G.R. No. L-30496. May 31, 1971
JOSE S. JIMENEZ, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. ANTERO U. ROA, C. B. AMORES AND HON. ABELARDO SUBIDO, RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental dismissing appellant’s petition for
declaratory relief and certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals as
involving purely questions of law.
The case background is thus given in the appellate court’s
certification resolution: “Petitioner
alleged that he is a civil service eligible appointed by respondent mayor (Antero U. Roa) of Clarin, Misamis Occidental, as
chief of police of said municipality effective January 1, 1964, on which date
he assumed office and performed his duties; that his appointment was forwarded
for attestation to the respondent provincial treasurer, (C. B. Amores) who, on March 10, 1964, returned it to the mayor,
without the attestation, because petitioner had a pending criminal case for
violation of Section 2753 of the Revised Administrative Code and because there
was no vacant position to which petitioner could be appointed as the former
chief of police had not resigned; that when the mayor returned petitioner’s
appointment to the Provincial treasurer, the latter endorsed it to the respondent
commissioner of civil service (Abelardo Subido); that on July 17, 1964, the mayor terminated the
services of petitioner and three days later, recalled his appointment from the
civil service commissioner; and that on August 20, 1964, petitioner
relinquished his office.
“Respondent mayor filed a motion to dismiss contending,
among other things, that under the provisions of the Rules of Court on
declaratory relief, the averments of the petition do not make out a case for
declaratory judgment. In his answer, respondent
provincial treasurer also prayed for dismissal inasmuch as the appointment,
which was, in the first place, not alleged to have been confirmed by the municipal
council, had already been recalled or withdrawn. On his part, respondent commissioner of civil
service averred that petitioner does not possess the appropriate civil service
eligibility to qualify him for the position of chief of police; that his appointment
has never become effective for lack of attestation by the provincial treasurer
as required under Section 20 of Rep. Act No. 2260 and not having become effective
the municipal mayor could withdraw it, as the latter
in fact did.
“The trial court issued an order dismissing the petition,
‘(S)ince the appointment has
already been recalled by the appointing power and the services of the
petitioner had been terminated, there is no more appointment the validity of
which is to be passed upon. The petition
does not state a cause of action. This
Court is not being asked to determine the validity of the recall of his
appointment.'”
Petitioner-appellant contends on appeal that the lower court
erred in holding that his petition failed to state a cause of action,
particularly since petitioner’s unattested appointment had been recalled and
petitioner had not asked it to determine the validity of such recall of
appointment.
The Court finds no error in the lower court’s dismissal order.
Prescinding from the question of
whether petitioner’s action, based on an incomplete appointment, could properly
come within the terms of Rule 64, section 1 for declaratory relief actions,[1]
his petition failed to make out a proper case for declaratory relief. This is Patent from the prayer of his
petition, whereby he petitioned the lower court “to exercise its power to determine
the validity of petitioner’s appointment should it be attested pending final
disposition of the criminal case against herein petitioner for alleged
violation of section 2753 of the Revised Administrative Code.”
Since the petition itself
was premised on the happening of a contingent event – the attestation of his
appointment, which as alleged in the very petition, was never given and
instead, his appointment was recalled – there was no issue ripe for judicial
determination and petitioner had no legal interest entitling him to declaratory
relief. His alleged right of appointment
had not come into being for the simple reason that the contingency of
attestation thereof had not come about.
The courts are not called upon to resolve problems as a
“pure academic exercise”, as stated in Aragones
vs. Subido[2];
“(T)he general rule has always been that courts
cannot furnish answers to purposeless questions that do not exist. Even in cases of declaratory relief, there
must be an actual and justiciable, not merely
theoretical, controversy.” The requisites of justiciability
of an action for declaratory relief must be present, satisfying the court that
“an actual controversy, or the ripening of one exists between parties all
of whom are sui juris
and before the court, and that the declaration sought will be a practical help
in ending the controversy.”[3]
Appellant’s ancillary contentions on appeal
that the lower court should have determined the validity of the recall of his
appointment by respondent mayor is manifestly untenable. His petition plainly sought a determination,
of the validity of his appointment “should it be attested” and in
no way, of the validity of its subsequent recall. The lower court therefore correctly ruled
that with such recall “there is no more appointment the validity of which
is to be passed upon” and properly exercised its discretionary power as
provided in section 5 of the Rule.[4]
Petitioner-appellant complains in his brief that he “had
performed an essential public service for sometime without having received
compensation because said compensation would depend on the attestation of the
appointment.” This is a completely different question for which
petitioner would have to avail of an ordinary action for recovery of
compensation for services rendered, should he establish a legal and factual
right thereto, considering the factual objections to his appointment tendered
by respondents viz., that the position to which he was appointed was not
vacant and that he lacked the appropriate civil service eligibility.
ACCORDINGLY, the order of dismissal appealed from is
hereby affirmed. Without
costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Barredo, and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Ruiz Castro, Fernando, and
Makasiar, JJ., took
no part.
[1] SECTION 1. Who may
file petition. — Any person
interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose
rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance,
may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action to determine any
question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or statute
and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder. x x“
[2] 25 SCRA 95 (Sept. 23, 1968) and cases cited.
[3] Vide
3 Moran’s Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., pp. 145-146.
[4] “Sec 5. Discretionary. — Except in actions falling under paragraph
2 of section 1 of this rule, the court may refuse to exercise the power to
declare rights and to construe instruments in any case where a decision would
not terminate the uncertainty or controversy which gave rise to the action, or
in any case where the declaration, or construction is not necessary and proper
at the time under all the circumstances.”