THELMA ARCENIO AND MARGARITA PONTING, COMPLAINANTS, VS. JUDGE VIRGINIA PAGOROGON, RESPONDENT.

These are two (2) administrative complaints commenced by
different parties against Municipal Trial Court Judge Virginia Pagorogon of San
Jose del Monte, Bulacan. The factual
background of these complaints will be treated herein separately, as
follows:

A. M. No. MTJ 89-270:

Complainants Arcenio and Ponting were the accused in two criminal
complaints filed by one Cipriano de Guzman, Jr. for Illegal Squatting (P.D.
772) before respondent judge Pagorogon.

After a preliminary examination, respondent judge issued warrants
for the arrest of the complainants. On
January 23, 1989, complainants were apprehended and filed their respective bail
bonds. Respondent judge then issued an
Order requiring complainants to file their counter-affidavits within ten (10)
days from receipt of the Order. Complainants failed to comply with the aforestated Order but instead
filed a Motion for Extension of time to file counter-affidavits in the afternoon
of February 3, 1989, the last day for compliance. Respondent judge denied the Motion for Extension filed by the
accused for being moot and academic. It
appears that in the morning of the same day, respondent judge had already
issued an Order forwarding the records to the Provincial Fiscal for the filing
of the corresponding information on the ground that “accused Ponting failed to submit her witnesses”.

The Order of denial however, erroneously referred to the Motion
for Extension as a Motion for Reconsideration, which mistake respondent judge
attributed to clerical error.

On February 14, 1989 complainants filed their counter-affidavits
alleging that they are DAR-identified farmer beneficiaries of the disputed
parcel of land which is devoted to agriculture and as such, is beyond the
coverage of P.D. 772.

On the same day, the accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the Order transmitting the cases to the Provincial Fiscal on the ground that
the Motion for Extension filed by them served to suspend the running of the
period within which to file their counter-affidavits. Respondent judge allegedly denied the Motion for Reconsideration
on the same day that it was filed but
the Order itself is missing from the records of the case.

On February 22, 1989 complainants filed the present administrative
complaint against respondent judge with the Office of the Court Administrator
for gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion and acting in excess
of her jurisdiction, alleging that respondent judge found probable cause only
on the basis of the sworn statements of the complainant and his witness,
ordered their arrest on the basis of a P.D. that is not applicable to them, and
for acting with undue haste in transmitting the records to the Provincial
Fiscal without first ruling on their Motion for Extension and Motion for
Reconsideration.

In her Comment, respondent judge claimed as erroneous and without
basis the complaint filed against her, arguing that the fact that only one
witness was presented does not militate against the existence of probable cause
as found by her. Furthermore, she
alleged compliance with the requirements of examination in writing and under
oath to justify the issuance of the warrants of arrest. On the issue of acting with undue haste,
respondent judge claimed that she acted upon the Motion for Extension and the
Motion for Reconsideration by denying both motions.

Thereupon, complainants were ordered to file their Reply by way
of a Resolution of this Court dated August 7, 1990. However, despite several Resolutions ordering compliance and
service of the said Resolutions upon the complainants, no Reply has yet been filed by the
complainants. In the meantime,
respondent Judge filed a motion for resolution of the complaint.

A. M. No. MTJ-92-637:

This case originated from an anonymous letter-complaint filed by
one A.C.B. with the Office of the Ombudsman accusing respondent judge of abuse
of authority and irregularity in connection with a motor vehicle in custodia legis alleged to have
been used in connection with a robbery case filed with respondent’s court. In turn, the Office of the Ombudsman
referred the undated letter to this Court for administrative investigation.

Per Resolution dated August 29, 1991, the Court directed the
Court Administrator to file a formal complaint for misconduct against
respondent judge and thereafter, to refer the complaint to Executive Judge
Natividad G. Dizon of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan for
investigation, report and recommendation.

The report of the Executive Judge disclosed that respondent judge
conducted a preliminary examination of a robbery (hold-up) case entitled
“People of the Philippines vs. Robert Geroi, et al.” on August 26,
1988. Part of the evidence in the
aforementioned case was a black and white renegade type jeepney. On September 19, 1988, the robbery case was
endorsed to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Malolos, Bulacan, for filing
of the information inasmuch as three (3) of the accused were detained.

However, the jeep was not turned over to the Provincial Fiscal
because the Clerk of Court had
no available funds to tow said jeep. The subject vehicle, therefore, remained in the premises of the
municipal building of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.

In March 1989, the Station Commander of San Jose del Monte
requested respondent judge to remove the jeep from the premises of the
municipal building as it was becoming an eyesore. Respondent judge then sought the opinion of then Acting RTC
Executive Judge Benjamin de Vega and Provincial Fiscal Liberato L. Reyes and
was allegedly advised that since the RTC of Malolos has no impounding area, she
should keep and maintain the jeep herself. In their sworn affidavits, however, the Executive Judge merely
remembered disclaiming control over the jeep until the Provincial Fiscal files
the criminal case with the RTC; the Provincial Fiscal, on the other hand, had a
vague recollection of the conversation and remembered only his hesitation to
accept the turnover of the jeep to his office. Neither one of the officials confirmed having advised respondent judge
to have custody of the subject vehicle.

On March 31, 1989 respondent Judge took possession of the jeep
and had an auto mechanic tow it to his (the auto mechanic’s) shop in Marilao,
Bulacan, repair it and repaint the same from black and white to red. Respondent judge even provided new batteries
for the jeep and initially spent P1,500.00 to put the jeep in good running
condition. Her brother volunteered “to
take care of the jeep” as she “could not afford to hire a
driver.” In addition, her brother shouldered additional expenses for the
further repair and maintenance of the jeep. It is for these expenses that respondent judge is seeking reimbursement
from the anonymous owner with the threat that unless she is reimbursed
“she is to return the jeep to its original condition.”

The anonymous letter-complaint further alleged that the
respondent judge even had the vehicle registered in her brother’s name but
respondent judge denied the same nor is there any evidence to support such
allegation. However, the investigation
of Executive Judge Dizon revealed that on the basis of the report from the Land
Transportation Office, the sticker attached to the vehicle appears to be
falsified.

To all these accusations, respondent judge maintains the defense
of having acted in good faith. In fact
to show her alleged good faith, respondent judge officially turned over the
jeep to the office of the Provincial Fiscal on February 25, 1992, three (3) years after having received custody thereof
in March 1989. She did so only after
this case was referred to the Executive Judge of Bulacan for investigation,
report and recommendation.

On the basis of the documentary evidence obtaining in the present
case, the investigating Executive Judge found respondent judge guilty of
misconduct in that she “exerted undue interest” over the vehicle by
spending for its repair and maintenance over and beyond what the circumstances
and the duties of her office called for. Moreover, by having the jeep repainted from its original color of black
and white to red, with full knowledge that the jeep constitutes vital evidence
in a Robbery case, respondent judge tampered with the evidence in a criminal
case for which she should be held answerable. In view of her findings, the investigating judge recommended the
imposition of the appropriate penalty upon respondent judge.

On the first administrative complaint for gross ignorance, grave
abuse of discretion and acting in excess of her jurisdiction, this Court
believes and so holds that respondent judge is not guilty of the acts
complained of as to warrant an administrative sanction. From the aforestated facts, it appears that
respondent judge faithfully complied with the procedure for preliminary examination
outlined in Rule 112 sections 9(b) and 6(b) of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure. She did not base her finding
of probable cause solely on the sworn statements of the complainant therein and
his witness as alleged by the complainants. Instead she propounded her own searching questions to the aforestated
parties during the preliminary examination, consistently with the Rules. Apparently however, such
“searching” questions (and
answers thereto) proved insufficient to elicit the nature of the
property subject matter of the complaint as to justify the application of P.D.
772 against the accused. However such
fact alone is not sufficient to justify a charge of gross ignorance of the law
against respondent judge.

Not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of her
duties makes her liable administratively. To hold a judge accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision that
he renders, would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position
unbearable. For after all, no judge, in
the process of administering justice, can be infallible in his judgment
(Gallardo vs. Judge Quintos, Adm. Mat. No. RTJ-90-577, 2 July 1991 En Banc,
Minute Resolution).

Even the allegation that respondent judge acted with undue haste
in forwarding the case to the Provincial Fiscal is devoid of merit. Complainants had no right to assume that
respondent judge will grant their Motion for Extension, especially in the
present case where the motion was filed on the very last day for filing of the
counter-affidavits and more so, where the respondent judge had already issued
an order of transmittal of the records to the Provincial Fiscal, thereby
rendering the motion moot and academic. Neither do complainants have the right to asssume that by the mere act
of filing a motion for an extension, the period for compliance with the Order
will be automatically “suspended”. Nowhere in the Rules is such automatic suspension sanctioned. The fact that respondent judge denied their
motion for extension cannot be deemed as an abuse of discretion inasmuch as the
decision on whether to grant motions or not rest entirely upon the discretion
of the judge.

There being no merit in the charges against respondent judge, the
Court resolved to dismiss the first administrative case against her.

However, as to the second administrative complaint involving the
vehicle in custodia legis, there is sufficient evidence on record
to warrant a finding that respondent judge committed gross misconduct in office
deserving the imposition of the most stringent of penalties possible. The intention of respondent judge to make
use of and benefit from the vehicle, a property in custodia legis,
was manifest. Respondent judge had no
reason to go overboard in spending for the repair of the jeep. The most she should have done, if her real
intention was the preservation of evidence and her goal was to turn over the
same to the office of the Provincial Fiscal, was simply to have the jeep, then
already in a dilapidated condition owing to its prolonged exposure to the
elements, towed to the premises of the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. From that moment on, the vehicle would have
been out of her hands, which was how it should be considering that the robbery
case had already been endorsed by her to the office of the Provincial
Fiscal. Had she effected the delivery
of the vehicle, then her insistence on being reimbursed, this time only for the
towing expenses, would have been reasonable. But instead, respondent judge engaged the services of a mechanic, not only
to tow the jeep but also to place the jeep in good running condition, spending
in the process P1,500.00 of her own money. No other logical inference could be deduced from such an action other
than respondent judge’s desire to use and enjoy the jeep for her own benefit
and convenience. Quite obviously,
respondent judge exhibited manifest intent to gain.

The act of respondent judge is not unlike the prohibited
acquisition by purchase described in Article 1491 of the New Civil Code and is in fact, even worse. In Article 1491 paragraphs 4 and 5, public
officers and employees, justices, judges, lawyers and similar persons charged
with the administration of justice are prohibited from acquiring by purchase
property the administration of which has been entrusted to them or any other
property which is the object of litigation. Here, respondent judge did not even offer to purchase the jeep from the
owner but by the mere fact of having whimsically spent for its repairs,
automatically appropriated the jeep for her own use and benefit.

Assuming, arguendo, that respondent judge was indeed acting in
good faith, i.e. she was acting upon the “advise” of the Executive Judge
of Malolos and the Provincial Fiscal, still the fact that she and her brother
regularly used the subject vehicle as if it were their own destroys her
pretensions of good intentions.

Furthermore, respondent judge had absolutely no right and/or
authority to change the color of the jeep from black and white to red. She knew very well that the jeep was vital
evidence in a robbery case since in fact, she was even the one who conducted
the preliminary examination in said case. Her act of having the jeep repainted to a different color clearly
amounted to tampering with evidence in a criminal case. The fact that the person who committed the
act of tampering is a member of the judiciary makes the act even more
deplorable, and sad to say, leaves a bitter taste.

In addition to the foregoing irregularities, the investigating
Judge also discovered, in the process of investigating whether the jeep was actually
registered in the name of respondent judge’s brother, that the sticker attached
to the jeep appears to be falsified inasmuch as the control numbers in the
sticker remain unissued and are in fact, still in the possession of the Land
Transportation Office. Whether the
sticker was already attached to the jeep when it was used in the robbery or
whether the same was attached by respondent judge in the course of her use of
the jeep, does not appear on record. Nevertheless, the mere fact of suspicion tips the scale against herein
respondent judge who, as a member of the judiciary, should be beyond reproach
at all times.

There is indeed no doubt that respondent judge took advantage of
the powers vested in her office in committing the acts complained of herein. For, had she not been the judge who
conducted the preliminary examination in the robbery case, she would not have
acquired jurisdiction over the subject vehicle and consequently, she could not
have taken possession of the said vehicle and used the same for her personal
benefit.

Undoubtedly, respondent judge committed gross misconduct in her
office. Misconduct is “a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer”
(Amasco v. Magro, 73 SCRA 107 [1976]). It is this kind of gross and flaunting misconduct on the part of those
who are charged with the responsibility of administering the law and rendering
justice that so quickly and surely corrodes the respect for law and the courts
without which the government cannot continue and that tears apart the very
bonds of our polity (Ompoc vs. Judge Torres, A.M. No. MTJ-86-11, 17 Sept. 1989
En Banc, Per Curiam).

Respondent judge utterly failed to conduct herself in the manner
prescribed by Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which is to “avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.” The case
at bar presents an occasion to again remind the members of the Judiciary to so
conduct themselves as to be beyond reproach and suspicion, and be free from any
appearance of impropriety in their personal behavior not only in the discharge
of their official duties but also in their private capacities (National
Intelligence and Security Authority vs. Tablang, 199 SCRA 766 [1991]). For, as we have often stated,
“(a)lthough every office in the government service is a public trust, no
position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an
individual than a seat in the Judiciary. A magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times in such manner
that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny
of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and
justice” (Dia-Anonuevo vs. Bercacio, 68 SCRA 81, 89 [1975]).

In the case at bar, respondent judge has shown herself unfit to
be a member of the Judiciary and must therefore be removed from office.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent judge Virginia
Pagorogon guilty of gross misconduct in A.M. No. 92-637 and she is hereby ordered DISMISSED from the
service with forfeiture of all benefits except accrued leave credits with
prejudice to reinstatement or reappointment to any public office including
government-owned or controlled corporations.

The complaint against respondent Judge in A.M. No. MTJ 89-270 is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Melo, and
Quiason, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., No part. Court
administrator when the case was evaluated.