ALHAMBRA INDUSTRIES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA ALHAMBRA (PAFLU), RESPONDENTS.

In this appeal by certiorari from an order of respondent
Court of Industrial Relations dated October
28, 1963, thereafter affirmed by respondent Court en banc,
petitioner Alhambra Industries, Inc. seeks to set aside the aforesaid order and
to compel the respondent Court to hear and receive evidence on its
manifestation and motion of October 9,
1963.

The antecedents of this case go back to April 3, 1962, when respondent Court found
petitioner’s predeces­sor, Alhambra Cigar and Cigarette Factory Co., guilty of
unfair labor practice and ordered the reinstatement by it or its successor,
petitioner Alhambra Industries, Inc. be­ing such successor, to reinstate
Emiliano Averilla, Maglayon Pangan, Alfredo Roy, Ricardo Bernardino and Juliana
Lapasaran to their former positions or to substantially equivalent positions in
such corporation.  This order was
affirmed by the respondent Court en banc on May 26,1962, and this Court dismissed a petition
for certiorari seeking its reversal in our resolution of July 24, 1962. 
Un­til now, however, there has been no such reinstatement.

The petition itself explains why. 
On July 6, 1962, the respondent Union, Kapisanan Ng Mga
Manggagawa Sa Al­hambra (PAFLU) filed a motion for execution
of said order of April 3, 1962.  An opposition was filed by petitioner’s predecessor
Alhambra Cigar & Cigarette Manufacturing Co., on the ground that it had
ceased to do business since Ja­nuary
12, 1962 on account of the expiration of its
corpo­rate life.  On May 30, 1963, respondent Court issued an or­der
holding that while Alhambra Cigar & Cigarette Manufac­turing Co. could no
longer be held liable, petitioner Al­hambra Industries, Inc., as successor,
should be held liable for both the reinstatement and back wages in accordance
with the order of April 3, 1962.  Not
in conformity with the above order, petitioner sought in a petition to have
this Court re­view the order, but in our resolution of September 10, 1963, we dismissed the petition for
certiorari with preliminary in­junction.

It is against such a background that the motion of res­pondent Union
for reinstatement and to compute back wages filed on October 4, 1963 should be viewed.  The final and executory character of the
order of May 30, 1963 was
stressed therein.  Five days later,
petitioner Alhambra Industries, Inc., as respondent, continued its stubborn
refusal to comply with such final and executory order by filing with respondent
Court two pleadings entitled Opposition to Motion for Reinstatement and to
Compute Backwages and Manifestation and Motion. 
The first would pray that the Court hold in abeyance the consi­deration
of the Union’s motion for reinstatement, and the second
would seek a hearing to enable it to present evidence why it should be exempted
from such reinstatement and the pay­ment of back wages.  Its reason is set forth in its petition
before us.  Thus:

“On October 9, 1963, the
herein petitioner filed a ‘Manifestation and Motion’, a certified copy of which
is hereto attached as Annex ‘L’ hereof, wherein it represented that it can
reinstate only Juliana Lapasaran in a position equivalent to the one she had at
the Alhambra Cigar & Cigarette Manufacturing Com­pany, but cannot reinstate
Alfredo Roy, Maglayon Pa­ngan, Emiliano Averilla and Ricardo Bernardino, for
the reason that the Alhambra Cigar & Cigarette Manu­facturing Co. itself,
and then the petitioner, at the start of its operations, which was in January, 1962, made innovations in some of the
working or­ganizations formerly under the Alhambra Cigar & Cigarette
Manufacturing Co., which affected their former positions by abolishing them for
legitimate business reasons as explained in said pleading, An­nex ‘L’ hereof,
and there are no substantially equi­valent positions for them to occupy, and praying that the Honorable Court conduct
hearings at which  the petitioner will
introduce evidence in support  of these
allegations, and that
after such hearings, the petitioner be declared exempted from reinstating and
paying the back wages of the aforesaid employees.”

On the above pleadings, respondent Court issued its order of October 28,1963 which is now on appeal before us. 
Its dispositive portion reads thus:

“Wherefore, the Motion for Reinstatement and to Compute
Backwages is hereby granted. 
Consequently, let a writ of execution for the reinstatement of Messrs.
Maglayon Pangan, Al­fredo Roy, Emiliano Averilla, Ricardo Bernar­dino and
Juliana Lapasaran, be immediately is­sued, in accordance with the Order of May 30,
1963.  The Chief Examiner of the Court is
here­by ordered to proceed to the Alhambra Indus­tries, Inc., to compute the
back wages and Christmas bonus due complainants under previous orders of the
court and thereafter to submit a report thereof.”

The challenged order of respondent court narrated the previous
incidents that have transpired in this at­tempt of the Union
to have the employees reinstated as well as paid their back wages.  Thus:

“It will be recalled that upon finality of the original
decision of this Court, after the
same was unanimously affirmed by the Court en banc, then by the
Supreme Court, the issue of execution was brought before this Court.  Respondents then claimed that the order of
reinstatement with full back wages can not be executed and/or enforced against
both the old Alhambra Cigar and Cigarette Mfg. Co. and the new Alhambra
Industries, Inc., the former’s corporate life having expired under the
Corporation Law and the latter, on ground of due process of law, it being not a
party to the case.  Complainants can not
be reinstated, respondent maintained.

“After due hearing and the presentation of evidence, both oral
and documentary, the Court ruled on May 30,
1963, that the Alham­bra Industries, Inc. is liable for the unfair labor
practice committed by the Alhambra Cigar and Cigarette Mfg. Co. and
consequently should be responsible for the reinstatement and the back wages of
the complainants from January 13, 1962 up
to their actual reinstatement.  This was
affirmed by the Court en banc in its resolution of August 23,
1963 and by
the Supreme Court in its resolutions a September 10 and 28, 1963, denying respondents’ appeal by certiorari and the
motion for reconsideration, respectively. 
Hence, said order is now final and
executory and the Court has no alternative, but to exe­cute the same, by
ordering immediate reinstate­ment of complainants and the computation of their
back wages.

Respondent Court likewise justified its inability to grant the
motion of petitioner and to postpone further the execution of the final order
of May 3, 1963 for reinstate­ment
and back wages.  Thus:

“This Court can not now entertain the objec­tion of
respondent.  It would amount to reopening
the issue of reinstatement which has already been decided and is now closed and
terminated.  The Sup­reme Court ruled in
Rattan Art vs. Rattan Art Union, G.R.No.L-6466, May 21, 1954, that a proceeding
may be reopened only upon grounds coming into existence after the order was
rendered by the CIR, but not upon grounds which had already been directly
or implied litigated and decided by said court, nor upon grounds available
to the parties of the former proceedings
and not availed of by any of them. (Underscoring sup­plied).

“Clearly, from the Motion and Manifestation and the records of
the case, the grounds now rais­ed by respondent against the reinstatement of
the four complainants were existing and available, even during the trial of the
merits of the case, and more so, at the time when the issue of reinstatement
was squarely under consideration by this Court. 
They could and should have been raised during those times.  It is rather too late now.”

In this appeal from the above-mentioned order, peti­tioner would
raise as the basic issue:  “May the
Respond­ent Court, upon direct resort to it by an employer, va­lidly refuse to
receive evidence on the allegation that the employees which it had ordered to
be reinstated, can­not be reinstated, because their former positions have been
abolished for
bona fide reasons, and there are no substantially
equivalent positions for them to occupy; and
so bypass the determination of this fact and arbit­rarily overrule this
proposition?”

Whatever merit such an issue may intrinsically pos­sess, we are
not called upon to resolve it in this peti­tion, as there is a finding of fact
by respondent Court evident from the above narration that the grounds raised by
petitioner against such reinstatement were already in existence and available
even during the trial of the me­rits of the case and therefore under the ruling
in Rattan Art vs. Rattan Art Employees Union^[1]
may no longer be availed of.  It is now too
well-settled to need any citation of authorities that the findings of fact of
respondent Court, if supported by substantial evidence, are binding on us.  As we held in a resent decision:^[2]
“In the more familiar terminology, only on a showing of clear and grave
abuse of discretion are we justified in disturbing its findings of fact.  So it has been uniformly and uninterruptedly
held from Manila Electric Company vs. National Labor Union, a 1940 decision,
the opinion being rendered by Justice Laurel, to Philippine Educational
Institution vs. MLQSEA Faculty Association, decided late last year.”

It follows then that the appealed order is in accord­ance with law and cannot be
disturbed.  There is another
consideration that likewise sustains the conclusion arrived at by respondent
Court.  In the very same National Water­works
and Sewerage Authority decision above-cited, as well as in the case of Sanchez
vs. The Preserver Shoe Company,^[3]
we have stressed the importance of the principle of the law of the case, especially in labor
litigations.  In the Sanchez case, we
said the following:  “It does not
admit of doubt that with
reference to our final judgment in labor matters, which insofar as the back
wages due the aggrieved workingmen could require further actions from
respondent Court, the law of the case does not apply solely to what is embodied
in our decision but to its implementation carried out in fealty to what has
been by us decreed.” Considering that the petition itself admits that as
of April 3, 1962, the predecessor company had already been found guilty of
unfair labor practice and that petitioner as successor company did try in vain,
its petition with us having been dismissed, to avoid the effects of such an
order, this persistence in refusing to abide by such a final judgment, in
effect twice affirmed by us, would clearly show a disregard of the principle of
the law of the case.

We have another
reason for not sustaining the appeal of petitioner.  The basic theory of the Industrial Peace Act
is to recognize the right to self-organization to enable labor unions to
bargain collectively and to avoid unfair labor practices on the part of labor
and management in order to attain industrial democracy.  The sooner then an inquiry is made into
alleged unfair labor practices and the sooner it is stopped, the better for
harmonious labor-management relations. 
To discourage each party from committing such unfair labor practices,
sanctions are provided for.  Here,
management was at fault, and petitioner, as the successor, can be compelled to
reinstate and to pay back wages.  That
order dates back to April 3, 1962.  That order until now has not been complied
with.  If we reopen the case to allow
petitioner to introduce evidence with respondent Court to show why it has not
complied with the order of reinstate­ment, we shall in effect be rendering
futile the rights of labor and frustrating the policies of the Industrial Peace
Act.  Considering the circumstances
disclosed, we cannot and should not do so.

WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari is denied, and the
appealed order of October 28, 1963 of the Court of Industrial Relations,
as well as its resolution en banc of November 25, 1963 sustaining such order, is hereby
affirmed.  With costs against petitioner.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando,
Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Reyes and Zaldivar, JJ.,
are on leave.

^[1]
G.R. No. L-6466, May 21, 1954.

^[2]
National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority v. NWSA Con­solidated Union, 27 SCRA
227 (1969).

^[3]
27 SCRA 490 (1969).