G.R. Nos. L-28170 & L-28200. February 17, 1968
CARMEN PARDO DE TAVERA Y LOPEZ MANZANO, PETITIONER, VS. DEMETRIO B. ENCARNACION; HON. JOSE B. JIMENEZ, AS JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITE, BRANCH III; HON. WALFRIDO DE …
ANGELES, J.:
Petitioner is the owner of a parcel of land situated in Quezon City, known as Lot No. 8-A,
Sub-block No. 13-F, of the Subdivision Plan Psd-1107, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 18304 (18833) of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. On February
18, 1954, she leased
the said lot to herein respondent Demetrio
B. Encarnacion, for a
period of twelve (12) years, at a monthly rental of
P0.60 per square meter, or P120.00 monthly.
The contract of lease
above referred to stipulates that –
“2. a – The duration of this lease shall be for a
period of Twelve (12) years counted from the date hereof, which may be renewed
for another period of Eight (8) years under such rental, terms and conditions
which the Lessor and the Lessee may then agree upon,
and in case the Lessee would desire
such renewal, he shall so notify the Lessor in
writing at least Sixty (60) days before the expiration of the Twelve (12) years
period hereinabove stipulated, and the parties will have to reach an agreement regarding the renewal at least
thirty (30) days prior to the date of expiration of the said Twelve (12) years period; otherwise,
the lease shall not be renewed.”
At the end of the
stipulated 12-year lease period, there was no agreement reached between the
parties as to the renewal of the
contract, although it appears from the record that before the expiration of the period of the lease, the parties tried to negotiate for a
renewal, as follows:
On September
25, 1965, the lessee
notified the lessor of his desire to avail of the renewal provision of their lease contract, but requesting
for a reduction of the rental to P80.00
a month. On October 1, 1965, the lessor informed the lessee that “there is a
prospect for the lease of the lot in question for ten (10) years
period from February 19, 1966, at P500.00 monthly rental, and all improvements to be introduced by
the lessee will be for me at the expiration of the period of the lease x x x.” On October 11, 1965, the lessee reiterated in writing his desire to renew the contract, and
mentioning justifications for a reduced rental. By a letter of October 22, 1965, the lessor informed the
lessee that if the lease would be renewed, it would be on an increased rental taking into account
the decrease in the purchasing
power of the peso, the increase of business opportunities in the vicinity, the
increase of rentals of buildings in similar locations, and increase in real
estate taxes. On January 17,
1966, the lessor wrote another letter stating that
“unless we could agree as to the amount of the rental for the renewal of the
lease of the lot to you, the contract of lease shall automatically expire on
February 18, 1966, and hence, after that
date you should vacate the premises and deliver possession thereof to me,”
and that “I am ready and willing to have the lease of the lot leased to
you renewed for another period of eight (8) years from February 19, 1966, x x x for double the present rental, or TWO HUNDRED FORTY PESOS (P240.00) a month which rental is even less than the rental I expect to get
from another x x
x“.
Still on January 25, 1966, the lessor wrote
again to the lessee informing him that as
per survey made of the premises, the total area of the lot occupied by
the lessee is 347 square meters,
so that “my letter to you of January 17, 1966 x x
x is hereby modified in the sense that if you want to
continue with the lease it must be under terms and conditions which must be
agreed upon on or before February 18, 1966 taking into account the area of the lot. x x x.”
On February 17, 1966, one day before the expiration date of the aforesaid contract of lease, the lessee filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance
of Cavite (Civil Case N-872), for specific performance with damages, seeking to obtain a
renewal of the lease at a reduced rental of P80.00 a month. The lessor,
on March 1, 1966, instead of
answering the complaint, countered with a
“Special Appearance Attacking Jurisdiction and Venue with
Consequent Dismissal of the Case.”
A few days after the expiration
of the contract of lease, or on March 10, 1966, the lessor instituted unlawful
detainer-ejectment proceedings against the lessee in
the City Court of Quezon City. The lessee moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of the pendency of another action between the same parties for the same cause, but said court declared itself with
jurisdiction over the same. In his answer, the lessee raised the
same issues which he brought out in his complaint filed with the Court of First
Instance of Cavite.
After the answer, the case (City Court, Quezon City) was set for trial several times but
postponed at the instance of the lessee.
Finally, on January 14,
1967, the lessee filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
injunction (Civil Case No. Q-10710) seeking a declaration
that the City Court of Quezon City has no jurisdiction to
try the ejectment case. On February
10, 1967, the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal issued an order, as prayed for, advising
the parties to maintain the status quo pending the resolution of
the aforesaid petition for certiorari
and prohibition. By virtue of
this order, the city court refrained from proceeding with the trial of the ejectment case.
On May 26, 1967,
the Court of First Instance of Cavite issued an order declaring itself with jurisdiction
over the case for specific performance with damages filed by the lessee on February 17, 1966.
The lessor, Carmen Pardo
de Tavera, has
brought the case directly to this Court on petition: (a) for certiorari, to annul the order of the respondent
judge of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, declaring itself with jurisdiction to take cognizance of Civil
Case No. N-872, and to likewise annul the orders of the respondent judge of the Court of
First Instance of Quezon City in its Civil Case No. Q-10710 restraining the Quezon
City Court from trying the ejectment case and
denying the lessor’s motion to dismiss; (b) for prohibition, to restrain the respondents judges
of said Courts of First Instance
from further proceeding with the aforesaid cases before them; and (c) for mandamus, to order the respondent judge of
the Quezon City court to proceed with the hearing of the unlawful detainer-ejectment
case pending therein until its final termination.
We
find the petition to be meritorious.
The provision of the
lease contract entered into between petitioner and respondent is apparently clear that unless the lessor
and lessee agreed to a renewal thereof at least thirty days prior to the date
of expiration, the lease shall not be
renewed. The facts on record show that
despite the exchange of communication,
proposals end counter-proposals, between the parties regarding a renewal of the lease, they were not able
to arrive at an agreement within
said period, for while the lessor wanted an increased rental, the lessee, on the other
hand, proposed for a reduction. With
this failure of an agreement, it is to be presumed that the lessee was aware
that an ejectment case against him was
forthcoming. Whether or not the case
filed before the Cavite Court of First Instance, just
one day before the expiration of the base contract, was an anticipation to
block the action for ejectment which the lessor was to take against the lessee, the fact, however, is that the lessee was not disposed to leave the
premises. At any rate, while the said
case before the Court of First Instance of Cavite
appears to be one for specific performance with damages, it cannot be denied
that the real issue between the parties is whether or not the lessee should be
allowed to continue occupying the land as lessee.
The situation is not
novel to Us.
It
has been settled in a number of
cases[1] that the right of a lessee to occupy land leased as against the demand of the lessor should be decided under Rule 70 (formerly Rule 72) of the Rules of Court.
There is no merit to the contention that
the lessee’s supposed right to a
renewal of the lease contract
can not be decided in the ejectment suit. In the case of Teodoro v. Mirasol, supra, this Court held that “if the plaintiff has
any right to the extension of
the lease at all, such right is a proper and legitimate issue that could be
raised in the unlawful detainer case because it may
be used as a defense to the action.” In other words, the matter raised in
the Court of First Instance of Cavite may be threshed out in the ejectment
suit, in consonance with the principle prohibiting multiplicity of suits. And the mere fact that the unlawful detainer-ejectment case was
filed later, would not change the situation of the
foregoing ruling:
“It is to be noted that the Rules do not require as a ground
for dismissal of a complaint that there is a prior pending action. They
provide that there is a pending action, not a pending prior action. The fact that the unlawful detainer suit was
of a later date is no bar to the dismissal of the present action” (Teodoro,
Jr. v. Mirasol, supra.)
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, let the writs issue as prayed for in the petition, and the
preliminary injunction issued at the
commencement of these proceedings is made permanent. Costs against Demetrio B. Encarnacion.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro,
and Fernando, JJ., concur.
[1]
Pue, et al. v. Gonzales 8 Phil. 81; Lim Si
v. Lim, 98 Phil. 856; and
Teodoro, Jr. v. Mirasol,
99 Phil. 150.