file:tecson vs comelec 161434 march 3, 2004 j_ carpio-morales.htm

DISSENTING OPINION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The Constitution, in unmistakable terms, declares that –

No person may be elected President unless he is a natural born
citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at
least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.[1]

Foremost, thus, in the qualifications for
one to seek to become the highest official of the land is that he must be a
natural-born Filipino, a “citizen of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
his Philippine citizenship.”[2]

As citizens of a nation which has its own political, social, and
cultural identity and independence, it is axiomatic that we elect to the
Philippine presidency only a citizen whose fealty to the Filipinos’ most
cherished ideals and aspirations as a people is above suspicion or whatever
approximates an unfailing allegiance to the Philippine State.  The President, with all his multifarious
powers and functions, is a focal point in this nation’s governance as shown by
the legacies and lessons of history and the continuing realities of the
present.  The process, therefore, of
selecting the person for the Office of the President partakes not only of a
moral obligation to choose the one best suited for the job but also, and more
importantly perhaps, of the matter of ensuring that he indeed possesses the
measurable qualifications as demanded of him by the Constitution.

This Court is once again mandated to interpret the law and apply
it to breathe life to its language and give expression to its spirit in the
context of real facts.  In the present
controversy which brings to fore the real import of the Constitutional
imposition that a candidate for President of the Philippines must be a natural-born Filipino, it is
specifically tasked to craft a rule of law that will govern the determination
of one’s citizenship in all cases, now
and in the future, without regard for whoever are the personalities involved.

The consolidated petitions subject of the present Decision, all
seek to disqualify respondent Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando
Poe, Jr. (FPJ) or Ronnie Poe, from seeking election as President of the
Republic of the Philippines on the ground that he is not a natural-born
Filipino and, thus, not qualified for the office of Chief Executive.

In G.R. Nos. 161434 and 161634, petitioners
Maria Jeannette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr. (Tecson et al.) and Zoilo Antonio Velez (Velez),
through separate original petitions filed with this Court, all invoke this
Court’s jurisdiction as “sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the President”[3]
of the Philippines to determine whether FPJ is eligible for the presidency in
accordance with the qualifications prescribed by Section 2 of Article VII of
the Constitution, viz:

Sec. 2. No person may be
elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the
day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election. (Emphasis supplied),

in relation to Sections 1 and 2 of
Article IV thereof, viz:

Sec. 1.          The following are citizens of the
Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution;

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with the law.

Sec. 2.          Natural-born citizens are those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.  Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.  (Emphasis supplied)

In G.R. No. 161824, petitioner Victorino X. Fornier (Fornier),[4]
via a petition for certiorari under
Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeks the review by this
Court of the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
dismissing a Petition for Disqualification in COMELEC SPA 04-003 filed by him
under Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, as amended, otherwise known as
the Omnibus Election Code:

Sec. 78.        Petition to
deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. – A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground
that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74
hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than
twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy
and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election. (Emphasis supplied),

in relation to Section 74 thereof:

Sec. 74.  Contents of
certificate of candidacy. – The certificate of candidacy shall state that the
person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and
that he is eligible for said office;
if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component
cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to
represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post
office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he
will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain
true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders,
and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a
permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation
imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion; and that the facts
stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.

x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Statement of the Case

On December 31, 2003, FPJ filed with the COMELEC his Certificate
of Candidacy for President[5]
indicating therein that, among others things, he is a natural-born Filipino
citizen, born on August 20, 1939 in the City of
Manila.

On January 9, 2004, petitioner Fornier filed a “Petition for
Disqualification of Presidential Candidate Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known
as Fernando Poe, Jr.”[6]
(Petition for Disqualification) with the COMELEC, which was docketed as COMELEC
SPA No. 04-003. Said Petition for Disqualification prayed that FPJ “be
disqualified from running for the position of President of the Republic of the
Philippines, and that his Certificate of Candidacy be denied due course, or cancelled.”[7]

In support of his Petition for Disqualification, petitioner
Fornier asserted that: (1) Allan F. Poe, father of FPJ, was a Spanish citizen,
hence, FPJ could not have derived Philippine citizenship from him;[8]
(2) Allan F. Poe’s marriage to FPJ’s mother, Bessie Kelley, an American
citizen, was void because of the prior subsisting marriage of Allan F. Poe to
one Paulita Gomez;[9]
and (3) given that the marriage of FPJ’s parents was void, even assuming arguendo that Allan F. Poe was a
Filipino citizen, FPJ could still not have derived Philippine citizenship from
him since, as an illegitimate child, he followed the citizenship of his
American mother. [10]

Petitioner Fornier thus concluded that FPJ, “not being a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, lacks an essential qualification and corollarily
possesses a disqualification to be elected President of the Republic of the
Philippines, as expressly required under the 1987 Constitution,”[11]
and, therefore, FPJ “should be disqualified from being a candidate for the
position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in the coming 10 May
2004 elections.”[12]

On January 16, 2004, FPJ filed his Answer[13] to
the Petition for Disqualification, maintaining that he is a natural born
Filipino since his father, Allan F. Poe, and grandfather, Lorenzo Pou, were
both Filipino; his father was never married to a Paulita Gomez;[14]
and he is the legitimate son of Allan Fernando Poe and Bessie Kelley.

In his Answer, FPJ expressly admitted the authenticity of the
copies of his Certificate of Candidacy and Birth Certificate[15]
attached to petitioner Fornier’s Petition for Disqualification, but denied that
of the other attached documents.

Attached to FPJ’s Answer was a certified copy[16]
of the Marriage Contract[17]
between Allan Fernando Poe and Bessie Kelley which shows that Fernando R.
Pou, Filipino, was married to Bessie Kelley, American, on September 16, 1940 at
906 Dakota Street, Manila in a ceremony officiated by Rev. Rito Aramil, and
witnessed by Roman Despi and Marta Gatbunton.

By Resolution No. 6558 of January 17, 2004, the COMELEC gave due
course to FPJ’s Certificate of Candidacy and included him among the six
qualified candidates for President.

On January 22, 2004, petitioners Tecson and Desiderio, Jr. filed
their Petition (With Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Restraining Order)[18]
with this Court questioning the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over the Petition
for Disqualification. In their petition, Tecson et al. argue that:

(1)            The COMELEC
does not have jurisdiction over the Petition for Disqualification filed by
petitioner Fornier against FPJ since paragraph 7 of Section 4, Article VII of
the Constitution provides that this Court is the sole judge of all contests
relating to the qualification of the President.  Moreover, this Court’s authority to act as
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications is all-encompassing and covers all matters related thereto from
beginning to end, including those arising before the proclamation of winners.[19]

(2)            FPJ was an
illegitimate child since his Birth Certificate shows that he was born on August
20, 1939, while the Marriage Contract between Fernando R. Pou and
Bessie Kelley attached to FPJ’s Answer to the Petition for Disqualification
shows that they were married on September 16, 1940.

(3)            FPJ was not
legitimated by the subsequent marriage in 1940 of his parents since,
under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which was then in force, only acknowledged
natural children can be legitimated, and it has not been shown that FPJ was
acknowledged by his parents whether before or after their marriage.[20]
Moreover, FPJ’s parents failed to comply with the procedural requirements to
legitimate him, through either voluntary acknowledgment under Article 131 of
the Spanish Civil Code or compulsory acknowledgment under Articles 135 and 136 thereof.[21]

(4)            The
citizenship requirement under Section 2, Article VII of the Constitution must
be interpreted strictly.  Since he was
illegitimate, FPJ follows the nationality of his only legally recognized
parent, his mother, who is an American.[22]

By Resolution of January 23, 2004, the First Division of the
COMELEC dismissed petitioner Fornier’s Petition for Disqualification for lack
of merit, holding that:

(1)     The COMELEC’s
jurisdiction under the Constitution is limited to contests relating
to elections, returns and qualifications of elective regional,
provincial and city officials, and does not include national
elective offices.

(2)     However, under Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC has the power to deny due course
or to cancel Certificates of Candidacy exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein is false.[23]

(3)     While the COMELEC is
“not at liberty to finally declare whether or not the respondent is a
natural-born Filipino citizen” since it is “not the proper forum,” nevertheless
it may establish FPJ’s citizenship as an incident to the
action to deny due course or cancel his Certificate of Candidacy under Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code.[24]

(4)     Petitioner Fornier’s
Petition for Disqualification did not allege that FPJ’s Certificate of
Candidacy contained a material misrepresentation. Moreover, the Petition and
the evidence presented by him failed to show convincingly and strongly that
FPJ’s declaration that he is a natural-born Filipino is false.[25]

(5)     The 1935 Constitution
provided that “[t]hose whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines” are
likewise Filipino.[26]
Both petitioner Fornier and FPJ agree that the latter is the son of Allan
Fernando Poe.  Hence, if Allan Fernando
Poe is a Filipino, necessarily, FPJ is likewise a Filipino.[27]

(6)     The purported marriage
contract between Allan Fernando Poe and one Paulita Gomez submitted by
petitioner Fornier states that he is the son of Lorenzo Poe, a Spaniard.  However, by operation of law and upon the
cession of the Philippines to the United States of America by Spain, Lorenzo Poe
ceased to be a Spaniard and became a citizen of the Philippine Islands and
later a citizen of the Philippines. 
Consequently, Allan Fernando Poe, following the citizenship of his
father, was also Filipino.[28]

(7)     Since paragraph 3,
Section 1 of Article IV of the 1935 Constitution does not distinguish between
legitimate and illegitimate children, FPJ’s legitimacy is beside the
point.  Since his father was a Filipino,
FPJ is a natural-born Filipino.[29]

On January 26, 2004, petitioner Fornier filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the COMELEC First Division Resolution in the Petition for
Disqualification.

On the same day, in light of the January 23, 2004 Resolution of
the COMELEC First Division, petitioners Tecson et al. filed a Supplemental Petition[30]
arguing that: (1) The COMELEC First Division Resolution is void since, as
COMELEC itself admitted, it has no jurisdiction to determine the “core issue”
of whether FPJ is a natural-born citizen; and (2) the COMELEC’s ruling that FPJ
is a natural-born citizen under paragraph 3, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution
is fatally flawed.[31]

In their Supplemental Petition, petitioners Tecson et al. reiterate their arguments that
FPJ is not a natural-born citizen, he being an illegitimate child and,
therefore, follows the citizenship of his American mother;[32]
and even assuming that FPJ was legitimated by the subsequent marriage and
acknowledgment of his parents, Article 123 of the Spanish Civil Code provides
that the effects of such legitimation commence only from the date of the marriage.  Thus, petitioners Tecson et al. conclude that
FPJ was, from his birth on September 9, 1939 up to September 15, 1940 (the day
prior to the marriage of his parents on September 16, 1940), illegitimate and
followed the citizenship of his American mother, hence, he cannot be considered
a natural-born citizen as Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution mandates
that such citizenship must be “from birth.”[33]

Still in their Supplemental Petition,[34]
Tecson et al. pray that the COMELEC
be enjoined from recognizing the candidacy of FPJ and conducting further
proceedings in the Petition for Disqualification; and, after hearing on the
merits, this Court render judgment:

(a)     declaring that [FPJ]
is not a natural-born Filipino citizen and thus not qualified to vie for the
position of the President of the Republic of the Philippines;

(b)     setting aside and
reversing Resolution No. 6558 dated 17 January 2004 issued by public respondent
Comelec, specifically that portion of the dispositive portion which gives due
course to the Certificate of Candidacy filed by [FPJ] for the position of
President of the Republic of the Philippines;

(c)     setting aside and
reversing the Resolution dated 23 January 2004 issued by respondent Comelec in
SPA No. 04-003; and

(d)     ordering the permanent
removal of the name of [FPJ] as a qualified candidate for President of the
Republic of the Philippines in all records of respondent Comelec.[35]

On January 29, 2004, petitioner Velez filed an “original petition”[36]
with this Court questioning FPJ’s qualifications as president “based on Section
4, paragraph 7 of the Constitution.”  In
his Petition, petitioner Velez alleges that:

(1)     As an illegitimate
child, FPJ acquired the citizenship of his only legally known parent, Bessie
Kelley, his American mother.[37]

(2)     The subsequent
marriage of FPJ’s parents did not result in his legitimation since: (1) it has
not been shown that he was acknowledged by his parents either before or after
their marriage as required by Article 121 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889; and
(2) the procedural requirements for his acknowledgement, whether voluntarily
under Article 131 of the Spanish Civil Code or compulsory under Article 135 and
136, have not been complied with.[38]

(3)     Even if respondent Poe
was legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents, he still cannot be
considered a natural-born Filipino considering that said marriage was an act
required to perfect his citizenship contrary to Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution.[39]

Petitioner Velez prays that this Court “take jurisdiction over
this instant petition and declare whether [FPJ] is a natural born citizen of
the Philippines; hence, qualified to be a candidate for President in the 10 May
2004 national elections.”[40]

By Resolution of February 6, 2004, the COMELEC en banc denied petitioner Fornier’s
Motion for Reconsideration, holding as follows:

(1)     Petitioner Fornier’s
Petition for Disqualification was in the nature of a “petition to deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy” under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code.  Such a petition relates
only to certificates of candidacy, is summary in character and has for its
purpose the disqualification of a person from being a candidate on the ground
that a material representation contained in the certificate of candidacy is false.[41]

(2)     The COMELEC has the
power to determine issues of citizenship as an incident to a petition for
disqualification or cancellation of a certificate of candidacy which, in turn,
falls within the COMELEC’s constitutional mandate to enforce and administer all
laws and regulations pertaining to the elections. The COMELEC First Division,
in stating that the Commission is not the proper forum to declare with finality
the citizenship of respondent Poe, merely prefaced its decision with “the
time-honored principle that there is no one court or body that judicially
declares the citizenship of any person.” [42]

(3)     For a petition under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to prosper, there must be “proof of
misrepresentation with a deliberate attempt to mislead.”  Thus, it must be shown by direct and
substantial evidence that FPJ “must have known or have been aware of the
falsehood as appearing on his certificate.”[43]

(4)     The COMELEC First
Division was correct in concluding that “[c]onsidering that the evidence
presented by the petitioner is not substantial,” FPJ “did not commit any
material misrepresentation when he stated in his Certificate of Candidacy that
he is a natural-born Filipino citizen.”[44]

In his Concurring and Separate Opinion,[45]
COMELEC Commissioner Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. sought to distinguish between
the COMELEC’s limited power to determine “whether or not respondent committed
material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy” and the
determination of respondent Poe’s citizenship in this wise:

x x x respondent’s representation anent his citizenship stems from
his reliance on public records, i.e., his birth certificate, his parents’
marriage contract, his Philippine passport, aside from his personal belief of
such fact.

To go beyond these public
records and scrutinize the same would inevitably compel the Commission to
determine the issue of respondent’s citizenship – a province already outside
of the Commission’s jurisdiction.  Corollarily,
and in the light of the same, neither could there be any deliberate attempt on
respondent’s part to commit material misrepresentation in his CoC.  As succinctly and clearly explained by the
Supreme Court, there is false representation when there is a deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible. (Salcedo vs.
Comelec, et al., GR No. 135886, 16 August 1999)

Nevertheless, I respectfully take exception to the conclusion made
by the 1^st Division that the issue of legitimacy is immaterial in
the determination of a person’s citizenship. 
For contrary to said observation, it is the settled rule of our
jurisprudence that only a legitimate minor child follows the citizenship of his
father. (Chiongbian vs. De Leon, 82
Phil. 771 [1949]; Morano vs. Vivo, 20
SCRA 562 [1967]; Paa vs. Chan, 21
SCRA 753 [1967]; Board of Commissioners
(CID) vs. De la Rosa, 197 SCRA 854 [1999]). 
Settlement of said issue then is
crucial in the determination of respondent’s citizenship in a direct proceeding
before the proper forum.[46]
(Emphasis supplied)

On February 10, 2004, petitioner Fornier filed his present
Petition for Certiorari[47]
under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, praying that the
COMELEC’s Resolutions dated January 23, 2004 and February 6, 2004 in the
Petition for Disqualification “be reversed, set aside and annulled, and that
judgment be rendered disqualifying [FPJ] from running for the position of
President of the Republic of the Philippines and directing respondent Comelec
to cancel his Certificate of Candidacy.”[48]
Before this Court, Fornier argues that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion when:

(1)     It ruled that it
had no jurisdiction over the Petition for Disqualification grounded on the
lack of an essential qualification of FPJ to be elected President of the
Republic of the Philippines;

(2)     It concluded that
Lorenzo Pou became a citizen of the Philippine Islands;

(3)     It concluded that
Allan F. Poe became a citizen of the Philippine Islands or of the Philippines;

(4)     It concluded that,
under the 1935 Constitution, FPJ is a natural-born citizen despite his
illegitimacy;

(5)     It concluded that
FPJ’s Certificate of Candidacy does not contain a material misrepresentation or
falsity as to his being a natural-born Filipino citizen;

(6)     It concluded that
FPJ should not be declared disqualified to run for President in the May 2004
elections.

Petitioner Fornier maintains that, in any event, this Court can
take cognizance of the issue of FPJ’s citizenship and rule on his
qualifications to run for President of the Republic of the Philippines.

On February 11, 2004, in compliance with this Court’s Resolution
of January 27, 2004, FPJ submitted his Consolidated Comment[49]
on the petitions filed by petitioners Tecson et al. and Velez.  In his
Comment, FPJ argues that:

(1)     The Supreme Court,
acting as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, may not exercise its
jurisdiction as “sole judge” of all contests relating to the qualifications of
the President prior to the elections.

(2)     Petitioners Tecson et al. and Velez have no standing to
seek the review of the questioned COMELEC Resolutions since the Constitution
provides that a review of a decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC may be
brought by the “aggrieved party,”[50]
and petitioners were never parties, much less “aggrieved parties,” to the
proceedings in the Petition for Disqualification.

(3)     Moreover, the issues
raised by petitioners Tecson et al.
and Velez have already been raised in the Petition for Disqualification.

On February 13, 2004, in compliance with this Court’s Resolution
of January 27, 2004, petitioner Fornier submitted his Comment [To Petitioners
Tecson et al.’s Petition and
Supplemental Petition in G.R. No. 161434].[51]
In his Comment, petitioner Fornier asserts that:

(1)     The petitions filed
directly with this Court by petitioners Tecson et al. and Velez are
premature and improper considering that the original jurisdiction to try and
decide the disqualification case of FPJ, prior to the May 10, 2004 elections,
is with the COMELEC. In fact, the original jurisdiction of the COMELEC over
disqualification cases has been recognized in a number of cases.[52]

(2)     Moreover, the
jurisdiction of this Court as “sole judge” of all contests relating to the qualifications
of the President begins only after a presidential candidate has already
been elected and his or her disqualification is being sought in an election
protest or by way of a quo warranto
proceeding.

On February 16, 2004, in compliance with this Court’s Resolution
of February 11, 2004, FPJ submitted his Comment[53]
on the Petition filed by petitioner Fornier. 
In his Comment, FPJ contends that:

(1)     Petitioner Fornier
cannot seek equitable relief from this Court since he “does not come with clean
hands,” he having knowingly annexed falsified documents to the Petition for
Disqualification.

(2)     Inasmuch as the only
issue in a petition for certiorari is
whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it promulgated
its questioned Resolutions, the issues in petitioner Fornier’s present petition
are limited to: (a) whether petitioner has shown by clear and convincing
evidence that FPJ is not a natural-born citizen; and (b) assuming petitioner
has discharged this burden, whether FPJ knew, at the time that he filed his
Certificate of Candidacy, that he is not a natural-born citizen.

(4)     Petitioner Fornier’s
Petition for Certiorari may not be treated as one for disqualification of FPJ
on the ground of ineligibility since:

(a)     Such would be in clear breach of Section 7,
Article IX-A of the Constitution and Rule 65 of the Rules of Court;

(b)     It would violate FPJ’s right to procedural
due process considering that the Petition for Disqualification was heard
summarily pursuant to Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure covering
Petitions to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificates of Candidacy; and

(c)     Neither the COMELEC nor the Supreme Court
has jurisdiction to disqualify a candidate for president for ineligibility
since:

(i)      Paragraph 2 of Section 2, Article IX-C of
the Constitution limits the original jurisdiction of the COMELEC to “contests
relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial and city officials; and

(ii)     This Court’s jurisdiction as the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal may only be invoked, and exercised, after the election and
proclamation of the President.

(5)     FPJ could not be other
than a natural-born Filipino considering that his father, Allan Fernando Poe,
and his grandfather Lorenzo Pou were both Philippine citizens.

(6)     Petitioner Fornier’s
evidence purportedly showing that FPJ is not a natural-born Filipino is based
on fabricated documents.

(7)     That FPJ’s parents
were married after his birth is no consequence on his Filipino citizenship since
his Birth Certificate declares that he is a Filipino. In addition, the Marriage
Contract of FPJ’s parents declares his father, Fernando R. Pou, and his
grandfather, Lorenzo Pou, to be Filipinos. Furthermore, FPJ’s legitimacy may no
longer be questioned and may not be subject to collateral attack.

On February 18, 2004, petitioners Tecson et al. filed a Consolidated Reply (To [FPJ’s] Consolidated Comment
and Respondent Fornier’s Comment)[54]
maintaining that:

(1)     This Court should
assume jurisdiction over the Petition in G.R. No. 161434 and
resolve the case on the merits considering that the question of whether FPJ is
a natural-born Philippine citizen qualified to run for President is a purely
legal one impressed with transcendental importance.

(2)     In addition, paragraph
7 of Section 4, Article VII taken together with Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution authorizes this Court to assume exclusive original jurisdiction
over the question of FPJ’s qualification to run for the Presidency.

(3)     The fact that FPJ did
not refute the allegations that he is not a natural-born Philippine citizen,
based on the very documents he presented, only proves that he has no solid
legal basis on which to anchor his claim of natural-born citizenship.

On February 19, 2004, this Court heard oral arguments by the
parties to the present cases during which the opinions of the following who
were invited as amici curiae were
proffered:

(1)     Supreme Court Associate Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza (Ret.)

(2)     Former
Constitutional Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas

(3)     Former
Dean Merlin Magallona; and

(4)     Professor
Ruben C. Balane

For purposes of the oral arguments, the Court issued an Advisory
defining the principal issues to be discussed as follows:

(1)     Whether the Commission
on Elections has jurisdiction over petitions to deny due course to or cancel
certificates of candidacy of Presidential candidates.

(2)     Whether the Supreme
Court has jurisdiction over the petitions of:

i.  petitioners Tecson et al.

ii. 
petitioner Velez

iii. 
petitioner Fornier

(3)     Whether respondent
Ronald Allan Kelley Poe is a Filipino citizen. 
If so, whether he is a natural-born Filipino citizen,

and suggested that:

In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:

a)      the Commission on Election’s power to
enforce and administer election laws and decide, except those involving the
right to vote, all questions affecting elections under paragraphs (1) and (3),
Section 2 of Article IX-C of the Constitution;

b)      the concept of natural-born citizen;

c)      the principle of jus sanguinis;

d)      applicability of international law in
resolving problems of citizenship;

e)      whether “children,” as used in citizenship
statutes, includes illegitimate children;

f)       laws governing the citizenship of a child
born under the 1935 Constitution;

g)      other Constitutional and statutory
provisions as well as jurisprudential principles relevant to the principal
issues.

On February 23, 2004, in compliance with the Order given in open
court in the course of the oral arguments, the parties and amici curiae submitted their respective position papers in lieu of memoranda.  Whereupon, these consolidated cases were
submitted for decision.

Issues for Resolution:

In summary, the instant petitions call upon this Court to determine:
(1) whether this Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction to pass upon the
qualifications of presidential candidates; (2) whether the COMELEC acted with
grave abuse of discretion when it issued its Resolutions of January 23, 2004
and February 6, 2004 dismissing the Petition for Disqualification; and (3)
whether FPJ is a natural-born Filipino and therefore qualified to seek election
as President of the Republic of the Philippines.

These issues will be discussed seriatim.

Supreme Court’s Jurisdiction
Over

the Petitions in G.R. Nos. 161464 and
161634.

Petitioners Tecson et al. and
Velez assert that this Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to determine
whether FPJ is qualified to be a candidate for President of the Republic of the
Philippines primarily on the basis of paragraph 7, Section 4 of Article VII of
the Constitution, to wit:

Sec. 4.          x x x

x x x

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President
or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose. (Emphasis
supplied)

However, the foregoing provision clearly refers to this Court’s
jurisdiction as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal over electoral contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the President,
and not to the qualifications or disqualifications of a presidential candidate.

An “electoral contest” has been defined as an adversarial
proceeding “by which matters involving the title or claim of title to an
elective office, made before or after the proclamation of the winner, is
settled whether or not the contestant is claiming the office in dispute.”[55]
Thus, the subject matter of such a contest is “the title or claim of title” to
an elective office itself and not merely the qualifications or absence of
qualifications of a candidate for such office.

In Topacio v. Paredes,[56] this Court distinguished between (a)
electoral contests relating to the election and election returns and (b)
contests relating to the qualifications for the electoral office:

All election disputes may be
divided into two distinct classes: (1) those which pertain to the casting and
counting of the ballots; and (2) those which pertain to the eligibility of the
candidates.  If there be cases incapable
of being so classified, they have not been suggested.  Those parts of section 27 [Act No. 1582 as
amended by Act No. 2170], indicative of the kind of contests which are to be
determined under its provisions, read:

“Such court (of First Instance) shall have exclusive and final
jurisdiction except as hereinafter provided, and shall forthwith cause the
registry lists and all ballots used at such election to be brought before it
and examined, and to appoint the necessary officers therefor and to fix their
compensation, . . .

xxx    xxx       xxx

“In such proceedings the registry list as finally corrected by the
board of inspectors shall be conclusive as to who was entitled to vote at such
election.”

These very words indicate the character of the election disputes
which Courts of First Instance are empowered to decide under this provision of
law. Contests which cannot be decided by an examination of the registry lists
and of the ballots, and evidence of fraud and irregularity in connection with
the manner of casting and counting the votes, must be included in the phrase
"for the determination of which provision has not been otherwise
made" which appears near the beginning of the section.  If the
nature of the evidence upon which the eligibility (qualifications) of a person
to hold office must be decided is considered, it will be seen that such
evidence has nothing to do with the manner of casting and counting the votes.  To what purpose would be the examination of
registry lists and ballots by officers appointed and paid for that purpose in
determining the eligibility of a successful candidate for office?  The
eligibility of a person to be elected to a provincial or municipal office
depends upon his qualifications as a voter, his residence, his allegiance to
the United States, his age, the absence of disqualifications inflicted by the
courts by way of punishment, etc.  That
is, these qualifications and disqualifications do not depend upon the
conduct of election inspectors, the illegal trafficking in votes, the method of
casting and counting the ballots, or the election returns. The evidence
required to establish such qualifications or disqualifications would not aid in
any way in determining the questions relating to the manner of casting and
counting the ballots. E converso,
would the examination of ballots aid in arriving at a decision as to his
eligibility.  There is nothing in
this section to indicate that the court shall receive or consider evidence as
to the personal character or circumstances of candidates.

Again, the effect of a
decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or
irregularities in the election is quite different from that produced by
declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office.  In the former case the court, after an
examination of the ballots may find that some other person than the candidate
declared to have received a plurality by the board of canvassers actually
received the greater number of votes, in which case the court issues its
mandamus to the board of canvassers to correct the returns accordingly; or it
may find that the manner of holding the election and the returns are so tainted
with fraud or illegality that it cannot be determined who received a plurality
of the legally cast ballots. In the
latter case, no question as to the correctness of the returns or the manner of
casting and counting the ballots is before the deciding power, and generally
the only result can be that the election fails entirely.  In the former, we have a contest in the
strict sense of the word, because opposing parties are striving for supremacy.
If it be found that the successful candidate (according to the board of
canvassers) obtained a plurality in an illegal manner, and that another
candidate was the real victor, the
former must retire in favor of the latter. 
In the other case, there is not,
strictly speaking, a contest, as the wreath of victory cannot be transferred
from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the
eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In
the one case the question is as to who received a plurality of the legally cast
ballots; in the other, the question is confined to the personal character and
circumstances of a single individual.

x x x

In Greenwood vs. Murphy
(131 Ill., 604), the court said:

“We think that the statute limits the power of the county court to
contests of elections. That court has no other or further jurisdiction than to
determine which of the contestants has been duly elected.  The
question whether or not a party already elected possesses the necessary
qualifications for the office is one which must be determined in another way
and by a different proceeding.

“Where it is claimed that
such an one unlawfully holds an office by reason of his lack of a legal
qualification therefor, his right should be determined by information in the
nature of quo warranto in the name of the people of the State.”[57]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Thus, the contest concerning the qualifications of the
President referred to in paragraph 7, Section 4 of Article VII of the
Constitution clearly refers to a quo
warranto proceeding.

Quo warranto literally
means “by what authority.”  It has been
defined as an extraordinary legal remedy whereby a person or entity is
challenged to show by what authority he holds a public office or exercises a
public franchise.[58]
The object of a quo warranto
proceeding is to determine the right of a person to the use or exercise of a
franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is
not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege.[59]

Hence, actions falling under paragraph 7, Section 4 of Article
VII of the Constitution may only be directed against the persons
occupying or having title to the position of President (and Vice President) – i.e. the incumbent President (and Vice
President) or the President-elect (and Vice-President-elect) – and not against
the candidates for said electoral offices who do not, as such, hold or have any
title thereto.

This interpretation is in consonance with Section 7 of Article
VII of the Constitution which provides for the procedure to be followed in case
the President-elect and/or Vice President-elect fail to
qualify:

Sec. 7.          The
President-elect and the Vice-President-elect shall assume office at the
beginning of their terms.

If the President-elect
fails to qualify, the
Vice-President-elect shall act as President until a President shall have been
chosen and qualified.

If at the beginning of the term of the President, the
President-elect shall have died or shall have become permanently disabled, the
Vice-President-elect shall become President.

Where no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen
or shall have qualified, or where
both shall have died or become permanently disabled, the President of the
Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall act as President until a President or a Vice-President
shall have been chosen and qualified.

The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one who
is to act as President shall be selected until a President or a Vice-President
shall have qualified, in case of
death, permanent disability, or inability of the officials mentioned in the
next preceding paragraph.  (Emphasis
supplied)

The procedure for quo
warranto proceedings questioning the eligibility of the President is
governed by Rules 12, 13 and 15 of the Rules of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal, which were promulgated by this Court specifically in order to
implement the above-cited Constitutional provision.  The Rules clearly provide that such quo warranto petition may be initiated
by any voter after a candidate has been vested with a claim of title to
the Presidency, i.e. after the
proclamation of the winner, viz:

Rule 12. Jurisdiction. –
The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the
Philippines.

Rule 13. How Initiated. –
An election contest is initiated by the
filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto against the President or Vice-President.  An election protest shall not include a
petition for quo warranto.  A petition for quo warranto shall not include an election protest.

x x x

Rule 15. Quo Warranto. – A verified petition for quo warranto contesting the election of
the President or Vice-President on
the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines may be filed by any voter
within ten (10) days after the proclamation of the winner.  (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 161434 and
161634, which invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, as the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal, to determine the eligibility or ineligibility of the
President (and Vice-President) or the President-elect (and
Vice-President-elect), are clearly premature and must be dismissed.

While conceding that under Republic Act No. 1793,[60]
the precursor to the above-cited Constitutional provision, the jurisdiction of
the Presidential Electoral Tribunal was limited to post-election controversies,[61]
petitioner Velez claims that the use of the word “President” (and
“Vice-President”) and not merely “President-elect” (and “Vice-President-elect”)
in the present provision implies an expansion of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal’s jurisdiction.  Specifically,
he asserts that “[t]he dropping of the word ‘elect’ in the present Constitution
is significant because this clearly means that the Supreme Court now has
jurisdiction over cases involving qualifications of presidential candidates
even if he is not yet elected.”

The Record of the Proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission does not, however, support petitioner Velez’s novel theory.  No intention to increase the jurisdiction of
the Presidential Electoral Tribunal may be fairly inferred from the
Record.  The intent of the Constitutional
Commissioners, as articulated by Commissioner Bernas, appears merely to elevate
the status of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal to that of a Constitutional
Body, to wit:

x x x

MR. VILLACORTA:           Thank you very much, Madam
President.  I am not sure whether
Commissioner Suarez has expressed his point. 
On page 2, the fourth paragraph of Section 4 provides:

The Supreme Court,
sitting en banc, shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
the President or Vice-President.

May I seek clarification
as to whether or not the matter of determining the outcome of the contests
relating to the election returns and qualifications of the President or
Vice-President is purely a political matter and, therefore, should not be left
entirely to the judiciary.  Will the
above-quoted provision not impinge on the doctrine of separation of powers
between the executive and the judicial departments of the government?

MR. REGALADO:             No, I really do not feel that would
be a problem.  This is a new provision
incidentally.  It was not in the 1935
Constitution nor in the 1973 Constitution.

MR. VILLACORTA:           That is right.

MR. REGALADO:             We feel that it will not be an
intrusion into the separation of powers guaranteed to the judiciary because
this is strictly an adversarial and judicial proceeding.

MR. VILLACORTA:           May
I know the rationale of the Committee because this supersedes Republic Act
7950 which provides for the Presidential Electoral Tribunal?

FR. BERNAS:                   Precisely, this is necessary.  Election
contests are, by their nature, judicial.  Therefore, they are cognizable only by
courts.  If, for instance, we did not
have a constitutional provision on an electoral tribunal for the Senate or an
electoral tribunal for the House, normally, as composed, that cannot be given
jurisdiction over contests.

So, the background of
this is really the case of Roxas vs.
Lopez.  The Gentleman will remember
that in that election, Lopez was declared winner.  He filed a protest before the Supreme Court
because there was a republic act which created the Supreme Court as the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal.  The
question in this case was whether new powers could be given the Supreme Court
by law.  In effect, the conflict was
actually whether there was an attempt to create two Supreme Courts and the
answer of the Supreme Court was:  “No,
this did not involve the creation of two Supreme Courts, but precisely we are
giving new jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, as it is allowed by the
Constitution.  Congress may allocate
various jurisdictions.”

Before the passage of
that republic act in case there was any contest between two presidential
candidates or two vice-presidential candidates, no one had jurisdiction over
it.  So, it became necessary to create a
Presidential Electoral Tribunal.  What we have done is to constitutionalize
what was statutory but it is not an infringement on the separation of
powers because the power being given to the Supreme Court here is a judicial power.[62]

x x x (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Petitioners Tecson et al.
and Velez also argue that the word “contests” should be interpreted liberally
in accordance with this Court’s ruling in Javier
v. Commission on Elections.[63]
They further cite Javier as authority
for the proposition that this Court may immediately exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over the issues concerning FPJ’s possession of the requisite
citizenship qualification to enable him to run as a candidate for the
Presidency.

Petitioners’ assertions cannot be sustained.  Javier involved
an electoral contest relating to serious anomalies in the conduct of an
election and the canvass election returns, and not to a proceeding to determine
the qualifications of a candidate for election, viz:

Alleging serious anomalies
in the conduct of the elections and the canvass of the election returns,
the petitioner went to the Commission on Elections to prevent the impending
proclamation of his rival, the private respondent herein.  Specifically,
the petitioner charged that the elections were marred by “massive terrorism,
intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud, tampering and falsification of election
returns under duress, threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes
perpetrated by the armed men of respondent Pacificador.” Particular mention
was made of the municipalities of Caluya, Cabate, Tibiao, Barbaza, Laua-an, and
also of San Remigio, where the petitioner claimed the election returns were not
placed in the ballot boxes but merely wrapped in cement bags or manila paper.[64]
(Emphasis supplied)

In fact, the ponencia, as
quoted by petitioners, clearly states that election contests refer to matters
involving the claim of title to an elective office, not a claim that one is
qualified to be a candidate for such office:

The word “contests”
should not be given a restrictive meaning; on the contrary, it should receive
the widest possible scope conformably to the rule that the words used in the
Constitution should be interpreted liberally. As employed in the 1973
Constitution, the term should be
understood as referring to any matter involving the title or claim of title
to an elective office, made before or after proclamation of the winner,
whether or not the contestant is claiming the office in dispute.  Needless to stress, the term should be given
a consistent meaning and understood in the same sense under both Section 2(2)
and Section 3 of Article XII-C of the Constitution.

The phrase “election,
returns and qualifications” should be interpreted in its totality as referring
to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee’s title.  But if it is necessary to specify, we can say
that “election” referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of
voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of
the votes; “returns” to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the
winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of
canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns; and “qualifications” to matters that could be
raised in a quo warranto proceeding
against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or
the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.[65]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Finally, petitioners Tecson et
al. and Velez claim that the issue of FPJ’s qualification for the Presidency
may also be brought directly to this Court on the basis of Section 1 of Article
VIII of the Constitution through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, specially
considering that the instant case is one of transcendental importance.

This claim cannot likewise be sustained.  First, it is axiomatic that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is not available where there is another plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.[66]
With respect to the issues raised in the present petitions, such other “plain,
speedy and adequate remedy” exists, namely, as will be discussed further below,
a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy before
the COMELEC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Rules of Court.  Thus, the correct remedy of petitioners
Tecson et al. and Velez should have
been to intervene in the Petition for Disqualification.

Second, in determining whether procedural rules, such as
standing, should be relaxed on the ground of “transcendental importance,” the
following determinants should be considered: (1) the character of the funds or
other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of
disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent
agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other
party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised.[67]
Considering that the substantive issues raised by petitioners Tecson et al. and Velez in G.R. Nos. 161434 and 161634, respectively, are virtually identical to those
raised by petitioner Fornier in G.R. No. 161824, this Court is not convinced
that the “transcendental importance” of the issues raised herein justifies a
direct resort to this Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court or the exercise
of its expanded certiorari
jurisdiction under Sec. 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.

Supreme Court’s
Jurisdiction Over

the Petition in G.R. No. 161824.

Upon the other hand, there can be no doubt that this Court has
jurisdiction over petitioner Fornier’s Petition for Certiorari questioning the
Resolutions of January 23, 2004 and February 6, 2004 issued by the COMELEC
First Division and En Banc,
respectively in the Petition for Disqualification.  Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution[68]
expressly vests this Court with the power of review over decisions, orders or
rulings of the COMELEC.

COMELEC’s Jurisdiction
Over the Subject

Matter of the Petition
for Disqualification

Under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election

Code.

The COMELEC, for its part, has original jurisdiction over
petitions to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy of
a Presidential candidate on the ground of falsity of material
representation under Section 78 of Omnibus Election Code, to wit:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. – A verified petition seeking
to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained
therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false.  The petition may be filed at any time not
later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than
fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis supplied)

This jurisdiction arises from the COMELEC’s powers and functions
under paragraphs (1) and (3) of Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution:

Sect. 2.         The
Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

(1)     Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.

x x x

(3)     Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections,
including determination of the number and location of polling places,
appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.
(Emphasis supplied)

and Sec. 52, Article VII of the Omnibus
Election Code:

Sec. 52. Powers and functions
of the Commission on Elections. – In addition to the powers and functions
conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive
charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest
elections x x x

x x x

As pointed out by petitioner Fornier, the
COMELEC’s authority to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy
on the ground specified in Section 78 and other similar provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code has been recognized in a long line of cases.

FPJ, however, points out that the cases cited by petitioner
Fornier do not involve candidates for either President or Vice-President.  He argues that the original jurisdiction of
the COMELEC is limited only to contests relating to elective regional,
provincial and city officials by paragraph (2) of Section 2, Article IX-C of
the Constitution, viz:

Sec. 2.          The
Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

x x x

(2)     Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to
the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial,
and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over
all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of
general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial
courts of limited jurisdiction.

 Decisions, final orders, or
rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and
barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.

x x x (Emphasis supplied)

FPJ adds that the above-cited Constitutional provision “refers
precisely to the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections over the
‘qualifications’ of candidates, definitively establishing that paragraphs (1)
and (3) which the petitioner invoked do not include issues or questions
involving the qualifications of candidates.”

The cited provision does not support FPJ’s conclusion.  Paragraph (2) of Section 2, Article IX-C
refers to the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over electoral contests
involving elective regional, provincial, and city positions, whether they are
questioning the conduct of the election and the canvass of the votes or are in
the nature of quo warranto
proceedings to determine the eligibility or ineligibility of the proclaimed
winner.  The provision says nothing at
all about the qualifications of a candidate for election, much less the
cancellation of a certificate of candidacy.

In contradistinction, Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
provides for the sanctions of denial of due course or cancellation where a
material representation required by Section 74 (i.e. announcement of candidacy, statement of eligibility, date of
birth, civil status, residence, profession or occupation, political
affiliation, etc.) as contained in a certificate of candidacy is shown to be
false.

The cancellation of a certificate of candidacy under Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code is clearly separate and distinct from the election
contests contemplated in paragraph (2) of Section 2, Article IX-C.  The former involves a measure to enforce
compliance with the statutory requirements for the filing of certificates of
candidacy, while the latter is an adversarial proceeding involving the title or
claim of title to an elective office. 
That there are grounds common to both does not detract from the fact
that each has a separate subject matter and purpose.

It is true that the present proceedings mark the first time that
a petition questioning the certificate of candidacy of a presidential candidate
under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code has reached this Court.  However, in a number of cases involving
candidates for the House of Representatives and the Senate, [69]
this Court has already recognized that the jurisdiction vested in the
COMELEC by Section 78 arises from its enforcement
powers under paragraphs (1) and (3) of Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution,
not from its adjudicatory powers under paragraph (2) of the same section.  Thus, in the recent case of Domino
v. Commission on Elections[70]
involving a candidate for Representative of the lone district of Sarangani,
this Court declared:

The COMELEC has jurisdiction
as provided in Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code, over a petition
to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy.  In the exercise of the said jurisdiction, it
is within the competence of the COMELEC to determine whether false
representation as to material facts was made in the certificate of candidacy,
that will include, among others, the residence of the candidate.[71]

x x x

DOMINO’s contention that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction in the
present petition is bereft of merit.

As previously mentioned, the
COMELEC, under Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code, has jurisdiction
over a petition to deny course to or cancel certificate of candidacy.  Such jurisdiction continues even after
election, if for any reason no final judgment of disqualification is rendered
before the election, and the candidate facing disqualification is voted for and
receives the highest number of votes and provided further that the winning
candidate has not been proclaimed or has taken his oath of office.[72]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

FPJ cites the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza, an amicus curiae in the present
proceedings, in Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission
in Elections[73] to support his claim that “there are no
proceedings to contest the eligibility or the qualification of a candidate
before the elections, and more specially, in regard candidates for President,
Vice-President and members of Congress.”

An examination of Justice Mendoza’s Separate Opinion, however,
shows that he was well aware of the nature and purpose of a petition to deny
due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy on the basis of Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code:

The various election laws will be searched in vain for authorized
proceedings for determining a candidate’s qualifications for an office before
his election. There are none in the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), in
the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646), or in the law providing for
synchronized elections (R.A. No. 7166). There are, in other words, no
provisions for pre-proclamation contests but only election protests or quo
warranto proceedings against winning candidates.

To be sure, there are provisions denominated for
“disqualification,” but they are not concerned with a declaration of the
ineligibility of a candidate. These provisions are concerned with the
incapacity (due to insanity, incompetence or conviction of an offense) of a
person either to be a candidate or to
continue as a candidate for public office. 
There is also a provision for the
denial or cancellation of certificates of candidacy, but it applies only to
cases involving false representations as to certain matters required by law to
be stated in the certificates.

These provisions are found in the following parts of the Omnibus
Election Code:

§ 12.       Disqualifications. — Any person who has been declared by
competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final
judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which
he has been sentenced to a. penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime
involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given
plenary pardon or granted amnesty.

The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be
deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity
or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five
years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again
becomes disqualified.

§ 68.       Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or
protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent
court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other
material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public
officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to
enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess
of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution
prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of
Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph
6, shall be disqualified from continuing
as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any
person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country
shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless
said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a
foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in
the election laws.

§ 78.       Petition to deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. — A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed
by any person exclusively on the ground
that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74
hereof is false.  The petition may be
filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing
of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

x x x

The petition filed by private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo in the
COMELEC, while entitled “For Cancellation and Disqualification,” contained no
allegation that private respondent Imelda Romualdez-Marcos made material
representations in her certificate of candidacy which were false. It sought her
disqualification on the ground that “on the basis of her Voter Registration
Record and Certificate of Candidacy, [she] is disqualified from running for the
position of Representative, considering that on election day, May 8, 1995, [she]
would have resided less than ten (10)
months in the district where she is seeking to be elected.” For its part,
the COMELEC’s Second Division, in its resolution of April 24, 1995, cancelled
her certificate of candidacy and corrected certificate of candidacy on the
basis of its finding that petitioner is “not qualified to run for the position
of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of
Leyte” and not because of any finding that she had made false representations
as to material matters in her certificate of candidacy.

Montejo’s petition before the COMELEC was therefore not a petition
for cancellation of certificate of candidacy under § 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code, but essentially a petition to declare private respondent ineligible. It
is important to note this, because, as will presently be explained, proceedings under § 78 have for their
purpose to disqualify a person from being a candidate, whereas quo warranto proceedings have for their purpose to disqualify a person from
holding public office. Jurisdiction over quo warranto
proceedings involving members of the House of Representatives is vested in the
Electoral Tribunal of that body.[74]
(Emphasis supplied, italics in the original)

x x x

Moreover, the COMELEC’s authority to deny due course to or cancel
the certificate of candidacy of a Presidential candidate under Section 78 in
connection with Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code cannot be deemed to run
counter to the policy against the filing of pre-proclamation cases against
Presidential candidates since it is evidently not one of the actions prohibited
under Section 15[75]
of Republic Act No. 7166.[76]

Indeed, Section 2, Article I of the Omnibus Election Code makes
its provisions, including Sections 74 and 78, applicable to all candidates for
all elective positions:

Sec. 2. Applicability. –
This Code shall govern all elections of public officers and, to the extent
appropriate, all referenda and plebiscites.

There being no provision to the contrary whether Constitutional
or statutory, there is every reason to apply Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code to the certificates of candidacy of Presidential candidates.

The COMELEC Acted with
Grave Abuse

of Discretion in
Dismissing the Petition for

Disqualification for Lack of Merit.

Having determined that the COMELEC has jurisdiction to deny due
course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy of a Presidential candidate
under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, this Court segues to the issue
of whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the Petition for Disqualification
for lack of merit.

Grave abuse of discretion has been defined as a capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.  The abuse of discretion
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.[77]

A careful review of the questioned COMELEC Resolutions of January
23, 2004 and February 6, 2004 shows that the COMELEC did indeed act with grave
abuse of discretion in issuing them: 
first, by resolving to dismiss the petition in the Petition for
Disqualification without stating the factual bases therefor;  and second, by resolving to dismiss the
Petition for Disqualification without ruling categorically on the issue of
FPJ’s citizenship.

Absence of Factual Basis
for the

Questioned COMELEC Resolutions

Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution provides that “[n]o
decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.”  This requirement that the factual bases for a
judgment must be clearly and distinctly expressed in a decision or resolution
has been extended to administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial
functions by legislative fiat through Section 14, Chapter 3, Book VII of
Executive Order 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987:

Sec. 14. Decision. – Every decision rendered by the agency in a
contested case shall be in writing and shall
state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.  The agency shall decide each case within
thirty (30) days following its submission. 
The parties shall be notified of the decision personally or by
registered mail addressed to their counsel of record, if any, or to them.
(Emphasis supplied)

Significantly, a corresponding rule was adopted by the COMELEC in
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure:

Rule 18.  Decisions.

Sec. 1. Procedure in Making Decisions. – xxx

Every Decision shall express
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

Sec. 2.  Minute Resolution. – No minute resolution resolving a case shall be
rendered if evidence has been adduced and received. (Emphasis supplied)

Despite the foregoing, however, a reading of the January 23, 2004
Resolution of COMELEC First Division in the Petition for Disqualification does
not state the facts on which the disposition of the said Resolution is based.

Said questioned Resolution contains an enumeration of the
evidence submitted by petitioner Fornier,[78]
a statement of the contents of FPJ’s Certificate of Candidacy,[79]
and a statement that the parties stipulated on the fact that Allan F. Poe is
the father of FPJ.[80]

However, in determining whether FPJ is a natural-born citizen,
the COMELEC First Division had only this to say:

To assail respondent’s claim of eligibility, petitioner asserts
that respondent is not a natural-born Filipino citizen.  According to him, Exhibit “B-2” (alleged
Marriage Contract between Allan Fernando Poe and Paulita Gomez) shows that the
nationality of the father of Allan Fernando Poe, Lorenzo Poe, is Español.  Allan Fernando Poe is admittedly the father
of the respondent.  In the same Exhibit
“B-2” appears an entry that the nationality of Allan Fernando Poe is also
Español.  Petitioner’s line of argument
is that respondent could not have acquired Filipino citizenship from his father
since the latter is Español.

Did the allegations in the petition as well as the exhibits presented
in support thereof convincingly controvert the declaration by respondent in his
Certificate of Candidacy that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen?

No.

The petition and the
evidence failed to show strongly and convincingly that the declaration in the
Certificate of Candidacy as to the citizenship of respondent was a falsehood.[81]
(Emphasis supplied)

In discussing the citizenship of Lorenzo Pou, to whom FPJ traces
his Philippine citizenship, the COMELEC First Division, after stating what it
held to be the applicable law,[82]
was equally parsimonious, to wit:

In the alleged marriage contract between Allan Fernando Poe and
Paulita Gomez, submitted in evidence by petitioner, it was stated that Lorenzo
Poe is the father of Allan Fernando Poe and that he is an “Español.” By operation of the foregoing laws,
however, Lorenzo Poe, respondent’s grandfather, the father of Allan Fernando
Poe, had ceased to be a Spanish subject and had become a Filipino citizen.  Necessarily, Allan Fernando Poe – Lorenzo
Poe’s child who was born subsequent to his (Lorenzo’s) acquisition of Filipino
citizenship – followed his father’s citizenship.  To dispute that fact, petitioner should have
presented proof that Lorenzo Poe intended to preserve his allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making before a court
of record, within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of the
peace treaty, a declaration of his decision to preserve such allegiance.  Since there was no such declaration, he
should be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the
territory in which he resides.[83]
(Emphasis supplied; italics in the original)

The February 6, 2004 Resolution issued by the COMELEC En Banc which passed upon Fornier’s
Motion for Reconsideration of the COMELEC First Division Resolution provides no
further elucidation of the operative facts of the Petition for
Disqualification.  In said Resolution,
the COMELEC En Banc redefined the
issue to be determined in the Petition as whether FPJ made a deliberate attempt
to mislead when he stated that he was a natural-born Philippine citizen in his
Certificate of Candidacy:

Undeniably, the question on the citizenship of respondent falls
within the requirement of materiality under Section 78.  However, proof of misrepresentation with a
deliberate attempt to mislead, must still be established.  In other words, direct and substantial
evidence showing that the person whose certificate of candidacy is being sought
to be cancelled or denied due course, must have known or have been aware of
the falsehood as appearing on his certificate.[84]
(Underscoring in the original)

The COMELEC En Banc
then proceeded to quote with approval the Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division:

We quote, with approval, the position taken by the First Division,
thus:

“Considering that the evidence presented by the petitioner is not
substantial, we declare that the respondent did not commit any material
misrepresentation when he stated in his Certificate of Candidacy that he is a
natural-born Filipino citizen.”

This leaves us with the question: Did the First Division err when
it proceeded to make a pronouncement that Respondent Poe is a natural-born
Filipino citizen in disposing the issue of whether or not he made a material
misrepresentation in his Certificate of Candidacy regarding his citizenship?

We do not think so.[85]

But on what factual basis
the First Division concluded at respondent FPJ is a natural-born Filipino
citizen, the COMELEC En Banc remained
silent.

Consequently, I am at a loss as to how the COMELEC appreciated
the evidence presented by the parties in order to arrive at its
conclusions.  As this Court observed in Nicos Industrial Corp. v. Court of Appeals:[86]

It is a requirement of due
process that the parties to a litigation be informed of how it was decided,
with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the
conclusions of the court.  The court
cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and
just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action.  The losing party is entitled to know why he
lost, so he may appeal to a higher court, if permitted, should he believe that
the decision should be reversed.  A decision that does not clearly and
distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties
in the dark as to how it was reached and is especially prejudicial to the
losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for
review by a higher tribunal.[87]
(Emphasis supplied)

In fine, neither the Resolution of the COMELEC First Division,
nor the Resolution COMELEC En Banc
indicates the factual findings on which both were supposedly anchored. This
failure on the part of the COMELEC to abide by the requirements of Section 14,
Chapter 3, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 as well as Sections 1
and 2 of Rule 18 of its own Rules of Procedure impressed the questioned
Resolutions of January 23, 2004 and February 6, 2004 with the vice of grave
abuse of discretion and reduced the same to patent nullities.

Apropos, in this
regard, is this Court’s admonition in Naguiat v. National Labor Relations Commission:[88]

x x x Unfortunately, the NLRC did not discuss or give any explanation
for holding Naguiat Enterprises and its officers jointly and severally liable
in discharging CFTI’s liability for payment of separation pay.  We
again remind those concerned that decisions, however concisely written, must
distinctly and clearly set forth the facts and law upon which they are
based.  This rule applies as well to
dispositions by quasi-judicial and administrative bodies.[89]
(Emphasis supplied)

COMELEC’s Jurisdiction
to Determine the

Citizenship of a
Candidate for Election/

Clarification of the
pronouncement in

Salcedo II.

From the records of the present case, it is clearly evident that
the central issue of the proceedings before the COMELEC in the Petition for
Disqualification, and indeed in the case now before this Court, is FPJ’s claim
to being a natural-born Filipino citizen.

By his original Petition in the Petition for Disqualification,
petitioner Fornier directly called into question FPJ’s claim to being a
natural-born Filipino citizen who is eligible for the position of President of
the Republic of the Philippines, thus:

4.       [FPJ], however, is
not even a citizen of the Philippines, much more a natural born citizen, and as
such lacks one of the essential qualifications for the position of President of
the Republic of the Philippines since both of his parents are not Filipino
citizens.

x x x

11.     Clearly, [FPJ] is not
a citizen of the Philippines, much more a natural-born Filipino citizen,
considering that both of his parents are aliens.  Also, even assuming arguendo that respondent Poe’s father, Allan F. Poe, is a Filipino
citizen, as indicated in his Certificate of Birth (Annex “B” hereof), since
respondent Poe is an illegitimate child of his father with Bessie Kelley, an
American, he acquired the citizenship of the latter.  [United
States vs. Ong Tianse, supra]

12.     Hence, [FPJ], not
being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, lacks an essential
qualification and corollarily possesses a disqualification to be elected
President of the Republic of the Philippines, as expressly required under the
1987 Constitution.

13.     In view of the
foregoing, [FPJ] should be disqualified from being a candidate for the position
of President of the Republic of the Philippines in the coming 10 May 2004 elections.[90]

The COMELEC First Division, while aware of the fact that the
Petition for Disqualification before it called for a determination of FPJ’s
citizenship and that the COMELEC had, in the past, given due course to similar
petitions, nevertheless held that it was not the proper forum to finally
declare whether FPJ is indeed a natural-born Filipino citizen:

As earlier stated, the Commission has jurisdiction to deny due
course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy exclusively on the ground that
any material representation contained therein is false.

We feel we are not at
liberty to finally declare whether or not the respondent is a natural-born
Filipino citizen.  Comelec is not the
proper forum.  But we are called upon
to decide the question of whether or not the Certificate of Candidacy filed by
the respondent should be denied due course or cancelled.[91]
(Emphasis supplied)

Passing on Fornier’s Motion for Reconsideration, the COMELEC En Banc declared that “[u]ndeniably, the
question on the citizenship of respondent falls within the requirement of
materiality under Section 78.” The COMELEC En
Banc went on to stress that the power of the COMELEC to determine issues of
citizenship as an incident to petitions for disqualification or cancellation of
certificates of candidacy has never been questioned by this Court.[92] Nevertheless,
it sustained the First Division’s dismissal of the Petition for
Disqualification without determining the issue of FPJ’s citizenship.

It is apparent then that the COMELEC avoided ruling squarely, one
way or the other, on the issue of FPJ’s citizenship.  Considering that Section 74 of the Omnibus
Election Code requires that a candidate must state under oath that he is
eligible for the office for which he is announcing his candidacy and that
Section 2, Article VII of the Constitution clearly provides that “[n]o person
may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines,” it was the duty of the COMELEC in the Petition for
Disqualification to determine, on the basis of the evidence adduced, whether
FPJ is in fact a “natural-born Filipino citizen.” In resolving to dismiss the
Petition without performing this duty, the COMELEC clearly acted with grave
abuse of discretion.

Notatu dignum is that
while, under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial
declaration of the citizenship of an individual,[93]
this Court has long recognized the power of quasi-judicial agencies to pass
upon, and rule on the issue of citizenship as an incident to the adjudication
of a real and justiciable controversy such as when a person asserts a right
exercisable only by a Filipino citizen.[94]
Indeed, the COMELEC itself has ruled, or has been deemed to have ruled,
squarely upon the issue of citizenship in a number of cases concerning
candidates for election.[95]

To justify its evasion of the duty to rule squarely on the issue
of citizenship, the COMELEC relies on this Court’s ruling in Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections,[96]
wherein this Court held:

Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation
under Section 78 must consist of a “deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform,
or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.” [Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300
(1995)] In other words, it must be made with an intention to deceive the
electorate as to one’s qualifications for public office.  The use of a surname, when not intended to
mislead or deceive the public as to one’s identity, is not within the scope of
the provision.[97]

Thus, upon the above-quoted pronouncement, the COMELEC En Banc held that Fornier should have
presented “proof of misrepresentation with a deliberate attempt to mislead” on
the part of FPJ, and evidently confined the issue in the Petition for
Disqualification to whether FPJ “must have known or have been aware of the
falsehood as [allegedly] appearing on his certificate.”

The COMELEC’s ratio
does not convince.  First, even accepting
its definition of the issue, it is impossible for the COMELEC to determine
whether FPJ was aware of a false material representation in his Certificate of
Candidacy without first determining whether such material representation
(in this case, his claim of natural-born citizenship) was false.  The fact alone that there is a public
document (i.e., his birth
certificate) which FPJ might have relied upon in averring natural-born
citizenship does not automatically exclude the possibility that (a) there is
other evidence to show that such averment is false, and (b) that FPJ was aware
of such evidence.

Second, the COMELEC’s strained construction of the ruling in Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections[98]
removes the above-quoted portion of the ponencia
from the factual circumstances of the case. 
The issue in Salcedo II was
whether Ermelita Cacao Salcedo’s use of the surname “Salcedo” in her
Certificate of Candidacy constituted a false material representation under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, given the allegation that she was not
legally married to Neptali Salcedo.  In
ruling that Ermelita Cacao’s use of the surname “Salcedo” did not constitute a
false material representation, this Court stated:

x x x it may be concluded
that the material misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 of the Code
refer[s] to qualifications for elective office.  This conclusion is strengthened by the fact
that the consequences imposed upon a candidate guilty of having made a false
representation in his certificate of candidacy are grave – to prevent the
candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for
violation of the election laws.  It could
not have been the intention of the law to deprive a person of such a basic and
substantive political right to be voted for a public office upon just any innocuous
mistake.

Petitioner has made no
allegations concerning private respondent’s qualifications to run for the
office of mayor.  Aside from his
contention that she made a misrepresentation in the use of the surname
“Salcedo,” petitioner does not claim that private respondent lacks the
requisite residency, age, citizenship or any other legal qualification
necessary to run for a local elective office as provided for in the Local
Government Code.  Thus, petitioner
has failed to discharge the burden of proving that the misrepresentation
allegedly made by private respondent in her certificate of candidacy pertains
to a material matter.

Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation
under Section 78 must consist of a “deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform,
or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.” In other
words, it must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one’s
qualifications for public office.  The use of a surname, when not intended to
mislead or deceive the public as to one’s identity, is not within the scope of
the provision.

There is absolutely no showing that the inhabitants of Sara, Iloilo
were deceived by the use of such surname by private respondent.  Petitioner does not allege that the
electorate did not know who they were voting for when they cast their ballots
in favor of “Ermelita Cacao Salcedo” or that they were fooled into voting for
someone else by the use of such name.  It
may safely be assumed that the electorate knew who private respondent was, not
only by name, but also by face and may have even been personally acquainted
with her since she has been residing in the municipality of Sara, Iloilo since
at least 1986.  Bolstering this assumption
is the fact that she has been living with Neptali Salcedo, the mayor of Sara
for three consecutive terms, since 1970 and the latter has held her out to the
public as his wife.

Also arguing against petitioner’s claim that private respondent
intended to deceive the electorate is the fact that private respondent started
using the surname “Salcedo” since 1986, several years before the
elections.  In her application for
registration of her rice and corn milling business filed with the Department of
Trade and Industry in 1993, private respondent used the name “Ermelita Cacao
Salcedo.”  From 1987 to 1997, she also
used the surname “Salcedo” in the income tax returns filed by herself and by
Neptali Salcedo.  The evidence presented
by private respondent on this point, which has remained uncontested by petitioner,
belie the latter’s claims that private respondent merely adopted the surname
“Salcedo” for purposes of improving her chances of winning in the local
elections by riding on the popularity of her husband.

Thus, we hold that private respondent did not commit any material
misrepresentation by the use of the surname “Salcedo” in her certificate of candidacy.[99]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The import of this Court’s ruling in Salcedo II is clearly that Ermelita Cacao’s use of the surname
“Salcedo,” assuming it to be a misrepresentation, was not a “false material
representation” in the context of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code since
it did not deceive the electorate as to either her identity or her
qualifications for the position of mayor.

In contrast, a false statement as to a qualification for elective
office – in this case, natural-born citizenship – is always material and, if the truth remains undisclosed, it would
definitely deceive the electorate as to a candidate’s qualifications for
office.

It may indeed be that a false representation in a certificate of
candidacy is the result of a candidate’s erroneous interpretation of law and
not from a false statement of fact, intentional or otherwise.[100]
In declaring that he is eligible, a candidate invariably relies on his
understanding of the legal requirement of residency or, as in this case,
citizenship.

Thus, in Romualdez-Marcos
v. Commission on Elections,[101]
cited in Salcedo II,[102] Mrs. Marcos stated that she had been a
resident of Leyte for only 7 months in the belief that what she was required by
the law to state was the period of her actual residence therein.  In deciding the case, this Court held that it
was the actual fulfillment of the requirement, not the candidate’s erroneous
understanding of the requirement which was controlling:

It is the fact of
residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought
to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the
constitution’s residency qualification requirement.  The said [false] statement becomes material
only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform,
or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.  It would be plainly ridiculous for a
candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of
candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.[103]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As applied to the present petitions, it is the status of
FPJ’s being a natural-born Filipino citizen, not the statement to that effect,
which is material since it is the status of being a natural-born Filipino which is decisive in determining whether the Constitutional and
statutory requirements have been fulfilled.

Viewed from whatever angle, it is beyond cavil that a
determination of FPJ’s citizenship was crucial to the proper disposition of the
Petition for Disqualification.  Such
determination was impressed with immense public interest and made more urgent
by the fast approaching May 10, 2004 elections as it directly impacts on the
informed choice of each and every Filipino voter.  The COMELEC’s failure to rule squarely on
said issue clearly constituted grave abuse of discretion.

Philippine Citizenship
as Conferred by the

Constitution.

Having identified FPJ’s citizenship to be the crucial issue,
whether in the Petition for Disqualification or in the instant petition, it is
necessary to consider the applicable law and jurisprudence for its
determination.

Citizenship is a political status denoting membership, more or
less permanent in character, in a political society and implying the duty of
allegiance on the part of the member and a duty of protection on the part of society.[104]

Thus, a citizen is one who, by birth, naturalization, or otherwise,
is a member of a political community, and as such is subject to its laws and
entitled to its protection in all his rights incident to that relation.  Derived from the Latin word “cives,” the term “citizen” conveys the
idea of connection or identification with the state or government and
participation in its function.[105]
It denotes possession within that particular political community of full civil
and political rights subject to special disqualifications such as minority.[106]

It is a recognized rule that each state, in the exercise of its
sovereign power, is free to determine who its citizens are, but not who the
citizens of other states are:

As a general principle, each
State is free to determine by its own law the persons whom it considers to be
its own nationals.  The Hague Convention
in 1930 on Conflict of Nationality Laws laid down two important rules on the
point.  The first rule is that it is for
the municipal law of each State (not for International Law) to determine who
are the nationals of a particular State, subject to certain limitations.  Hence, the following provisions of the Hague
Convention:

“It is for each State to
determine under its own law who are its nationals.  This law shall be recognized by other States
insofar as it is consistent with international conventions, international
customs, and the principles of law generally recognized with regard to
nationality.”

The second rule is a logical corollary of the first.  If it is for the municipal law of each State
to determine who are its nationals, it would necessarily follow that –

“Any question as to whether a person possesses the nationality of a
particular State shall be determined in accordance with the law of that State.”

In short, no other law than that
of the Philippines determines whether or not a person is a Filipino national.[107]
(Emphasis supplied)

In the Philippines, citizenship is essential not only for the
exercise of political rights[108]
and the right to hold public office,[109]
but for the exercise of a number of important economic privileges which the
Constitution reserves exclusively to Philippine citizens as well.[110]
A comparison of the 1935, 1973 and present 1987 Constitution shows that a
number of economic privileges reserved exclusively to Philippine citizens has
increased over time.

These “nationalist provisions” make the question of citizenship
of even greater importance and “deserving of the most serious consideration.”
Thus, it has been said that “[to] those who are citizens by birth it is a precious
heritage, while to those who acquire it thru naturalization it is a priceless acquisition.”[111]

Philippine Citizenship as Conferred

by the Constitution.

Being a political status, citizenship is determined by political
law and not by civil or other laws.  Thus
in Ching Leng v. Galang,[112]
this Court, speaking through Justice (later Chief Justice) Roberto Concepcion,
stated:

The framers of the Civil
Code had no intention whatsoever to regulate therein political
questions.  Hence, apart from
reproducing the provisions of the Constitution on citizenship, the Code
contains no precept thereon except that which refers all matters of
“naturalization,” as well as those related to the “loss and reacquisition
of citizenship” to “special laws.” 
Consistently with this policy, our Civil Code does not include therein
any rule analogous to Articles 18 to 28 of the Civil Code of Spain, regulating citizenship.[113]
(Emphasis supplied, underscoring in the original)

Philippine citizenship is thus governed primarily by Article IV of
our 1987 Constitution, viz:

ARTICLE IV

Citizenship

Sec. 1.          The following
are citizens of the Philippines :

(1)     Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption
of this Constitution;

(2)     Those whose fathers or
mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

(3)     Those born before
January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and

(4)     Those who are
naturalized in accordance with law.

Sec. 2.          Natural-born
citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.
Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3),
Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.

Sec. 3.          Philippine
citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.

Sec. 4.          Citizens of
the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by
their act or omission they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it.

Sec. 5.          Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt
with by law. (Emphasis supplied)

Paragraph (1) of Section 1, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution
recognizes as citizens those who were considered Philippine citizens under the
1973 Constitution. Paragraph (1) of Section 1, Article III of the 1973 Constitution,[114]
in turn refers to those who were citizens under Article IV of the 1935
Constitution,[115]
which provides:

ARTICLE IV

CITIZENSHIP

Sec. 1.          The following
are citizens of the Philippines:

(1)     Those who are citizens
of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

(2)     Those born in the
Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.

(3)     Those whose fathers
are citizens of the Philippines.

(4)     Those whose mothers
are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship.

(5)     Those who are
naturalized in accordance with law.

Sec. 2.          Philippine
citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.

Thus, the citizenship of one born during the effectivity of the
1935 Constitution is determined by the provisions thereof.  Moreover, the changes in the provisions on
citizenship in the present Constitution may not be deemed to retroact to
benefit those born before it, except only when such retroactive effect has been
made explicit in the Constitution itself. 
Thus, in In Re: Application For Admission to the Philippine Bar. Vicente
D. Ching,[116]
this Court held that:

x x x It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987
Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having a
curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those
covered by the 1935 Constitution. If the citizenship of a person was subject
to challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the
new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before the
effectivity of the new Constitution.[117]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied supplied).

Prior to the ratification of the 1935 Constitution, citizenship
of the Philippine Islands was governed by the principal organic acts by which
the United States governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July
1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, also known as the
Jones Law. Both of these organic acts make reference to the Treaty of Paris of
December 10, 1898 by which Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United
States. Article IX of the Treaty of Paris provided for effects of the change in
sovereignty on citizenship status in the Philippine Islands:

Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the
territory over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her
sovereignty, may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in
either event all their rights of property, including the right to sell or
dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right
to carry on their industry, commerce and professions, being subject in respect
thereof to such laws as are applicable to other foreigners.  In case they remain in the territory they may
preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of
record, within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this
treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default
of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have
adopted the nationality of the territory in which they may reside.

The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of
the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the
Congress.

Interpreting the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and
the Jones Law, this Court, in the recent case of Valles v. Commission on Elections,[118]
had occasion to state:

The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis.  Thereunder, a child follows the nationality
or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as
opposed to the doctrine of jus soli
which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.

Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934
in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco,
a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an
Australian. Historically, this was a year before
the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the
Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the
United States governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1,
1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, also known as the
Jones Law.

Among others, these laws defined who were deemed to be citizens of
the Philippine islands.  The Philippine Bill of 1902 defined
Philippine citizens as:

SEC. 4. x x x all inhabitants of the Philippine  Islands continuing to reside therein who were
Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and
ninety-nine, and then resided in the Philippine Islands, and their children
born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United
States, except such as shall have
elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with
the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain
signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.

The Jones Law, on the other hand, provides:

SEC. 2.  That all
inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh
day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said
Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held
to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the
Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between
the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight, and except such others as have since become citizens
of some other country: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein
provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who cannot
come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of
the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands
who are citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of the
United States under the laws of the United States if residing therein.

Under both organic acts, all
inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided
therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens.  Private respondent’s father, Telesforo
Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact duly
evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus,
under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was
deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the
laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo’s daughter, herein private
respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.

The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has
established the principle of jus
sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, to wit:

(1)     Those who are citizens of the Philippine
Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

(2)     Those born in the Philippine Islands of
foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution had been elected
to public office in the Philippine Islands.

(3)     Those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines.

(4)     Those whose mothers are citizens of the
Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine
citizenship.

(5)     Those who are naturalized in accordance
with law.

So also, the principle of jus
sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was
subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein
private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been
born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not
tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the
principle of jus soli, then at most,
private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her
possession of dual citizenship.[119]
(Emphasis supplied, italics in the original)

Upon the other hand, in In
Re: Bosque,[120]
this Court elucidated on the requisites for the acquisition of citizenship
of the Philippine Islands by operation of the Treaty of Paris as follows:

The cession of the Philippine Archipelago having been agreed upon
by the parties to the treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, the compulsory
subjection of the subjects of the ceding power to the new sovereign followed as
a logical consequence.  The status of these subjects was not
uniform, as in addition to the natives there were others who were merely
residents but who, equally with the natives had interests and rights inherent
in the nationality of the territory. 
With respect to these the special agreement contained in article 9 was
established, by virtue of which it was agreed to accord them the right of
electing to leave the country, thus freeing themselves of subjection to the new
sovereign, or to continue to reside in the territory, in which case the expiration
of the term of eighteen months[121] without their making an express
declaration of intention to retain their Spanish nationality resulted in the
loss of the latter, such persons thereby becoming subjects of the new sovereign
in the same manner as the natives of these Islands.  The period of eighteen months began to run
from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of the treaty – that is to
say, from April 11, 1899, and expired on the corresponding day of October, 1900.  The petitioner absented himself from these
Islands on May 30, 1899, and remained absent therefrom during the whole
period.  It was in January, 1901, that he
returned to these Islands.

From this conduct on the part of the petitioner it is evident that
he elected to take the first of the two courses open to him under his right of
option.  Neither the Government nor the
courts can place any other construction upon the facts above related.  Having left the Islands he had no occasion to
make any declaration of his intention to preserve his Spanish nationality,
which he carried with him on his departure. 
This nationality could be
forfeited only by a continued residence in the ceded territory and a failure to
make a declaration of intention to preserve it within the term fixed therefore.
The conditions which gave rise to the presumptive change of nationality were
residence and the lapse of eighteen months without express declaration to the
contrary; these two conditions not being fulfilled there was no change of
national status.  Neither by the
Government of Spain nor by that of the United States could the petitioner be
regarded as a Filipino subject.  By
absenting himself from the territory he continued to be a Spaniard.

To native-born subjects
of the territory no such right of option was accorded; it was expressly
refused them upon the rejection by the American Commissioners of the
proposition in favor of the inhabitants of the ceded territories made by the
Spanish Commissioners in Annex No. 1 to the twenty-second protocol.  (Conference of December 10, 1898).  The
native subject could not evade the power of the new sovereign by withdrawing
from the Islands, nor while continuing to reside therein make declaration of
his intention to preserve the Spanish nationality enjoyed under the former
sovereign.  Neither the Government of
the United States nor that of Spain can consider them as other than Filipino
subjects.  This is expressly stated by
the Spanish Government in article 1 of its royal decree of May 11, 1901.

The dates fixed by the treaty by which the sovereignty of one
nation is ceded to another are of the highest importance, they being part of
the contract, and are not within the control of the subjects as are those
relating to their individual rights by reason of the fact that the political
rights of the contracting nations themselves are the subject of the
agreement.  It is for this reason that
the Government of Spain in the royal decree above cited has always taken the
dates fixed in the treaty of Paris as the starting point, and, moreover,
expressly declares therein that persons
who are natives or residents of the ceded or relinquished territories can not,
in their relations with the Government or authorities of such territories, lay
claim to Spanish nationality preserved or recovered by virtue of said decree,
except with the consent of such Government, or under treaty stipulations.  (Art. 5.) 
The Government and courts of these Islands should not act with less
circumspection in the matter, and invade the sovereign rights of Spain by
giving the presumptive nationality established by Article IX of the treaty of
Paris an extent not warranted by the conditions upon which it depends, to wit,
residence coupled with failure to make an express declaration to the contrary.  The ordinary provisions of local laws in
their normal operation with regard to the effect of absence upon the retention
of a residence or domicile can not therefore be relied upon, nor the
presumptions as to the intention of an absentee recognized by the civil codes
and international treaties, although the most general and almost the only proof
allowed by statute as evidence of an intention to preserve a residence or
domicile in a country is the maintenance of a dwelling or commercial
establishment therein, upon which point, as also upon the fact that the
petitioner became a member of the bar of Barcelona upon his arrival in that
city, we make no decision, not regarding it as of any moment in view of the
conclusions above expressed.  The fact is that one is not to be regarded
as having submitted to the new sovereign by the mere failure to make an express
declaration, inasmuch as without a residence de facto the declaration is of no significance, having been
established for the express purpose of overcoming the effect of a continued
residence, an act which in itself implies subjection to the new sovereign
by giving rise to the presumption of waiver of Spanish nationality and the
adoption of that of the territory.

The petitioner can not, therefore, be considered to have lost his
Spanish nationality by reason of his residence in the territory after the 11^th
of October, 1900, and his failure to make declaration of his intention to
preserve it within the period agreed upon by the high contracting parties to the
treaty of Paris, and to have adopted the nationality of the native subjects
under the presumption arising from the conditions expressed.  He can only acquire it through voluntary
renunciation of his present nationality by seeking to become naturalized in
these Islands; but upon this matter this court can decide nothing, there having
been no legislation upon the subject up to the present.[122]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

From the foregoing, it can be gathered that Article IX of the
Treaty of Paris contemplated two distinct classes of persons: (a) the native
inhabitants of the Philippine Islands, and (b) Spanish subjects who were
natives of the Peninsula. The native inhabitants immediately became citizens of
the Philippine Islands with no option whatsoever to retain Spanish
citizenship.  However, for the natives
of Spain to become citizens of the Philippine Islands, the following
conditions had to be met: (1) they had to be residents of the Philippine
Islands on April 11, 1899; (2) they had to maintain actual residence
therein for a period of 18 months or until October 11, 1900; (3) without their
making an express declaration of intention to retain Spanish citizenship.  The absence of any of these requisites
prevented them from becoming citizens of the Philippine Islands.

In the later case of In Re Mallare,[123]
this Court, speaking through Justice (then Acting Chief Justice) J.B.L. Reyes,
held that a claim of Philippine citizenship on the basis of the Treaty of Paris
and the two Organic Acts must be supported by preponderant evidence, to wit:

On 16 July 1962, the then Acting Commissioner of Immigration
Martiniano P. Vivo denounced the respondent to this Court as a Chinaman
masquerading as a Filipino citizen and requested that the matter be
investigated thoroughly and if the respondent fails to show that he has legally
become a Filipino, steps be taken for striking his name from the roll of
persons authorized to practice law. Acting upon the request, this Court, on 9
August 1962, referred the matter to its Legal Officer-Investigator for
investigation and report. An investigation was thus held wherein the relator or
complainant and the respondent appeared and adduced their respective evidence.

The position of the respondent-lawyer is that he is a Filipino
citizen based on the supposed citizenship of his father, Esteban Mallare,
alleged to be a Filipino citizen by choice, because he was the illegitimate son
of a Chinese father and a Filipina mother, Ana Mallare; and that the
respondent’s mother, Te Na, a Chinese, followed the citizenship of her husband
upon their marriage.

x x x

On respondent’s first claim
to citizenship by blood, the earliest datum that can be stated about the
respondent’s supposed ancestry is that in 1902, ex-municipal president Rafael
Catarroja, then eight years old, met for the first time Ana Mallare, the
supposed paternal grandmother of the respondent, in Macalelon, Quezon.  He had not seen her deliver or give birth to
the baby boy, Esteban Mallare, father of the respondent, but met the supposed
Filipina mother and Esteban Mallare years later when the boy was already eight
(8) years old. (Annex “8”, pp. 10-12, t.s.n., Sept. 24, 1959, Civil Case No.
329-G, CFI of Quezon Province).  There is no evidence that Ana Mallare was
an “inhabitant of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who was a
Spanish subject on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and
ninety-nine”, as required by the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and she
cannot, therefore, be considered a Filipina. That witness Catarroja, the
respondent, and the latter’s brothers and sisters, stated that Ana Mallare was
a Filipina, as well as their testimonies in the civil case that she had not
married her Chinese husband and that she is the true mother of Esteban Mallare,
are more of opinion or conjecture than fact, utterly insufficient to overcome
the presumption that persons living together as husband and wife are married to
each other (Rule 131, par. bb). “Every intendment of law and fact”, says
Article 220 of our Civil Code “leans toward the validity of marriage and the
legitimacy of children.”[124]
(emphasis supplied)

It was only after a new trial, wherein Mr. Mallare was able to
present sufficient evidence, that his claim of Philippine citizenship was
finally recognized:

In Our decision of April 29,
1968, respondent’s claim that he is a Filipino was denied for lack of evidence
proving the Philippine citizenship of his father, Esteban Mallare. It was ruled
that Ana Mallare (Esteban’s mother) can not be considered a Filipino, there being
no proof that she was "an inhabitant of the Philippines continuing to
reside therein who was a Spanish subject on the eleventh day of April, eighteen
hundred and ninety-nine"; that the landing certificate issued by the
Bureau of Immigration which referred to respondent’s mother, Te Na, as
"wife of Dy Esteban, P.I. citizen", was based upon an ex parte determination of the evidence
presented by therein applicant and consequently carries little evidentiary
weight as to the citizenship of her said husband; and that the affidavit of
Esteban Mallare, executed on February 20, 1939, to the effect that he had
chosen to follow the citizenship of his Filipino mother was not only
self-serving, but also it can not be considered a re-affirmation of the alleged
election of citizenship since no previous election of such citizenship has been
proved to exist.

With the additional evidence
submitted by respondent pursuant to the authority granted by this Court, the
aforementioned void in the proof of respondent’s citizenship has been duly
filled.

The witnesses, all natives
of Macalelon, who had personal knowledge of the person, birth and residency
of both Ana Mallare and her son Esteban, were one in their declaration that
Ana Mallare is a Tagalog who had continuously resided in the place, and that
Esteban, her son, was reputedly born out of wedlock. Such declarations
constitute admissible evidence of the birth and illegitimacy of Esteban
Mallare. Reputation has been held admissible as evidence of age, birth, race,
or race-ancestry, and on the question of whether a child was born alive. Unlike
that of matters of pedigree, general reputation of marriage may proceed from
persons who are not members of the family – the reason for the distinction is
the public interest that is taken in the question of the existence of marital
relations.

The principle could not have been more true than in a Philippine
rural community where relationships not in conformity with established
conventions become the subject of criticisms and public cynosure. Thus, the
public reputation in Macalelon that Esteban was Ana’s natural child, testified
to by the witnesses, would constitute proof of the illegitimacy of the former.
Besides, if Esteban were really born out of legal union, it is highly
improbable that he would be keeping the surname “Mallare” after his mother,
instead of adopting that of his father. And it would be straining the
imagination to perceive that this situation was purposedly sought by Esteban’s
parents to suit some ulterior motives. In 1903, we can not concede that alien
inhabitants of his country were that sophisticated or legally-oriented.

The assertion of the witnesses, which have not been controverted,
that Ana Mallare is a Tagalog (and, therefore, a Filipino citizen), cannot be
assailed as being mere conclusions devoid of evidentiary value. The
declarations were not only based on the reputation in the community regarding
her race or race-ancestry, which is admissible in evidence, but they must have
certain factual basis. For it must be realized that in this Philippine society,
every region possesses certain characteristics all its own. Thus, a Tagalog
would normally detect if a person hails from the same region even from the way
the latter speaks. Considering that the witnesses testified having known, and
lived with, Ana Mallare in Macalelon, their declaration that she is a Tagalog
should receive a high degree of credibility.[125]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Indeed in Valles v.
Commission on Elections,[126]
the claim of citizenship was again sufficiently supported by the evidence, viz:

Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of
the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein
including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens.  Private
respondent’s father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet,
Camarines Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry
in the Registry of Births.  Thus,
under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was
deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the
laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo’s daughter, herein private
respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.[127]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The same requirement was consistently
adopted in other cases decided by this Court.[128]

It thus clear that a claim of citizenship on the basis of the
Treaty of Paris, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law must be
adequately supported by evidence and cannot be sustained on mere assumption or
supposition.

Citizenship of an Illegitimate Child.

It is in light of the foregoing laws and jurisprudence that I now
proceed to examine the arguments concerning Philippine citizenship of
illegitimate children like FPJ who was born on August 20, 1939, before his
parents contracted marriage on September 16, 1940.

Petitioner Fornier argues, on the basis of this Court’s rulings
in United States v. Ong Tianse,[129] Serra v. Republic,[130]
Zamboanga Transportation Co. v. Lim,[131]
Board of Immigration v. Gallano,[132]
and Paa v. Chan,[133]
that an illegitimate child follows the citizenship of his or her mother, and
not that of the illegitimate father. 
Thus, he concludes, even if the illegitimate child’s father is a
Filipino, paragraph (3) of Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution would
not operate to confer Philippine citizenship on him or her.

In the cited case of United
States v. Ong Tianse,[134]
decided in 1915 before the ratification of the 1935 Constitution, this Court
held:

x x x  In the present case,
Ong Tianse alleges that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in the
Philipines of a Filipino mother, with the circumstance that his Chinese father
was not legally married to his natural mother. 
Under these conditions the
appellant follows, in accordance with law, the status and nationality of his
only known parent, who is his mother, Barbara Dangculos, a Filipina.[135]
(Emphasis supplied)

The foregoing was known to and considered by the delegates to the
1934 Constitutional Convention.  Indeed,
even after the ratification of the 1935 Constitution, commentators were of the
opinion that it was a well-settled rule in our jurisdiction that an
illegitimate or natural child “follows the status and nationality of its
mother, who is the only legally recognized parent.”[136]

Indeed, even former amicus
curiae Constitutional Commissioner Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., once held
the same view:

It is also a settled rule that the principle of jus sanguinis applies only to natural
filiation and not to filiation by adoption. 
Likewise, it is a settled rule
that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that
“illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother and
follow her nationality, not that of
the illegitimate father.” This rule, based on parental authority, remains
unchanged by the 1973 Constitution.[137]
(Emphasis supplied; italics in the original)

FPJ, on the other hand, argues that a plain reading of the Constitutional
provision does not reveal any distinction in its application with respect to
legitimate or illegitimate children. 
This view is shared by amici
curiae Justice Mendoza, Fr. Bernas, and former University of the
Philippines College of Law Dean Merlin M. Magallona.

In his Position Paper, Justice Mendoza opines:

On the basis of Art. IV, Sec. 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution (“Those
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines”), as interpreted by this Court,
the rule may be summarized as follows:

1.   A child follows the citizenship of his
Filipino father if he is legitimate. If he is not a legitimate child but a
natural one, he may be legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents
provided he is acknowledged by them either before or after the marriage.

2.   A child born out of wedlock of an alien
father and a Filipino mother follows the citizenship of his mother “as the only
legally recognized parent.”

Thus, the cases interpreting Art. IV, Sec. 1(3) do not exclude
illegitimate children of Filipino fathers from this class of citizens of the
Philippines.  They do not say that only
legitimate children or natural children, who are legitimated as a result of the
subsequent marriage of their parents and their acknowledgement before or after
the marriage, belong to this class of citizens of the Philippines (“Those whose
fathers are citizens of the Philippines”). Nor, on the other hand, by holding
that illegitimate children follow the citizenship of their Filipino mothers as
the “only legally recognized parents,” do the cases excludes instances in which
an illegitimate child may have been acknowledged by his Filipino father.

These cases (United States v. Ong Tianse, supra; Serra v.
Republic, supra; Santos Co v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 52
Phil. 543 (1928); Ratunil Sy Quimsuan v. Republic, 92 Phil. 675 (1953), holding
that illegitimate children follow the citizenship of their Filipino mothers,
involve situations in which the fathers are not Filipinos and the discernible
effort of the Court is to trace a blood relation in order to give the
illegitimate child Philippine citizenship. This blood relationship is easily
established in the case of the mother as “the only legally recognized parent of
the child.” But it would stand the principle on its head to say that the
illegitimate child cannot follow the citizenship of the father if it happens
and that he is the citizen of the Philippines, while the mother is the alien.
Indeed to hold that an illegitimate child follows the citizenship of his
Filipino mother but that an illegitimate child does not follow the citizenship
of his Filipino father would be to make an invidious discrimination. To be sure
this Court has not ruled thus.

To this Fr. Bernas, adds:

I now come to the question whether jus sanguinis applies to illegitimate children.  We have many decisions which say that jus sanguinis applies to the
illegitimate children of Filipino mothers because the mother is the only known
or acknowledged parent.  But does the law
make a distinction and say that jus
sanguinis does not apply to the illegitimate children of Filipino fathers
even if paternity is clearly established?

No law or constitutional provision supports this distinction.  On the contrary, the Constitution clearly
says without distinction that among those who are citizens of the Philippines
are those whose father[s are] Filipino citizen[s].  Hence, what is needed for the application of jus sanguinis according to the clear
letter of the law is not legitimacy of the child but proof of paternity.

Having said that, however, we must contend with four cases
promulgated by the Supreme Court which contain the statement that illegitimate
children do not follow the Filipino citizenship of the father.  These cases are: Morano v. Vivo, 20 SCRA 562 (1967), which in turns cites Chiongbian v. De Leon, 46 O.G. 3652 and Serra v. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952,
and finally Paa v. Chan, 21 SCRA
(1967).

x x x

I submit that the petitioners in this case as well as three Comelec
Commissioners, including the two controversial new ones, and even the Solicitor
General himself supported by sixteen Solicitors, Associate and Assistant
Solicitors, have merely repeated, without any semblance of analysis, the obiter dicta in these four cases.  It is I believe an unfortunate lapse in government
legal scholarship.

The clear conclusion from all these four cases is that their
statements to the effect that jus
sanguinis applies only to legitimate children were all obiter dicta which decided nothing. The Court had purported to
offer a solution to a non-existent problem. 
Obiter dicta do not establish
constitutional doctrine even if repeated endlessly.  Obiter
dicta are not decisions, and non-decisions do not constitute stare decisis.  They therefore cannot be used to resolve
constitutional issues today.

For his part, Dean Magallona states:

The transmissive essence of citizenship here is clearly the core
principle of blood relationship or jus
sanguinis. On this account, the derivation of citizenship from a person or
the transmission of citizenship to his child, springs from the fact that he is
the father. Thus, paternity as manifestation of blood relationship is all that
is needed to be established.  To
introduce a distinction between legitimacy or illegitimacy in the status of a
child vis-a-vis the derivation of his citizenship from the father defeats the
transmissive essence of citizenship in blood relationship. The text of the law
which reads “Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines” becomes an
embodiment of the kernel principle of blood relationship, which provides no
room for the notion of citizenship by legitimacy or legitimation.

I am aware that under Roman Law, from which the concept of jus sanguinis originated, a child born
out of the pale of lawful marriage always followed the condition of his or her mother.[138]
However, it cannot be denied that the concept of jus sanguinis as well as the rights of an illegitimate child have
progressed considerably in the three millennia since the inception of Roman
Law.  Thus, I am open to a closer
examination of the pronouncement that an illegitimate “follows the status and
nationality of its mother, who is the only legally recognized parent.”

In Zamboanga Transportation
Co. v. Lim,[139]
this Court affirmed an Order by the Public Service Commission to the effect
that an illegitimate child born to a Filipino mother during the effectivity of
the 1935 Constitution did not have to elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching majority,[140]
thereby implying that paragraph (4) of Section 1, Article IV of the 1935
Constitution did not apply to illegitimate children.  However, said decision precisely had the
effect of recognizing the citizenship of the illegitimate child on the basis of
his blood relationship to his Filipino mother. 
It cannot reasonably be inferred, however, from this pronouncement that
paragraph (3) of Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution should be
construed as preventing an illegitimate child from deriving Philippine
citizenship from his Filipino father.

I am likewise aware that in Morano
v. Vivo,[141]
Chiongbian v. de Leon[142]
and Ching Leng v. Galang[143]
it declared that a legitimate minor child follows the citizenship of his or her
father.  However, as observed by Justice
Mendoza, these pronouncements “did not say that only legitimate children will
follow the citizenship of one or the other parent, who is a Filipino.”[144]

As regards this Court’s statement in United States v. Ong Tianse[145]
that a child born out of wedlock to a foreign father and a Filipino mother is
presumed prima-facie to be a citizen of this country for, as under the law, he
follows the status and nationality of his only legally recognized parent – his
mother, a Filipina, Justice Mendoza comments that such pronouncement is based
on the fact that a child’s blood relationship to his mother is easily
determined at birth.  However, so Justice
Mendoza asserts, the pronouncement does not entirely foreclose the possibility
that the illegitimate child may derive his father’s citizenship should such
blood relationship be proved.

After due consideration of the arguments presented by the parties
and amici curiae, I agree with the
view of FPJ and the amici curiae that
indeed a textual examination of the relevant provisions of the Constitution
shows the same do not distinguish between legitimate or illegitimate
children.  As priorly observed, the
Philippines has adopted the principle of jus
sanguinis, or blood relationship, as the rule in determining
citizenship. Consequently, the civil law status of legitimacy or illegitimacy,
by itself, is not determinative of Philippine citizenship.

This view is reinforced by an examination of the record of the
proceedings of the 1934 Constitutional Convention, particularly the session of
November 26, 1934 when the provisions on citizenship were taken up by the
plenary.  The proceedings of the
Constitutional Convention reveals that the delegates were acutely aware of the
possible problems with respect to illegitimate children and foundlings that
could arise from the adoption of jus
sanguinis as the exclusive source of Philippine citizenship.  Nevertheless, the consensus of the Convention
delegates was apparently that such cases were too few to warrant the inclusion
of a specific provision in the Constitution, and should be governed by
statutory legislation, the principles of international law, and the decisions
of this Court.[146]

In sum, finding no cogent reason to, in the language of Dean
Magallona, “defeat the transmissive essence of citizenship in blood
relationship” between fathers and their children, legitimate or illegitimate, I
find that illegitimate children may follow the citizenship of their fathers
under the principle of jus sanguinis.

In the determination of the citizenship of the illegitimate
child, his status as such becomes material only in case his mother is an alien
and he desires to claim Philippine citizenship through his putative Filipino
father.

Relevance of
Legitimacy/Illegitimacy at

Birth/Clarification of
Doctrine in Ong

Tianse.

Does my foregoing statement render completely irrelevant the
pronouncements, whether doctrine or dicta, in United States v. Ong Tianse[147]
and the other cases cited by petitioner Fornier?  FPJ and the amici curiae would argue in the affirmative.

On considered reflection, however, I find in the negative.

The rationale for the rule that the citizenship of an
illegitimate child follows that of his or her mother appears to be two-fold:
first, as an illegitimate child, he or she does not have an identifiable father
and, unless he is identified, considered nullus
filius or the child of no one; second, because the father is unknown, an
unacknowledged illegitimate child acquires no rights with respect to his
father.   Both reasons appear to possess
some practical value.

Undoubtedly, citizenship is a political right which flows not
from legitimacy but from paternity.  But,
while it is impossible to argue with the statement of Fr. Bernas that
“paternity begins when the ovum is fertilized nine months before birth and not
upon marriage or legitimation,” the practical fact of the matter is that, at
the point of conception and perhaps even until and beyond the point of birth,
the identity of the father remains a secret known only to God and hidden from
men – the child’s father included.

Put differently, the recognition that an illegitimate child may
derive citizenship from his Filipino father does not resolve all issues as to
his citizenship.  All the amici curiae agree that an essential
prerequisite is that the identity of the illegitimate child’s father should be
firmly established – he should be legally known.

Human biology is such that, as a scientific fact, the identity of
the mother is immediately known at birth, but that of the father is not. To
manage this uncertainty as well as preserve, protect and promote the family as
a social institution,[148]
the law steps in and creates certain strong presumptions as to paternity.

With respect to filiation to his or her father, a child born
within the marriage of his or her parents differs from one born out of
wedlock.  For a child born within the
marriage of his parents, the law creates a strong presumption as to the
paternity of his mother’s husband.[149]
Correspondingly, the law makes it difficult to impugn the presumption that he
is the child of his father.[150]

The law makes no such
presumptions with respect to the paternity of an illegitimate child, however.[151]

As noted by the amici
curiae, the rights accorded to illegitimate children have steadily
progressed through time. Since the Roman Law to the present legal framework of
the Family Code, a trend towards affording the nullius filius with more rights is readily apparent.  Thus, the law does allow a father to
establish his paternity with respect to his illegitimate child and, correspondingly,
it also allows the illegitimate child to prove his filiation to his
father.  Given this, the principle
enunciated in United States v. Ong Tianse[152]
may be correctly understood to be that an illegitimate child follows the
nationality of his legally recognized parent or parents.

For purposes of establishing citizenship, how then may he or she
legally establish his or her filial relationship to his or her father?  In the absence of more specific legislation,
the provisions of civil law, as suggested by amicus curiae Prof. Ruben F. Balane, with respect to filiation may
provide some guidance.

Under the Family Code, an illegitimate child may establish his or
her filiation in the same manner as a legitimate child.[153]
Article 172 of the Family Code thus provides:

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by
any of the following:

(1)     The record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or

(2)     An admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation
shall be proved by:

(1)     The open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child; or

(2)     Any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws.

May an illegitimate child use the foregoing methods to prove his
filiation for purposes of establishing not only his civil law status as the
child of his father, but also to derive the political status of citizenship
from his father?  In evaluating this
proposition, I am guided by the knowledge that citizenship confers a broader
spectrum of rights and privileges between the individual and the State than
between a child and the other members of his family.

With respect to voluntary acknowledgment, specially if made
prior to any controversy concerning citizenship, the same may be considered
sufficient to prove filiation for purposes of establishing citizenship on the
assumption that a man would not lightly assume the solemn responsibilities of
fatherhood if he were not certain of his paternity.

With respect to compulsory acknowledgment through a judicial
proceeding, the same may be considered ideal as it would provide an opportunity
for all parties to furnish all the evidence relevant to the issue of
paternity.  Moreover, it would give the
State the opportunity to intervene and satisfy itself as to the jus sanguinis of the parties and ensure
the enforcement of the State’s strict policies on immigration. In this regard,
the observation of this Court in Tijing v. Court of Appeals[154]
with respect to DNA evidence is significant:

A final note.  Parentage will still be resolved using
conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways
available.  Fortunately, we have now the
facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage
testing.  The University of the
Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis
Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem
repeat (STR) analysis.  The analysis is
based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy
from the mother and the other from the father. 
The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to
establish parentage.  Of course, being a
novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to
challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate
to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. 
For it was said, that courts
should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of
situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress. Though
it is not necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in future it would
be useful to all concerned in the prompt resolution of parentage and identity
issues.  (Emphasis supplied)[155]

With respect to the open and continuous possession of the status
of a legitimate child, the same may prove less weighty considering that a child
is accorded the status of a legitimate child for reasons other than blood
relationship.  The statements of this
Court in Morano v. Vivo,[156]
and Ching Leng v. Galang[157]
to the effect that blood relationship, and not merely parental authority, is
required for a child to derive Philippine citizenship from his father may be
considered persuasive.

Natural-born citizenship

Indeed, I note that in the context of the present case, the
strictest proof of filiation is required since what must be determined is not
merely citizenship but natural-born citizenship.

The concept of “natural-born citizen” was a concept adopted in
the 1935 Constitution as a qualification for the offices of President and Vice-President,[158]
Senator,[159]
as well as Member of the House of Representatives.[160]

The 1935 Constitution did not itself define who is a natural-born
citizen, but the concept was elucidated in the discussion between Delegates
Artadi and Roxas during the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention,[161]
wherein Delegate Roxas explained that a natural-born citizen is one who is a
citizen by reason of his birth and not by naturalization or by any subsequent
statement required by the law for his citizenship.[162]

The requirement was considered a reflection of the nationalistic
spirit of the Framers of the Constitution.[163]
According to Delegate Aruego, “It was felt that, by virtue of the key positions
of the President and the Vice-President in the Philippine Government, every
precaution should be taken to insure the fact the persons elected, instead of
being or developing to be mere instruments of foreign governments or foreign
groups, would be loyal to the country and to its people.”[164]

The 1973 Constitution explicitly incorporated the definition of
natural-born citizen into the text,[165]
as does the present 1987 Constitution:

Sec. 2.          Natural-born
citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.
Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3),
Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.

The second paragraph of the foregoing provision was intended to
equalize the status of those born of Filipina parents before the effectivity of
the 1973 Constitution on January 17, 1973 with that of those born after that
date.  Hence, by express Constitutional
fiat, legitimate children of Filipino mothers born before the 1973 Constitution
who elect Philippine citizenship within a reasonable time after reaching their
majority age are deemed natural-born citizens even though they had to perform
an act to perfect their Philippine citizenship.

It may be noted that, with the singular exception of those
covered by the second sentence of Section 2, as discussed above, the essential
features of natural-born citizenship is that it is (1) established at birth,
and (2) involuntary in character — that is, a natural-born citizen has no
choice in his being a Filipino.

That more high ranking public officials are required to be
natural-born Philippine citizens under the present 1987 Constitution than in
previous Constitutions may be interpreted to be further measures taken by the
Constitutional Commissioners to ensure that the nationalist provisions of the
Constitution, political, social and economic, are carried out by men and women
who are of unquestionable loyalty to the Philippines, whether in war or in
peace.  It may be further remarked that
this expansion of the requirement of natural-born citizenship to other high
public offices may prove prophetic in the context of the increasing importance
of global trade and the intensity of global economic competition.

The special importance of the status of a natural-born citizen
was eloquently stressed by Associate Justice Sandoval-Gutierez in her
dissenting opinion in the recent case of Bengzon III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,[166]
where the question of whether a natural-born citizen who had emigrated to a
foreign country could subsequently re-acquire his natural-born status by
repatriation:

For sure, the framers of our
Constitution intended to provide a more stringent citizenship requirement for
higher elective offices, including that of the office of a Congressman. Otherwise, the Constitution should have
simply provided that a candidate for such position can be merely a citizen of
the Philippines, as required of local elective officers.

The spirit of nationalism
pervading the 1935 Constitution, the first charter framed and ratified by the
Filipinos (even as the draft had to be approved by President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt of the United States) guides
and governs the interpretation of Philippine citizenship and the more narrow
and bounded concept of being a natural-born citizen.

Under the 1935 Constitution, the requirement of natural-born
citizenship was applicable only to the President and Vice President. A person
who had been a citizen for only five (5) years could be elected to the National
Assembly. Only in 1940, when the first Constitution was amended did
natural-born citizenship become a requirement for Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives. A Filipino naturalized for at least five (5) years could
still be appointed Justice of the Supreme Court or a Judge of a lower court.

The history of the
Constitution shows that the meaning and application of the requirement of being
natural-born have become more narrow and qualified over the years.

Under the 1973 Constitution, the President, members of the National
Assembly, Prime Minister, Justices of the Supreme Court, Judges of inferior
courts, the chairmen and members of the Constitutional Commissions and the
majority of members of the cabinet, must be natural-born citizens. The 1987
Constitution added the Ombudsman and his deputies and the members of the
Commission on Human Rights to those who must be natural-born citizens.

The questioned Decision of respondent HRET reverses the historical
trend and clear intendment of the Constitution. It shows a more liberal, if not
a cavalier approach to the meaning and import of natural-born citizen and
citizenship in general.

It bears stressing that we
are tracing and enforcing a doctrine embodied in no less than the
Constitution.  Indeed, a deviation from the clear and constitutional definition of a
"natural-born Filipino citizen" is a matter which can only be
accomplished through a constitutional amendment.  Clearly, respondent HRET gravely abused its discretion.[167]
(Emphasis supplied; italics in the original)

Considering the special status and privileges of a natural-born
citizen, how should be determine whether a child born out of wedlock to an
alien mother is indeed a natural-born Filipino citizen?

Justice Mendoza offers a possible solution in his Position Paper:

Finally, the question is whether respondent FPJ is a natural born
citizen. The definition of who is a natural born citizen of the Philippines in
the 1973 and in the 1987 document follows the general idea that a person be a
citizen at birth. This notion applies whether citizenship in a nation is based
on the principle of jus sanguinis
(blood relationship) or the principle of jus soli (place of birth). The notion
was articulated in the American case of United
State[s] v. Wong Kim Ark, 769 U.S. 649, 18 S. Ct. 456, 42 L. Ed. 890 (1848)
and considered by the Constitutional Convention of 1934. (See the discussion between delegates Roxas and Artadi (See 5 Proceedings of the 1934-1935
Constitutional Convention 306-309 (Salvador H. Laurel, ed. 1966)).  Consequently,
if it can be shown that his acknowledgment by his supposed father was made upon
his birth, then respondent FPJ is a natural born citizen of the Philippines
within the meaning of Art. IV Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution.

x x x

6.       If an illegitimate child’s filiation to his supposed father and his
acknowledgment by the latter are made at the moment of the child’s birth
and these matter are duly proven, then he is a natural born citizen of the
Philippines.  (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied; italics in the original)

The suggestion of Justice Mendoza that an illegitimate child of a
foreigner-mother who claims to be the son or daughter of a Filipino father may
be considered a natural-born citizen if he was duly acknowledged by the latter
at birth, in so far as it requires that citizenship be established at birth and
preserves the involuntary character of natural-born citizenship, is well taken.

Citizenship of FPJ

The determination of FPJ’s citizenship, which is the pivotal
issue in the Petition for Disqualification, thus hinges on the application of
the foregoing laws and jurisprudence to the facts of the present case.

But what precisely are the facts to which the law should be
applied?  As aforementioned, the COMELEC,
in grave abuse of its discretion, limited itself to the entries in respondent
Poe’s certificate of candidacy without determining the veracity of these
entries on the basis of the evidence adduced by the parties.

The rules governing the Petition for Disqualification were laid
out by the COMELEC in its Resolution 6452,[168]
promulgated on December 10, 2003.  By
said Resolution, the COMELEC, in the interest of justice and speedy
disposition, suspended its Rules of procedure as may be inconsistent therewith;[169]
designated the Clerk of the Commission to receive petitions pertaining to
candidates for President;[170]
and specified the procedure for presentation of evidence in Petitions to Deny
Due Course or to Cancel Certificates of Candidacy,[171]
and Petitions to Disqualify a Candidate Pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code and Petitions to Disqualify for Lack of Qualifications or
Possessing Same Grounds for Disqualification.[172]

Pursuant to said COMELEC Resolution 6452, petitioner Fornier
presented the following documentary evidence in the Petition for
Disqualification:

(1)        A certified copy of FPJ’s Birth
Certificate, certified by V. C. Feliciano, Registration Officer IV of the City
Civil Registry Office of Manila, indicating that FPJ was born on August 20,
1939, and that his parents are Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, and Allan F.
Poe, allegedly a Filipino citizen. (petitioner’s Exhibit “A”).

(2)        A certified photocopy of an Affidavit
executed on July 13, 1939 by Paulita Poe y Gomez in Spanish, certified by
Ricardo L. Manapat of the Records Management and Archives Office, attesting to
the fact that she filed a case of bigamy and concubinage against respondent’s
father, Allan F. Poe, after discovering the latter’s bigamous relationship with
respondent’s mother, Bessie Kelley. 
(petitioner’s Exhibit “B” and “B-1”)

(3)        A certified photocopy of the Marriage
Contract entered into on July 5, 1936 by and between respondent’s father, Allan
Fernando Poe and Paulita Gomez, certified by Ricardo L. Manapat of the Records
Management and Archives Office, showing that respondent’s father is “Español;” and that his parents, Lorenzo
Poe and Marta Reyes, were “Español”
and “Mestiza Española”, respectively.
(petitioner’s Exhibit “B-2”)

(4)        An English translation of the Affidavit
dated July 13, 1939 executed by Paulita Poe y Gomez. (petitioner’s Exhibit
“B-3”)

(5)        A certified photocopy of the Birth
Certificate of Allan Fernando Poe, certified by Ricardo L. Manapat of the
Records Management and Archive Office, showing that he was born on May 17,
1915, and that his father, Lorenzo Poe, is “Español”
and his mother, Marta Reyes, is “Mestiza
Española”. (petitioner’s Exhibit “C”)

(6)        A Certification dated 16 January 2004
issued by Ricardo L. Manapat, Director of the Records Management and Archives
Office, certifying that the National Archives does not possess any record of a
certain Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou residing or entering the Philippines before
1907. (petitioner’s Exhibit “D”)

(7)        A Certification dated 12 January 2004
issued by Estrella M. Domingo, OIC of the Archives Division of the National
Archives, certifying that there is no available information in the files of the
National Archives, regarding the birth of “Allan R. Pou”, alleged to have been born
on November 27, 1916. (petitioner’s Exhibit “E”)

FPJ, for his part, offered the following as evidence in the
Petition for Disqualification:

(1)        A Certification dated January 12, 2004,
issued by Estrella M. Domingo, OIC of the Archives Division of the National
Archives, certifying, among others, that there is no available information
regarding the birth of Allan R. Pou in the Register of Births for San Carlos,
Pangasinan, in the files of said Office. (respondent’s Exhibit “1”)

(2)        A Certification dated January 13, 2004,
issued by Estrella M. Domingo, OIC of the Archives Division of the National
Archives, certifying, among others, that there is no available information
about the marriage of Allan Fernando Poe and Paulita Gomez alleged to have been
married on 18 July 1936 in Manila. (respondent’s Exhibit “2”)

(3)        A certified copy of the Birth
Certificate of Ronald Allan Poe, certified by Gloria C. Pagdilao of the City
Civil Registrar of Manila. (respondent’s Exhibit “3”)

(4)        A certified photocopy of Opinion No. 49,
Series of 1995 rendered by Acting Secretary Demetrio G. Demetria on May 3,
1995, certified by Monalisa T. Esguerra, Chief of the Records Section,
Department of Justice.  (respondent’s
Exhibit “4”)

(5)        A Certification dated January 12, 2004
issued by Zenaida A. Peralta of the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City,
Pangasinan, certifying, among others, that as appearing from the Register of
Death, Lorenzo Pou died on 11 September 1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan.  (respondent’s Exhibit “5”)

(6)        A copy of Original Certificate of Title
No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan in the name
of Lorenzo Pou, certified by the Registrar of Deeds/Deputy Registrar of Deeds
of San Carlos City, Pangasinan on January 12, 2004 as a certified true copy,
the original of which is on file in said Registry of Deeds.  (respondent’s Exhibit “6”)

(7)        Copies of Tax Declaration Nos. 20644,
20643, 23477 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, certified as true copies from the
office file by Irene M. De Vera, In-charge of the Records Division, and of Tax
Declaration No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, certified as true copy from
the original by Irene M. De Vera, In-charge of the Records Division
(respondent’s Exhibit “6-A” to “6-D”)

(8)        Certified copy of the Certificate of
Death of Fernando R. Poe, certified by Gloria C. Pagdilao of the City Civil
Registrar of Manila, stating, among others, that he died on October 23,
1951.  (respondent’s Exhibit “7”)

(9)        A Certification dated January 13, 2004
issued by Lt. Colonel Narciso S. Erna, Assistant Adjutant General of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, showing certain available data regarding Fernando
Reyes Poe. (respondent’s Exhibit “8”)

(10)      Certified copy of an alleged Affidavit for
Army Personnel executed by Fernando R. Poe on December 22, 1947, certified by
Lt. Colonel Narciso S. Erna, Assistant Adjutant General of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines.  (respondent’s Exhibit
“8-A”)

(11)      Purported copy of General Order No. 175
allegedly issued by Army Headquarters APO 501 conferring Award of Gold Cross to
Fernando Poe.  (respondent’s Exhibit “9”)

(12)      A copy of Memorandum dated January 27,
1951 purportedly issued by S.H. Concepcion of the Office of the Adjutant
General, Armed Forces of the Philippines addressed to Lt. Col Conrado Rigor,
the latter being the officer tasked by the Armed Forces of the Philippines to
present the Gold Cross Medal to the family of the late Captain Fernando
Poe.  (respondent’s Exhibit “10”)

(13)      A certified photocopy of the Certificate
of Birth of Elizabeth Ann Poe, sister of respondent Poe. (respondent’s Exhibit
“11”)

(14)      A certified photocopy of the Certificate
of Birth of Fernando Poe II, of the City Civil Registrar of Manila.
(respondent’s Exhibit “12”)

(15)      Certified photocopy of the original
Certificate of Birth of Martha Genevieve Poe, sister of respondent, issued and
certified by Gloria C. Pagdilao of the City Civil Registrar of Manila, showing
that her nationality is “American.” (respondent’s Exhibit “13”)

(16)      Certified photocopy of the original
Certificate of Birth of Baby Poe, brother of respondent, issued and certified
by Gloria C. Pagdilao of the City Civil Registrar of Manila.  (respondent’s Exhibit “14”)

(17)      Certified photocopy of the original
Certificate of Birth of Evangeline K. Poe, respondent’s sister, issued and
certified by Gloria C. Pagdilao of the City Civil Registrar of Manila.
(respondent’s Exhibit “15”)

(18)      Copy of Passport No. ll491191 issued on
June 25, 2003 in the name of respondent Poe. (respondent’s Exhibit “16”)

(19)      A photocopy of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 55020 of the Registry of Deeds for Rizal in the name of spouses
Jesusa Poe and Ronald Allan Poe. 
(respondent’s Exhibit “17”)

(20)      A photocopy of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. RT-116312 of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City in the name of
Ronald Allan Poe. (respondent’s Exhibit “18”)

(21)      A photocopy of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 300533 of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City in the name of
spouses Ronald Allan Poe and Jesusa Sonora. 
(respondent’s Exhibit “19”)

(22)      A Declaration of Ruby Kelly Mangahas,
sister of the late Bessie Kelly, executed on January 12, 2004 in Stockton,
California, U.S.A. notarized before Dorothy Marie Scheflo of San Joaquin
County, California, U.S.A., attesting that her nephew, Ronald Allan Poe, is a
natural born Filipino and is the legitimate child of Fernando Poe Jr.
(respondent’s Exhibit “20”)

(23)      A certified photocopy of the Marriage
Contract entered into by and between respondent’s father, “Fernando Pou” and
respondent’s mother Bessie Kelly on September 16, 1940, certified by Florendo
G. Suba, Administrative Officer II of the Civil Registrar of Manila.  (respondent’s Exhibit “21”)

(24)      A Certification issued by the Office of
the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, certifying, among
others, that the records of birth of said office during the period 1900 to May
1946, were totally destroyed during the last World War II.  (respondent’s Exhibit “22”)

Each of the foregoing must be carefully considered and evaluated,
both individually and in comparison with the others, as to admissibility,
relevance, and evidentiary weight in order that a firm factual footing for this
case may be established.

A review of the arguments presented by the parties during the
oral arguments and a preliminary examination of the foregoing documents leads
to the following initial observations:

Some of the documents presented by petitioner Fornier[173]
as well as those offered by FPJ[174]
appear to be documents consisting of entries in public records. As such, they
are prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein.[175]
However, several of these documents conflict with one another in material
points.

Some of FPJ’s documentary submissions[176]
appear to be transfer certificates of title to real properties acquired by him
jointly with his wife, Jesusa Sonora. 
Considering that the exercise of rights exclusive to Filipinos has been
held not to be conclusive proof that he is a Filipino citizen,[177]
these do not appear to be relevant to the issue of citizenship.

Several Certifications[178]
submitted by the parties may be admissible evidence that the records of the
custodian’s office do not contain a certain record or entry,[179]
but do not necessarily prove the said record or entry does or did not ever
exist or that the purported contents thereof are either true or false.

On further examination, the evidence submitted by the parties,
taken together, do not form a coherent and consistent whole. Indeed, even
considered apart from the documents submitted by petitioner Fornier, the
documents offered by FPJ are in conflict with each other.

Thus, for example, FPJ’s birth certificate refers to his putative
father as Allan F. Poe, while the name in the space for the “father” in the
birth certificates of his putative siblings uniformly appears as Fernando Poe.
Similarly, what he claims to be his father’s death certificate is also in the
name of Fernando R. Poe. While that appearing under “husband” in the alleged
Marriage Contract of his putative parents is Fernando R. Pou.

As a further example, FPJ’s birth certificate indicates that his
parents were married, and that he is a legitimate child.  However, the Marriage Contract of his
putative parents, Fernando R. Pou and Bessie Kelley, is dated September 16,
1940; thus, seemingly indicating that FPJ was born out of wedlock.

The difficulty in appreciating and weighing the foregoing pieces
of evidence was further compounded during the oral arguments of the present
case when, after the Chief Justice suggested that the parties enter into a
stipulation of facts in order to abbreviate the proceedings, counsel for FPJ
Atty. Estelito Mendoza disclaimed any knowledge as to the truth of the entries
in FPJ’s Birth Certificate as well as the Marriage Contract of Allan F. Poe and
Bessie Kelley:

CHIEF JUSTICE:  I think we can avoid all these disputations
on these fact[s], if the parties will only agree on stipulation of facts on
very, very simple questions.  Cannot the
parties for instance agree for the record that private respondent Fernando Poe,
Jr. was born on 20 August 1939 in Manila, Philippines?  Second, that his parents were Allan Poe and
Bessie Kelley?  Third[,] that Bessie
Kelly was an American citizen before and at the time she gave birth to Fernando
Poe Jr. and that Allan Poe and Bessie Kelly subsequently contracted marriage.
They were married on 16 September 1940. 
If you can agree on that there seems to be no disputation at all on the
details and so on.  And if there is
no agreement on the entries in both the record of birth and the marriage
contract and then that would call for a presentation of evidence, and this
Court is not a trier of facts.

ATTY. FORNIER:  We are willing to agree, Your Honor.

CHIEF JUSTICE:  Justice
Quisumbing.

JUSTICE QUISUMBING:  A few
questions, Mr. Counsel.

CHIEF JUSTICE:  Yes, would Atty. Mendoza agree to these
facts?  So, we could terminate faster
this oral argument.  So, I will ask first
Atty. Fornier.  Do you agree that private
respondent Fernando Poe Jr. was born on 20 August 1939 in Manila, Philippines?

ATTY. [FORNIER]:  Yes, Your Honor.

CHIEF JUSTICE:  Atty. Mendoza, do you agree to that?

ATTY. MENDOZA:  Your Honors please, I can only stipulate
[that] is what the birth certificate says.

CHIEF JUSTICE:  But is that a
fact?

ATTY. MENDOZA:  Your Honors,
please I can only agree that that is what the birth certificate says.

CHIEF JUSTICE:  But is that a fact?

ATTY. MENDOZA:  No, I cannot agree, Your Honor, please.

CHIEF JUSTICE:  In other
words, (interrupted)

ATTY. MENDOZA:  I have no personal knowledge on that and I
cannot confirm it.  Both the father and
mother are already deceased.  There is no
one from whom I can confirm those as facts. 
I regret very much Your Honor that I cannot agree to those as facts.  All that I know [is] that the birth
certificate stated that and that the petitioner marked that as evidence twice
and he presented that as his own evidence and he must be bound by everything
that he has stated in the certificate of voters.  For example, Your Honor, that Bessie Kelly
states that she is an American, but she is also a Filipino, because she was
born in the Philippines.  So, this is something
which requires evidence.  Based on all
the extant records in the case he was (interrupted)

CHIEF JUSTICE:  Yes, before
you go into that (interrupted)

ATTY. MENDOZA:  That is why
if Your Honor please which I regret very much (interrupted)

CHIEF JUSTICE:  Do you admit
that the documents mentioned by Atty. Fornier, that is the birth certificate
and the marriage contract were furnished by you or by the respondent here?

ATTY. MENDOZA:  I have my
turn but I’ll have to explain (interrupted)

CHIEF JUSTICE:  We try to shorten
the proceedings, but it would appear that you are not agreeable to these facts
even if this would come from documents presented by you?

ATTY. MENDOZA:  No, no, Your
Honor please.  May I clarify?

CHIEF JUSTICE:  Yes.

ATTY. MENDOZA:  The birth
certificate was presented by petitioner Fornier.  It was marked as Exhibit “A” and Exhibit
“B”.  Apart from that, if Your Honor
please, it was Atty. Fornier who subpoenaed the Civil Registrar of Manila to
bring the original of the birth certificate. 
And the birth certificate was brought to the COMELEC and the certified
copies that we used were confirmed as authentic.  Now, marriage contract was our evidence and
since that was our evidence, I am not conceding that for example, that Bessie
Kelly was not necessarily Filipino.  The
fact that her citizenship is stated in the birth certificate as American does
not necessarily preclude that she was also Filipino.  Because as a matter of fact I can also prove
that is, from information, that Bessie Kelly’s mother was a Filipina.  Her name was Martha Gatbonton.  She was from Candaba, Pampanga.  So,
there are many facts, if Your Honor please, which I cannot stipulate on
this.  Because even my client Mr. Poe
does not know this, he was just a small boy when his [father] died.  So, I regret very much Your Honor please I
can go no further but to stipulate on certain documents.  But on whether those documents states the
truth is something I cannot stipulate on because I would have no basis.

CHIEF JUSTICE:  That seems to
[be] very, very clear to the Court.  You can stipulate on the authenticity of
the document presented, the record of birth and the marriage contract but as to
the truth or falsity of the contents therein you cannot stipulate?  That would seem to be clear to us.

ATTY. MENDOZA:  Your Honor,
at the stage of the proceeding this is already a petition to review by
certiorari a resolution of the COMELEC. 
And I do not think the Supreme Court may review on the basis of Rule 65
petition proceeding before the COMELEC and the basis of stipulation made by the
parties before this Court.  This case is
only before the Court on a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.  So, I regret very much if Your Honors please,
that at the stage of the proceeding, I am unable to stipulate on many things.

CHIEF JUSTICE:  Thank you, We
cannot force you.  Anyway, Fornier
himself admitted, rather tried to insinuate of certain false entries.  So, I doubt very mush if these facts could be
considered as no longer disputed by the parties.  We can now proceed with interpolation of
Atty. Fornier.  The Court now recognizes
Justice Quisumbing. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)[180]

Even Prof. Balane, upon a question by the Chief Justice, could
not determine whether the evidence submitted by the parties was sufficient to
prove filiation under the provisions of the Civil Code:

CHIEF JUSTICE:  One or two
questions Professor Balane.  In light of your recommendations, and the
possible conclusion regarding the political status of the private respondent
here, especially on the matter of issue of legitimation and the effects
thereof, according to the rules established by the New Civil Code, can you
conclude from the facts adduced here admitted by the parties or otherwise
undisputed by the parties, to be sufficient to show that there had been
legitimation in the case of private respondent?

PROFESSOR BALANE:  First of
all Mr. Chief Justice, I would like to confess that I looked at the pleadings,
but I did not go very thoroughly [at] them because I did not have enough time.  But my
impression now is that [there is] still that requirement of recognition for
legitimation I am not sure that the facts as we have them, now amount to a
recognition, even if we were to follow the rule laid down in Tongoy vs. Court
of Appeals that for legitimation, you do not even need voluntary recognition,
but just the continuous possession of a state of a natural child.  I am not sure that there is enough evidence
to establish [that] at this stage.

CHIEF JUSTICE:  So, in light
of your observation that there is not enough evidence to reach that conclusion
to sustain your view, would you recommend that this case be remanded to the
COMELEC, for the COMELEC to receive the evidence in this regard?

PROFESSOR BALANE:  I would probably recommend Mr. Chief Justice,
that evidence be presented, to determine whether the requirements of
recognition and therefore, legitimation are present.

CHIEF JUSTICE:  But
definitely not before this Court because this Court is not a trier of facts but
to the proper instrumentality, more specifically [in] this case[, to] the
COMELEC because this case started with the COMELEC and the COMELEC has
jurisdiction over the issue?

PROFESSOR BALANE:  If the
COMELEC has the competence to pass upon these matters in not a summary manner
but in a thorough manner which I am not sure of.  In fact, I have been grappling with that
question Mr. Chief Justice, I am not an expert in procedural law.

CHIEF JUSTICE:  Since
evidence would be necessary.

PROFESSOR BALANE:  Since
evidence seems to be necessary in order to establish the fact of his
legitimation (interrupted)

CHIEF JUSTICE:  Whose burden would it be to prove these
facts, would it be the burden of the petitioner or will it be the burden of the
respondent?

PROFESSOR BALANE:  Well, generally, it is he who seeks to
establish his status as a legitimated child, he will have the burden to prove
it.  It may not be difficult to
prove, but I think he would have the burden. 
Frankly, honestly, I am not sure what the proper Tribunal is to which it
should be referred.

CHIEF JUSTICE:  [In] other
words, it [may] not even be the COMELEC but definitely it should not be the
Supreme Court?

PROFESSOR BALANE:  Because
that would make this Court a trier of facts, Mr. Chief Justice.[181]
(Emphasis supplied)

Given this situation, it may have been prudent for this Court to
have remanded or referred this case to trier of facts in order that all
available relevant evidence may be presented and threshed out in the necessary
evidentiary hearings.  As it is, I am
constrained to scrutinize the records of this case to determine five crucial
factual questions, to wit:

(1)        Whether Lorenzo Pou has been established
to be a Filipino citizen at the time of the birth of his son, Allan F. Poe;

(2)        Whether Allan F. Poe, the putative
father of FPJ was a Filipino at the time of the birth of the latter;

(3)        Whether FPJ is a legitimate or
illegitimate child;

(4)        Whether Allan F. Poe has been legally
determined to be the father of FPJ;

(5)        Whether FPJ is a natural-born Filipino
Citizen.

Citizenship of Lorenzo Pou

In his Answer in the Petition for Disqualification, FPJ claimed
to have derived Philippine citizenship from his father, Allan F. Poe, who in
turn derived from his father (FPJ’s grandfather) Lorenzo Pou:

Respondent is a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines because
his father, Allan Fernando Poe, was a citizen of the Philippines.  Upon the other hand, Allan Fernando Poe, was
a citizen of the Philippines, because Lorenzo Pou, the father of Allan Fernando
Poe, or respondent’s grandfather, was a citizen of the Philippines.

x x x

Lorenzo Pou was born a Spanish subject. He was an inhabitant of the
Philippine Islands when on December 10, 1898, by virtue of the Treaty of Paris,
Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States.[182]

In support of the foregoing, FPJ submitted a Certification from
the Civil Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan which contains the following
entries:

Registry number       :           681

Date of Registration :           September 11, 1954

Name of deceased   :           LORENZO POU

Sex:                          :           Male

Age                           :           84 yrs old

Civil Status               :           Married

Citizenship                :           Filipino

Date of death            :           September 11, 1954

Place of death          :           San
Carlos, Pangasinan

Cause of death         :           Cerebral
Hemorrhage,

Hypertensive, heart disease

FPJ also submitted Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of
the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Pangasinan in the name of Lorenzo Pou
covering a Sales Patent dated September 10, 1936.

Under prevailing jurisprudence, the foregoing submissions by the
parties are insufficient to prove that Lorenzo Pou became a citizen of the
Philippine Islands by operation of the Treaty of Paris, the Philippine Bill of
1902 and the Jones Law.

The above-mentioned entry in the Registry of Deaths is only prima facie evidence that Lorenzo Pou
died in Pangasinan on September 11, 1954. 
No presumption can be made that he was a resident of Pangasinan before
that date.

Similarly, Original Certificate of Title P-2247 of the Registry
of Deeds of the Province of Pangasinan is only prima facie evidence that Lorenzo Pou purchased a parcel of land in
Pangasinan on September 10, 1936.  It is
neither proof that Lorenzo Pou resided in Pangasinan prior to that date nor
proof that Lorenzo Pou was a citizen of the Philippine Islands.

Following the cases of In
re Mallari and Valles v. Commission
on Elections,[183]
the claim that Lorenzo Pou was an inhabitant of the Philippine Islands when on
December 10, 1898, by virtue of the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine
Islands to the United States must be supported by a record of birth evidencing
his birth in the Philippine Islands, testimonial evidence to that effect, or
some other competent evidence of that fact.

Moreover, the admission that Lorenzo Pou was a subject of Spain
and not merely a native of the Philippine Islands opens the possibility that he
was a native of the Spanish Peninsula. 
If such were the case, then he would have had to comply with the
requirements prescribed in In Re: Bosque,[184]
to become a citizen of the Philippine Islands. 
To reiterate, these requirements are:  (1) he should have been a resident of the
Philippine Islands on April 11, 1899; (2) he should have maintained actual
residence therein for a period of 18 months or until October 11, 1900; (3)
without their making an express declaration of intention to retain his Spanish
citizenship.

In sum, the evidence presented does not show that Lorenzo Pou
acquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of the Treaty of Paris or the Organic
Acts covering the Philippine Islands.

Citizenship of Allan F. Poe at the

time of the Birth of FPJ

In the proceedings in the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier presented a
document (Petitioner’s Exhibit “C”) purported to be the Birth Certificate of
Allan F. Poe and stamped:

CERTIFIED PHOTOCOPY:

(Sgd.)

RICARDO L.
MANAPAT

RECORDS MANAGEMENT

AND ARCHIVES
OFFICE

The entries in petitioner Fornier’s Exhibit “C” indicate that
Allan F. Poe was a Spanish citizen born to Lorenzo Pou, “Español,” and Marta
Reyes, “mestiza Española.”

FPJ vehemently denied the authenticity and due execution of
petitioner Fornier’s Exhibit “C,” alleging that the same is a “Manapat-
fabricated document” on the basis of the testimony of certain personnel of the
Records Management and Archives Office before the Senate Committee on
Constitutional Amendments, Revision of Codes and Laws.

Granting arguendo that
the testimony of the witnesses in the Senate is competent proof that may be
appreciated both in the proceedings in the Petition for Disqualification as
well as in the present petition, this Court shall examine only the claim made
by FPJ in that Allan F. Poe acquired Philippine citizenship independently of
the latter’s father, Lorenzo Pou, by virtue of jus soli, Allan F. Poe having been allegedly born in the
Philippines on November 27, 1916.

Allan Fernando Poe was born in San Carlos, Pangasinan, on November
27, 1916.  His parents were Lorenzo Pou
and Marta Reyes of Pangasinan.  Allan
Fernando Poe was also known as Fernando Poe, Sr.  He obtained the degree of Bachelor of Science
in Chemistry from the University of the Philippines in 1935 and the degree of
Doctor of Dental Medicine from the Philippine Dental College in 1942.  He later became a leading movie actor.  He died on October 23, 1951.  Like his father, Lorenzo Pou, he died, as his
Certificate of Death states, a “Filipino”.

Since Lorenzo Pou, the father of Allan Fernando Poe, was a citizen
of the Philippine Islands, his children, including Allan Fernando Poe, were
citizens of the Philippines.

Moreover, because Allan Fernando Poe was born in 1916 in the
Philippines, before the 1935 Constitution, he furthermore acquired citizenship
of the Philippine Islands because he was born in the Philippines –
independently of the citizenship of his parents.[185]

No evidence appears to have been submitted by FPJ in support of
the foregoing allegations.  However, even
assuming arguendo that Allan F. Poe
was born in the Philippines on November 27, 1916, such fact, per se, would not
suffice to prove that he was a citizen of the Philippine Islands absent a
showing that he was judicially declared to be a Filipino citizen.

In Tan Chong v. Secretary
of Labor,[186]
this Court ruled that the principle jus
soli or acquisition of citizenship by place of birth was never extended or
applied in the Philippine Islands:

It appears that the petitioner in the first case was born in San
Pablo, Laguna, in July 1915, of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother,
lawfully married, left for China in 1925, and returned to the Philippines on 25
January 1940. The applicant in the second case was born in Jolo, Sulu, on 8 May
1900, of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. It does not appear whether
they were legally married, so in the absence of proof to the contrary they are
presumed to be lawfully married. From the date of his birth up to 16 November
1938, the date of the filing of his application for naturalization, and up to
the date of hearing, he had been residing in the Philippines. He is married to
a Filipino woman and has three children by her. He speaks the local dialect and
the Spanish and English languages.

Considering that the common
law principle or rule of jus soli
obtaining in England and in the United States, as embodied in the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, has never been extended
to this jurisdiction (section 1, Act of 1 July 1902; sec. 5, Act
of 29 August 1916); considering that the law in force and applicable to the
petitioner and the applicant in the two cases at the time of their birth is
sec. 4 of the Philippine Bill (Act of 1 July 1902), as amended by Act of 23
March 1912, which provides that only those "inhabitants of the Philippine
Islands continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day
of April, 1899; and then resided in said Islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine
Islands," we are of the opinion and so hold that the petitioner in the
first case and the applicant in the second case, who were born of alien
parentage, were not and are not, under said section, citizens of the Philippine
Islands.

Needless to say, this
decision is not intended or designed to deprive, as it cannot divest, of
their Filipino citizenship those who had been declared to be Filipino
citizens, or upon whom such citizenship had been conferred, by the courts because
of the doctrine or principle of res
adjudicata. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).[187]

Allan F. Poe then cannot, even by virtue of the doctrine of res judicata, be considered a Filipino
citizen.

Legitimacy or Illegitimacy of FPJ

As priorly mentioned, FPJ’s birth certificate indicates that his
parents were married, and that he is a legitimate child.  However, the Marriage Contract of his
putative parents, Fernando R. Pou and Bessie Kelley, is dated September 16,
1940, thereby indicating that he was born out of wedlock. The entries in the
two documents, both entries in a public record and prima facie proof of their contents, are obviously in conflict with
each other.

In appreciating the evidentiary weight of each document, it is observed
that the Birth Certificate was prepared by the attending physician who would
have had personal knowledge of the fact and date of birth, but would have had
to rely on hearsay information given to him as regards the other entries
including legitimacy of FPJ.  Hence,
greater weight may be given to the date and fact of FPJ’s birth as recorded in
the Birth Certificate, but less weighty with respect to the entries regarding
his legitimacy or paternity.[188]

As for the marriage contract, since the two contracting parties,
Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, participated in its execution, the entry
therein with respect to the date of their marriage should be given greater
weight.

This Court thus concludes, on the basis
of the evidence before it, that FPJ was born out of wedlock, and was thus an
illegitimate child at birth.  As such,
he, at birth, acquired the citizenship of his legally known American mother,
Bessie Kelley.

Whether Allan F. Poe Has Been

Legally Determined to be the Father

of FPJ

Assuming arguendo that
Allan F. Poe has been shown to have acquired Philippine citizenship, whether
derived from Lorenzo Pou or through some other means, before the birth of FPJ,
this Court now examines FPJ’s claim of filiation.

As proof of his filiation, FPJ relies upon (1) the stipulation by
petitioner Fornier, both before the COMELEC and this Court that Allan F. Poe is
indeed the father of FPJ; (2) the declaration of Ruby Kelley Mangahas; and (3)
a certified copy of an affidavit of “Fernando R. Poe” for Philippine Army Personnel.

With respect to the admission made by petitioner Fornier that
Allan F. Poe is indeed the father of FPJ, the same appears to have been based
on the Birth Certificate of FPJ which is a common exhibit of both parties.  However, the same is deemed negated by the
statements of Atty. Estelito Mendoza, counsel for FPJ, during the oral
arguments, when the Chief Justice asked him to stipulate on the truth of the
entries of the said document, that:

x x x I have no personal
knowledge on that and I cannot confirm it. 
Both the father and mother are already deceased.  There
is no one from whom I can confirm those as facts.  I regret very much Your Honor that I cannot
agree to those as facts.

x x x

x x x So, there are many
facts, if Your Honor please, which I cannot stipulate on this.  Because even my client Mr. Poe does not
know this, he was just a small boy when his [father] died.  So, I regret very much Your Honor please I
can go no further but to stipulate on certain documents.  But on whether those documents states the
truth [is] something I cannot stipulate on because I would have no basis.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)[189]

Certainly it would be absurd to bind one party’s stipulation as
to the truth of certain facts after the party alleging the same facts has
categorically denied knowledge of the truth thereof.

In any event, such an admission, if it may be deemed one, made by
a third party (petitioner Fornier) is not one of the accepted means of proving
filiation under the Family Code, it having been made by one who does not claim
to have personal knowledge of the circumstances of FPJ’s birth.

With respect to the Declaration of Ruby Kelley Mangahas, to wit:

DECLARATION

of

RUBY KELLEY
MANGAHAS

I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing
in Stockton, California, U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with law, do
hereby declare that:

1.       I am the sister of
the late BESSIE KELLEY POE.

2.       Bessie Kelley Poe was
the wife of FERNANDO POE, SR.

3.       Fernando and Bessie
Poe had a son by name of RONALD ALLAN POE, more popularly known in the
Philippines as “Fernando Poe, Jr”, or “FPJ”.

4.       Ronald Allan Poe
“FPJ” was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke’s Hospital, Magdalena St.,
Manila.

5.       At the time of Ronald
Allan Poe’s birth, his father, Fernando Poe, Sr., was a Filipino citizen and
his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American citizen.

6.       Considering the
existing citizenship law at that time, Ronald Allan Poe automatically assumed
the citizenship of his father, a Filipino, and has always identified himself as
such.

7.       Fernando Poe, Sr. and
my sister, Bessie, met and became engaged while they were students at the
University of the Philippines in 1936.  I
was also introduced to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that same year.

8.       Fernando Poe, Sr.,
and my sister, Bessie had their first child in 1938.

9.       Fernando Poe, Sr., my
sister Bessie, and their first three children, Elizabeth, Ronald Allan, and
Fernando II, and myself lived together with our mother at our family’s house on
Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberation of Manila in
1945, except for some months between 1943-1944.

10.     Fernando Poe, Sr. and
my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4) more children after Ronald Allan
Poe.

11.     From the very first time I met Fernando Poe, Sr., in 1936, until
his death in 1951, I never heard my sister mention anything about her husband
having had a marital relationship prior to their marriage.

12.     During the entire life of Fernando Poe, Sr., as my brother-in-law,
I never heard of a case filed against him by a woman purporting to be his wife.

13.     Considering the status of Fernando Poe, Sr., as a leading movie
personality during that time, a case of this nature could not have escaped
publicity.

14.     Assuming, for the sake
of argument, that the case was never published in any newspaper or magazine,
but was in fact filed in court, I would have known about it because my sister
would have been an indispensable party to the case, and she could not have kept
an emotionally serious matter from me.

15.     This is the first
time, after almost 68 years, that I have heard Fernando Poe, Sr., being
maliciously accused of being a married man prior to his marriage to my sister.

16.     This is the first
time, after almost 68 years, that I have heard the name Paulita Poe y Gomez as
being the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.

17.     There was no Paulita
Poe y Gomez, or any complainant for that matter, in or out of court, when my
sister gave birth to six (6) children, all fathered by Fernando Poe, Sr.

18.     I am executing this
Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronald Allan Poe is a natural
born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of Fernando Poe, Sr.

Done in the City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12^th
day of January 2004.

(SIGNED)

RUBY KELLEY
MANGAHAS

Declarant,

(Emphasis supplied)

aside from the fact that it is hearsay,[190]
it does not serve as proving either FPJ’s filiation or his citizenship.

It may not be the basis for proving paternity and filiation since
it is in the nature of a self-serving affidavit, the reliance on which has long
been frowned upon.[191]
The self-serving nature of the affidavit is readily apparent, the affidavit
having been executed on January 12, 2004 or after the petition for disqualification had already been filed by
petitioner Fornier on January 9, 2004. 
The only conclusion then is that the extrajudicial Declaration was
executed solely to buttress respondent’s defense.

Inadmissibility in evidence aside, the statements in the
Declaration are regarded as favorable to the interest of the declarant, being
the aunt of FPJ.  To admit Declaration as
proof of the facts asserted therein would open the door to frauds and perjuries.[192]

Neither can the same Declaration be made the basis to prove
pedigree under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence, as it is
necessary that the following requisites be present: (1) the declarant is
already dead or unable to testify (2) pedigree of a person must be in issue (3)
declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in question (4)
declaration must be made before the controversy has occurred (5) the
relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree must be shown
by evidence other than such act or declaration.

The Declaration of Mrs. Mangahas was executed AFTER the
controversy had already arisen.  There is
thus failure to comply with the requisite that the declaration must have been
made ante litem motam – that is before the controversy, and under such circumstances
that the person making them could have no motive to misrepresent the facts.

In order thus for a declaration as to pedigree to be admissible,
it is necessary that the declarant should have been disinterested to the extent
of having no motive which can fairly be assumed to be such as it would induce
him to state the fact otherwise than as he understood it.  The statement must, therefore, be shown to
have been made ante litem motam; a fortiori, it must have been made
before the commencement of a suit involving the issue to which the declaration relates.”[193]

Nor can the Declaration be the basis to prove family reputation
or tradition regarding pedigree under Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Evidence.  While a declaration relating
to pedigree may be in any form capable of conveying thought, provided the
authenticity of the vehicle conveying the statement is established to the
satisfaction of the court by evidence as recognition in the family or
production from proper custody, the declaration must be a statement of fact.[194]
The statements that FPJ is a natural-born Filipino and a legitimate child of
Fernando Poe, Sr. are not statements of fact, but conclusions of law.

More.  The Declaration may
not also be the basis for proving the citizenship of Allan Poe since, again,
the same is a conclusion of law.

In In re Mallare,[195]
this Court, based on the testimonies of the claimant’s witnesses, concluded
that the claimant’s father was a Filipino citizen. These testimonies included
facts respecting claimant’s father – his childhood, residency, habits, on the
bases of which this Court concluded that claimant’s father was indeed Filipino.

Mrs. Mangahas’ Declaration, on the other hand does not state the
operative facts on which such a conclusion were based.

As for the Affidavit for Philippine Army Personnel[196]
of December 22, 1947, it does not qualify as an acknowledgment in a public
document. In acknowledgment through a public instrument, the parent must admit
legitimate filiation in a document duly acknowledged before a notary public or
similar functionary, with the proper formalities, through private handwritten
document signed by him.[197]

Moreover, the admission must be direct and unambiguous to make it
at par with, or at least comparable in form and substance to, either a record
of birth or a final judgment.  An
incidental statement that does not convey a clear intent to establish the
child’s legitimacy should, at best, be just a piece of evidence that might be
considered in proving that filiation by judicial action.[198]

Parenthetically, the age of FPJ indicated in the affidavit which
was purportedly executed on December 22, 1947 does not jibe with his date of
birth appearing in his Birth Certificate.

In sum, the proofs relied upon by FPJ do not constitute
sufficient proofs of filiation under Article 172 of the Family Code.

Whether FPJ is a natural-born

citizen

Following the suggestion of Justice Mendoza, I am adopting the
rule that an illegitimate child of an alien-mother who claims to be an
offspring of a Filipino father may be considered a natural-born citizen if he
was duly acknowledged by the latter at birth, thus leaving the illegitimate
child with nothing more to do to acquire or perfect his citizenship.

Assuming arguendo,
therefore, that Allan F. Poe, the putative father of FPJ, was indeed a Filipino
citizen at the time of his birth, no evidence has been submitted to show that
Allan F. Poe did indeed acknowledge FPJ as his own son at birth.  In fact, as
emphasized by petitioner Fornier, in the course of the proceedings before the
COMELEC, both parties verified that there was no such acknowledgment by Allan
F. Poe on the dorsal portion of FPJ’s Birth Certificate.

Since FPJ then was born out of wedlock and was not acknowledged
by his father, the only possible Filipino parent, at the time of his birth, the
inescapable conclusion is that he is not a natural-born Philippine citizen.

Consequently, the material representations in his Certificate of
Candidacy that “[he] is a natural born Filipino citizen,” and that “[he] is
eligible for the office [he] seek[s] to be elected” are false.  Necessarily, his Certificate of Candidacy
must be cancelled pursuant to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.

A Final Note

The onus of resolving
the disqualification case against FPJ, lodged in this Court as the final
arbiter of all legal or justiciable disputes, had to be discharged, the clamor
for this Court to stay away therefrom and let the will of the electorate decide
it notwithstanding.

By no stretch of the imagination does this Court envision itself
as impeding or frustrating the will of the people in choosing their leaders,
for this institution is precisely built to uphold and defend the principle
underlying our system of government — that “sovereignty resides in the people
and all government authority emanates from them.”[199]

But if a candidate for public office has not shown that he
possesses the basic qualifications required by law, will he be allowed to
continue his candidacy?  Why then, in the
first place, have laws been legislated charting the procedure for pre-election
disqualification or declaration of ineligibility of candidates?

The rallies and show of force that have been, and appear to
continue to be carried out by sympathizers of FPJ, the threats of anarchy, the
incendiary statements against this Court spawned by the present controversy
have no place in a society that adheres to the rule of law.  Nor do they matter in the arrival of a
judicial decision, rendered in accordance with the facts, evidence, law and
jurisprudence.

To be cowed or intimidated by these currents of misguided
resentment, and unrest, to say the least, is to allow extralegal forces to
bastardize the decision making process.

WHEREFORE, I vote
to:  (1) DISMISS the petitions in G.R.
Nos. 161434 and 161634 for being premature, (2) DECLARE
COMELEC Resolutions dated January 23, 2004 and February 6, 2004, rendered in
COMELEC SPA No. 04-003 NULL AND VOID, and (3) DIRECT the COMELEC to cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy of Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe Jr.,
for containing a false material representation.