RICARDO PARULAN, PETITIONER, VS. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, RESPONDENT.

On petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed by
Ricardo Parulan, directed to the Director of the
Bureau of Prisons, praying that the latter be ordered “to release
immediately and without delay the body of the petitioner from unlawful and
illegal confinement”, anchoring the relief prayed for on certain allegations
in the petition, to the effect that petitioner’s confinement in the state
penitentiary at Muntinglupa, Rizal,
under the administrative and super­visory control of the respondent Director of
Prisons, is illegal, for the reason that the sentence of conviction impose upon
said petitioner for the crime of evasion of service of sen­tence, penalized
under Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, was rendered
by a court without juris­diction over his person and of the offense with which
he was charged.

It appears that the petitioner as alleged in the petition, was confined in the state peniten­tiary at Muntinglupa, Rizal, serving a
sentence of life imprisonment which, however, was commuted to twenty (20) years
by the President of the Philip­pines.  In October, 1964, he was transferred to the
military barracks of Fort Bonifacio (formerly Fort Wm.
McKinley) situated at Makati,
Rizal, under the custody of the Stockade Officer of
the said military barracks.  In that
month of October, 1964, while still serving his prison term as aforesaid, he effected his escape from his confinement.  Peti­tioner was recaptured in the City of Manila.  Pro­secuted for the crime of evasion of
service of sen­tence, penalized under Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code,
before the Court of First Instance of Manila, after due trial, petitioner was
found guilty of the offense charged and sentenced accordingly with the impossable penalty prescribed by law, on August 3, 1966.

Assuming the correctness of the facts as alleged in the petition,
and on the basis thereof, we shall proceed to discuss the merits of the case
regarding the validity and legality of the decision sentencing the petitioner
to a prison term for the crime of evasion of sentence.

Settled is the rule that for deprivation of any fundamental or
constitutional rights, lack of jurisdiction of the court to impose the
sentence, or excessive penalty affords grounds for relief by habeas corpus.

The issue, therefore, as posed in the peti­tion is:  Was the Court of First Instance of Manila with
jurisdiction to try and decide case and to impose the sentence upon the
petitioner, for, the offense with which he was charged – evasion of service of
sentence?

Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

“Place where action is to be instituted.  – (a) In all
criminal prosecutions the act­ion shall be instituted and tried in the court of
the municipality or province where the offense was committed or any of the
essential ingre­dients thereof took place.”

There are crimes which are called transitory or continuing
offenses because some acts material and essential to the crime occur in one
province and some in another, in which case, the rule is settled that the court
of either province where any of the essential ingredients of the crime took
place has jurisdiction to try the case.^[1]
As Go­mez Orbaneja opines –

Que habiendo en
el delito continuado tantos resultados como hechos
independientes en sentido
natural, el principio del resultado
no basta para fijar el forum delicti
commisi, y ha de aceptarse
que el delicto se comete en cualquira de los lugares donde
se produzca uno de esos plurales resultados.”^[2]

There are, however, crimes which although all the elements
thereof for its consummation may have occurred in a single place, yet by reason
of the nature of the offense committed, the violation of the law is deemed to
be continuing.  Of the first class, the
crime of estafa or malversation,^[3]
and abduction,^[4]
may be mentioned; and as belonging to the second class are the crimes of
kidnapping and illegal detention where the deprivation of liberty is persistent
and continuing from one place to ano­ther,^[5]
and libel where the libelous matter is pub­lished or circulated from one
province to another.^[6]
To this latter class may also be included the crime of evasion of service of
sentence, when the prisoner in his attempt to evade the service of the sentence
imposed upon him by the courts and thus defeat the purpose of the law, moves
from one place to another; for, in this case, the act of the escaped prisoner
is a continuous or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated
by an uninterminent force, how­ever long it may
be.  It may not be validly said that
after the convict shall have escaped from the place of his confinement the
crime is fully consummated, for, as long as he continues to evade the service
of his sentence, he is deemed to continue committing the crime, and may be
arrested without warrant, at any place where he may be found.  Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court may be
invoked in support of this conclusion, for, under section 6[c] thereof, one of
the instances when a person may be validly arrested without a warrant is where
he has escaped from confinement.^[7]
Undoubtedly, this right of ar­rest without a warrant is founded on the principle
that at the time of the arrest, the escapee is in the continuous act of
committing a crime – evading the service of his sentence.

WHEREFORE, the writ is denied.  Without costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Ruiz Castro, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

^[1] U.S. v. Santiago, 27 Phil. 408; U.S. v. Cardell, 23 Phil. 207.

^[2] VI-Nueva Enciclopedia
Juridica por F Seix Editor, p. 463.

^[3] U.S. v. Santiago, supra.

^[4] People v. Bernabe, 23 Phil. 154.

^[5]
U.S. v. Laureaga, 2 Phil. 71; People v.
Parulan, L-2025, April 25, 1951.

^[6]
Art. 360, par. 3, as amended by Rep. Act 1289; People v. Borja, 43 Phil. 618.

^[7] Salonga v. Holland, 76 Phil. 412.