G.R. No. 105180. July 05, 1993
PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC., PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF BENJAMIN TANDOC Y DELA CRUZ, DAISY TANDOC MAMENTA IN HER BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF HER MINOR CH…
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
On 23 April 1985 at about 3:00 p.m., a vehicular accident
occurred along the MacArthur Highway at Barangay Bacag, Villasis, Pangasinan involving two buses owned and operated
by the Pantranco North Express, Inc. (PNEI) and a Toyota Corona car owned by
Vice-Mayor Benjamin Tandoc of Tayug, Pangasinan which was then being driven by
his son-in-law, Patricio
Mamenta. As a result of the three-vehicle collision, Patricio Mamenta and Samson de
Vera, who was the driver of one of the PNEI buses, died, while Benjamin Tandoc,
Jose Sison (an occupant of the Toyota car) and several passengers of the PNEI
buses suffered physical injuries. The
Toyota car was a total wreck.
On 23 July 1985, Benjamin Tandoc and the heirs of Patricio
Mamenta, namely, his wife, Daisy Tandoc-Mamenta, and his minor children, Daphne
and Patricia Dayan, filed a complaint for damages against PNEI and the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) with the Regional Trial Court of Tayug, Pangasinan. The PNB was impleaded
because it is allegedly the mortgagee, receiver, and/or owner of PNEI,
hence an indispensable party. The
complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. T-1721.[1] PNEI
filed its Answer with Counterclaim on 22 August 1935.[2] PNB
filed a motion to dismiss[3] and
upon its denial[4]
by the trial court, it filed its Answer with Counterclaim.[5]
On 17 June 1987, during the pendency
of the case, Benjamin Tandoc died of a heart attack. He was substituted by his heirs.
On 15 December 1989, the trial court rendered a decision[6]
dismissing the complaint against the PNB but holding the PNEI liable to the
plaintiffs as follows:
“On
the First Cause
of Action
1. To pay the heirs of deceased Benjamin Tandoc
the following sums of money:
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On the Second Cause of Action
2. To pay the heirs of deceased Patricio Mamenta
the following sums of money:
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b) Funeral & related
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c) Loss of Earning Capacity ———— |
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Plus costs.”
PNEI appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which docketed
the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 26220.
In a decision[7]
promulgated on 31 March 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification
the judgment of the trial court. The
modification consists in the reduction of the awards for the value of the car and
for funeral and related expenses to P80,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively.
Still dissatisfied, PNEI came to this Court via this petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and alleges the following grounds in support thereof:
“1. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE
LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN ASSUMING JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE DESPITE NON?PAYMENT
OF REQUIRED DOCKET FEES.
2. EVEN ASSUMING, WITHOUT ADMITTING, THAT THE
LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN ASSUMING JURISCTION (sic) OVER THE CASE, THE COURT
OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN UPHOLDING THE AWARD FOR LOSS OF
EARNING CAPACITY OF BENJAMIN TANDOC.
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN UPHOLDING THE LOWER COURT’S AWARD FOR ATTORNEY’S (sic) FEES.
4. THE
COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DISREGARDING THE RULE ON RES
GESTAE.
5. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT IT WAS THE DRIVER OF PANTRANCO BUS NO. 1202 WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
ACCIDENT.”[8]
The factual findings of the Court of Appeals are as follows:
“The plaintiffs and the defendant PNEI have conflicting
versions of the incident that resulted in a mishap which killed not only
Patricio Mamenta and caused physical injuries not only to Benjamin Tandoc but
also to several others who were passengers of the two (2) Pantranco buses that
figured in the accident.
According to the testimony of Benjamin Tandoc, in the afternoon of
April 23, 1985, he was riding in his Toyota car at the backseat thereof with
Jose Sison, while his son-in-law Patricio
Mamenta was driving. They had come from
Binalonan, Pangasinan and were cruising along the MacArthur Highway bound
towards the south. While they were
negotiating a sharp curve in Bacag, Villasis, Pangasinan where no overtaking
was allowed, as shown by two (2) yellow parallel lines painted in the center of
the highway, a Pantranco bus bound northward for Baguio City overtook several
vehicles and was coming towards the Toyota car. Tandoc told Mamenta to go to the shoulder of the road, seeing
that the Pantranco was running very fast and was about to collide with the
car. However, before Mamenta could
swerve towards the shoulder, the
Pantranco bus bumped the left front side of the car, which was pushed up
towards the shoulder. At that moment
the car was also bumped from behind by another Pantranco bus which had been
following it, thus causing the car to be sandwiched between the two (2)
Pantranco buses.
As a result of the impact, Mamenta died. Tandoc lost consciousness, and when he regained it the following
morning, he was already at the Urdaneta Sacred Heart Hospital. His left elbow was dislocated and he
sustained lacerated wounds in his left eyebrow, left eyelids, and left upper
lips.
Jose Sison corroborated the testimony of Tandoc on how the incident
happened, maintaining that the Pantranco bus had overtaken several vehicles
before its front left side hit the car at its left front portion. He too lost consciousness and regained it at
the Urdaneta Emergency Hospital at about 6:00 P.M. He suffered two (2) broken ribs.
Upon the other hand, Pedro Duay, the driver of the Pantranco Bus
No. 1122 which had been following the Toyota car of Tandoc, testified that
while he was cruising the curved portion of MacArthur Highway at Bgy. Bacag,
the Toyota car overtook and passed his bus to a distance of about five (5)
meters and while the said car was still at the center lane of the highway going
towards Manila, an oncoming Pantranco Bus No. 1202 bumped the car, causing it
to be thrown towards the right side of the highway. After the impact, Duay said,
the Pantranco Bus No. 1202 rammed his bus on the left front portion
thereof. As a result of the incident he
suffered a fractured right leg and his left chin and jaw were also injured.
The conductor of bus No. 1122, Edgardo Cayanan, testified that when
the incident took place, he had his back turned towards the driver and he was
facing the rear part of the bus because he was then talking to two (2) women
passengers regarding student tickets, hence he did not see what actually
happened.
Another witness, however, testified for the defense. He was Leonardo Lopez, Jr., a member of the INP in Paniqui, Tarlac, who
stated that at the time of the incident he and his family were riding in a
Mazda mini-bus going home to Tarlac from a beach resort in La Union. He stated that the car tried to overtake but
did not make it and it was hit by a Pantranco bus going to Baguio City, while
another Pantranco bus also hit the car at its rear portion. He took shots of the incident and then gave
them to an employee of the Pantranco.
Faced with these conflicting versions as to which vehicle actually
overtook vehicles in a no overtaking-zone, the lower court gave credence to the
version of the plaintiffs, which was supported by the findings of the policemen
who conducted an on the spot investigation of the incident.
Pat. Renario B. Acosta of the Integrated National Police of
Villasis, Pangasinan, a police investigator since 1972, and the OIC of the
Investigation Section of the Villasis Police Station conducted an investigation
of the incident. We quote pertinent
portions of the written report he submitted:
‘2. Detailed
investigations revealed that the above-mentioned PANTRANCO with Body No. 1202
was then in the process of overtaking
within the prohibitive zone, as shown by the double yellow line in the center
of the road, and without taking the necessary precaution to avoid damage to and
loss of lives and properties, and considering the
several vehicles ahead proceeding north direction and while in the process of
overtaking by taking the western lane of the Macarthur Highway, bumped and
sideswiped the oncoming Toyota Car hereto above mentioned. After the impact, the said car turned on its
side and finally rested on the western side of the shoulder of the road facing
East direction. The said PANTRANCO bus
with Body No. 1202 went further along the same lane intended for oncoming
vehicles coming from the North, again collided and bumped head-on another
PANTRANCO passenger bus with Body No. 1122 coming from the North proceeding
southward direction. After the impact,
both PANTRANCO buses finally rested on the western shoulder of the highway,
wherein the rear portion of Bus No. 1122 was facing Northeast direction, while
the rear portion of Bus No. 1202 was facing Southeast direction both buses were
occupying the western portion of the Macarthur Highway.
3. That
the probable impact between the PANTRANCO Bus with Body No. 1202 and the Toyota
Car took place near the western edge of the asphalt pavement of the highway as evidenced by the scattered pieces of glasses
and other objects found on the surface of the road; while the point of impact
between the two buses was likewise indicated on the attached sketch taken and
prepared by Pat. Ruben V. Pituc of this unit. In both cases, the impact took place at the lane intended for vehicles
coming from the north proceeding south direction.’
Another policeman, Pat. Ruben Pituc, prepared a sketch at the scene
of the incident.
The defense had tried to discredit the investigation report of Pat.
Acosta by presenting Police Major Romeo Bascos, then Station Commander of the
INP in
Villasis. Major Bascos testified
that upon knowing that a vehicular accident happened in Barangay Bacag, he went to the scene where he saw
Patrolmen Acosta and Pituc still conducting their investigation. He made a Spot Report to the effect that:
‘Investigation conducted disclosed that both buses were bound
Manila and Baguio City, when the above-mentioned car tried to overtake bus
bound Manila. At this juncture,
Pantraco (sic) bus bound Baguio City, while on its full speed, bumped said car
which resulted to their instant death and simultaneously collided with the
Manila bound bus which caused damages on both vehicle.’
Major Bascos claimed that he based this report on the investigation
conducted by Pat. Abrenica and the information given by the residents of the
place. He stated that Pat. Acosta was
not in charge of investigation while Pat. Pituc only prepared a sketch but was
not an investigator. He informed the
court that his own investigation prevails over that of the others when there is
a discrepancy. He, however, confirmed that he agreed with
the sketch prepared by Pat. Pituc.
We agree with the trial court when it gave more weight to the
findings of Pat. Acosta, ‘it possessing the earmarks of truth and credibility
insofar as it stated how the incident actually happened’. The court took note of the fact that Pat.
Acosta had been a police investigator for thirteen (13) years and was the chief
investigator of their police station; that his report was based on interviews with
plaintiff Tandoc, from residents near the place of the incident, especially one Arcadio Menor, who was in his
store some 40 to 50 meters away from the scene; and more importantly, his own visual inspection of the damages sustained by the three (3)
vehicles involved in the incident.
On the other hand, Maj. Bascos relied heavily for his Spot Report
on the version of a certain Pat. Jose Abrenica who was supposedly at the
scene at the time of the incident. However, as the trial court stated, Pat. Abrenica was not presented as a witness and
it is doubted whether he was actually at the scene, since his name was never
mentioned in the testimonies of Patrolmen Acosta or Pituc or of the other
defense witnesses. Furthermore, there is no
showing that Major Bascos is qualified as a traffic accident investigator. The mere fact that he is a superior officer
of Pat. Acosta does not make his report more credible. Moreover, there is no explanation for the fact that
Major Bascos had to prepare his own separate report when, as he admitted, he
saw Patrolmen Acosta and Pituc already in the scene conducting their
on-the-spot investigation.
We find no reason to disagree with the conclusion of the trial
court that it was in fact the driver of the Pantranco bus No. 1202 who was
responsible for the accident. Thus it
is, that the defendant PNEI is liable for the damages
caused by its said employee by virtue of the provisions of the Civil Code.”[9]
The errors assigned by the petitioner are not strictly errors of
law. The fourth and fifth assigned
errors even raise purely factual issues notwithstanding the claim in the fourth
that the public respondent “abused its discretion in disregarding the rule
on res
gestae.” Said fourth assigned error merely involves the question
as to whose testimony and spot report — whether that of Patrolman Acosta or
that of Major Basco -- should be given full faith and credit.
We shall first dispose of these factual issues.
Well-entrenched is the general rule that the jurisdiction of this
Court in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals is limited to
reviewing or revising errors of law; findings of fact of the latter are
conclusive[10]
for it is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh such evidence all
over again. It is only in exceptional
cases where this Court may review findings of fact of the Court of Appeals.[11]
In the instant case, both the
trial court and the public respondent found that it was the driver of the
petitioner’s bus no. 1202 who was responsible
for the accident and that Patrolman
Acosta is more credible than Major Basco. Petitioner has not shown to us that such findings and conclusions
fall within any of the exceptions to this rule. As regards the so-called spot report of Major Basco which the
petitioner describes to be part of the res gestae, the petitioner has a misconception
of what res gestae is, which, as it should have known, relates to the
admissibility of evidence and not to its
weight and sufficiency. In the instant
case, there was no evidence which was offered as part of the res
gestae, hence, none could have been denied admission by the trial
court and the public respondent. In any
event, if there was one, the petitioner miserably failed to show or prove
the presence of the requisites of res
gestae, viz.: (1)
that the principal act be a startling occurrence, (2) that the statements were
made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise, and (3) that the
statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately
attending circumstances.[12]
We shall now resolve the questions of law which are raised in the first to the third assigned
errors: whether or not the public
respondent gravely abused its discretion (a)
in holding that the lower court did not err in assuming
jurisdiction over the case despite the non-payment of the required docket fees,
(b) in sustaining the award of P300,000.00 for the loss of earning capacity of
Benjamin Tandoc, and (c) in upholding the trial court’s award of P80,000.00 for attorney’s fees. As to the
first, it is not altogether correct to say that the required docket
fees were not paid. There was only a deficiency payment of such. The public respondent ruled as follows:
“The records show that the plaintiffs paid a filing fee of
P600.00 and a legal research fee of P30.00, as evidenced by O.R. No 3711618 and
O.R. No. 6035087, respectively. The
defendant-appellant never raised the issue of inadequate filing fees in the
court below. It now invokes the ruling
in Manchester Development Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA 562 where
the Supreme Court held that all complaints, petitions, answers and other
similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for, not
only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall
be considered in the assessment of filing fees in any case, and that any pleading
that fails to comply with this requirement shall not be accepted or admitted,
or shall otherwise be expunged from the records; and that the court acquires
jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee.
In the case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) vs. Asuncion, 170 SCRA
274, however, the High Court made a more
liberal interpretation of the rules, considering that the private respondent
therein demonstrated his willingness to
abide by the said rules by paying the additional docket fees required. When the petitioner in the said case
contended that the fee paid by the respondent was still insufficient,
the Supreme Court stated that the clerk of court and/or his duly authorized
docket clerk or clerk in charge should determine if any amount is due and,
thereafter, require the private respondent to pay the same.
The Supreme Court then
said:
‘3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction
over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the
prescribed filing fee but, subsequently the judgment awards a claim not
specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for
determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefore shall
constitute a lien on the judgment. It
shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy
to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.’
In the case now before us, we do not find the plaintiffs had the
intention of evading the payment of the required docket fees and, applying the rule in the case hereinabove
cited, we hold that the lower court did not err when it assumed jurisdiction over the case.”[13]
The guiding rules laid down by this Court in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., (SIOL) vs. Asuncion[14] are as follows:
“1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint
or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket
fee, that vests a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where a filing of the initiatory pleading is
not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of
the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive
counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be
considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is
paid. The court may also allow the
payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction
over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the
prescribed filing fee but, subsequently,
the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the
same has been left for determination
by the court, the additional
filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk
of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect
the additional fee.”
We further clarified the rules in Tacay vs. Regional Trial Court of Tagum,
Davao del Norte:[15]
“Now, under the Rules of Court, docket and filing fees are
assessed on the basis of the ‘sum claimed,’ on the one hand, or the ‘value of the property in litigation or the
value of the estate,’ on the other. There are, in other words, as already
above intimated, actions or proceedings involving real property, in which the
value of the property is
immaterial to the court’s jurisdiction, account thereof being taken merely for
assessment of the legal fees; and there are actions or proceedings, involving
personal property or the recovery of money and/or damages, in which the value
of the property or the amount of the demand is decisive of the trial court’s
competence (aside from being the basis for fixing the corresponding docket
fees).
Where the action is purely for the recovery of money or damages,
the docket fees are assessed on the basis of the aggregate amount claimed,
exclusive only of interests and costs. In this case, the complaint or similar pleading should, according to
Circular No. 7 of this Court, ‘specify the amount of damages being prayed for
not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages
shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case.’
Two situations may arise. One is where the complaint or similar pleading sets out a claim purely
for money or damages and there is no precise statement of the amounts being
claimed. In this event the rule is that
the pleading will ‘not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged
from the record.’ In other words, the complaint or pleading may be dismissed,
or the claims as to which the amounts are unspecified may be expunged, although
as aforestated the Court may, on motion, permit amendment of the complaint and
payment of the fees provided the claim has not in the meantime become
time-barred. The other is where the
pleading does specify the amount of every claim, but the fees paid are insufficient; and here again,
the rule now is that the court may allow a reasonable time for the payment
of the prescribed fees, or the balance thereof, and upon such payment, the
defect is cured and the court may properly take cognizance of the action, unless
in the meantime prescription has set in and consequently barred the right of
action.
Where the action involves real property and a related claim for
damages as well, the legal fees shall be assessed on the basis of both (a) the
value of the property and (b) the total amount of the related damages
sought. The Court acquires jurisdiction
over the action if the filing of the initiatory pleading is accompanied by the
payment of the requisite fees, or, if the fees are not paid at the time of the
filing of the pleading, as of the time of full payment of the fees within such reasonable time as the court may grant,
unless, of course, prescription has set in in the meantime. But where — as in the case at bar — the fees prescribed for an action involving real
property have been paid, but the amounts of certain of the related damages
(actual, moral and nominal) being demanded are unspecified, the action may not
be dismissed. The Court undeniably has
jurisdiction over the action involving real property, acquiring it upon the
filing of the complaint or similar pleading and payment of the prescribed
fee. And it is not divested of that
authority by the circumstance that it may not have acquired jurisdiction over
the accompanying claims for damages because of lack of specification
thereof. What should be done is simply
to expunge those claims for damages as to which no amounts are stated, which is
what the respondent Court did, or allow, on motion, a reasonable time for the amendment
of the complaints so as to allege the precise amount of each item of damages
and accept payment of the requisite fees therefor within the relevant
prescriptive period.”
In Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals,[16] we held that the prescriptive period
mentioned in the Sun Insurance case:
“refers to the period in which a specific action must be
filed. It means that in every case, the
docket fee must be paid before the lapse of the prescriptive period. Chapter 3, Title V, Book III of the Civil
Code is the principal law governing prescription of actions.”
Ideally then, the private respondents should have specified the
amount of their claims for moral and exemplary damages and for loss of earning
capacity so that the clerk of court of the trial court may be able to compute
the requisite docket fees. However,
considering the attendant circumstances in this case, the pronouncement of the
public respondent on the issue of jurisdiction
should be sustained. For one, the
complaint in this case was filed on 28 July 1985 or one (1) year, nine (9)
months and fourteen (14) days before the promulgation of the decision in Manchester
Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals.[17] While it is true that in Sun
Insurance we declared that the Manchester ruling applies retrospectively, the fact
remains that in the instant case, the last witness for the plaintiff’s evidence
in chief testified on 20 August 1986,[18] or long before the Manchester decision was promulgated, and although the
trial court decided this case on
15 December 1989, the petitioner never raised the issue of jurisdiction arising from the
insufficiency of the docket fees paid either in its answer or in any subsequent
pleading. On the contrary, it not only
resisted the claims of the plaintiffs but even invoked the jurisdiction of the
trial court in its counterclaims wherein it prayed for judgment ordering the
plaintiffs solidarily:
“a) To reimburse to PNEI the amount of P753,548.00
representing advances made by it as alleged in paragraph 8 of the counterclaim
with interest thereon at the rate of 16% p.a. from the date the amounts were
advanced until the same is fully reimbursed;
b) To reimburse to PNEI any amounts which may be
advanced in future dates to the other injured passengers with interest thereon;
c) To pay to PNEI the amount of P101,781.47
representing actual expenses for the repairs of Bus No. 1122 and Bus No. 1202
and to pay the unearned revenue during the period when the said busses were
under repair;
d) To pay to PNEI attorney’s fees of P50,000.00
plus appearance and expenses of litigation in the amount of P500.00 per
hearing.”[19]
The petitioner raised the issue regarding jurisdiction for the
first time in its Brief filed with the public respondent in CA-G.R. CV No.
26220 on 2 February 1991.[20] After
vigorously participating in all stages of the case before the trial court and
even invoking the trial court’s authority in order to ask for affirmative relief, the petitioner is
effectively barred by estoppel from challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction. Although the issue of jurisdiction may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings as the same is conferred by law, it is
nonetheless settled that a party may be barred from raising it on ground of
laches or estoppel.[21] The deficiency in the payment of the docket
fees must, however, be considered a lien on the judgment which must be remitted
to the clerk of court of the court a quo upon the execution of the judgment.
Petitioner’s contention that the Court of Appeals erred in
upholding the award of damages for loss of earning capacity of Benjamin Tandoc
in the amount of P300,000.00 is meritorious. The only possible basis for such an award is the public respondent’s
statement, culled from the decision of the trial court, that, per Tandoc’s
testimony, he used to earn P3 million annually
and that at the time of the accident, he was about to negotiate a P1.5 million
contract with Minister Hipolito which he was unable to get because he was by
then already disabled.[22] However, Tandoc testified that his business
resumed operations after stopping for only about a month.[23] As to the alleged contract he was about to
negotiate with Minister Hipolito, there is no showing that the same has been awarded to him. If Tandoc was about to negotiate a contract
with Minister Hipolito, there was
no assurance that the former
would get it or that the latter would award the contract to him since there was
the requisite public bidding. The
claimed loss of profit arising out of that alleged contract which was still to be negotiated is a mere expectancy. Tandoc’s claim that
he could have earned P2 million in profits is highly speculative, and no
concrete evidence was presented to prove the same. The only unearned income to which Tandoc is
entitled to from the evidence presented is that for the one-month period during
which his business was interrupted, which is P6,125.00, considering that his
annual net income was P73,500.00.[24]
There is, however, no merit
in the petitioner’s claim with respect to attorney’s fees. While attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigation are not recoverable as a matter of right if not stipulated upon,
Article 2208 of the Civil Code allows their recovery in specific instances,
among which are:
x x x
“(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
(2) When
the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to x x x incur
expenses to protect his interest;
x x x
(11) In any other case where the court deems it
just and equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should be
recovered.”
x x x
In the instant case, exemplary damages were awarded by the trial
court which the public respondent sustained. There can as well be no doubt that because of the tortious act of the petitioner, the private
respondents were compelled to incur expenses
to protect their interest. Finally, considering the attendant
circumstances in this case, we are of the opinion that justice and equity
warrant the recovery of attorney’s fees. However, as directed by the last
paragraph of the said Article 2208, “[i]n all cases, the attorney’s fees
and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.” The award of P80,000.00 as
attorney’s fees in the first cause of action (re claim of Benjamin Tandoc) and none in the second cause of action (re death of Patricio
Mamenta) breaches the parameters of reasonableness. It should be reduced to P25,000.00.
Finally, in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, the death
indemnity of P30,000.00 is increased to P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is partly GRANTED and the challenged
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 26220 is hereby MODIFIED
by: (a) reducing the award of damages
for loss of earning capacity of Benjamin Tandoc from P300,000.00 to P6,125.00,
(b) reducing the award for attorney’s fees from P80,000.00 to P25,000.00, and
(c) increasing the death indemnity to P50,000.00. In all other respects, the decision is AFFIRMED.
The deficiency in the payment of the docket fees, to be computed
by the clerk of court of the trial court, shall constitute a lien on the
judgment.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, (Chairman), Bidin, Romero, and Melo, JJ., concur.
[1]
Original Records (OR), 1-14; Rollo, 32-42.
[2]
Id., 42-49; Id., 44-50.
[3]
OR, 52-59.
[4]
Id., 132.
[5]
Id., 158-168.
[6]
Id., 694-720; Rollo, 52-77. Per judge Pedro C. Cacho.
[7]
Rollo, 97-107. Per Associate
Justice Salome A. Montoya, concurred in by Associate Justices Reynato S. Puno
and Celso L. Magsino.
[8]
Rollo, 14-45.
[9]
Rollo, 99-103.
[10]
Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA
737 [1970], citing numerous cases.
[11]
Remalante vs. Tibe, 158 SCRA 138 [1988]; Medina vs. Asistio, 191
SCRA 218 [1990]; Banaag vs. Bartolome, 204 SCRA 924 [1991].
[12]
People vs. Sanchez, 213 SCRA 70 [1992].
[13]
Rollo, 104-105.
[14]
170 SCRA 274 [1989].
[15]
180 SCRA 433, 442-443 [1989], footnotes omitted. See also, Country Bankers Insurance Corp. vs. Court of
Appeals, 201 SCRA 458 [1991] and Original Development and Construction
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 202 SCRA 753 [1991].
[16]
208 SCRA 652, 683 [1992].
[17]
149 SCRA 562. Promulgated on 7 May 1987.
[18]
Decision of trial court, 7; Rollo, 58.
[19]
Rollo, 49-50.
[20]
Annex “D” of Petition; Id.,
78-96.
[21]
Gulang vs. Nadayag, 214 SCRA 355, 362 [1992], and the cases enumerated
therein at footnote nos. 9 and 10.
See also, Aquino vs. Court of Appeals, 204 SCRA 240 [1991].
[22]
Rollo, 105.
[23]
TSN, 18 July 1986, 5; TSN, 22 July
1986, 14.
[24]
Exhibit “Z.”