]
decided in 1953.  Thus:  “Antonio Mirasol
is in a
different predicament.  He bought the
property from Natividad Escarrilla,
who in turn acquired it from Salvador Solano. 
The different deeds of conveyance were merely annotated on the original
and duplicate certificates of title which appear in the name of the previous
owners.  Neither Solano, nor Escarrilla, nor Mirasol ever
secured from the Register of Deeds the transfer of a new certi­ficate of title
in their names.  In other words, the only
picture Mirasol presents before us is that of a
purchaser of registered land from a person who did not have any certificate of
title in his name, his only evidence being the deed of sale in his favor, and its annotation on the certificate of title
which still appears in the name of the previous owners, most of whom had
already died.  He is not therefore a
‘subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes a certificate of title
for value and in good faith’ and
who is protected against any encumbrance except those noted on said
certificate, as provided for in section 39 of Act No. 496.”^[24]
The Mirasol ruling was reiterated in Revilla v. Galindez,^[25]
decided seven years later, in these words: 
“Where a person buys land not from the registered owner but from
one whose right to the land has been merely annotated on the certificate of
title, and such purchaser merely had his deed of sale annotated on the certi­ficate
of title, he is not considered a ‘subsequent purchaser of registered land who
takes certificate of title for value and in good faith and who is protected
against any encumbrance except those noted on said certificate.’ “^[26]

It is thus apparent that the attempt of petitioner Fermin to impute alleged errors to respondent Court is
devoid of any support in law.

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of February 27, 1964 is affirmed.  With costs against petitioners, except
petitioner Antero Sanchez.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Ruiz Castro, J., no part.

^[1]
These respondents are:  Luisa Barbosa, Maria Sarmiento, Agueda Sarmiento, Petra Sarmiento and Rufina Sarmiento.

^[2]
She is married to one of the petitioners, Teodorico
Solis.  Another petitioner, Albino Caldona, appeared to be her overseer.

^[3]
Petitioner Felix Capito was such previous vendee who
first acquired the same from petitioner Marta Quiñiano.  The last-named person in the petition, Antero Sanchez, bought one-fourth of a lot in dispute from
petitioner Quiñiano. 
No further notice need be taken of him, as this Court, by a resolution
of July 20, 1964,
reaffirmed in another resolution of September
7, 1964 denying a motion for reconsideration, dismissed his
petition for being late.

^[4]
Decision of the Court of Appeals, Appendix to the Brief for the Petitioners, p.
37.

^[5]
Ibid, p. 38.

^[6]
Ibid.

^[7]
Ibid, p. 45.

^[8]
Ibid, p. 39.

^[9]
Ibid.

^[10]
Ibid.

^[11]
Ibid, p. 40.

^[12]
Ibid, pp. 40-41 and p. 51.

^[13]
Ibid, p. 34.

^[14]
Ibid, p. 54.

^[15]  92 Phil. 826. 
Cf. Avecilla v. Yatco,
103 Phil. 666 (1958); Nebrada v. Heirs of Alivio, 104 Phil. 126 (1958); Roco
v. Gimeda, 104 Phil. 1011 (1958); Aragon v.
Aragon, 105 Phil. 365 (1959); Republic v. Heirs of C. Carle, 105 Phil.
1227 (1959); Moldero v. Yandoc,
L-14321, Oct. 20, 1961, 3 SCRA 246; Alzona v. Capunitan, L-10228, Feb. 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 450; Juan v.
Zuñiga, L-17044, April 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 1221; J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. v. Macalindong,
L-15398, Dec. 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 938; Gonzales v. Jimenez, L-19073, Jan.
30, 1965, 13 SCRA 80.

^[16]
Ibid, p. 831.

^[17]
40 Phil. 620.  The Cabanos
decision was subsequently cited in the following cases:  Sotto v. Sotto, 43 Phil. 688 (1922); Severino v. Severino, 44
Phil. 343 (1923); Paguio v. Manlapid, 52 Phil. 534 (1928); Garcia v. Doncillo, 53 Phil. 682 (1929); Philippine Land Improve­ment
Co. v. Blas, 55 Phil. 540 (1930); Roco v. Gimeda, 104 Phil.
1011 (1958); Tiburcio v. P.H.H.C., 105 Phil.
477 (1959); Vengaso v. Buencamino,
109 Phil. 206 (1960); Caladiao v. Vda. de Blas, L-19063, April 29,
1964, 10 SCRA 691; Almirañez v. Devera, L-19496, Feb. 27, 1965, 13 SCRA 343; P.H.H.C. v.
Mencias, L-24114, Aug. 16, 1967, 20 SCRA 1031; Gestosani v. Insular Development Co. Inc., L-21166,
Sept. 15, 1967, 21 SCRA 114; Galarpe de Melgar v. Pagayon,
L-22731, Nov. 15, 1967, 21 SCRA 841.

^[18]
Ibid, p. 632.

^[19]
Juan v. Zuñiga, L-17044, April 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 1221, 1226.

^[20]
Llanera v. Lopos,
106 Phil. 70 (1959); Gerona v.
de Guzman, L-19060, May 29, 1964,
11 SCRA 153.

^[21]
Gonzales v. Jimenez, L-19073, Jan. 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 80, citing Boñaga v. Soler, L-15717,
June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 755; Alzona v. Capunitan, L-10228, Feb. 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 450; Joaquin v.
Cujuangco, L-18060, July 25, 1967, 20 SCRA 769.

^[22]
Decision of the Court of Appeals, Appendix to the Brief for the Petitioners, p.
52.

^[23]
93 Phil. 480.

^[24]
Ibid, pp. 485-486.

^[25]
107 Phil. 480 (1960).

^[26]
Ibid, p. 486.