F. SARE ENTERPRISES, PETITIONER, VS. THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, RESPONDENT.

The petitioner F. Sare Enterprises’
importations of dried fish, smoked ham, pears, chestnuts, waternuts,
dates, oranges, apples, and other foodstuffs from Hongkong,
which arrived in Ma­nila in December, 1954 in three shipments, were seized by
cus­toms authorities for failure of the petitioner to present the corres­ponding
Central Bank release certificates as required by Central Bank Circulars 44 and
45, and were subsequently delivered to it only upon its posting of three bonds
in the amounts of P 11,760,
P11,455 and P10, 344.

After appropriate proceedings, the Collector of Customs on April 1, 1955 rendered a decision
against the petitioner and ordered it and its surety to pay jointly and
severally to the Bureau of Customs the full amounts of the bonds given to
secure the re­lease of the goods.  On
appeal taken by the petitioner, the decision of the Collector of Customs was
affirmed first by the Commissioner of Customs on December 14, 1959 and then by the Court of Tax Ap­peals
on July 3, 1963.  Hence this petition for review, the
petitioner contending (1) that neither Circular 44 nor Circular 45 provides for
the forfeiture of goods imported in violation thereof; (2) that the goods in
question cannot be considered either as “merchandise of prohibited
importation” or as goods imported “contrary to law” within the
meaning of section 1363(f) of the Administrative Code; and (3) that assuming
that forfeiture could validly be ordered, both circulars have been repealed by
Circular 133 with the result that the importation in question must now be
deemed to have been law­fully made.

The issues, while perhaps fresh and novel at the time they were
raised by the petitioner, have since been resolved squarely by this Court.

Thus, in Capulong v. Aseron^[1]
this Court held that while Circulars 44 and 45 do not expressly so provide, the
forfeiture of goods imported in violation of those circulars may nevertheless
be justified on the basis of section 1363(f) of the Administrative Code,^[2]
which authorizes the forfeiture of “Any merchandise of pro­hibited
importation or exportation, the importation or exportation of which is effected
or attempted contrary to law.” Circulars 44 and 45 should be correlated to
section 1363 of the Administrative Code.

Upon the second issue raised by the petitioner, it was held in Capulong that while goods imported in violation of
the circulars may not be considered “merchandise of prohibited
importation,” they nevertheless fall within the other category of
merchandise imported “contrary to law,” because regulations issued
pursuant to “customs laws” form part thereof, so that violation of
the said regulations can properly be regarded as coming within
the pur­view of section 1363(f).

Finally, with respect to the third issue, this Court said in Capulong:

“Petitioner also contends that the mer­chandise in question
cannot be legally forfeited under Central Bank Circulars Nos. 44 and 45 be­cause
these circulars have already been repeal­ed by Central Bank Circular No.
133.  This conten­tion is without
merit.  Central Bank Circular 133 has not
exactly repealed Central Bank Circulars Nos. 44 and 45 but rather it reenacted
them when it provided therein that all existing regulations not inconsistent
with the circular are deemed incorporated and made integral parts thereof by
reference.  And it cannot be disputed
that both Central Bank Circulars Nos. 44 and 45 and Cen­tral Bank Circular No.
133 have a common pur­pose, – which is to require the presentation of a release
certificate from the Central Bank before any importation may be made to the
Philippines.  Evidently, the purpose of
these circulars is to keep a tab of the volume of imports that come in­to the Philippines
in order to enable the Central Tank to make a survey and study of the appro­priate
measures that may be adopted to remedy the long-drawn financial crisis in the
country.

“Even assuming that Central Bank Circu­lar No. 133 had the
effect of repealing impliedly Central Bank Circulars Nos. 44 and 45, such re­peal,
however, cannot have the effect of abating the forfeiture case instituted
against petitioner for the simple reason that forfeiture proceedings are civil
in nature and not criminal.  In this
sense, the repeal cannot be given any retroactive effect.

“’x x x Petitioner contends that upon the expiration of Republic
Act No. 650 the Commissioner of Customs lost jurisdiction over the case and
therefore his decision was null and void. 
This contention is untenable.  It
is a settled rule that a court, be it judicial or administra­tive, that has
acquired jurisdiction over a case, retains it even after the expira­tion of the
law governing the case.  Here­in, we are
concerned with the effect of the expiration of a law, not with the abro­gation
of a law, and we hold the view that once the Commissioner of Customs has
acquired jurisdiction over the case, the mere expiration of Republic Act No.
650 will not divest him of his jurisdiction thereon duly acquired while said
law was still in force. In other words, we believe that despite the expiration
of Republic Act No. 650 the Commissioner of Cus­toms retained his jurisdiction
over the case and could continue to take cognizance thereof until its final
determination, for the main question brought in by the appeal from the decision
of the Collector of Cus­toms was the legality or illegality of the decision of
the Collector of Customs, and that question could not have been abated by the
mere expiration of Republic Act No. 650. 
We firmly believe that the expiration of Republic Act No. 650 could not
have pro­duced the effect (1) of declaring legal the importation of the cotton
counterpanes which were illegally imported, and (2) of declar­ing the seizure
and forfeiture ordered by the Collector of Customs illegal or null and void; in
other words, it could not have the effect of annulling or setting aside the
decision of the Collector of Customs which was render­ed while the law was in
force and which should stand until it is revoked by the appel­late
tribunal.  x x x (Roxas
v. Sayoc, G.R. No. L-8502, November 29, 1956).’”

The ruling in Capulong has been
reiterated and reaffirmed in numerous decisions of this Court^[3]
and it is now late in the day to suggest that it should be reexamined – which
of course the peti­tioner does not do.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is affirmed, at
petitioner’s cost.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Makalintal, Sanchez, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Reyes and Zaldivar, JJ., are on official leave.

^[1]
G.R. No. L-22989, May 14, 1966, 17 SCRA 11.

^[2]
Now Tariff and Customs Code, sec. 2530(f).

^[3]
De la Cruz v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-23335 & L-23452, Feb. 29, 1968,
22 SCRA 886; De la Cruz v. Court of Tax Ap­peals, G.R. Nos. L-23334 & L-23451, Feb. 29, 1968,
22 SCRA 891; Capulong v. Acting Comm’r, G.R. No. L-22991, Jan. 16, 1968, 22 SCRA 32, citing other cases; Leuterio
v. Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. L-21800,
June 22, 1968, 23 SCRA 1055; La­zaro v.
Commissioner of Customs, G.R. Nos. L-22511 & L-22343, May 16, 1966, 17 SCRA 36; see also
Papa v. Mago, G.R. No. L-­27360,
Feb. 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 857.