EDUARDO JIMENEZ, PETITIONER, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND JUDGE PEDRO NAVARRO, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, RESPONDENTS.

On petition for writs of certiorari, prohibi­tion and mandamus,
with preliminary injunction, to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, praying:  (a)
to review and thereafter annul the order of respondent Judge denying
petitioner’s motion to set aside decision and promulgation thereof; (b) to
restrain respondent Judge from promulgating the decision; and (c) to direct
respondent Judge “to make re-examination of the evidence presented”
during the trial of the case and to render a decision upon the evidence.

The antecedent facts of the case which are not disputed,
are the following:

Eduardo Jimenez, herein petitioner, together with others, was
charged with homicide in an information, dated May 13, 1960, before the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, criminal case No. 9531 of
said court.  The case was heard and tried
before Judge Eulogio Mencias,
presiding one of the branches of the court. 
Admittedly, the decision prepared signed by Judge Mencias
was delivered to the clerk of court on January
16, 1965.  On the same date,
the clerk of court issued and served notice on the petitioner to appear in
court on January 21, 1965
for the promulgation of the sentence.  In
view that January 21, was declared by the President a special holiday, the
promulgation of the decision could not carried out on that day.  On January
21, 1965, Judge Eulogio Mencias had reached the age of 70 and was retired on that
day from the bench.  Respondent Judge
Pedro Navarro was immediately designated to take place of Judge Mencias.  The former
judge ordered that the sentence be promulgated on January 29, 1965 but for some reason, it was postponed to March 1, 1965.

On March 1, 1965, petitioner Jimenez filed a motion to set aside
decision and promulgation there­of, on the following grounds:  (a) “That the case was heard and tried
by the Hon. Eulogio Mencias
and judgment was rendered by him before he retired on January 21, 1965, having
reached the age of 70 years”; and (b) “That said judgment cannot be
validly promulga­ted since it is no longer the official act of a judge either de
jure or de facto.”

The motion was opposed by the private prosecutor.

On April 2, 1965,
the respondent Judge issued an order denying the motion, and ordered that the
decision be promulgated.

Hence, the instant petition.

The theory of the petitioner is, that for a decision to be
validly promulgated, the same must not only be rendered by a judge legally
appointed and acting either as de jure
or de facto, but that the decision must also be promulgated
during the incumbency of the judge who penned the decision, reasoning that if
the judge who penned the decision is no longer a judge at the time of the
promulga­tion, there is nothing that can legally be promul­gated because the
decision is no longer an official act of the judge.

The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that, while he
is in accord with the view that for a decision to be validly promulgated there
must be a judge legally appointed and acting, either de jure or de facto, it is not necessary
that the promulgation be made during the incumbency of the judge who prepared
and signed the decision, and the deci­sion can be validly promulgated as long
as it was signed and delivered to the clerk of court for promulgation during the
judge’s term of office.

Before the effectivity of the Revised
Rules of Court, on January 1, 1964,
the rule on promulgation of judgment in criminal cases was Section 6, Rule 116
of the Rules of Court, which reads thus:

“Sec. 6.  Promulgation of judg­ment.  – The judgment is promulga­ted by reading the
judgment or sentence in the presence of the defendant and the judge of the
court who has rendered it.  The
defendant must be personally present if the conviction is for a grave or less
grave offense; if for light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the
presence of his attorney or representative. 
And when the judge is absent or outside of the province, his pre­sence
is not necessary and the judgment may be promulgated or read to the defendant
by the clerk of court.” [Underscoring supplied]

After January 1, 1964,
the rule now is Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Court, which reads
thus:

“Sec. 6.  Promulgation of judg­ment.  – The judgment is promulga­ted by reading the
judgment or sentence in the presence of the defendant and any judge of the
court in which it was rendered.

“If the defendant is con­fined or detained in another province
or city, the judgment of conviction may be pro­mulgated by the judge of the
Court of First Instance having jurisdiction over the place of confinement or
detention upon the request of the court that rendered the judgment.  The court promulgating the judg­ment shall
have authority to accept the notice of appeal and to approve the appeal
bond.” [Underscoring supplied]

In Ong Siu, et al., v. Hon. Antonio P. Paredes,
et al., G. R. No. L-21638, July
26, 1966, the facts are as follows:

Four criminal cases, in which there were 6 accused, were tried
jointly by Judge Sta. Maria of the Municipal Court of Manila, and a single
decision was rendered, under date of July
7, 1962.  On July 9, 1962, before the decision
could be promulgated, Judge Sta. Maria was appointed to and assumed the
position of judge of the Court of First Instance of Mindoro.  Judge German succeeded him as Municipal Judge
of Manila.  Two of the accused, Fung
and Lu, petitioned the court that the unpromulgated
decision of Judge Sta. Maria be declared null and void.  Judge German granted the petition, but before
retrial of the cases could be had, Judge German resigned.  On August
23, 1962, Judge Paredes was appointed to
the vacant position of Municipal Judge of Manila.  On the same day, he scheduled the
promulgation of the decision of Judge Sta. Maria.  This was done with respect to the four
accused, but not with regards to defendants Fung and
Lu who did not appear during the promulgation of the judgment.  The latter two insti­tuted certiorari and
prohibition proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Manila to restrain
the promulgation of the decision.  The
Court of First Instance of Manila granted the writ on the ground that since
Judge Sta. Maria was no longer a judge of the Municipal Court, the decision,
prepared and signed by him could no longer be validly promulgated.  So Judge Paredes of
the Municipal Court ordered a retrial of the four criminal cases which was set
for March 14, 1963.  The four defendants Ong
Siu, Sy So Ty, Francisco Ong and Lucio Ong, went to CFI Manila and
applied for a writ to restrain the Municipal Judge from retrying the four
cases, on the ground that as the decision acquitting them had already been promulgated with respect
to them, a retrial of the cases would subject them to double jeopardy for the same offense.  The CFI Manila dismissed the pe­tition for the reason that the decision of Judge Sta. Maria being invalid because its promulgation was effected when the
judge had already ceased to be a municipal judge, the same cannot
place the de­fendants twice in jeopardy for the same offense. 
The four defendants appealed to the Supreme Court.  In affirming the appealed decision of the Court of First Instance, the Supreme Court in
applying Sec. 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules, said:

“The appellants in effect con­tend that since the decision of
Judge Sta. Maria was signed by him while he was still the judge of the
Municipal Court of Manila where they were tried, its promulgation, although made in his absence, was valid.  In support of this contention, they cite
Section 6 of Rule 116 (now Rule 120) of the Rules of Court, which reads:

‘Sec. 6. 
Promulgation
of judgment.  – The judgment is
promulgated by reading the judgment or sentence
in the presence of the defendant and any judge of the court in which it
was rendered.  The defendant must be
personally present if the conviction is for a grave of­fense; if for a light offense, the judgment may be
pronounced in the presence of his attorney
or represen­tative.  And when the
judge is absent or outside of the province or city, his presence is not
necessary and the judgment may be promulgated or read to the defendant by the
clerk of court.  x x
x.’ [Underlining supplied]

“Pursuant to the above-quoted provisions, the petitioners-appel­lants
argue, the decision of Judge Sta. Maria was promulgated in the presence of
Judge Paredes, another judge of the Municipal
Court.  They claim that the absence of
Judge Sta. Maria during the promulgation does not render the decision he penned
prior to his appointment to the position of judge of the court of first
instance null and void.  Thus, it is
alleged, the promulga­tion thereof, upon order of Judge Paredes,
was valid and could be the basis of the defense of double jeo­pardy.

“The above-quoted Section 6 of Rule 116 (now Rule 120) of the
Rules of Court, allowing the dis­pensability of the presence of the judge in
the reading of a sentence refers only to the physical absence of the judge,
and not to his inability to be present during the promulgation of the judgment
because of the cessation of or his removal from office.  This is clear from the use of the disjunctive
clause “ab­sent or outside of the province or city” in the
provision.  In other words, the decision
of the judge may be promulgated even without his presence, as long as he is
still a judge of that court (Luna v. Rodri­guez, 37 Phil. 186; Garchitorena v. Criscini, 37
Phil. 675; Barredo v. Commission on Elections, 45 O.
G. 4457; People v. Court of Appeals, G. R. Nos. L-9111-9113,
Aug. 28, 1956; People v. So, G. R. No. L­8732,
July 30, 1957)

“In the present case, what we have is not merely physical ab­sence
of the judge who penned the decision, but the cessation or termination of his
incumbency as such judge.  In the case of People v. Bonifacio So y
Ortega, (G. R. No. L-8732, supra) this Court ruled:

‘It is well-settled that to be binding a judg­ment must be duly
signed, and promulgated during the incumbency of the judge who signed it.

‘In Lino Luna v. Rodri­guez, supra,
Judge Barreto signed his decision on Jan­uary 14; two
days later (January 16), he qualified as Secretary of Finance thereby retiring
from the Judiciary; and on January 17, his decision was promulgated.  This Court held such decision to be void,
because at the time of the promulgation the judge who prepared it was no longer
a judicial officer.

‘In criminal proceedings the Rules are more explicit.  They require the judgment to be promulgated
by reading the judgment or sentence in the presence of the defendant and the
judge of the court who has rendered it.’ (Rule 116 sec. 6); and although
it is true that it may be read by the clerk “when the judge is absent or
outside the province”, it is implied that it may be read, provided he is
the judge therein.

It is contended that herein decision was promulgated to all intents
and purposes, when it was delivered to the clerk for promulgation – June
18.  That contention was however,
indirect­ly overruled in People v. Court of Appeals, a case similar to this
wherein we regarded com­pliance with sec. 6 of Rule 116 as essential to
promulgation, and held that as the judgment was promulgated after the
judge who penned it had ceased to be judge, it was not legally bind­ing.

It is true that in Cea v. Cinco (50 O. G. 5254) this sec­tion was interpreted to mean
that where judgment is one of acquittal, reading in the presence of the
defendant” may be substituted by giving a copy of the decision to
him.  We declared that such act –
delivery copy – amounted to promulgation. 
In the case before us, notice that the decision would be read (on Jun
30) was sent out, while Judge Encarnacion was still a
judge.  Yet no copy of such decision was
given the accused, and he was not informed thereof during said judge’s
incumbency.  No judg­ment was therefore
validly entered. (Cf. Landicho Tan,
48 O. G. 1007).’

“Here, in the present case, when the notice for the
promulgation of the decision was sent out, the judge who signed the decision
was no longer the judge of the court, and no copy of the judgment of acquittal
was deli­vered to the appellants.  With
more reasons, therefore, is there no judgment validly entered in this
case.”

Upon the foregoing considerations, We
hold that the decision rendered by the retired Judge Eulogio
Mencias cannot be validly promulgated and acquire a
binding effect for the same has become null and void under the circumstances.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Ruiz Castro, and Fernando, JJ., concur.