OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, COMPLAINANT, VS. HON. GENARO C. GINES, AS PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 26; MA. GORGONIA L. FLORES, COURT INTERPRETER AND OFFICER-IN-CHARGE, BRANCH …

This case was initiated by the Office of the Court Administrator
with the filing of an administrative complaint which reads:

“Pursuant to the Resolution of the Court En Banc, dated July
30, 1991, the undersigned hereby institutes this administrative complaint
against Judge Genaro C. Gines, Presiding Judge, Branch 26; Ma. Gorgonia L.
Flores, Court Interpreter and Officer-in?Charge, Branch 26; Rosie M.
Munar, Stenographic Reporter, Branch 26; Pacita B. Diaz, Staff Assistant IV,
Office of the Clerk of Court; Ma. Concepcion B. Diaz, Staff Assistant I, Branch
26; and Mr. Alfredo V. Lacsamana, Jr., Staff II, Branch 26, all of the RTC, San
Fernando, La Union, for Dishonesty; Violation of par. (e), Sec. 3 of R.A. 3019
(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) as amended; and Violation of
Administrative Order No. 6, dated June 30, 1975, Circular No. 7, dated
September 23, 1974, and Administrative Order No. 1, dated January 28, 1988, by
virtue of their collective illegal acts involving deliberate and surreptitious
assignment of cases at the Docketing and Receiving Section, Office of the Clerk
of Court, RTC, San Fernando, La Union.

1. This complaint is substantially anchored on
the Report submitted by Atty. Aurora P. Sanglay, Clerk of Court, RTC, San
Fernando, La Union, relative to her investigation on the alleged anomaly in the
non-raffling of cases in the said Court, and the Affidavit-complaint of Ma.
Concepcion B. Diaz dated September 19, 1991, implicating other court personnel involved
in the aforestated irregularity;

2.    Atty. Sanglay, in her Report, averred that:

2.1  From April 3, 1989 to April, 1991, there were
forty-four (44) Special Proceedings cases, twenty-seven (27) Land Registration
cases, six (6) Civil Cases, and three (3) Criminal Cases which were directly
assigned to the RTC, Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union, without passing through
the mandatory raffling procedure of cases except for three (3) special
proceedings cases which were assigned to Branch 27, which anomaly had been
going on since 1986;

2.2  Pacita Diaz, Ma. Concepcion Diaz and Alfredo
Lacsamana, Jr.
were the court employees in-charge in (sic) the receiving and docketing
of the Land Registration cases, Special Proceedings cases and Civil Cases,
respectively; and

2.3  There is a probability that the aforesaid
clerks, who were in-charge of receiving the cases, did not submit deliberately
to the Officer-in-Charge some of the cases received for mandatory raffling in
compliance with the Administrative Orders/ Circulars of the Supreme Court;

3.   In the Affidavit-Complaint dated September
19, 1991, of Ma. Concepcion B. Diaz, which was received by the Office of the
Court Administrator on September 20, 1991, she asserted, inter alia, that:

3.1. She blamed Judge Genaro C. Gines, Presiding
Judge, RTC, Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union, Ma. Gorgonia Flores, Court
Interpreter and Officer-In-Charge, same Court, and Rosie Munar, Stenographic
Reporter, same Court, for applying pressures and intimidations to her in order
that the cases of their choice may no longer be forwarded to the proper
Officer-In-Charge;

3.2. Several petitions have been prepared by the
(sic) Judge Gines himself in coordination with his Stenographer Rosie Munar and
Court Interpreter Ma. Gorgonia Flores, some of which are as follows:

3.2.1. Special Proceeding No. 1965 where the
petitioner, who alleged himself to be a resident of San Fernando, La Union, is
actually a resident of Sta. Cruz, Ilocos Sur and the Aunt of Judge Gines. The required bond of P500.00 therein has not
yet been posted; and

3.2.2. Special Proceeding No. 1967 where the
Office of the Solicitor General and other parties were not furnished with
copies of the petition upon the instruction of Judge Gines.”

The respondents were then required to answer the complaint.

Separate motions for an extension of time to file their answers
were made by the respondents, but only respondents Pacita Diaz and Ma.
Concepcion Diaz filed their Answer within the extended period. The Resolution which granted the others the
extension warned them that no further postponements would be granted. Notwithstanding such caveat, however, they
again asked for another extension. In
the Resolution of 28 May 1992, this Court ruled, inter alia, that:

“It appearing that said respondents have not taken this case
seriously, and considering the prior warning in the Resolution of 7 May 1992,
the above motions for another extension of time to file the Answers are hereby
DENIED. The respondent Judge and
respondents Flores, Munar and Lacsamana are deemed to have waived the filing of
their Answer.”

As it turned out, respondents Flores, Munar and Lacsamana were
able to post their joint Answers on 15 May 1992, the last day of the additional
period they had prayed for in their second motion which was eventually denied
in the aforementioned Resolution.

Respondents then filed a motion to reconsider the Resolution of
28 May 1992; the same was denied in the Resolution of 14 July 1992. This latter resolution likewise denied the
respondent Judge’s motion to reconsider the 7 May 1992 Resolution wherein he
prayed that his answer (actually a Comment), dated 14 May 1992, be
admitted. However, this Court resolved
that the said comment be attached to the record of the instant case.

In the same 14 July 1992 Resolution, the instant case was
referred to Mr. Justice Nathanael P. De Pano, Jr. of the Court of Appeals for
investigation, report and recommendation.

On 31 March 1993, Justice De Pano, Jr. submitted his 26-page
REPORT. It appears therefrom that on 2 September
1992, he issued an order (a) requiring the parties to file their respective
affidavits which shall serve as their direct testimonies in this case subject,
however, to cross-examination by the adverse parties and (b) setting the
initial hearing of the case for 28 September 1992. Respondents Pacita Diaz and Ma. Concepcion Diaz submitted their
joint affidavit, dated 9 September 1992, as well as the affidavits of Fortunata
Gualberto, retired branch clerk of court of Branch 27 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in San Fernando, La Union, and Consolacion M. Dulay, Clerk III of the
same Branch 27. Respondents Gorgonia
Flores, Rosie Munar and Alfredo Lacsamana likewise submitted their individual
affidavits which are all dated 14 September 1992. Respondent Judge Gines, for his part, filed a manifestation,
dated 17 September 1992, adopting his 14 May 1992 Comment as his direct
testimony as well as the aforesaid affidavits of respondents Flores, Munar and
Lacsamana.

At the hearing on 28 September 1992, the parties entered into a
stipulation of facts. They agreed on
the status and personal circumstances of the parties as stated in the
affidavits, as well as the
descriptions of their respective positions in the RTC in San
Fernando, La Union; the assumption into office of the respondent Judge in
January of 1987; the non­-membership of the respondent Judge and the other
respondents in the raffle committee; and the procedure prescribed for the
raffling of cases filed with the RTC in San Fernando, La Union. The respondents then marked as exhibits
their affidavits and other documents.

It further appears from the REPORT that no testimonial evidence
was offered by the parties. While the
complainant wanted to present Atty. Sanglay, the respondents admitted her
report and agreed to dispense with her testimony. The complainant then marked in evidence the following documents:
(1) the undated Report of Atty. Aurora Sanglay to the Executive Judge, as
Exhibit “A”; (2) the 17 June 1991 Letter of Atty. Aurora Sanglay
addressed to the Executive Judge, with annexes, as Exhibit “B”; (3)
the Joint Affidavit of Pacita and Ma. Concepcion Diaz dated 11 September 1992,
as Exhibit “C”; (4) the Compliance of respondents Flores, Munar and
Lacsamana, Jr., as Exhibit “D”; (5) the Affidavit of respondent
Flores dated 14 September 1992, as Exhibit “E”; (6) the Affidavit of
Romeo Hermosura dated 14 September 1992, as Exhibit “F”; (7) the
Affidavit of Teodorico Basilio dated 14 September 1992, as Exhibit
“G”; (8) the Affidavit of respondent Munar dated 14 September 1992,
as Exhibit “H”; (9) the Affidavit of respondent Lacsamana, Jr. dated
14 September 1992, as Exhibit “I”; and (10) the Manifestation of
respondent Judge Gines dated 17 September 1992, as Exhibit “J.” It
appears that counsel for the complainant expressed a desire to cross-examine
respondents Flores, Munar and Lacsamana but that the latter’s counsel objected
on the ground of possible self-incrimination. These three respondents further manifested that they were not presenting
any evidence against the other respondents. Respondents Pacita Diaz and Concepcion Diaz likewise manifested, through
counsel, that they will not present evidence on account of the possibility of
self-incrimination. Respondent Judge
Gines did not present his evidence.

Justice De Pano, Jr. then
made the following observations, findings and conclusions in his REPORT:

“Executive Judge Braulio Yaranon of the San Fernando, La Union
Regional Trial Court, in a letter dated June 20, 1991, transmitted to the
Court, the report dated June 17, 1991, of Attorney Aurora Sanglay, the said
Court’s Clerk of Court, on the subject of cases that had not been raffled by
the appropriate committee on raffle but which nevertheless, found their way
mostly, to Branch 26 of the said Court (presided over by respondent Genaro
Gines from January 1987) and Branch 27 (the letter and its annexes were later
marked Exhibit B. In 1986, the report
states, 6 criminal cases, 9 civil cases, 51 special proceedings cases and 9
land registration cases, (a total of 75 cases) did not pass through the raffle
committee but went directly to the branch which apparently acted on the cases
without question. In 1987, 8 criminal
cases, 9 civil cases, 13 special proceedings cases, 2 land registration cases
(a total of 32 cases) did not pass through the raffle committee. In 1988, 9 civil cases, 18 special
proceedings cases and 2 land registration cases (a total of 29 cases) went directly to the
branches mentioned. A total of 136
cases from 1986 to 1988, Attorney Sanglay reports, went from filing/docketing
direct to two branches without undergoing the mandated raffle by the raffle
committee.

The more germane report, one which demonstrates the continuing
perpetuation of the above obviously illegal and nefarious system of directing
cases filed with the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, La Union to Branches
26 and 27 of that court, is the undated report of Clerk of Court Aurora P.
Sanglay to Executive Judge Braulio Yaranon, and received by his office on June
6, 1991. The letter, uncontroverted, is
marked Exhibit A, Court Administrator, and it reads thus:

‘In compliance to (sic) your memorandum dated may 23, 1991,
directing the undersigned to make an investigation re the matter of cases filed
before my office (Office of the Clerk of Court), which did not undergo the
mandatory raffle procedure, herewith are my findings:

‘The period covered by my investigation is from April 3, 1989 to
April 1991. In summary, during this
period, there were FORTY-FOUR (44) Special Cases, TWENTY-SEVEN (27) Land
Registration Cases, SIX (6) Civil Cases, and THREE (3) Criminal Cases which did
not pass through raffle, but which were instead directed to specific RTC
Branches, particularly Branch 26 and Branch 27. A great majority of these cases however were assigned to Branch
26.

‘Attached is the list of these cases mentioned for your
reference. This data obtained (sic) by
counterchecking the Minutes of previous raffles covering the period of my
investigation vis-a-vis the corresponding docket books.

‘Until your memorandum dated May 24, 1991, the following persons
were in-charge of receiving and docketing the following kinds of cases:

‘Mrs. Pacita Diaz — Land Registration Cases

‘Miss Ma. Concepcion Diaz — Special Proceedings Cases

‘Mr. Alfredo Lacsamana — Civil Cases

‘Criminal Cases were docketed by Mr. Vicente Tatunay of the
Prosecutor’s Office and received by either Mr. Alfredo Lacsamana, Jr., the
person handling all cases filed for raffle, or Mr. Oscarlito Fantastico or any
of the clerks in the OCC, in his absence.

‘Supposed to be, all these filed cases are to be turned over to Mr.
Alfredo Lacsamana Jr. for
raffle, but as per my findings, some of these cases were not at all included in
the mandatory raffle, but were instead directed to specific RTC Branches. The possibility is not remote that these
clerks in-charge of receiving their respective cases deliberately did not
submit some of their received cases for raffle.

‘A lapse in the system and poor monitoring also provided for this
thing to happen. Instances are common
where a client/lawyer is allowed possession of the papers to be filed at
certain critical stages of the receiving process, specifically after the
docketing and payment of filing fees, and after said stages, the possibility is
not likewise remote that these papers are not submitted to the person in-charge
of the raffle.

‘The undersigned had already instituted procedures, i.e.
centralized receiving, payment of filing fees, docketing, and has strengthen
(sic) monitoring of the cases and the number of cases filed to prevent
occurrence (sic) of similar nature. (Exhibit A, Court Administrator, pp. 76-77, rec., 3rd Folder)

Clerk of Court Sanglay’s report includes 44 special proceedings
cases, 27 land registration cases, 6 civil cases and 3 criminal cases or a
total of 80 cases that did not pass through raffle from April, 1989 to April,
1991 but found their way directly to Branches
26 and 27 of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, La union. Of these 80 cases, all, except 3, found their
way to Branch 26, occupied by respondent Judge Genaro Gines who, as he admits,
was assigned in (sic) that branch since January, 1987.

The respondents here are Judge Genaro Gines, the incumbent
presiding judge of Branch 26 of the RTC in Judicial Region No. 1 based in San
Fernando, La Union; Pacita Diaz, a staff member in that court now retired in
the period covered by the Sanglay report, in charge of filing and docketing of
land registration cases; Pacita Diaz’s daughter, Ma. Concepcion Diaz, another
staff member in Branch 26, during the period covered by the Sanglay report, the
clerk in charge of the filing and docketing of special proceedings cases;
Alfredo Lacsamana, Jr., in the period covered by the Sanglay report the clerk
in-charge of the filing and docketing of civil cases; Rosie Munar, court
stenographic reporter; and Ma. Gorgonia Flores, court interpreter and the
Officer-in-Charge of Branch 26. Francisco (sic) Lacsamana, Jr., additionally, was assigned to gather all
cases filed and docketed in the week — civil, criminal, special proceedings,
land — one day before the weekly raffle, and to transmit these newly filed
cases to the Committee on Raffle. Ma.
Gorgonia Flores, Officer-in?Charge of Branch 26, oversees the
administrative machinery of Branch 26 (pp. 8-9, t.s.n., September 28, 1992).

The respondents felt that since the Court Administrator limited
himself to the sworn statement and report of Clerk of Court Attorney Aurora
Sanglay, they were not called upon to present evidence in their behalf as it
would amount to self-incrimination. They refused to testify; they refused to be cross examined. Your investigator informs the Court that the
Sanglay affidavit and report are uncontroverted. Admissions in the sworn statements forming part of the record are
utilized in this report in addition to the stipulated facts.

The respondents are charged in the administrative complaint:

(1)  
for dishonesty, in violation of paragraph (e), Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended;

(2)  
for violation of Administrative Order No. 6, dated June 30,
1975;

(3)  
for violation of Circular No .7, dated September 23, 1974; and

(4)  
for violation of Administrative Order No. 1, dated January 28,
1988.

The last three, Supreme Court issues, have to do with the creation
of a raffle committee in multi-branch Regional Trial Courts, with supervision
of the raffle of newly-filed cases; with the manner of raffling cases, and
establish the policy that no case, in multi-branch trial courts, may be
assigned to any branch or sala unless it had undergone the raffle
process.

Supreme Court Circular No. 7, September 23, 1974 mandates that in
courts with several branches, cases shall be assigned to the different branches
only by raffle. ‘No case may be
assigned to any branch without being raffled.’ (Part I) And immediately after raffle, the Executive Judge is mandated
by the said Circular to indicate the particular branch to which the case is
raffled, ‘the same to be written in words
and in figures on the cover of
the Rollo and on the first page
of the original complaint or information
and initialled by the Executive judge
and the two other officers who
attended said raffle.’ (Part III). The same circular created a raffle committee
of three, composed of the Executive Judge and two other judges of the
court. The Executive Judge, supervises
the Raffle. Administrative Circular No.
1, (January 28, 1988) reiterates strict compliance with Administrative Order
No. 6 (June 30, 1975) and Circular No. 7 (September 23, 1974) Raffle of cases,
this later Circular required, must be ‘in open session in the presence of
lawyers and spectators x x x.’ (Section 8.1). The Court in this later Circular restated the res ipso loquitor
(sic) rule regarding the conduct and removal of judges (Section 5.2).

It is, therefore, beyond cavil, that under the rules governing the
administration of courts, all
cases filed in court must go through the raffle committee for assignment. No case must be assigned, in multi-branch
courts, unless it is raffled by the Raffle Committee. The 80 cases involved in this case, filed from April 1989 to
April 1991, were not raffled, but were directly assigned to, or taken by,
Branch 26 (except 3) under respondent Judge Gines. Respondent Judge Gines must know, under the above Supreme Court
acts, at a simple glance on the cover of the rollo and the first page of
every such record, whether a case was assigned to him after going through
raffle or not. Cases assigned to his
branch, after going through the required raffle, show on the face of the rollo,
in words and figures, the branch to which the case is assigned, authenticated
by the initials of the Executive Judge and the two other members of the
Committee. From January 1987, when
respondent Judge Gines was appointed to Branch 26, the respondent judge had
received unraffled cases, considered them and decided them. He had done so, apparently, not because he
was a maniac of a worker, nor because he loved his work but for reasons
unspoken in this case. Why should a
sane judge accept additional cases for study and decision, in addition to his
regular load, without any benefit or consideration? Here, obviously, the res
ipso loquitor (sic) doctrine applies.

Among the administrative officers charged here, Alfredo Lacsamana,
Jr., as stipulated, gathers all the cases filed and docketed in any particular
week, for transmittal to the Committee on Raffle. He prepared the cases for raffle, including the preparation of
the pieces of paper properly written on, to be picked in the raffle. It was his job to do so. He was assigned to do so; he admitted so. That he did not do so is obvious from the
Sanglay report — from 1989 to 1991, he failed to transmit 80 cases — and
these cases found their way (except for 3) to respondent Judge Gines. The Sanglay report is not controverted. It was Lacsamana’s job to collect all
cases docketed, and to transmit them to the Raffle Committee. 80 such cases he did collect and failed to
report to the Raffle Committee from April, 1989 to April, 1991.

The Diazes, in the period covered by the Sanglay report had
apparently fallen out with respondent Judge Gines and respondents Flores, Munar
and Lacsamana. In an affidavit dated
September 18, 1991 executed by respondent Ma. Concepcion Diaz, the following
passages appear, to wit:

x x x

The conflict between the Diazes and the other respondents deem
(sic) to have arisen from the suspicion the respondent Judge entertained that
the Diazes had ‘squealed’ on him to the Executive Judge, the Honorable Braulio
Yaranon. This is contained in the
Diazes Joint Affidavit dated September 9, 1992 (Marked C-Diaz), in the
following passage:

x x x

As to the two other respondents, respondents Ma. Gorgonia Flores,
who is officer-in-charge of Branch 26, and Rosie Munar, court interpreter,
there appears to be no evidence. The
record shows that when the Court Administrator’s lawyers rested their case with
the presentation of the Sanglay report, the respondents refused to be
cross-examined on their sworn statements. Consequently, each sworn statement lost value as evidence against the
other respondents. However, it may be
easily inferred that as court officer-in-charge, respondent Flores was in
(sic)-duty bound to supervise the work of her subalterns. The non-raffling of 80 cases during the
period covered from April, 1989 to April 1991 reflects her failure to do her
job.

x x x

The Supreme Court orders and circulars complained of as having been
violated, are directed to district judges, while Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA 3019 is inclusive in scope,
penalizing public officers for ‘causing undue injury to any party x x or giving
any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official, administrative a (sic) judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence x x x.’

The prosecution had limited itself to presenting the Sanglay
report. It is apparent that we must
take the Diazes’ statement that they were pressured to do that which they had
to do, and whatever it was, was done without consent, and against their
will. However, under the facts here,
all the cases filed docketed in Branch 26 were collected by respondent
Lacsamana, Jr. who was in (sic) duty bound to forward the cases to the Raffle
Committee. That 80 such cases did not
find their way to the Committee, but ended up as 80 extra cases (except 3) in the
docket load of the respondent judge, means at the very least that Lacsamana,
Jr. failed to perform his job. The
respondent judge in accepting or securing, such 80 cases, (minus 3) that did
not pass through raffle, for his action and resolution, and which he eventually
resolved violated all the Supreme Court circulars on the matter with the help
and cooperation of respondent Lacsamana, Jr. Evidently, respondent judge must have received undue benefits and
advantages (which have not been demonstrated in this case) in securing this
extra load of cases, benefits and advantages coming from the party benefitted
(sic) by his action, and at the same time, granted the parties involved in the
some (sic) 80 cases that did not undergo raffle, undue and unwarranted benefits
resulting from the bias and partiality in their favor coming from the
respondent judge. As earlier observed,
a single glance at the cover and first page of each of the 80 or so rollos
would show that they were unraffled, and yet, the respondent judge knowing that
such cases were unraffled, secured the said cases, considered them and decided
or resolved them, in violation of law.

It would appear, therefore, that the respondent judge is guilty of
the charges in the administrative complaint. Along with him as guilty, is respondent Alfredo Lacsamana, Jr. This conclusion is bolstered by, among other
things, the Diazes’ statement that cases were indeed directly secured by the
respondent judge without their undergoing raffle.

With respect to the other respondents, it could be deduced that
respondent Ma. Gorgonia Flores, as officer-in-charge of Branch 26, would have
known that Alfredo Lacsamana, Jr. was not doing his job of forwarding all
docketed cases to the Raffle Committee faithfully.”

He then recommends:

“WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended:

1.     
That respondent Judge Genaro C. Gines be appropriately
penalized for violation of all the Supreme Court orders and circulars mentioned
in the Administrative Complaint for the period covered from April 1989 to April
1991, plus apparent violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of R.A. 3019;

2.     
That respondent Alfredo Lacsamana, Jr. for his apparent
failure to do his job, be, likewise appropriately penalized, at least with a
6-month suspension without pay; and

3.     
That respondent Ma. Gorgonia Flores be likewise penalized with
a 3-month suspension without pay; and

4.     
That the other respondents be warned against committing any
such violations.”

The continuing deliberate violations of Administrative Order No.
6 (dated 30 June 1975), Circular No. 7 (dated 23 September 1974) and
Administrative Order No. 1 (dated 28 January 1988) for the years reported in
Atty. Sanglay’s report, and their belated discovery boggle our minds. The irregularities should have been easily
discovered by the respondent Judge either because the fact that a case has not
been properly raffled off is at once discernible on the cover of the records
and on the first page of the original of the initial pleading (complaint,
information, etc.), or because plain common sense would have told him that
something was wrong somewhere as an unusual number of cases of the same class
had been “assigned” to his sala. That he had failed to appreciate the physical evidence or, at the very
least, exhibit surprise at the unusual number of cases is quite amazing. Thus, we are loathe to grant him the benefit
of the doubt and conclude that he had no interest whatsoever in having those
cases raffled off to him and that he only loved to work more than the
others. Given the circumstances of this
case, we cannot merely cut him some slack and assume good faith on his part; he
deserves no such treatment. As the
investigating Justice himself assessed the situation:

“x x x The 80 cases involved in this case, filed from April
1989 to April 1991, were not raffled, but were directly assigned to, or taken
by, Branch 26 (except 3 under respondent Judge Gines. Respondent Judge Gines must know, under the above Supreme Court
acts, at a simple glance on the cover of the rollo and the first page of
every such record, whether a case was assigned to him after going through
raffle or not. x x x From January 1987,
when respondent Judge Gines was appointed to Branch 26, the respondent judge
had received unraffled cases, considered them and decided them. He had done so, apparently, not because he
was a maniac of a worker, nor because he loved his work but for reasons
unspoken in this case. Why should a
sane judge accept additional cases for study and decision, in addition to his
regular load, without any benefit or consideration? Here, obviously, the res
Ipso loquitor (sic) doctrine applies.”

The irregularity and violations of the aforementioned
administrative orders and circular could not have been committed so blatantly,
brazenly and openly for an unusually long period of time if the respondent
Judge did not have the cooperation of some of the court employees. We therefore agree with the investigating
Justice that such support and cooperation were extended by subordinates who
likewise had something to do with the raffle of cases. Hence, the findings on the degree of
participation, either by commission or omission, of respondents Flores and
Lacsamana are sustained.

In his report, the investigating Justice absolves the Diazes and
Munar from responsibility in the aforesaid irregularities.

With respect to respondent Pacita Diaz, the case has become moot
as she died on 10 February 1993.^[1] Thus,
the case is dismissed insofar as she is concerned.

On the other hand, while we find no evidence to link respondent
Munar to the aforementioned irregularities, we hold that respondent Ma.
Concepcion Diaz is not entirely blameless. In her affidavit of 18 September 1991, the relevant portions of which
are quoted in the REPORT of Justice de Pano, she explicitly admitted:

“11.   In my explanation dated May 27, 1991 to the
Memorandum of Judge Yaranon, while I might have made an admission that I was
the clerk receiving cases that later turned out to be unraffled, I placed the
direct blame on Judge Gines and my two officemates, namely, Mrs. Ma. Gorgonia
L. Flores and Mrs. Rosie Munar who had applied all sorts of pressures upon me,
including series (sic) of intimidation and insinuations in order that cases of
their choice receive (sic) by me may no longer be forwarded to the proper
officer-in-charge of the raffle, but to them directly in Branch 26,”^[2]

It is
to be noted that Ma. Concepcion did not elaborate on the nature of such
intimidation and insinuations. In view
of the fact, however, that she was in charge of receiving and docketing special
proceedings cases, and that out of the controversial 80 unraffled cases, 44
were special proceedings cases, her participation could, by no means, be
considered as insignificant. And even
if the alleged “intimidation” and “insinuations” were true,
they still would not exculpate her in view of the length of time involved, the
number of cases questioned and the absence of proof that such intimidation and
insinuations were persistent, continuous and irresistible. It is thus clear that she had, by neglecting her duty,
allowed herself to be used by the other respondents.

A far more serious matter which has escaped the attention of the
investigating Justice involves the charges set forth under paragraph 3 of the
Administrative Complaint, particularly on the preparation by the respondent
Judge, allegedly in coordination with respondents Munar and Flores, of
petitions in certain cases, some of which are (a) Special Proceeding No. 1965
wherein it is made to appear that the petitioner therein — an aunt of the
respondent Judge and a resident of Sta. Cruz, Ilocos Sur — ­resides in San Fernando, La Union, and
(b) Special Proceeding No. 1967 wherein the Office of the Solicitor General and
the other parties were not furnished with copies of the petition upon order of
the respondent Judge. Not having
undergone the prescribed raffle procedure, these two cases were directly
assigned to the respondent Judge who then acted thereon. The said petitions, the pertinent orders
issued in the course of the
proceedings therein and the minutes thereof were attached by the respondent
Judge to his 14 May 1993 Comment, which he had adopted as his direct testimony
pursuant to his 17 September
1992 Manifestation (Exhibit “J”). These documents provide conclusive proof of more serious irregularities amounting to either gross ignorance or malicious
disregard of applicable procedural laws, grave misconduct, grave abuse of
authority and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The respondent Judge made a mockery of the
judicial process as it is obvious that he had displayed a special interest in
these cases; in fact, he even caused the cases to be excluded from the
raffle. A careful review of the
abovementioned petitions will reveal that the designation “Branch 26,”
indicating the branch presided over by the respondent Judge, has been
originally typewritten as part of the caption, and not merely entered in the
blank space reserved for the branch to which the case may subsequently be
raffled off. It is to be further observed
that the petition in Special Proceeding No. 1965 was subscribed and sworn to
before respondent Flores in her capacity as the Officer-in-Charge of the Office
of the Clerk of Court, Branch 26.

Special Proceeding No. 1965 involves a petition for guardianship
over the person and property of a certain Juan R. Lagmay. The said petition was filed by Regina Lagmay
Valdez — who claims to be a resident of Poblacion, San Fernando, La Union^[3]
— on 24 September 1990, and alleges that Juan R. Lagmay is “presently
residing at No. 2579 Pamintuan Village,
Mabalacat, Pampanga.” Upon its filing, the respondent Judge
immediately issued an order (a) giving due course to the petition, (b)
directing that notices be served to Juan Lagmay’s nearest of kin, namely
Bonifacia Lagmay, Lilia Gumangan and Mariano Lagmay, all residents of Las-ud,
Sta. Cruz, Ilocos Sur and (c) directing the latter to submit their opposition
to the petition, if any, on or before 8 October 1990 at 8:30 a.m.^[4]
No order setting the case for hearing at that particular date, time and place
was issued. It would appear, however,
that this 24 September 1990 order was considered by the respondent Judge as the order setting the case
for hearing on 8 October 1990 because respondent Flores prepared the Minutes of
the alleged proceedings conducted on 8 October 1990.^[5] The
said Minutes show that the following exhibits were offered for jurisdictional
purposes: (1) Notice of hearing, as Exhibit “A” and (b) the dorsal
side of Exhibit “A,” purportedly to show that Juan Lagmay’s nearest
of kin were furnished with the notice of hearing, as Exhibit “A-1.”
Said Minutes further disclose that the petitioner therein was not assisted by
counsel; that respondent Flores acted as Interpreter while respondent Munar
acted as Stenographer; and that since no opposition was filed therein, the
testimony of the petitioner was received. The latter then allegedly declared that she is a resident of Poblacion, San Fernando, La Union; she is Juan Lagmay’s niece as he is her father’s brother; and Juan
Lagmay is an American citizen, single, childless, a resident of 2579 Pamintuan
Village, Mabalacat, Pampanga and a retired seaman receiving pension from the
Social Security Administration of the United States of America in the amount of
$550.00 a month. Thereafter, the
respondent Judge issued an order appointing petitioner Regina Valdez as the
guardian of the person and property of Juan R. Lagmay, and directing her to
take her oath as such upon the filing of a bond of P500.00, after which she
would be issued letters of guardianship. Without the bond having first been filed, however, respondent Flores
administered the oath to Regina Valdez.^[6]
Thereafter, or on 18 October 1990, respondent Flores issued to the latter her
letters of guardianship.^[7]

A closer examination of the so-called proofs of notice of hearing
to the nearest of kin, consisting supposedly of “registry return
receipts,” reveals that there are no entries in the blanks reserved for
information on the name of sender, name of post office, municipality or
province where the same post office is located, registry number and case
number. It is not likewise indicated
therein when the addressees received the “registered” letter. In view thereof, the conclusion that the
so-called notices were not sent at all is inevitable.

Respondent Judge knew or ought to have known that his court was
not the proper venue for the case because the person sought to be placed under
guardianship was alleged to be a resident of Mabalacat, Pampanga. Section 1, Rule 92 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:

“Guardianship of the person or estate of a minor or
incompetent may be instituted in the Court of First Instance of the province,
or in the justice of the peace court of the municipality, or in the municipal
court of the chartered city where the minor or incompetent
person resides, x x x” (underscoring supplied for emphasis).

Worse, the aforesaid Order of 24 September 1990 did not even
direct that notice be served on Juan Lagmay, the very party sought to be placed
under guardianship. Such an omission,
therefore, clearly violated Section 3, Rule 93 of the Revised Rules of Court
which directs the court to fix the time and place for hearing and cause
reasonable notice to be given to the person named in the petition, including
the minor if above 14 years of age or the incompetent himself. We have ruled that service of notice to the
minor above 14 years of age or the incompetent is jurisdictional.^[8]
Failing to have notice sent to Juan Lagmay, respondent Judge had no
jurisdiction to proceed with the hearing on
8 October 1990, receive the petitioner’s testimony, if he did at all,
and thereafter appoint her as Juan Lagmay’s guardian. Nor was the
respondent Judge justified in issuing on 22 January 1990 — pursuant to the
petitioner’s 17 January 1990 motion^[9] — an
order appointing deputy sheriffs Oscar Fantastico and Romualdo Baladad as
special sheriffs to take custody over the person of Juan Lagmay from one
Florencio “Boy” Cortes of Bolinao, Pangasinan. In the said order, respondent Judge further
directed Boy Cortes “to release from his custody and deliver the person of
said Juan R. Lagmay, a.k.a. John R. Lagmay to the aforementioned special
sheriffs immediately upon receipt of this Order, under pain of contempt.”^[10]
Based on the special sheriffs’ report,^[11]
however, Boy Cortes did not release Juan Lagmay because the latter was too weak
and sickly to travel. This refusal
prompted the respondent Judge to order Boy Cortes’ arrest (for contempt) and
confinement until he shall have complied with the said order.^[12]
It was respondent Flores who forwarded the warrant of arrest to the PNP
Regional Command at San Fernando, La Union for its service.^[13]

Having acquired no jurisdiction to hear the case and appoint Regina
Valdez as Juan Lagmay’s guardian, respondent Judge acted clearly beyond his
authority when he designated special sheriffs to take custody of Juan Lagmay,
directed the person who had custody over the latter to deliver him to the said
special sheriffs and ordered the arrest of the said person who refused to
surrender custody. And even if we are
to assume, for the sake of argument, that the respondent Judge had validly
acquired jurisdiction over the case and appointed Regina Lagmay as guardian,
and that Boy Cortes did in fact refuse to deliver Juan Lagmay to the special
sheriffs, he (respondent Judge) would still be guilty of gross ignorance of the
law for ordering Cortes’ arrest and confinement. In such a situation, the petitioner’s remedy would be to file a
petition for habeas corpus, and not
to have Boy Cortes cited for contempt, much less arrested.

We shall now focus our attention to Special Proceeding No.
1967. It is a very strange
proceeding. The case involves a
petition for the “judicial confirmation of the de facto adoption” of Cecilia Averion filed on 11 October
1990. The petitioner therein alleges
that she and her late husband, Fernando Averion — who died in 1987 —
“adopted” Cecilia Averion in 1967; only 1 year and 3 months old at
the time, Cecilia was supposedly given up by her natural parents, the
whereabouts of whom remain unknown. Petitioner further avers that she and her husband, during his lifetime,
reared the child and gave her all their love, attention, care and
understanding. They also provided her
with an education and considered her as their own child. Hence, the petition was filed “for the
purpose of judicially confirming the de facto adoption of Cecilia Averion by
herein petitioner and her late husband.”^[14] The
said petition was not accompanied by the written consent of Cecilia Averion
who, at the time of filing, was already of legal age. On the very day the petition was filed, respondent Judge
forthwith issued a Notice of Hearing which provided that the petition would be
heard on 31 October 1990; it was likewise ordered therein that “a copy of
this notice be published once a week for three consecutive weeks at the expense
of the petitioner in a newspaper of general circulation in La Union and in the
Philippines.”^[15]

From the so-called Minutes of the proceedings of 31 October 1990,^[16]
as prepared by respondent Flores, it appears that the following exhibits were
offered to establish the jurisdiction of the court: (1) the affidavit of the
Editor of the North Tribune, “a newspaper of general circulation in La
Union and Northern Luzon provinces,” published in San Fernando, La Union,
as Exhibit “A”; (2) clippings of the published order in the 10, 17
and 24 October 1990 issues of the North Tribune, as Exhibits “A-1,” “A-2” and
“A-3,” respectively; and (3) the entire issues of the North Tribune
for 10, 17 and 24 October 1990, as Exhibits “B,” “B-1” and
“B-2,” respectively. It may
further be gleaned from the said Minutes that since no opposition was
registered by any other party, the petitioner’s testimony was received by the
court. On 6 November 1990, the
respondent Judge handed down a decision^[17]
granting the petition and decreeing as follows:

“WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves the petition and hereby
confirms the de facto adoption of Cecilia Averion by
herein petitioner and her late spouse Fernando Averion retroactive to the year
1967.”

The remedy pursued in Special Proceeding No. 1967 is certainly
unusual as we are not aware of any prescribed action that may be instituted for
the judicial confirmation of a de facto adoption. Nor do our adjective and substantive laws on adoption provide for
such a proceeding. In fact, the only
proper and authorized procedure relative to adoption is outlined in the rule on
adoption itself.^[18]
That Cecilia Averion had been treated by the petitioner and her husband as
their own child during the former’s minority may only provide compelling
reasons to grant the decree of adoption notwithstanding her (Cecilia’s) having
attained the age of majority. This is
one of the exceptions provided by the Family Code to the rule that a person of
legal age cannot be adopted.^[19]

In “confirming” the so-called de facto adoption
and decreeing the same to be “retroactive to the year 1967,”
respondent Judge has carved a name for himself in history for, as already
pointed out, no action or proceeding for judicial confirmation of a de facto adoption is authorized in this jurisdiction. Furthermore, by its very nature and purpose,
a decree of adoption can never be made to retroact. Lastly, considering that the petitioner’s husband had died in
1987, or three years before the petition was filed, he could not now be
resurrected for purposes of the adoption, be in fact declared an adopter and be
subsequently bound by the decree to the prejudice of his heirs.

Then too, respondent Judge completely disregarded the fact that
Cecilia Averion had submitted no written consent to the adoption at the time of
the filing of the petition or at any subsequent date — a manifest
infirmity. Nor was Cecilia called to
testify in the case. Moreover, there
seems to be an irregularity in the publication of the notice of hearing. It is to be observed that as indicated in
the upper right hand corner of the first page of the petition, the proceeding
was instituted on 11 October 1990. If
this were so, the notice of hearing which was issued by the respondent Judge on
that same date^[20]
could not have been published in the North Tribune in its 10 October 1990
issue. In his affidavit, the Editor of
the said newspaper disclosed that the notice was indeed published on 10 October
1990.

All told, respondent Judge completely ignored the procedural
rules on adoption and promulgated guidelines for himself to suit his own
purpose and design.

Hence, it is evident that Special Proceeding No. 1965 and Special
Proceeding No. 1967 were not only directly filed with the court of the
respondent Judge without passing through the raffle procedure, the two cases
were also resolved by the latter in a manner that may be characterized by gross
ignorance or the brazen and blatant disregard of the applicable procedural
laws, grave misconduct, palpable abuse of authority and conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service. He is
therefore unfit to continue in the service a day longer. He has evidently forgotten that the
administration of justice is a sacred task. Upon assumption to office, a judge ceases to be an ordinary mortal. He becomes “the visible representation
of the law and, more importantly, of justice.”^[21] A
judge must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence,^[22]
and should be studiously careful to avoid even the slightest infraction of the
law, lest it be a demoralizing example to others.^[23]

As shown in the above disquisitions, respondent Flores was a
willing participant in the commission of the irregularities in both
proceedings. On the other hand,
however, respondent Munar’s participation has not been substantiated.

Before closing, we would like to point out that per our
Resolution of 2 March 1993, we referred to Justice De Pano for inclusion in his
investigation the 29 January 1993 letter of Executive Judge Baulio Yaranon
which was addressed to Deputy Court Administrator Juanito Bernad.^[24]
In his letter, Judge Yaranon informs the latter about matters discovered in the
course of the audit which are more serious than the “illegal
raffling” of cases. He then
exposes alleged case fixing and illegal office practices committed on a large
scale by a syndicate composed principally of court officers and personnel, and
describes the modus operandi of those involved as follows:

“The operation in a particular case, starts with ‘AMBULANCE
CHASING’; after arrangements are made with a prospective applicant/petitioner,
a petition is prepared by the syndicate; the same is then signed personally by
the petitioner/applicant; and the oath for purposes of verification, is
administered also by the syndicate.

The petition/application is then filed with the Office of the Clerk
of Court, where syndicate members receive and docket the case in the docket
book of Branch 26; the case is deliberately separated from the cases that are
turned over to the Raffle Committee, and is directly turned over to Branch
26. Care is taken that the date of
filing is made to coincide with the scheduled day for raffling of cases
(Tuesdays).

On the same date of filing, the ORDER setting the case for initial
hearing, is issued by Branch 26. On the
date of initial hearing, a lawyer-contact of the syndicate enters an appearance
for the petitioner/ applicant, and he then presents jurisdictional facts.

On the very same day of initial hearing (in special proceedings)
and without any ACTUAL HEARING (in special proceedings and land registration
cases), for the reception of evidence on the material allegations of facts in
the application/petition, a DECISION is forthwith issued.”

Judge Yaranon then partly concludes:

“Just one aspect of the matter is herein submitted for
consideration. The issuance of a
DECISION without any previous hearing being held for the reception of evidence
by the applicant/petitioner, constitutes FALSIFICATION OF A PUBLIC DOCUMENT by
a public officer, under Article 171, Revised Penal Code committed by:

‘2. Causing it to appear that persons have
participated in an act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;
x x x’ (par. 2, Art. 171, Revised Penal Code).”

According to Justice De Pano, he received the 2 March 1993
Resolution just as he was about to write his report in this case. He then suggests that the matter subject
thereof be treated separately and that “appropriate charges be levelled
against the respondent Judge principally, and his cohorts, with the Tanod
Bayan, for criminal prosecution.”^[25]
Indeed, the referral of Judge Yaranon’s letter to Justice De Pano may have been
too late. In any event, the charges
proffered therein may be separately dealt with.

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby
rendered:

(1) DISMISSING from the service respondent
Judge GENARO C. GINES with prejudice to re-employment in the government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, and with forfeiture of
all benefits except earned leave credits. This dismissal shall be immediately executory and said respondent Judge is hereby ordered to forthwith
vacate his position and desist from performing any further official function;

(2) SUSPENDING from office respondents MA.
GORGONIA L. FLORES and ALFREDO V. LACSAMANA, JR. for a period of six (6) months
each, without pay;

(3) SUSPENDING from office respondent MA.
CONCEPCION B. DIAZ, for a period of three (3) months, without pay.

The foregoing suspensions shall take effect immediately upon the
service of a copy of this Decision on the aforenamed respondents MA. GORGONIA
L. FLORES, ALFREDO V. LACSAMANA, JR. and MA. CONCEPCION B. DIAZ. The periods of their respective suspensions
shall not be charged against their leave credits, if any;

(4)  DISMISSING this case as against respondent
PACITA B. DIAZ in view of her demise; and

(5)  DISMISSING this case as against respondent
ROSIE M. MUNAR for lack of substantial evidence.

The Office of the Court Administrator is hereby directed to
evaluate the 29 January 1993 letter of Executive Judge Braulio Yaranon —
subject of the 2 March 1993 Resolution of this Court in this case — and to
submit to this Court appropriate recommendations thereon within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of a copy of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Melo, and
Quiason, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., No part.
Court administrator when complaints were
evaluated.

---

^[1]
See 29 April 1993 urgent motion of respondent Ma. Concepcion Diaz, temporary rollo.

^[2]
Report, 17.

^[3]
Rollo, vol. 1, 180-181.

^[4]
Id., 182.

^[5]
ld., 186.

^[6]
Rollo, vol. 1, 190.

^[7]
ld., 189.

^[8]
REGALADO F.D., Remedial Law Compendium, vol. 2 1984 ed.,
504, citing Nery vs. Lorenzo, L-23376, 27 April 1972.

^[9]
Rollo, vol. 1, 191-192.

^[10]
Id., 199.

^[11]
Id., 200.

^[12]
Id., 201-202.

^[13]
Id., 203.

^[14]
Rollo, vol. 1, 206-207.

^[15]
Rollo, vol. 1, 208.

^[16]
Id., 217.

^[17]
Id., 218-219.

^[18]
Rule 99, Revised Rules of Court.

^[19]
Article 187.

^[20]
Rollo, vol. 1, 208.

^[21]
De la Paz vs. Inutan, 64 SCRA 540 [1975]; Fonacier-Abaño vs.
Ancheta, 107 SCRA 538 [1981]; Inciong vs. De Guia, 154 SCRA 93 [1987].

^[22]
Canon 1, Rule 1.01, Code of Judicial Conduct.

^[23]
Heading 22, Canons of Judicial Ethics.

^[24]
Rollo, vol. 1, 497-498.

^[25]
Report, 24.